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ABSTRACT 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea sets a normative framework 
for an integrated governance of the oceans, with far-reaching implications for states. Its 
implementation - as to navigation rights, preservation of marine environment, exploitation 
of resources, economic jurisdiction, or any other marine issues - depends however on one 
central issue: the spatial allocation of authority. This thesis examines one specific aspect of 
this international legal problem - maritime boundary delimitation. 
A major challenge for this thesis lies in the fact that its subject has been extensively 
and thoroughly reviewed, both in scholarship and in jurisprudence. Notwithstanding this, a 
closer look reveals a paucity of conceptual analysis. Drawing on historical elements, as well 
as on state practice and case law, the present thesis endeavours to further the understanding 
of maritime delimitation from a conceptual standpoint. 
Focusing on the development of conventional provisions on delimitation, Part I 
eventually argues that the so-called 'equitable principles doctrine' is not customary law. 
What is part of customary law is an obligation of result: maritime delimitations must result 
in equitable solutions. The distinction between these propositions becomes clear in Part I I . 
By deconstructing the subject into its three core issues - concept, methods and normativity, 
this thesis submits that the said obligation is to be met through the optimisation of two legal 
principles: the principle of maritime zoning and the principle of equity. Whilst suggesting 
that the watchword is reasonableness, it proposes that the reasonableness of the boundary 
be objectified by reference to a novel concept: the average 'distance ratio' of the line. As a 
denouement, Part I I I investigates the 'discovery' of boundary-lines. Recognising that the 
legal determination of maritime boundaries consists of a multiple-factor analysis, in which 
the sphere of discretion conferred upon courts is critical, it aims at improving reasoning 
discourse through 'multicriteria decision-making' and the utilisation of 'yardsticks'. After 
discussing which elements of the 'factual matrix' are legally relevant, and how they bear on 
the 'discovery' of the boundary-line, this thesis offers a test study intended to validate the 
conceptualisation proposed. 
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G E N E R A L I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Maritime delimitation - the process that consists of "establishing lines separating 
from each other the maritime areas in which coastal states exercise [sovereignty or] 
jurisdiction"1 - is one of the most extensively researched fields in international law. The 
decision to undertake this research was therefore taken with some trepidation. However, a 
number of factors prima facie justified a further examination of several issues. 
The paramount importance of boundaries in international affairs is the first reason. 
Indelibly intertwined with the political notion par excellence - the state, and with one of its 
fundamental elements - the territory2, boundary delimitation bears an intrinsic political 
dimension3. Its political significance is such that DeLapradelle described it as a formal and 
juridical means of expression of the state4. Without a doubt, boundary delimitation affects 
and interacts with inter alia political issues, historical and cultural factors, strategic and 
security concerns, primary economic interests, and interests of population groups. Its 
political consequences may be seen on three levels: peace between neighbour states; 
reaffirmation of independence by them; and security created by a quasi-sacred line5. 
With respect to maritime delimitation, Higgins has suggested that the task "of 
determining whose claim is well founded is only the preliminary to the real task of 
allocating resources between claimants"6. This is perhaps an over-simplification of 
maritime delimitation - although for exclusive economic zone (hereinafter "EEZ") and 
continental shelf delimitation such a view may often be not far from the reality. In territorial 
sea delimitation, where more than economic resources are in question, this view is less 
accurate. From a more balanced perspective, Oxman considers that "maritime boundary 
issues do not normally seem to engage the same level of political attention as many disputes 
over land territory", that the "resultant agreements are often viewed as economic or 
(1) Caflisch/1989, p.212. Lucchini and Voelckel argue that, strictly speaking, dividing-lines regarding jurisdiction areas should be 
termed limits, and that the term boundary should regard only areas of sovereignty (cf. Lucchini/Vcelckel/1996, p.24). In contrast, 
Bedjaoui affirms that "maritime delimitations produce genuine 'frontiers', [and that though] the extent of state jurisdiction is 
undoubtedly different for maritime limits and for land frontiers, [such a difference] is one of degree and not one of kind, even if 
certain maritime limits do not 'produce' an exclusive and complete state jurisdiction". Notwithstanding this, he also considers that 
the two types of boundaries are "of a different nature or category" (cf. Dissenting Opinion, Guinea-Bissau/Senegal arbitration, 
ILR/83/1990, pp.58,64). 
(2) Cf. Kelsen/1998, pp.299-314; Zippelius/1984, pp.37-45; Jellinek/1973, pp.295-304. The territorial sea is part of the territory of a 
state. Insofar other maritime zones entail a spatial extension of state jurisdiction (although not sovereignty) the analogy is valid. 
(3) Cf. Nguyen/Daillier/Pellet/1999, pp.460-463; Kelsen/1998, p.307; Jennings/Watts/1997, pp.661-662; Weil/1989, pp. 30-31; 
Prescott/1985 p. 10; Bardonnet/1984, p.4; Zippelius/1984, pp.42-43; Dipla/1984, pp. 235-236; DeLapradelle/1928, pp.9-17. 
(4) DeLapradelle/1928, p.55. 
(5) Adler/2001, p.2. On this issue, cf. also DeLapradelle/1928, pp.56-65. 
(6) Higgins/1994, p.224. Bowett appears to have a similar resource-oriented perspective (cf. Bowett/1987b, p.27). 
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technical" and that "few maritime boundary agreements are regarded as overwhelmingly 
political"7. 
That maritime boundaries differ from land boundaries in some aspects is beyond 
doubt. Notwithstanding this, it is also doubtless that some disputes over maritime 
boundaries are highly charged with political concerns. The dispute between Greece and 
Turkey in the Aegean Sea is a clear illustration. Similarly, the emerging difficulties between 
Australia and East Timor appear to result from Australia's concerns as regards the 
possibility of having to renegotiate its boundaries with Indonesia. The suggestion that "the 
dominant political and legal approach to formal accommodation of states' competing claims 
to use and control on land" is extended to oceanic spaces, and influences its management, 
seems thus to reflect the reality of state practice8. Maritime zones have been somewhat 
'territorialised', and maritime boundaries have become ever more a political boundary at 
sea9. Clearly, the emergence of new boundaries, or changes to existing boundaries, results 
always from a certain political scenario. That the choice of the boundary location always 
results from a precise political balance, and that this balance may be altered in time, can 
hardly be disputed10. Thirlway presents an excellent example of how political settings 
govern the delimitation of maritime boundaries. He observes hypothetically, referring to the 
North Sea cases, that i f the territories of Denmark and Germany were to become part of one 
state, the maritime area currently held jointly by them "would not be the same as that which 
would be allotted to Germany/Denmark on the basis of a delimitation de novo with the 
Netherlands"". 
Taking into account the relevancy of this key political issue, it is striking to note 
that the body of research suffers from a certain imbalance. Whereas jurisprudence and state 
practice have been widely studied, theoretical examinations are a rarity. As Evans observed, 
"the process of maritime delimitation is less commonly approached or presented from a 
theoretical perspective, either by the ICJ or by commentators, but is the subject of more 
practically oriented analyses of state practice"12. However, developments in Law, whatever 
the field, should rely on theoretical studies as much as on practice-oriented analyses. In 
undertaking this study a key aim was to meet this need for theoretical investigation. This 
(7) Oxman/1993, p. 12. For examples of agreements which might have been influenced by political considerations, cf. pp. 13-15. 
(8) Oxman/1993, p.4. Bardonnet has compared in-depth land and maritime boundaries, and concludes that the distinction between 
the two types seems to be fading (cf. Bardonnet/1989). However, Judge Bedjaoui asserts that maritime delimitation creates 
"frontiers of a different nature or category". He argues that, "[i]n the matter of frontiers, [...] the law of the sea [does] not comply 
with the same principles, rules and patterns as the law of land frontiers", and that "the rules applicable to achieve such 
delimitations must necessarily be adapted to the environment to which they will apply and to the material element specific to that 
environment" (cf. Guinea-Bissau/Senegal arbitration, Dissenting Opinion, ILR/83/1990, pp.64-65). 
(9) Bardonnet/1989, pp.39-54. 
(10) Nguyen/Daillier/Pellet/1999, pp.463-464. 
(11) Thirlway/1993,pp.9-10. 
(12) Evans/1999, p.156. 
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theoretical investigation is also justified on another ground. Whilst noting that "[vjarious 
theoretical models have been proposed in order to channel the reasoning of tribunals, but 
none has been successful"13, Vicuna has drawn attention to the fact that questions still hang 
over reasoning discourse. The conviction that such concerns could be overcome is thus 
another leitmotiv. 
A second reason that justifies this study is the fact that these concerns are somewhat 
reflected in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter 
"LOSC"1 4). One motivation for convening the Third United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea (hereinafter "Third Conference") was the need to re-examine the limits of the 
maritime zones under sovereignty or jurisdiction of coastal states. Needless to say, this issue 
turned into a maritime zoning process whereby states sought to safeguard their maritime 
interests, whilst setting up a comprehensive legal partition of the oceanic space. The way in 
which the 'appropriation' of the ocean by coastal states evolved bore witness to the 
emergence of a concept of 'maritime territory', and to the aforementioned 'territorialisation' 
of maritime boundaries. Special attention was drawn, during the Third Conference, to the 
rules for delimiting boundaries separating the maritime spaces of neighbouring states with 
adjacent or opposite coasts. The provisions dealing with the delimitation of the EEZ and of 
the continental shelf were a particularly difficult matter - which remained unresolved until 
the final stages of the conference. The main issue, which reflected previous conventional 
law and the developments in case law, was whether equidistance and/or equitable principles 
should be given prominence in the LOSC1 5. Disagreements were eventually overcome by a 
sui generis compromise, the interpretation of which however, leaves various unanswered 
questions - and room for dissention. 
Amongst the unanswered questions (illustrative of the legal-conceptual concerns 
aforementioned), are the following: Why has equidistance been deemed to be a mere 
method, when under the conventional provisions that refer to the 'equidistance-special 
circumstances formula' what is at issue is a legal norm? Why, despite the emphasis placed 
by courts on the 'fact' that equidistance is a mere method, has equidistance become the 
most commonly utilised starting point for negotiated delimitations? Why significantly does 
the 'equidistance-special circumstances formula' seem to have crystallised as the de facto 
operative formula for determining maritime boundaries in recent case law? Why has 
reference often been made to 'equitable principles' in case law, while references thereto in 
(13) Vicufla/1990, p.614 
(14) The L O S C was signed on 10 December 1982, and entered into force on 16 November 1994 (1833 UNTS 31363). For an 
explanation on the utilisation of the acronym L O S C , instead of UNCLOS, cf. Edeson/2000. 
(15) L O S C , Articles 74(1) and 83(1). Article 15, which refers to territorial sea delimitation, makes explicit reference to equidistance. 
Incidentally, unless otherwise indicated or otherwise clear from the context, all references to articles with no explicit mention of 
the convention in question should be understood as referring to the L O S C . 
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conventional law and in state practice are scarce? What is the role of equity, especially in 
light of the reference to 'equitable principles'? Why has the solution (a boundary-line) for 
each case been required to be necessarily unique, when almost paradoxically, there is more 
than one solution that meets the requirements of delimitation law? Why has maritime 
delimitation law been seen as leading to unpredictable outcomes? How may the factual 
elements relevant for delimitation be identified, and how are they to be assessed? What is 
the scope for discretionary assessments within the noimativity that governs the maritime 
boundary adjudication? 
These questions underlie the third justification for this research. Clear answers 
thereto are required for very practical reasons. The world maritime political map is still in 
its infancy16. Comprehensive research carried out under the auspices of the American 
Society of International Law identified 167 maritime delimitation agreements17. Between 
1997 and 2001, other 20-odd agreements were concluded18. More than a half of the world's 
potential maritime boundaries are therefore yet to be delimited19. Taking into account that 
on average only 3 or 4 maritime boundaries have been agreed per year, maritime 
delimitation is likely to remain an important issue in international affairs for at least the next 
quarter of a century. Further, as illustrated by the fact that the docket of the International 
Court of Justice (hereinafter "ICJ", "Court", "International Court") includes at present three 
cases in which the question of maritime delimitation is raised20, many delimitation disputes 
will be resolved by adjudication21. Clearly, a solid understanding of the theoretical 
framework is required. 
As to the present and future importance of the delimitation provisions of the LOSC, 
it suffices to note that this convention has been ratified, or acceded to, by some 80% of the 
world's coastal states, and is moving to universal acceptance22. The rules embodied therein 
are indeed likely to become central to future delimitations, even between those states which 
are not parties to the LOSC. A good example is that of the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration. 
(16) Blake/1987, p.l. 
(17) International Maritime Boundaries (hereinafter "IMB"). The first two volumes (1993) contain information on maritime 
boundaries delimited until 1991; the third volume (1998) updates that information to 1996. Roughly, 103 boundary agreements 
had been concluded by 1985 (cf. Jagota/1985, pp.331-344). In 1988, the total number thereof was estimated in more than 130 (cf. 
Johnston/1988, p.xiii). 
(18) Appendix 2, Table F. 
(19) In 1982, the number of potential maritime boundaries at world level was estimated as being 376 (Smith/1982, p.3). Prescott 
advances a very similar figure (374); cf. Prescott/1985, pp.155, 354. For a comparative view of three different assessments as to 
the number of potential boundaries, cf. Blake/1987, p.7. There are some 420 potential maritime boundaries worldwide; cf. 
Carleton/1999 (unpublished), para.5.10; Blake/1998 (unpublished). The emergence of new states has generated new maritime 
boundaries, and with the extension of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in certain areas, new boundary delimitations 
might be required (even in areas where delimitations up to 200 nautical miles have already been effected). 
(20) The maritime boundaries at issue are those between: Cameroon and Nigeria, Nicaragua and Honduras, and Nicaragua and 
Colombia. Of these states, only Colombia is not a party to the L O S C . 
(21) This study uses the term "adjudication" as encompassing both judicial and arbitral settlement of disputes. All references to a 
specific arbitral court or tribunal will use the term 'Tribunal", as opposed to "Court" which refers to the ICJ. 
(22) By March 2002, 137 states (15 of which are landlocked states) had ratified or acceded to the L O S C . States have been called 
upon to become parties thereto "in order to achieve the goal of universal participation" (UN Doc, A/Res/55/7,30 October 2000). 
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Although not party to the LOSC, Eritrea agreed that the adjudication of its maritime 
boundary with Yemen would be effected by reference to these rules. In the Qatar/Bahrain 
case, similarly, although Qatar was not party to the LOSC, it concurred with the idea that 
the relevant conventional provisions reflected customary law. 
This research, whilst examining a number of conceptual issues concerning maritime 
delimitation, contributes to resolving several outstanding issues, with a view to facilitating 
the future delimitation of maritime boundaries23. Part I , which serves as a springboard for 
the discussion on conceptualisation, includes three chapters which argue that the 
delimitation provisions in the LOSC ought to be seen as the outcome of three decades of 
developments (which form its contextual framework). Returning to the 1958 Conventions, 
Chapter 1 delves into the preparatory work of the ILC, and the provisions stemming 
therefrom. Chapter 2 analyses the case law pre-dating 1982, which focuses upon the North 
Sea cases and the Anglo/French arbitration. The work of the Third Conference, and the 
provisions incorporated in the LOSC, are the subject matter of Chapter 3. Part I I of this 
work attempts to deconstruct the delimitation problem into three core issues: the concept of 
maritime delimitation (Chapter 4); the technical definition of boundary-lines (Chapter 5); 
and the normative standards applicable to maritime delimitation (Chapter 6 ) 2 4 , which this 
study argues are the principle of maritime zoning and the principle of equity25. The primary 
issue, that of determining the boundary-line, is examined in detail in Part I I I , which dwells 
on the process whereby such a line is legally 'discovered'. The attempt made to rationalise 
aspects of the justification discourse (Chapter 7), and to discuss relevant factual 
circumstances (Chapter 8), is supplemented by a case study that seeks to test the 
propositions advanced in this thesis (Chapter 9). Each part presents its own set of 
conclusions, which provide integrated elaborations of arguments advanced in its chapters. 
For clarity of exposition, some points concerning the scope of and the terminology 
used in this study should be made from the outset. 
As regards scope, it must be first noted that the delineation of limits of maritime 
zones, despite being interwoven with the subject matter of this thesis, is not specifically 
addressed. As recognised in jurisprudence, the "normal and ordinary meaning" of the term 
boundary should not be confused with "what is usually called a maritime limit"26. 
(23) As the research progressed, it became clear that the goal of conceptualising all aspects of maritime delimitation was too 
ambitious, especially in the light of the constraints imposed by the word-limit. Space has indeed precluded us from covering 
certain legal and technical aspects (e.g. dispute-settlement mechanisms - in particular questions relating to jurisdiction, and the 
essential technical notions utilised in this field). The following text is thus a shortened version of the initial draft. 
(24) The term "normative standards" is used to comprise both rules and principles of positive law. The term "standard" is not used 
in the stricter juridical-technical sense sometimes given thereto in Anglo-American law (a special type of legal rule). 
(25) Unless explicitly stated, the term "equity" is not used in the juridical-technical sense that is given to it in Anglo-American law. 
(26) Eritrea/Y emen-II, para. 129; cf. also para. 161 in fine. 
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Boundaries are lines that separate the sphere of jurisdiction of adjoining states . Limits are 
lines that separate the sphere of jurisdiction of one state from maritime areas not subject to 
state authority. Whereas maritime boundaries (regardless of the procedural means whereby 
they are determined) always have a bilateral character, maritime limits are defined by states 
unilaterally28. Establishing maritime boundaries is thus an operation that should be 
differentiated from the establishment of (inner and outer) limits of maritime zones29. 
Conceptually, the term 'delimitation' should be used to refer strictly to the establishment of 
boundaries between neighbouring states30. 
On another level, it must be emphasised that the delimitation process is understood 
here as being constitutive in nature. It entails the ex novo determination of the course of a 
boundary. Bravender-Coyle suggests that the determination of the existence of an express or 
a de facto agreement determining a boundary should be a part of a "system of priorities 
which collectively constitutes the emerging general rule of customary international law 
relating to the delimitation of maritime boundaries between states"31. But i f the dividing 
lines are already established, for example, by means of an international treaty, due to the 
application of the uti possidetis juris principle, or as a result of acquiescence, recognition or 
estoppel, or by any other means, one should not speak of delimitation. As Charney states, 
these aspects are preliminary issues to the delimitation32. Throughout this study, the absence 
of a dividing line thus is taken as a conditio sine qua non for speaking of delimitation 
proprio sensu. 
As for deciding whether or not such a dividing line exists, it is important not to 
overlook the distinction between "boundary-lines" and "lines of allocation". Lines of 
allocation were often "delimited through the high seas or unexplored areas for the purpose 
of allocating lands without conveying sovereignty over the high seas"33. But they are not 
boundaries in the sense adopted here. This distinction emerged, for example, during the 
Guinea/Guinea-Bissau arbitration. Whereas Guinea argued that the line defined in Article I 
of the Franco-Portuguese Convention of 1886 constituted a boundary, Guinea-Bissau 
(27) The term "jurisdiction" might be used in this study with a wider scope, to comprise not only mere jurisdiction, but also 
sovereignty and sovereign rights. 
(28) Gulf of Maine case, ICJ/Reports/1984, pp.292, 299, paras.87, 112(1). In the Fisheries case, the ICJ averred the international 
relevance of unilateral definitions of maritime limits, and the need for these unilateral claims to abide by international law 
(ICJ/Reports/1951,p.l32). 
(29) Referring to "two types of maritime delimitation" - "maritime limit" and "maritime boundary", cf. Thamsborg/1998, p.223. 
Mentioning "ocean boundaries" - which include "seaward limits, baselines and lateral boundaries", cf. Johnston/1988, p.75. Cf. 
Lucchni/VoelckeI/1996, pp.6-10; Roubertou/1996, p.372; Tanja/1990, p.xvi; Caflisch/1983, p.36; Jennings/1969a, pp.376,428. 
(30) Jonhston/1988, p.9. 
(31) Bravender-Coyle/1988, pp.172-177, Appendix A. When mentioning express or de facto agreement, he apparently refers to all 
cases in which a boundary-line is adopted by means other than a formal boundary treaty. 
(32) Charney/1994, p.234. Often, disputes emerge because one of the states considers that the boundary has already been delimited, 
whereas the other contends that it has to be delimited ex novo. The decision regarding the existence of a boundary precedes the 
delimitation, which is only required when it is concluded that no boundary is yet in place. 
(33) Jones/1945, p.143, 149-150. 
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argued that such line was merely a line of allocation of sovereignty over islands. Taking 
into account the evidence available, the Tribunal concluded that the line had not been 
established as a maritime boundary, which seems to mean that the limit was viewed as a 
line of allocation^. 
We must allude, moreover, to the inescapable dualism and the interdisciplinary 
nature of the subject, which bears on the terminology used. Among geographers, McMahon 
refined the 'boundary terminology' with the distinction between "delimitation" and 
"demarcation"35. In the 1940's, Jones referred to the "continuity of the boundary-making 
process"; he advanced a four-stage description thereof: allocation, delimitation, demarcation 
and administration36. This view continues to be adopted today37. From a slightly different 
approach, DeLapradelle refers to three stages: preparation, decision and execution. 
Delimitation corresponds essentially to the "decision" stage (although some aspects might 
be identified in the stage of "preparation"), which is to take place through either treaty or 
adjudication38. In this study, delimitation proprio sensu - as a stage of the boundary-making 
process, is seen as consisting of "the determination of a boundary-line" (that is, "the choice 
of a boundary site1'') and "its [technical] definition"39. But technical definition should not be 
confused with demarcation40, which consists of marking the boundary on the ground, by 
construction and/or identification of conspicuous marks41. 
Finally, it is certainly emphasised that the concept of boundary herein adopted is 
purely political. As Jones notes, "the most unreal of boundary classifications is the 
too-familiar one of natural and artificiaF'42. Natural facts produce no legal consequences43. 
The political-legal significance of natural features is derived from decisions of states. 
Boundaries in general are political and man-made. At sea, even more than ashore, 
boundaries are a political phenomenon that can hardly be seen as having any natural 
(34) ILM/25/1986, pp.275-282, paras.46-67. 
(35) McMahon/1935, p.4. 
(36) Jones/1945, p.5. 
(37) Nguyen/DailIier/Pellet/1999, p.462; Sharma/1989, pp.11-20; Prescott/1987, pp. 13-14, 68-77; Johnston/1988, p.8. 
(38) DeLapradelle/1928, pp.72-73; on the stage of "decision", cf. also pp.105-143. 
(39) Jones/1945, p.57; Boggs/1940, p.32; emphasis added. Cf. para.4.2. infra. 
(40) On the distinction between delimitation and demarcation, cf. e.g. Nguyen/Daillier/Pellet/1999, pp.462-463; Brownlie/1998a, 
p. 122; Jennings/Watts/1997, p.662; Lucchini/Voelckel/1996, p.30; Adler/1995, pp.2-6, 9-17; Sharma/1989, pp.8-12; 
Prescott/1987, p.13; Bardonnet/1984, pp.4-6; Brownlie/1979, p.4; Rousseau/1977, pp.235, 269-272; Cukwurah/1967, pp.78-83; 
Jones/1945, p.57; Boggs/1940, p.32. Elaborating extensively on demarcation, cf. Jones/1945, pp. 165-225. "Demarcation" appears 
to correspond to the stage "execution" in DeLapradelle's classification (DeLapradelle/1928, pp.25-26). 
(41) Sea boundaries are difficult to demarcate. Setting up marks in deep-sea waters often is an impossible task. Even if shore-based 
marks are used, because they are not visible at long distances from the coast, they are in many cases ineffective. For a demarcated 
maritime boundary, cf. e.g. Georgia (ex-USSR/Turkey), Appendix 2, D60, F35; Figure 43. This creates a crucial distinction 
between land and maritime boundaries in that as no marks can be set along a maritime boundary the latter cannot be object of 
'densification' (construction of marks along the boundary so that consecutive marks are within sight distance of each other); cf. 
Bardonnet/1984. 
(42) Jones/1945, p.7. 
(43) Gulf of Maine case, lCJ/Reports/1984, p.296, para.102. Cukwurah/1967, pp.12-15. 
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character, especially because there are no visible natural features to which 'abstract 
boundary-lines' can be attached44. As Judge Bedjaoui affirmed unequivocally45: 
The idea of 'natural boundaries' formed by mountains, waterways or various 
accidents of nature, has never been able to commend itself to states for purposes of 
their land frontiers, although these limits are visible to the naked eye. Legal science 
is unlikely to accept for maritime spaces what it rejects for land spaces and to confer 
legal standing on those 'natural boundaries' constituted by an important and 
significant geological feature when that boundary is not even visible to the naked 
eye. Having always shunned land relief despite the fact that it is visible, man cannot 
but shun still more underwater relief which is out of his sight. 
(44) Lucchini/Voelckel/1996, p.25. Bardonnet/1989, p.2. Analysing how the distinction between land and sea bears upon geodesy, 
cf. Roubertou/1996, pp.324-328. 
(45) Guinea-Bissau/Senegal arbitration, Dissenting Opinion, ILR/83/1990, p. 101, para. 114. 
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I 
DELIMITATION LAW IN THE LQSC: 
THREE DECADES OF DEVELOPMENT 
• 
INTRODUCTION TO PART I 
The provisions of the LOSC on delimitation - Articles 15, 74(1) and 83(1) - form 
today the primary legal reference in maritime delimitation. Naturally, the conceptualisation 
herein attempted must adequately consider them. It should be observed, nevertheless, that 
the legal regime of maritime delimitation, as most regimes in international law, appears as 
the result of a continuum. Unexpected 'shifting-developments', although existent, were a 
seldom occurrence. When they seem to have happened, close scrutiny leads to conclude that 
they were less marked than they look at first glance. In effect, the provisions of the LOSC 
ought to be assessed within its wider context. 
Seeking to provide this assessment, Part I looks into the three decades of evolution 
of maritime delimitation law, prior to the advent of the LOSC. The initial developments, 
from the preparatory works undertaken by the International Law Commission in the early 
1950's to the 1958 Conventions, are examined in Chapter 3. Because case law has played a 
crucial part in shaping the contents of and the debate on maritime delimitation law, to the 
point of making it known as 'judge-made law', Chapter 4 looks into three cases - the 
Grisbadarna arbitration, the North Sea cases, and the Anglo/French arbitration - that have 
played a part in the process towards the conventional provisions (although the relevance of 
the latter two is admittedly much more significant than that of the former). In Chapter 5, the 
work and outcome of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea is 
appraised. 
The objective of this part, therefore, is to provide a sound interpretation of the 
LOSC provisions, in light not only of the historical element and the common intention of 
the parties, but also of the specific legal system embedded in the LOSC. 
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Chapter 1 
THE 1958 CONVENTIONS 
1.1. Introduction 
The regimes of the high seas and of the territorial waters were amongst the 
provisionally selected topics of international law whose codification was considered by the 
International Law Commission (ILC) as "necessary or desirable"1. Several events explain 
the need for codification at the time. The first is the failed attempt at codification at the 
1930 Hague Conference. The subsequent period, characterised by the collapse of the 
League of Nations and the outbreak of World War I I , was far from being propitious for any 
type of cooperation at the international level. The creation of the United Nations (UN) in 
the aftermath of World War I I , the Truman Proclamation of 1945 concerning the 
"jurisdiction over natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf, and 
the 'reaction' of states around the globe to this declaration (e.g. the Santiago Declaration of 
1952), sparked for a second time the debate on law of the sea issues2. 
The ILC decided to give priority to three topics. Among them was the regime of the 
high seas, which included the continental shelf. Francois was elected Special Rapporteur3. 
Considering that "the regime of the high seas and the regime of the territorial waters [were] 
closely related", the General Assembly of the UN recommended the inclusion of the latter 
in the study to be carried out by the ILC 4 . The recommendation was accepted by the ILC in 
1950, and the study of the regime of territorial waters was initiated in parallel with that of 
the high seas in 1951. Francois was also appointed the Special Rapporteur for this study. 
The process started by the ILC eventually led to the First United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea (hereinafter "First Conference") and to the 1958 Conventions. 
The rules dealing with the legal determination of international maritime boundaries 
underwent a process of codification, and indeed of progressive development, during both 
the First Conference and its travaux preparatoires5. From this process stemmed the first 
(1) ILC/Yearbook/1949, pp.280-281. 
(2) For an overview of the reaction of the states, cf. e.g. Auguste/1960, pp.57-72, 105-165, Attard/1987, pp. 1-11, Brown/1992, 
pp.56-62; ILC/Yearbook/1950(11), pp.49-50. 
(3) ILC/Yearbook/1949, p.281. 
(4) UN Doc, G A Res.374(IV), of 6 December 1949. 
(5) The Commission recognised, in general terms, that some of its proposals were de lege ferenda. However, it also remarked that 
trying to identify which draft articles were merely codification and which were progressive development had proved impossible 
since some of the articles did not belong to either category (ILC/Yearbook/1956(H), pp.255-256). 
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codified rules on delimitation of maritime zones, which were incorporated in the Geneva 
Conventions6. Unsurprisingly, the First Conference and the ILC preparatory work have 
been extensively examined7. A re-examination is thus outside the purpose of this study. 
Nevertheless it is evident that the conclusions arrived at, particularly by publicists, are by 
no means unanimous. A different approach to several issues is possible. 
The analysis provided here is primarily intended to underline and emphasise certain 
features of the development of those rules - which arguably bear upon the interpretation of 
both the 1958 and the LOSC provisions8. A set of arguments may ab initio be put forward 
to support this view. First, the rules embodied in the 1958 Conventions form an essential 
part of a background against which the debates that characterised the Third Conference 
have to be understood. Secondly, the LOSC rule applicable to the delimitation of the 
territorial sea is almost identical to its 1958 equivalent. Thirdly, since the LOSC does not 
include any provision dealing specifically with the delimitation of the contiguous zone, it is 
necessary to investigate whether the 1958 provision is in any measure still applicable. 
Finally, it must be enquired whether the 1958 rule on continental shelf delimitation is to any 
extent relevant in interpreting the equivalent 1982 rule, and that concerning the EEZ. 
One major idea summarises the First Conference and its travaux preparatories as 
regards delimitation of maritime zones: it was a quest for material criteria of delimitation. 
And since "the regime of the high seas and the regime of the territorial waters [were 
considered as] closely related", that quest concerned simultaneously the delimitation of all 
maritime zones9. As a result of that evolving process, all rules embodied in the Geneva 
Conventions prescribe, to one extent or another, the recourse to equidistance. The different 
delimitation rules must then be analysed jointly. The correct understanding of the process 
that led to their approval, and their contents, depends on a parallel and integrated analysis10. 
1.2. The I L C Pursuit of Normative Standards 
1.2.a) Pre-1958 State Practice 
The 1929 Draft Convention on Territorial Waters prepared by the Harvard Law 
School included an article on delimitation of territorial waters in straits, which stated: "in 
the absence of special agreement to the contrary [...] the territorial waters of each state 
(6) TS/CZ Convention, Articles 12(1) and 24(3); CS Convention, Article 6(1 )(2). 
(7) Oude Elferink/1994, pp.13-26; Caflisch/1991, pp.439-477; Tanja/1990, pp.21-45; Jayewardene/1990, pp.260-277, 282-283, 
285-308; Evans/1989, pp.8-15; McDougal/Burke/1987, pp.427-437, 725-729; Jagota/1985, pp.49-57; Dipla/1984, pp.131-151; 
O'Connell/1989, pp.673-677,684-685,699-705; Bowett/1979, pp.143-160; Whiteman/1958, pp.651-654. 
(8) Cf. L O S C , Articles 15,33, 74(1), 83(1), T S / C Z Convention, Articles 12(1), 24(3); CS Convention, Article 6(1)(2). 
(9) UN Doc, G A Res.374(IV), of 6 December 1949. 
(10) Noting the relationship between the continental shelf and the territorial sea, cf. ILC/Yearbook/1950(1), p.233. 
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extend to the middle of the strait"11. The Basis of Discussion No. 16 presented at the 1930 
Hague Conference adopted a similar wording, and referred to "a line running down the 
centre of the strait"12. Although, prior to 1958, state practice in maritime delimitation was 
scarce, as to territorial waters it seemed to show preference for this equidistance-based 
approach. The Peace Treaty with Italy of 10 February 1947, for example, refers to "a line 
placed equidistant from the coastlines of the Free Territory of Trieste and Yugoslavia"13. 
When the ILC preparatory works started, the only agreement on delimitation of 
maritime areas beyond the territorial sea that was known was the 1942 Anglo/Venezuelan 
treaty concerning the Gulf of Paria. Lacking precedents, this agreement seems to have 
followed a sui generis approach that, insofar as it did not advance "any general principle or 
method for boundary making", became "rather limited in scope as a potential precedent for 
future delimitations"14. In fact, as far as continental shelf delimitation was concerned, state 
practice comprised essentially unilateral acts. The first reference to delimitation criteria was 
made in the Truman Proclamation, which asserted: "where the continental shelf of one state 
extends to the shores of another state, or is shared with an adjacent state, the boundary shall 
be determined by the United States and the state concerned in accordance with equitable 
principles". What was meant by "equitable principles" was never clarified. By 1945, it was 
not possible to ascertain what rules of law were applicable in the delimitation "of even 
traditionally recognised maritime areas such as the territorial sea". It is perfectly acceptable 
to assume that the reference to equitable principles envisaged no more than "to provide for 
the negotiation of a fair and reasonable boundary"15. Notably, the United States' 
understanding of delimitation in accordance with equitable principles seemed associated 
with the use of equidistance. Writing in 1951, Boggs suggested that equidistance "would 
provide the 'equitable principles' for [reaching] accord between the United States and a 
neighbour state"16. Furthermore, as the 1958 Conventions referred, without exception, to the 
use of equidistance in delimitation, the United States ratification of all four Conventions in 
1961 may also be seen as a token of this idea. 
(11) Article 9, AJIL/I929/23(Supp.-Special), pp.243-244, emphasis added. 
(12) AJIL/1930/24(Supp.), p.36, emphasis added. No reference was made to delimitation between adjacent states. 
(13) UNTS/1950/49, p.139, emphasis added. References to other agreements may be found in ICJ/Pleadings/1968(1), pp.263-265: 
Yugoslavia/Trieste (1947), Italy/Turkey (1932), United States/Canada (1925 and 1908), and Norway/Finland (1924). Although 
using different terminology, they all convey the same notion of equidistance (e.g. "equidistant", "halfway", or "middle"). 
(14) Anderson/1988, p.231; Nweihed, IMB/Report 2-13(1), p.645. See Figure 16. 
(15) Brown/1992, p.57. It must be mentioned that, by 1930, the concept of delimitation was viewed as always comprising also the 
problem of unilateral delineation of the outer limits of maritime zones (Boggs/1930). 
(16) Boggs/1951, p.262, fh.34. Although Boggs' writings are not legal opinions, they must be seen in the light of Article 38(l)(d) of 
the Statute of the ICJ, which refers to highly qualified doctrine as a subsidiary means of interpreting rules of law. He was the 
Special Adviser on Geography for the U.S. Department of State. His views, crucial for interpreting the United States' practice, 
greatly influenced the development of the international law of delimitation of maritime zones (cf. Boggs/1930, Boggs/1937). He 
was a member of the Committee of Experts that proposed the use of equidistance to the I L C , and his work was cited on various 
occasions during the I L C debates on maritime delimitation (e.g. ILC/Yearbook/1950(1), p.233; ILC/Yearbook/1951(I), pp.268, 
287; ILC/Yearbook/1952(1), pp.180-182; ILC/Yearbook/1953(1), p.128). 
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Following the Truman Proclamation, other states made reference to the term 
"equitable principles" (or similar expressions) in their legislation regarding the continental 
shelf. This is the case with Iran, Nicaragua, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab states of the Persian 
Gulf under the protection of the United Kingdom1 7. It has to be kept in mind that this state 
practice was not disregarded by the ILC. On the contrary, the process that led to the 
approval of the Geneva provisions took due account of the historical development of the 
continental shelf and related state practice18. Equally, it is important to say that there is no 
record whatsoever regarding the recourse to natural prolongation as the delimitation 
standard in state practice. 
Finally, it is important to note the reaction of some states on the western coast of 
South America to the Truman declaration and the emergence of the concept of continental 
shelf. Because of a phenomenon of subduction between two tectonic plates, these states 
have no geological continental shelf. In 1952, this led Chile, Peru and Ecuador to claim an 
area up to 200 M from the coast. The paramount consideration was an exclusive access to 
fishing resources in the area. Attempting to assert and further their maritime claims, these 
states decided also to delimit their boundaries by recourse to parallels of latitude. As will be 
seen, at that time, the use of equidistance as a delimitation standard was not yet widely and 
clearly understood, even by the ILC members. 
1.2.b) First Drafts 
1.2.b)(i) The Continental Shelf 
In 1950, during the second session of the ILC, the Special Rapporteur presented his 
first report on the regime of the high seas. When discussing the continental shelf, the report 
offered a survey of state practice which led Francois to conclude that, even in relation to the 
very notion of continental shelf, "/a plus grand incertitude" subsisted. According to him, 
that uncertainty extended to the criteria for delimitation between states. Observing that the 
only guidance offered by state practice was that delimitation should be effected by 
agreement between the states involved, he considered it advisable to ask governments their 
views on how delimitation was to be effected in cases of overlapping claims19. 
The fact that the ILC members were initially faced with the idea that no clear legal 
definition of continental shelf existed at the time cannot be overemphasised. During the 
(17) Appendix 2, A1-A 12. 
(18) ILC/Yearbook/1950(11), pp.49-50, 91-93. Three other delimitation agreements on areas beyond the territorial sea were signed 
before 1958 (Appendix 2, A13-A15). Two of them referred to an area that, at the time, was not recognised under international law 
(the 1952 Chile/Peru and Ecuador/Peru agreements). Related to the Santiago Declaration, they did not concern continental shelf 
delimitation but rather the delimitation of a 200-mile zone. The other agreement was signed in 1957 between Norway and the 
USSR. Since the I L C draft articles were finalised in 1956, it had no influence on the wording of those articles. 
(19) ILC/Yearbook/1950(11), pp.49-51. 
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discussion of the points raised by Francois' first report, recognising that there was no 
definition of continental shelf, Yepes observed that "such definition could be given only by 
geologists and geographers, not by the International Law Commission, which did not have 
the requisite knowledge", and added that " i f scientists provided a definition, they would 
know what rights over the continental shelf could be vested in states"20. This seems to make 
clear that the quest of the ILC was centred not only on the delimitation standards, but also 
on the juridical notion of continental shelf. That a right to claim a submerged area adjacent 
to the land territory had emerged since 1945 is an acceptable idea. By contrast, to assert that 
in the early 1950's the legal concept of continental shelf (in terms of spatial extension) was 
part of customary law is highly questionable. 
Not surprisingly, the opinions of the ILC members also reflected uncertainty as 
regards continental shelf delimitation. Alluding to the conclusions contained in the Report 
of the 44 t h Conference of the International Law Association (ILA), Hudson observed that 
"custom and theory gave no enlightenment on the subject, and in his view the question 
should therefore be set aside". In response, El-Khoury stated that, "as a general rule, when 
two states were separated by waters, the frontier was fixed in the middle of those waters". 
He argued that the same rule would apply where continental shelves overlapped21. Hudson 
raised serious objections to this view, emphasising the idea in the said report as to the need 
to study and develop delimitation criteria. In his opinion, that showed that no rule or 
principle of delimitation existed. Only one idea seemed to gather consensus within the 
Commission: i f required, delimitation had to be effected by agreement. As to the desirability 
of developing delimitation criteria, opinions remained divided22. In this light, therefore, 
attempting to demonstrate that delimitation standards existed in customary law, by the early 
1950s, is equally questionable23. 
At this juncture, it is worth characterising the point of departure of the ILC in its 
search for delimitation criteria. These are ideas that remained present throughout the work 
of the ILC. They play, even today, an important part in understanding the delimitation rules. 
Support for the idea that delimitation was to be effected by agreement between the states 
concerned was unanimous. The majority of members seemed to believe that international 
law prescribed no material principle applicable to continental shelf delimitation. And the 
possibility of developing delimitation criteria was expressly admitted. It is noteworthy that, 
despite the references that were made to the Truman Proclamation, no suggestion of using 
(20) ILC/Yearbook/1950(I), p.228. 
(21) It follows apparently the proposal presented at the 1930 Hague Conference, although no explicit reference is made to it. 
(22) ILC/Yearbook/1950(1), pp.232-234. 
(23) This issue relates to some assumptions made by the ICJ in the North Sea cases, which are examined later (para.2.3.b)(ii) infra). 
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equitable principles as delimitation criteria was advanced either by the Special Rapporteur, 
or by any other member of the ILC. 
The debates in the third session (1951) were based upon the Second Report of the 
Special Rapporteur. As to continental shelf delimitation, various points deserve attention. 
The legal definition of continental shelf proposed therein comprised the seabed and subsoil 
of territorial waters24. This seemed a straightforward transposition of the geomorphological 
concept, thus reinforcing the idea that the legal concept of continental shelf was far from 
being clear. It was Hudson who stressed that it was "necessary to stipulate that, from the 
legal standpoint, the continental shelf only consisted of that part [of the seabed and subsoil] 
which lay outside territorial waters". Indicating that the same misconception was also 
present in a bill before the United States Congress, he affirmed that the adoption of that 
perspective "would be very regrettable and not justified by the historical development of the 
law in the matter"25. Interestingly, the juridical notion of continental shelf was not clear 
even within the state that had first claimed rights over the seabed and subsoil. 
The basis of discussion suggested by the Special Rapporteur distinguished between 
situations of adjacency and of oppositeness. The median line was proposed for the latter 
case, on the basis of an analogy with delimitation in straits. For adjacency situations, the 
proposed solution was the recourse to the prolongation of the territorial sea boundary. The 
note to draft Article 9 mentions the Grisbadarna arbitration however, suggesting that the 
reference was to the prolongation of the perpendicular to the coast at the terminus of the 
land boundary. Nevertheless, the possibility for states to delimit their boundaries in a 
different manner, by agreement, continued to be acknowledged26. 
The role of agreements was repeatedly reaffirmed27. It was Amado who, quoting an 
article that analysed the Truman Proclamation, raised the idea that boundaries were to be 
delimited by agreement on the basis of equitable principles2*. To him, however, this 
expression meant solely that a mutually acceptable agreement was required29. No further 
references were specifically made to equitable principles during the debate. 
The ILC members were clearly aware of the non-existence of normative guidance in 
maritime delimitation30. Whether to adopt rules that would become applicable by default in 
the absence of an agreement was still an unresolved question that divided the Commission. 
Transposing from geography to law the concept of delimitation proved to be a daunting 
(24) Para.162, Article 1, ILC/Yearbook/1951(11), p.102. 
(25) ILC/Yearbook/1951(I), pp.268-269. 
(26) ILC/Yearbook/1951 (II), pp. 102-103, Article 9 and Note. The prolongation of the land boundary, or the use of perpendiculars to 
the general direction of the coast, had already been suggested in scholarship (DeLapradelle/1928, pp.215-216). 
(27) Cf. e.g. the statements of Spiropoulos, Yepes, Scelle, Hudson, ILC/Yearbook/1951(T), pp.286-288,290. 
(28) Ibid., p.285. 
(29) Ibid., p.293. 
(30) Cf. e.g. El-Khoury, C6rdova, Spiropoulos, Sandstrom, and Hudson, Ibid, pp.289-293. 
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task. As recognised by Hudson, until then "the problem had been tackled by geographers". 
The Chairman, Brierly, went even further and stated that delimitation was actually "a matter 
of geography rather than of law" 3 1. When examining the various potential delimitation 
standards, references were made to the perpendicular to the general direction of the coast, 
the prolongation of the territorial waters boundary, the prolongation of the land boundary, 
and the use of an equidistance-line32. The Commission eventually rejected the inclusion of 
delimitation standards in the draft article33. In the commentary, nonetheless, allusion was 
made to the use of the median line in cases of adjacency. 
It was Hsu who brought up the issue of the equitableness of the delimitation, in the 
116th Meeting. He asked "whether it was equitable to extend seawards the dividing-line 
between the territorial waters". Incisively, he also pointed out that the "dividing-line would 
be relatively unimportant in the case of territorial waters, which were a narrow belt, but 
might take on great significance and cause injustice if applied to continental shelves which 
were sometimes of considerable extent". His conclusion was that delimitation should be 
effected, "failing agreement, by arbitration on a fair and equitable basis"34. 
Since the prevailing view was that no substantive criteria existed, the ILC had to 
turn to compulsory arbitration as a means of resolving situations where no agreement could 
be reached35. Scelle affirmed that he "could not agree to stating bluntly that two states must 
reach agreement"; this would create the danger of leaving "the strong free to exert pressure 
on the weak"36. The recourse to agreement and ex aequo et bono arbitration in the relevant 
draft article may be explained by the concatenation of three aspects37. One was the primacy 
given to agreements. The second was the non-existence of delimitation standards. The third 
was the need to contemplate a mechanism that, failing agreement, would ensure that 
delimitations would not be effected unfairly or through recourse to political pressure. 
The two equally important aspects of delimitation had finally surfaced. On the one 
hand, its intrinsic geography-related character became axiomatic. On the other hand, it was 
acknowledged that delimitation should not lead to a manifestly unreasonable boundary. It 
must be emphasised that, although almost subliminally, the need to balance geography and 
fairness surfaced during the ILC work. Indeed it appeared at a very early stage. Whatever 
the solution adopted in the end, it definitely took account of this primary equilibrium. In 
(31) /«</., p.287. 
(32) Cf. e.g. the statements of Spiropoulos, Cdrdova, Sandstrom, and Hudson (ILC/Yearbook/1951(i), pp.286-287). Francois 
introduced the work of Boggs on the use of the median line in continental shelf delimitation (ILC/Yearbook/1951(l), p.268). 
(33) ILC/Yearbook/1951(i), p.291. Cf. Article 7 of the Draft Articles (ILC/YearbookmSUII), p.143). 
(34) ILC/Yearbook/1951(I), p.288-290, emphasis added. 
(35) /6iy.,pp.291-294. 
(36) /iW.,pp.288-289. 
(37) ILC/Yearbook/1951(n), p.143, commentary to Article 7. 
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short, by the end of the 1951 session, the issue of delimitation standards remained unclear. 
Hesitancies were many, and certainties were few and far between. 
1.2.b)(ii) The Territorial Sea 
The debate on the regime of the territorial sea was initiated in 1952, when Francois 
presented his First Report on the matter. With regard to delimitation, distinction was made 
between straits, mouths of rivers, and adjacent states38. In the case of straits, the draft article 
(which was identical to the one proposed at the 1930 Conference) seemed to deal with the 
definition of the seaward limits of the territorial sea in straits, and not with delimitation 
between states. And the same occurred with the cases of mouth of rivers. 
In relation to situations of adjacency (which had not been considered during the 
1930 Conference), draft Article 13 of the report prescribed the use of the median line as 
proposed by Boggs. The commentary stressed that such a line would not be retained in 
cases where a special configuration would demand modifications1'9. As can be deduced 
from this statement, the ILC members were conscious of the existence of special situations 
that would require departing from equidistance. The case of a navigable channel running in 
the vicinity of the boundary was presented as an example where a thalweg-based line would 
probably be more appropriate. The recourse to a perpendicular line in the Grisbadarna 
arbitration was cited. Also important were also Francois' observations regarding the need to 
consider "arguments historiques", in the presence of which delimitation rules would not be 
applicable*0. As in relation to the continental shelf, attention was devoted to the role of 
equity. References to "unfairness of delimitation" (Hudson), to "fair and equitable basis" 
(Hsu), or to "settling [...] differences equitably" (El Khoury), show that the need to prevent 
inequitable delimitations remained one of the concerns of the Commission41. 
In the 171 s t Meeting, while introducing the delimitation provisions incorporated in 
his report, Francois referred to the concept of equidistance, as analysed by Boggs in his 
writings. His references to a "geometric concept" that raised difficulties to "laymen" were a 
first clear suggestion that maritime delimitation was also a geographical issue, requiring 
technical expertise. Doubts remained however as to the possibility of finding a regime of 
worldwide application. Affirming that the use of equidistance "would not be satisfactory in 
a number of cases", Hudson was manifestly against the idea of finding a general principle 
upon which to base the drawing of boundary-lines. Intervening in this debate, Lauterpacht 
stated that "the Commission was not the appropriate body to discuss such technical issues". 
(38) ILC/Yearbook/1952(11), pp.37-38. 
(39) This idea seems to have stemmed from Gidel's writings in the 1930's (Gidel/1934, pp.769-771). 
(40) ILC/Yearbook/1952(IT), P-38. Cf. paras. 1.3.c)(ii), 2.2.b) infra. 
(41) ILC/Yearbook/1951(1), pp.287-290. 
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Considering that expert advice was required, he proposed that a small committee formed for 
example by Hudson, Francois, Boggs and "an expert cartographer" would provide the ILC 
with the necessary technical recommendations42. This proposal was strongly supported by 
Francois (who stated that "he could do no further useful work [...] without expert advice"), 
Cordova, Yepes, and Hsu. This 'know-how-related deadlock' led the Commission to 
eventually vote in favour of obtaining expert advice43. 
Two other outstanding points came to light during this fourth session of the ILC. 
The fact that states "would not be prepared to submit a question to compulsory arbitration 
which would not be based on specific legal rules" was emphasised by Lauterpacht44. This 
commentary reflected the position assumed by the Government of the United Kingdom in 
relation to the draft Article 7 on the continental shelf, and transmitted in 2 June 1952 to the 
Permanent Delegation in the United Nations45. As will be shown, the comments made by 
states to the draft articles confirmed this idea. Even more important is Hsu's assertion that 
"if the Commission was unable to deduce general rules from practice, it must derive them 
from legal principles^. It suggests that, although the ILC's quest for delimitation rules 
might have amounted to progressive development, it was nonetheless based on legal 
foundations. Deriving specific rules from principles, although not without difficulties, is 
undeniably a juridically sound way of establishing a legal regime47. 
1.2.c) Subsequent Development of a General Substantive Rule 
Before the 1953 session, the hesitancies in the ILC as to the inclusion of substantive 
criteria in the delimitation provisions remained. Technical aspects were also a source of 
difficulty. Doubts continued to exist, moreover, in respect of the way in which the disputes 
between states were to be resolved. In an attempt to tackle the problems that had emerged, 
in its 172nd Meeting (1952), the ILC decided to ask states to furnish information regarding 
their practice on territorial sea delimitation and to submit any observations that they might 
wish to make in that respect. 
In 1953, the Commission proceeded, inter alia, with its work on continental shelf 
delimitation. By then, it had to examine and discuss both the outcome of the consultation 
with Governments regarding the project on the continental shelf, and the recommendations 
made by the Committee of Experts on the delimitation rules. 
(42) ILC/Yearbook/1952(1), pp. 180-181. 
(43) /«</., pp.181-185. 
(44) /W</.,p.l84. 
(45) ILC/Yearbook/1953(11), p.267. 
(46) ILC/Yearbook/1952(1), p. 184, emphasis added. 
(47) The rule devised by the I L C seems indeed to stem from the concatenation of two principles. Cf. Conclusions to Part II infra, 
General Conclusions. On the distinction between rules and principles, cf. para.6.2.b) infra. 
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Confirming Lauterpacht's viewpoint, the recourse to ex aequo et bono arbitration 
was almost unanimously rejected or considered as not advisable by states. Belgium, for 
example, stated that "legal provisions should be laid down as a basis for arbitration and for 
possible recourse to the International Court of Justice". Israel stressed the fact that states 
had "in the past shown little propensity to proceed to arbitration or judicial settlement ex 
aequo et bono". The Netherlands considered the "it would very definitely be advisable to 
lay down specific rules of law upon which arbitrators could base their decisions". South 
Africa, on the other hand, observed that resorting to judicial settlement on the basis of law 
was "more likely to contribute to the orderly development of international law than [was] 
the creation of a network of ad hoc arbitral awards based upon political rather than legal 
considerations". The statements of Denmark, Egypt, Sweden, United Kingdom and United 
States of America all supported this same standpoint. Notably, states from different legal 
traditions had common views in this matter, and went even further in their comments. Egypt 
drew "attention to the advantage of working out a set of rules to be applied in delimiting the 
zones of each state". And Israel observed that the draft articles "should proceed from a 
more positive attitude towards established principles of law", and at least "from an 
examination into the problem of how far these established principles can be regarded as 
having application" in delimitation48. 
These statements are consonant with Hsu's point as regards how the ILC should 
continue its work, i.e. to derive rules from legal principles. The statements of states 
encouraging the ILC to identify or develop substantive delimitation standards to assist them 
in negotiations and to be applied by courts in adjudications arguably constitute an 'atypical 
mandate' given to the ILC; consequently it must be duly taken into consideration in the 
international law-making process. It amounts to a rejection of non-normative approaches to 
delimitation, and emphasises the need for certainty. As Shaw observes, the "comments 
made by governments on drafts produced by the International Law Commission" constitute 
state practice from which customary law may emerge49. 
These strong objections raised by states against ex aequo et bono arbitration, led 
Francois to alter the draft provision on continental shelf delimitation50. The new wording 
(48) For the comments sent by Governments, cf. ILC/Yearbook/1953(II), pp.241-269. 
(49) Shaw/1997, p.65. Although it may be argued that no formal juridical value can be attributed to this 'mandate', it is certainly an 
element of interpretation of the evolving process that was underway, an element to be weighed within the peculiar international 
law-making process and the manner in which it operates. Thirlway suggests that "the work of the International Law Commission 
[...] cannot be equated with state practice, or evidence of an opinio juris", and that what it does "is put into shape and give 
expression and definition to a more or less amorphous state practice" (Thirlway/1990, pp.59-60). The idea that this type of state 
practice is to be given some value in the law-making process is sometimes implicitly endorsed (e.g. Nguyen/Daillier/Pellet/1999, 
pp.321-323; Brownlie/1998a, p.5; Brownlie/1998b, p.20; Malanczuk/1997, pp.39-41; Pereira/Quadros/1993, pp.159-160; 
Wolfke/1993, pp.71-72; Danilenko/1993, pp.85-94). As to what type of acts constitute state practice, cf. ILA, Final Report of the 
Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International Law, pp. 13-19. 
(50) Draft Article 7 (and commentary), ILC/Yearbook/1953(II), pp.48-49. 
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was largely the same, but referred to conciliation instead of ex aequo et bono arbitration. 
However, when he introduced draft Article 7 for debate in the Commission, during the 201 s t 
Meeting, he proposed a text referring to "arbitration". In the meantime, he had consulted 
with the Committee of Experts, which had advanced a proposal for having recourse to 
equidistance as a generally applicable criterion. Apparently, there would no longer be a 
question of ex aequo et bono arbitration; the arbitration was to consider the principles that 
were being laid down5 1. Eventually, the ILC approved the inclusion of an additional draft 
Article 8, which provided for a normative settlement of disputes (including delimitation 
disputes), and which could be requested by "any of the parties"52. 
The debate on draft Article 7 was resumed in the 204 th Meeting, and centred on the 
proposal of the Committee of Experts to resort to equidistance as the generally applicable 
criterion of delimitation53. Following the decision taken by the Commission, Francois had 
met the Committee of Experts before the beginning of the 1953 session, to obtain expert 
advice on the technical difficulties related to delimitation54. This consultation was based on 
a number of questions posed to the Committee of Experts55. The objective was, as Alfaro 
put it in the previous session, to leave "to the experts to decide the technical question 
precisely how the line was to be drawn in each case, and that the Commission confine itself 
to seeking to formulate a juridical principle which would be applicable in all cases"56. 
Sensibly, the Commission sought to address the legal aspects of delimitation only after 
securing a more complete technical picture. 
How to delimit the territorial sea boundaries between states in cases of oppositeness 
and adjacency was the fundamental question posed to the Committee. For delimitations 
between opposite coasts, the Committee advised that the boundary "should as a general rule 
be the median line every point of which is equidistant from the two coasts". Attention was 
nonetheless drawn to the existence of "special reasons" that would justify departing from 
the median line, amongst which were "interests of navigation" and "fishing" 5 7. 
When the ILC formulated the question in relation to adjacent coasts, it made explicit 
reference to different possibilities of defining the boundary: the prolongation of the land 
boundary; the perpendicular to the coast on the point where the land boundary intersected 
the coast; the perpendicular to the general direction of the coast; the median line. Such 
(51) ILC/Yearbook/1953(I), p.106. 
(52) ILC/Yearbook/1953(1), pp.118-124; ILC/Yearbook/1953(II), pp.213-217. 
(53) On the technical notion of equidistance, cf. para.5.2.a) infra, and Figures 48 to 56. 
(54) The Committee was integrated by Mr Boggs (USA), Professor Asplund (Sweden), Commander Kennedy (United Kingdom), 
Mr Couillault (France), Vice-Admiral Pinke (The Netherlands). 
(55) For the Report of the Committee of Experts on technical matters, which is presented as part of addendum 1 to the second report 
on the regime of the territorial sea (ILC/Yearbook/1953(II), p.77-79). 
(56) ILC/Yearbook/1952(I), p.182, emphasis added. 
(57) By the 1930s, Boggs had already made reference to the relevance of navigation and fisheries in maritime delimitation 
(Boggs/1930, p.542; Boggs/1937, p.446). 
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multiplicity of possible criteria seems to have flowed from the commentaries of states on 
delimitation standards58. The conclusion of the Committee was that the boundary should be 
defined by reference to the principle of equidistance, considering the coastlines on both 
sides of the terminal point of the land boundary. It was observed, however, that in some 
situations it would prove difficult to achieve an equitable solution; another line would have 
to be looked for by negotiation. Although no further explanation is given in the report as to 
what this expression was intended to cover, the concern with equitableness of the boundary 
was consistent with the previous debates in the ILC 5 9 . Presumably, it was intended to cover, 
under a general caption, situations where the equidistance would have to be adjusted. 
Having also been asked whether islands and low-tide elevations should be taken into 
consideration in delimitation, the Committee stated that unless states would agree otherwise 
all islands and all low-tide elevations located within the territorial sea had to be accounted 
for. Finally, it was affirmed that the designated solutions applied not only for territorial sea 
delimitation, but also for continental shelf and contiguous zone delimitation. 
A revised version of draft Article 13, included in the amendment to the second 
report on the regime of the territorial sea, transcribed the Committee of Experts' findings 
virtually verbatim60. In the 1953 session, however, the Commission only addressed the 
question of continental shelf delimitation. The expert advice was duly taken into account 
and played a crucial role in the debates. How to transpose into legal language the technical 
advice of the Committee was a central question. This 'legalisation' of scientific-technical 
concepts and terminology is not as strange as it might seem at first glance. The legal notion 
of continental shelf, for example, was also derived from its geomorphological concept, 
albeit in a modified form. Indeed, this process of 'appropriation' of scientific-technical 
concepts was taken even further with the LOSC. 
Related to this last point is the observation made in the Committee's report as to the 
fact that it considered it as often impracticable to establish any 'general direction of the 
coast'. This would depend on the scale of the chart being used, and on arbitrary decisions as 
to the extension of the coastline to be considered61. Technically, this is an indisputable 
assertion62. Without surprise, the Commission abandoned all references to perpendiculars to 
the direction of the coast. Inasmuch as the Commission had been mandated by states to 
identify and develop normative delimitation standards, the conclusion that this standard 
(58) Cf. e.g. Belgium, Burma, Denmark, France, Norway, Sweden, United States, and Yugoslavia (ILC/Yearbook/1953(11), 
pp.80-89,241,246,264,269). 
(59) Para.l.2.b)(i) supra. 
(60) ILC/Yearbook/1953(II), p.77. 
(61) ILC/Yearbook/1953(11), p.78. 
(62) Para.5.2.d)(i) infra. 
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was "too vague for the purposes of law" thus is paramount . Importantly, it strengthens the 
idea that the adopted delimitation rules were not only legal rules, but rules that (as required 
by states) stressed certainty in particular. 
The quest of the ILC for a generally applicable rule may be summarised in a few 
ideas. The main difficulty that it had to face was to combine the two focal points conveyed 
by the Committee of Experts: the recourse to equidistance; and the need to provide for cases 
where departures from it would have to be considered. One needs scarcely point out that 
while the former epitomised the relevance of geography, the latter stemmed from concerns 
with equity. It is quite remarkable that technical experts and lawyers, although approaching 
delimitation from different backgrounds, arrived at analogous ideas. This fact has to be duly 
weighed when assessing the Commission's work. 
1.3. The First Conference on the Law of the Sea 
1.3.a) Draft Articles 
The 1953 debates are central to understanding the provisions on delimitation 
included in the draft articles before the 1958 Conference64. They are a key element in the 
interpretation of the delimitation provisions of the 1958 Conventions. Consequently, they 
become the point of departure for the final part of this chapter. 
The amended text for draft Article 7, which was presented to the Commission in 
1953, evidenced the ideas of the Committee of Experts as to standards of delimitation. No 
reference was however made to the situations in which departure from equidistance would 
be possible. Notwithstanding this, Francois emphasised that the Committee "had agreed that 
the rules might give rise to doubts in certain specific cases, but had recognised that it would 
be impossible to devise a universally applicable method"65. Whether allowance should be 
made for "special cases where the application of the normal rule would lead to manifest 
hardship''' was the issue that Sandstrom raised66. Noting that the Committee's reference to 
"navigation interests" and "fishing" were issues related only with territorial sea delimitation 
Francois agreed that attention had to be paid to some special cases. He affirmed that, though 
"a general rule was necessary, [...] it was also necessary to provide for exceptions to i t " 6 7 . 
(63) ILC/Yearbook/1954(11), p.158, commentary to Article 16, emphasis added. This statement was kept in the commentary to the 
1956 draft Article 14 (ILC/Yearbook/1956(II), p.272). As stated in the commentary to draft Article 72 (p.300), the principles 
adopted for continental shelf delimitation were the same as those adopted for the territorial sea. 
(64) ILC/Yearbook/1956(II), pp.271-272, 300. 
(65) ILC/Yearbook/1953(I), p.106. 
(66) Ibid., p. 126, emphasis added. 
(67) Ibid., pp. 127-128. 
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Quite clearly, the use of the term "general rule" in the paragraph relating to cases of 
oppositeness was intended to allow departures from the median line 6 8. An equivalent term -
"as a rule" - was proposed for the paragraph dealing with situations of adjacency69. 
Lauterpacht raised doubts, however, as to whether the expression "general rule" would not 
deprive such a rule of its legal character70. With regard to the term "as a rule", he asserted 
that "no judge or arbitrator could interpret a text so worded". Noting that "he appreciated 
the point that some mention had to be made of exceptions", he suggested that "it would be 
better to specify the cases rather than to open the door to difficulties of interpretation". 
Agreeing, Yepes stated that "a reference to exceptions should be included, but it should be 
worded differently"7 1. Owing to this criticism, these expressions were abandoned. 
Irrespective of whether this was the right option, it ought to be noted that years later 
the views of the Commission as to the normative character of the expression "general rule" 
changed. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (VCLT) 
contains a "general rule of interpretation" which can be departed from, according to 
Article 32(b), when it "leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable". These 
articles were adopted by the Conference with no material changes in relation to the proposal 
of the ILC. The purpose in quoting this provision is to suggest that the Commission could 
have easily adopted a similar structure with respect to the delimitation rule. Had it been 
adopted, the expression "general rule" would in no way have deprived the delimitation 
provision of its normative nature. Its effect would have been simply to recognise the 
existence of cases where equidistance would not be applicable owing to the manifestly 
inequitable nature of the resulting boundary. Equidistance would appear as the starting 
point of all delimitations, but not necessarily as the final line. The correspondence between 
"general rule" and "starting point" is explicit in the commentary to draft Article 27 (general 
rule of interpretation) of the project of convention on the law of treaties, which states that 
"the starting point of interpretation [should be] the elucidation of the meaning of the text"72. 
As will be shown, after a somewhat 'tortuous' development, the idea of equidistance as a 
starting point for all delimitations eventually prevailed73. 
How to define the exceptions to the use of equidistance was the major substantive 
issue faced by the ILC members. Whether to describe those exceptions in general terms, or 
to opt for an exhaustive enumeration, was the problem that had to be tackled. Considering 
the arguments raised against the term "general rule", Spiropoulos proposed that the 
(68) The Committee of Experts had used the term "rigle generate" in its report. 
(69) ILC/Yearbook/1953(1), p.131. 
(70) Ibid., p. 128. 
(71) /AW., p.131. 
(72) ILC/Yearbook/1966/11, p.220. 
(73) Paras.6.3., 6.4., Conclusions to Part II infra. 
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expression "unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances" should be 
used instead74. When the issue was raised again by Lauterpacht in relation to the term "as a 
rule", Sandstrom reintroduced Spiropoulos' proposal. During the debate, Francois clarified 
that "the purpose of inserting an escape clause was to enable arbitrators to deviate from the 
rule in [special] circumstances"15. As Spiropoulos observed, the intention was precisely to 
leave to judges and arbitrators to assess what constituted special circumstances; an approach 
endorsed by Alfaro, who confirmed that arbitral tribunals "would have to pronounce on the 
existence or non-existence of such special circumstances"76. 
It is clear that the attempt to define 'special circumstances' exhaustively, as an 
'exceptional clause', as jus singulare requiring restrictive interpretations, was rejected by 
the LLC7 7. Instead, the choice was to have recourse to an indeterminate concept that had to 
be interpreted in concreto. The intention was to leave to courts to assess, in cases where 
agreement could not be reached, what constituted special circumstances. As Spiropoulos 
explained, "only in cases where the application of the [equidistance] rule would lead to 
manifest unfairness would it have to be waived"78. Special circumstances was undeniably 
seen as a notion to be assessed in concreto, through a judgment of (un)reasonableness, 
which seems to amount more to the use of equity in its corrective role rather than to decide 
ex aequo et bono19. 
In 1954 and 1955, the ILC continued its work on the regime of the territorial sea. As 
regards delimitation, however, no substantive innovations were introduced. The drafting of 
the delimitation provisions was clearly determined by the report of the Committee of 
Experts and the 1953 debates that followed. By 1955, situations of oppositeness (Article 12) 
were still treated separately from those of delimitation in straits (Article 14)80. These two 
articles were eventually merged in Article 12 on "Delimitation of the territorial sea in straits 
and off other opposite coasts"81. A l l in all, the delimitation provisions included in the 1956 
final draft maintained the 1953 standard based on equidistance and special circumstances82. 
The ILC debates and the commentaries to the draft articles show that equidistance 
was seen as a general rule to apply in delimitation. "Reasonable modifications" were 
deemed admissible wherever special circumstances were considered to exist. The rule was 
(74) ILC/Yearbook/1953(I), p.130. 
(75) Ibid., emphasis added. 
(76) /&/</., pp.132-133. 
(77) The difference is crucial in as far as the adoption of a jus singulare enumeration would impose a restrictive interpretation of the 
exceptions turning impossible any kind of analogical interpretation. 
(78) ILC/Yearbook/1953(I), p.133; emphasis added. 
(79) As to the facts that may be weighed in the equity-oriented assessment, cf. paras.7.2., 8.2, 8.3. infra. 
(80) ILC/Yearbook/1954(1), pp.100-103; ILC/Yearbook/1954(11), pp.157-158; ILC/Yearbook/1955(II), p.38. 
(81) ILC/Yearbook/1956(11), p.271. 
(82) By proposal of the UN General Assembly, all matters concerning the law of the sea were grouped systematically in a single 
document (UN Doc, GA Res.899(IX), of 14 December 1954). 
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undoubtedly devised to be seen as "fairly elastic", and applied "very flexibly" . It also 
became clear that such rule would only be applicable in situations where no agreement 
could be reached between states. The concept of special circumstances was seen as 
including, inter alia, "exceptional configurations of the coast", "the presence of islands or 
navigable channels", "fishing interests", and the convexity and concavity of coasts84. It 
should be noted, first, that not all islands were looked upon as special circumstances, and 
secondly, that low-tide elevations were a fortiori included in this category. Importantly, 
some special circumstances were seen as not bearing upon all delimitations. As Francois 
noted, questions of navigation and fishing interests should not be considered in delimiting 
the continental shelf' 8 5. The reason is obvious. The Commission had agreed since the very 
beginning that the control and jurisdiction of states over the continental shelf should not 
affect the right of free navigation or the right of free fishing in the superjacent waters86. This 
principle was later embodied in Article 5(1) of the CS Convention. 
The idea that the rule emerging from the ILC debates amounts to progressive 
development deserves some support. As to continental shelf delimitation this leaves little 
doubt, i f only because it concerned a maritime zone whose regime had not crystallised by 
1951. With regard to the territorial sea, however, the recourse to equidistance as the prima 
facie delimitation line, subject to adjustments in the presence of exceptional circumstances, 
had already been advanced in the mid-1930's. Gidel portrayed it as "la regie de droit 
commun", and saw the absence of agreement and of "conditions physiques exceptionelles" 
as the prerequisite for applying the median line as a rule of delimitation87. Importantly, this 
referred both to oppositeness and adjacency. Finally, it is notable that the idea of weighing 
factual circumstances in concreto had been resorted to in the Grisbadarna arbitration. 
1.3.b) The Debates in the Conference 
The delimitation provisions drafted by the ILC had a homogeneous structure that 
reflected their intertwined development. Although discussed in different Committees of the 
Conference, that homogeneity was essentially not broken. The two main changes that were 
introduced in the rule regulating the delimitation of the territorial sea are not enough to say 
that they brought about an alteration of the kernel of the delimitation provisions. The first 
change stemmed from a Norwegian proposal in the First Committee, which led to the 
(83) ILC/Report/1956, p. 18,44. 
(84) Respectively, ILC/Yearbook/1953(II), p.216 and p.79, 1952(1), pp.182, 190. Although concavity and convexity were 
mentioned in the debates on territorial sea delimitation, they are obviously applicable to the cases of continental shelf delimitation. 
(85) ILC/Yearbook/1953(1), pp.127, 129,134. 
(86) ILC/Yearbook/1950(1), p.224. 
(87) Gidel/1934, pp.756-757, 769-773. For a review of the standards for territorial sea delimitation alluded to by the doctrine in the 
early 20* century, where the median line had a central place, cf. e.g. Johnston/1988, pp. 129-131. 
- 3 6 -
TOWARDS THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF MARITIME DELIMITATION 
combination in one single article of the two draft provisions on territorial sea delimitation; 
because "the problems dealt with in the two articles were so closely related as in some cases 
to be practically indistinguishable"88. The phraseology of the article on the delimitation of 
the continental shelf was discussed, but the duality of equidistance-special circumstances 
was eventually maintained89. 
A second alteration stemming from the Conference is the reference to "historic title" 
in territorial sea delimitation provisions, which again resulted from a proposal put forward 
by Norway. According to it, in the case of "prescriptive usage" states would be entitled to 
define their boundaries "in a way which is at variance with" equidistance. The Grisbadarna 
arbitration and the Fisheries case apparently motivated this proposal, where the juridical 
value of historic title was considered in the allocation of maritime areas90. The influence of 
historic titles in defining the extent of the territorial sea seemed to already be reflected in 
the work of the Preparatory Committee for the 1930 Conference. The commentary to the 
Basis of Discussion No. 16 mentioned that in defining the territorial waters it was 
"necessary to take into consideration [...] the existence of any usage varying the ordinary 
rule"91. The argument found support during this First Conference. The insertion of the 
expression "historic title" was justified on the grounds that situations of longa possessio or 
historic rights have "the same legal value as those acquired by an explicit agreement"92. The 
Committee eventually adopted this alteration93. Inasmuch as the 'juridical continental shelf 
was at the time a recent concept, it is understandable that no mention of historically 
consolidated rights was made during the debates in the Fourth Committee94. 
It is important to stress that the Conference confirmed the previously underlined 
willingness of states to define normative delimitation criteria. Not agreeing with the use of 
equidistance in the delimitation provisions, Venezuela advanced a proposal making no 
reference to substantive criteria, which was rejected by strong majority9 5. 
There is also plentiful evidence to suggest that the Conference was not prepared to 
alter the relationship between equidistance and special circumstances proposed by the ILC. 
Yugoslavia, Portugal, Greece, and to some extent Norway and Colombia, wanted the 
reference to special circumstances to be deleted. These approaches were rejected by the 
(88) The example advanced in support to this idea was of "a common land frontier which met the sea at the head of a deep bay". 
Compare I L C draft Articles 12 and 14 (ILC/Report/1956, pp.271-272); Off.Rec-1958(111), p.188 ; T S / C Z Convention, Article 12; 
CS Convention, Article 6. On the distinction between oppositeness and adjacency, cf. para.l.3.c)(iv) infra. 
(89) The article on continental shelf delimitation was approved before the debate on the delimitation of the territorial sea in the First 
Committee (Off.Rec.-19S8(II), p.15). The almost unanimous approval of the former was used as an argument for not introducing 
major changes in the contents of the latter (Off.Rec.-l958(in), p. 191). 
(90) Off.Rec.-1958(III), p.239. 
(91) AJIL./1930/24(Supp.), p.36. 
(92) F.R.Germany, Off.Rec.-1958(111), p. 187. 
(93) Off.Rec.-1958(HI), pp.190, 193. 
(94) Brown/1992, p.82; Weil/1989a, p.138, footnote 103. 
(95) Off.Rec.-1958(VT), pp.97, 138. 
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Conference . Noteworthy in the debates was the straightforward assertion that, even in the 
presence of special circumstances, equidistance "would still provide the best starting point 
for negotiations''''91. I f anything, the Conference thus re-emphasised the use of equidistance 
tempered by special circumstances as the substantive delimitation rule. 
The Conference debates could go no further than the Commission had already gone 
in relation to the notion of special circumstances. The enumerative approach did not gain 
support, and an unspecified reference thereto was thus kept. However, other types of special 
circumstances bearing on continental shelf delimitation were proposed as, for example, the 
existence of special mineral exploitation rights or of mineral deposits98. Although the 
recourse to special circumstances was linked to the need to ensure equitable delimitations, it 
is important to stress that the so-called "equitable principles" were again virtually ignored. 
Hence, since state practice referring to this expression was considered, and since states 
supported instead the use of the rules incorporated in the ILC draft articles, it must be 
concluded that the use of the so-called "equitable principles" was rejected. It is even more 
so when considering the overwhelming majorities that approved, without any votes against, 
the articles governing territorial sea and continental shelf delimitation99. These elements 
cannot be discarded when assessing state practice with a view to establish the nascence of a 
customary rule, i f only because this practice hampers the emergence of an opposite rule 1 0 0. 
Finally, it must be noted that the work of the Conference also resulted in the 
inclusion of a provision dealing with contiguous zone delimitation. Such an article had not 
been foreseen in the ILC drafting. Following a Yugoslavian proposal, the Conference 
added, without much debate it must be said, a third paragraph to draft Article 66, which 
made reference only to equidistance101. 
1.3.c) Ratio Legis of the Delimitation Rules 
The prevalence of the traditional jus tractuum of states over any delimitation rule 
was acknowledged from the very beginning, and is reflected in the conventional provisions. 
Strictly speaking, however, this reference is not a part of the delimitation rule. What has to 
be investigated is the operativeness of the normative standards of delimitation included in 
the Geneva Conventions. Importantly, the interpretation of the delimitation rules, it is 
(96) Off.Rec.-1958(ni), pp.187, 190, 192 and 1958(VI), pp.91,94, 130, 133, 138. 
(97) Off.Rec.-1958(VI), pp.92-93, emphasis added. The notion of equidistance as a starting point for delimitation was referred to the 
United Kingdom delegation (Gutteridge and Kennedy), and reflects how the rule was envisaged to operate. Cf. para.l.3.a) supra. 
(98) Off.Rec.-1958(VI), pp.91-98, in particular pp.93, 95. 
(99) Off.Rec-1958(11), pp.15,64. The results were respectively 63 to none, with 2 abstentions, and 76 to none, with 1 abstention. 
(100) Thirlway seems to be against giving any relevance in the customary law-making process to the assertions of states made in 
international conferences (Thirlway/1990, p.55). This is arguably correct; but only to the extent that it means that no definitive 
conclusions can be drawn from such statements only. 
(101) Off.Rec.-1958(111), pp.91, 182,226. During the Plenary sessions no reference seems to have been made to this provision. 
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submitted, should not be carried out separately. Their contents are better grasped i f the 
evolving process of the delimitation provisions, started with the preparatory works of the 
ILC, is considered on the whole. 
1.3 .c)(i) Equidistance and Special Circumstances 
The use of the term "necessary" in Article 12 of the TS/CZ Convention, as opposed 
to the term "justified" in Article 6 of the CS Convention, does not seem to have altered 
materially the relationship between equidistance and special circumstances102. The former 
term appeared in the text due to the insertion of the proviso concerning "historic title", and 
seems to have no more than a formal impact103. In any event, the recourse to equidistance 
was devised as a general rule, i.e. a starting point for the delimitation, to which reasonable 
modifications were to be introduced where special circumstances so warranted104. Indeed, 
the report of the Committee of Experts, and the realisation that resort to strict equidistance 
could be inequitable, have led the Commission to design a flexible standard. It combined a 
reference to equidistance, which was to be modified in face of special circumstances105. The 
main difficulty in the application of this equidistance-special circumstances rule is that no 
precise definition was given to the term special circumstances. Although using diverse 
approaches, scholars have often noted this fact 1 0 6. 
What 'special circumstances' actually means is thus difficult to assert; and this is 
where authors disagree. The travaux preparatoires suggest that it is an equity-oriented 
concept. Exceptional configurations and concavity or convexity of coasts, the location of 
islands, navigational channels, fishing interests, mineral deposits or exploitation rights, are 
examples that were advanced107. It may be added that none of these examples can be seen as 
always constituting special circumstances, and that some of them have relevance for the 
(102) Cf. e.g. Weil/1989a, p.138, footnote 103; Bowett/1979, p.36. 
(103) It stems from the amended Norwegian proposal; cf. Off.Rec-1958(111), pp.192-193, 239. 
(104) ILC/Yearbook/1953(II), p.216; Off.Rec.-1958(VI), pp.93-96. Cf. e.g. Jayewardene/1990, p.303; Vcelckel/1979, p.707; 
Whiteman/1965, p.329, citing Pearcy; Shalowitz/1962(1), p.232; Gutteridge/1959, p.120; Kennedy/1958 (unpublished), at 
conclusions; Judge Koretsky, Dissenting Opinion, North Sea cases, ICJ/Report/1969, p.162. Referring to equidistance as "a clear 
and unambiguous guideline", cf. Tanja/1990, p.40. 
(105) Viewing the equidistance-special circumstances formula as one of general rule-exception, e.g. Franck/1997, p.61 ("escape 
clause"); Ahnish/1993, pp.55-57; Brown/1992, p.107, Attard/1987, p.229; Dipla/1984, pp.148, 173; Rhee/1981, p.610; 
Bowett/1979, pp.149-150; judges Tanaka, Lachs and Serensen, Dissenting Opinions, North Sea cases, ICJ/Report/1969, pp.187, 
240, 255; Judge Shahabuddeen, Separate Opinion, Jan Mayen case, ICJ/Report/1993, p.157. Contra Symonides/1984, pp.41-42. 
Some authors argue for what seems to be a third genus, where equidistance and special circumstances have a non-hierarchical 
relationship; cf. Charney/1989, p.34; O'Conneli/1989, p.705; Caflisch/1980, p.91. 
(106) Oude Elferink/1994, pp.22-23; Brown/1992, pp.75-76; Jayewardene/1990, pp.304-305; Tanja/1990, p.45; O'Connell/1989, 
pp.673-674; McDougal/Burke/1987, pp.436-437; Symonides/1984, p.23; Dipla/1984, p.135. In relation to case law, cf. the North 
Sea cases, ICJ/Reports/1969, p.42, para.72. 
(107) Shalowitz/1962(I), p.232. Although proposed by Iran during the Conference (Off.Rec.-1958(VI), pp.92, 142), the recourse to 
the high-water mark where the low-water mark cannot be used should not be seen as a special circumstance. What is involved 
here is a change of referential for computing the equidistance-line. Oude Elferink seems to accept the view that it is a type of 
special circumstance (Oude Elferink/1994, p.21). 
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delimitation of certain maritime zones only . The conclusion is that special circumstances 
exist where, in concreto, their existence causes equidistance to yield a rather inequitable 
boundary. Since the "function [or classical role] of equity is precisely to mitigate the 'blind 
effect' of rules of law when their application in particular situations produce 'extraordinary, 
unnatural or unreasonable' results"109, the equity-base of this concept seems undoubted. 
One important point concerns the fact that no explicit limit was set to the category 
of circumstances to be appraised. Lauterpacht was critical of the idea of exceptions to be 
identified by judges on the ground that it was tantamount to giving courts the power to 
judge ex aequo et bono110. This criticism is somewhat striking. During the debates on the 
definition of island, this eminent jurist proposed the adoption of the expression "normal 
circumstances" to qualify the expression "permanently above high-water mark", in order to 
account for "exceptional cases" in which an island would be covered by water1". It may 
safely be affirmed that the term ''normal circumstances" is no less indeterminate than 
"special circumstances". 
When exceptions to a rule have to be considered, the choice between describing 
generally those situations and enumerating them exhaustively must always be made. Insofar 
as foreseeing all contingencies is sometimes impossible, in many circumstances a general 
definition of exceptions offers the best balance between certainty and fairness. More often 
than not exhaustive enumerations raise insurmountable difficulties. For one thing, they may 
lead to treating differently situations that, although not having been foreseen in the 
enumeration, are substantively equal to those included therein - thus giving rise to great 
unfairness. For another, their rigidity increases the likelihood of obsolescence of the regime. 
One would contend that the reference to special circumstances was not intended to amount 
to an 'exceptional clause' in the sense of jus singulare. For it did not convey a meaning that 
contradicts a fundamental principle of law, i.e. it did not bear a spirit contra rationem juris. 
Analogical interpretations were thus allowed. 
In delimitation, evidence concerning the possible existence of special circumstances 
has to be put forward by the claiming party. How these circumstances lead to an inequitable 
boundary also has to be shown, in order to facilitate in casu the proper interpretation of the 
rule by the decision-making body112. But this is no more difficult than presenting evidence 
to support any other claim based on equitable considerations. It may be suggested then that 
(108) The view that each island "should be considered on its merits", and that its classification as a special circumstance depended 
on a case-to-case assessment, for example, was prevalent. The rejection of an Italian proposal is clear indication of this approach. 
Also, navigation channels and fisheries were viewed as irrelevant for continental shelf delimitation (para. 1.3.a) supra.). 
(109) Jennings/1989, pp.399-400. 
(110) ILC/Yearbook/1953(I), p.131. 
(111) ILC/Yearboook/1954(I), p.92. 
(112) In relation to this issue, cf. Ahnish/1993, p.42; Brown/1992, p.107; McDougal/Burke/1987, p.437; Bowett/1979, p.150; Judge 
Shahabuddeen, Separate Opinion, Jon Mayen case, ICJ/Report/1993, p. 157. 
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inasmuch as special circumstances are the justification for departing from the equidistance-
line, an onus probandi latissimo sensu lies on the claimant in casu. Equidistance emerges as 
a juris tantum presumption"3, refutable by evidence of existence of special circumstances. 
Notwithstanding this, adjudicating bodies are entitled to investigate the matter by their own 
initiative, in view of attaining a proper interpretation the rule: jura novit curiaU4. 
Insofar as the use of strict equidistance was qualified by modifications "justified by 
special circumstances", it seems to have a "residual character". This viewpoint, which is 
based upon the statements of the United Kingdom and The Netherlands in the Fourth 
Committee"5, is one possible understanding of the role of equidistance. Recourse to strict 
equidistance would presuppose the fulfilment of two negative conditions: the absence of 
agreement, and the absence of special circumstances"6. Furthermore, this qualification of 
equidistance by special circumstances was undoubtedly intended to avoid inequitable 
delimitations in situations where the use of strict equidistance would lead thereto. This goal 
is explicit in references made by the ILC members to equity, which can be traced back to 
1951. Questions of "unfairness", "manifest hardship", and "undue hardship" in delimitation 
were the teleological motivations behind the departures from equidistance considered in the 
form of special circumstances"7. This is why, in Franck's words, the combined rule invites 
"principled and reasoned fairness discourse, including elements of distributive justice"m. 
1.3.c)(ii) Historic Title 
Although it is beyond the scope of this study to analyse the legal regime of historic 
title and historic rights, the mention of historic title in the delimitation rule applicable to the 
territorial sea justifies further examination. Broadly speaking, a historic maritime title 
depends upon the existence of a possessio longi temporis, carried out a titre de souverain, to 
which it has to be given due notoriety, and to which the international community as a whole 
(113) It might be argued, because theoretically a state might claim less than equidistance, that there is no presumption in favour of 
equidistance. This idea cannot be accepted. The fact that a state decides, in concreto, to claim less than equidistance, is irrelevant 
in establishing the contents of the norm. Either it amounts to recognising the existence of special circumstances (in which case the 
rule is in effect being applied), or it amounts to a voluntary waving of its rights (which is not limited by the content of the rule). 
(114) Oude Elferink questions whether "it is actually possible for a state to prove" the existence of special circumstances, since the 
"drafting history of Article 6 does not give any indication of how this burden of proof can be satisfied" (Oude Elferink/1994, 
p.24). But this is exactly the plane in which that negotiation and adjudication will play their key role (Spiropoulos and Alfaro, 
1 LC/Yearbook/1953(1), pp. 132-133). 
(115) Tanja/1990, p.40; Off.Rec.-1958(VI), pp.93-95. 
(116) Judge Tanaka, Dissenting Opinion, North Sea cases, ICJ/Reports/1969, p.185; Jayewardene/1990, p.300. 
(117) Hudson, Hsu, El-Khoury, ILC/Yearbook/1951(I), pp.287-290; Sandstrflm, Lauterpacht, Spiropoulos, ILC/Yearbook/1953(I), 
pp.126, 132-133. 
(118) Franck/1997, p.61, emphasis added. Similarly, Ahnish/1993, pp.44; Tanja/1990, pp.4M2, 71; Weil/1989a, p.146, 162, 170; 
Jennings/1989, pp.399-400; McDougal/Burke/1987, p.729; Oda/1987, p.357; Weil/1987, p.541; Dipla/1984, pp.148, 173; 
Rhee/1981, p.611; Caflisch/1980, pp.92, 103-104; Whiteman/1965, p.331, citing Pearcy; judges Weeramantry, Dissenting 
Opinion, Jan Mayen case, ICJ/Report/1993, p.235, Judge Oda, Dissenting Opinion, Tunisia/Libya case, ICJ/Report/1982, p.246, 
judges Morelli and Serensen, Dissenting Opinions, and Judge Ammoun, Separate Opinion, North Sea cases, ICJ/Report/1969, 
pp.209, 256, 151. The idea that "the standard of equity was not thought by the International Law Commission [...] and played 
little part in its deliberations on the draft of Article 6 of the CS Convention" is difficult to understand (O'ConncI1/1989, p.694). 
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has acquiesced"9. As derogation away from international law, namely to the principle of the 
freedom of the high seas, this title is then dependent upon the acquiescence of the great 
majority of the states. Whereas historic titles are opposable erga omnes, historic rights are 
advanced merely inter partes, and their scope falls short of sovereignty120. They are 
non-exclusive rights, which Blum categorises into two main types: historic rights of passage 
and historic fishing rights121. Moreover, whilst the former can only be originated by acts of 
state officials or persons authorised to act on behalf of the states, the latter may emerge 
from mere acts of private individuals122. 
The travaux preparatoires seem to indicate that the inclusion of the expression 
"historic title" by the Conference was intended to comprise historic titles and historic rights. 
The statement of the F.R.Germany referred to both situations of longa possessio and 
historic rights123. Substantively, however, the two situations have a marked distinction. A 
historic title signifies that no other state can potentially be entitled to exercise powers over 
the area to which the title is referred. Historic titles exclude the existence of any other title. 
In contradistinction, historic rights have a non-exclusive nature and are reconcilable with a 
maritime title vested in another state124. Arguably relevant for this debate is the 
Eritrea/Yemen arbitration. The Tribunal stated that, by its very nature, the lex pescatoria 
that had been part of the immemorial way of life of the Red Sea fishermen was in no way 
qualified by the maritime zones specified under the LOSC. The traditional regime (which 
included activities other than fishing) was deemed not to be, either for its existence or for its 
protection, dependent on the drawing of a maritime boundary125. This immemorial regime 
remained unaffected by, and had no impact on, the maritime delimitation126. 
Despite having the notion of historic bays at its root, the concept of historic title 
"can apply [...] to waters other than bays, i.e., to straits, archipelagos, and generally to all 
those waters which can be included in the maritime domain of a state"111. Referring 
primarily to internal waters, the claims of historic title can undoubtedly also be put forward 
in relation to the territorial sea. The Court had already upheld this view in the Fisheries 
(119) The factors to weigh in the determination of a historic title are: (i) an exercise of authority for a long period and in accordance 
with the maritime title that is being claimed; (ii) the notoriety and continuity of such display of authority; (iii) the reaction - or 
lack of it - of other states; cf. Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays, ILC/Yearbook/1962(1), pp. 1-26 
(hereinafter "JRHW"). On the question of historic titles over maritime areas, cf. also Blum/1965, pp.241-334; Sharma/1997, 
pp.173-182; Scovazzi/1993, pp.321-331; Jennings/1963, pp.23-28; Johnson/1955, pp.215-225; 0ff.Rec.-1958(I), pp.21-27. 
(120) Blum/1965, p.3ll. 
(121) Ibid., p.315 (for the whole analysis, pp.311-334). The question of sedentary fisheries, and its impact on the regime of the high 
seas and the continental shelf, was looked into by the ILC with particular attention during the travaux preparatoires of the Geneva 
Conventions. Cf. the Special Rapporteur's conclusions (ILC/Yearbook/1951(11), pp. 94-99). 
(122) The activities of the Swedish fishermen in the Grisbadama Banks are a good example (para.2.2. infra). 
(123) Off.Rec.-1958(111), p.187. 
(124) This possibility is clearly admitted by Article 51(1) of the LOSC, where it is prescribed that the state exercising sovereignty 
over archipelagic waters "shall recognise traditional fishing rights" of other states. 
(125) Eritrea/Yemen-II, paras. 109-110. 
(126) For an analysis of this regime, cf. Antunes/2001, pp.301 -316, 339. 
(127) JRHW, ILC/Yearbook/1962(I), p.6, emphasis added. 
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case128. The inclusion of a proviso concerning historic title in the delimitation rule for the 
territorial sea is no more than the recognition of this fact. 
Notably, in theoretical terms, historic title seems to allow states to claim sovereignty 
over areas that lie beyond the limits of what would be in principle their maximum territorial 
sea entitlement. The existence of such sovereignty would only depend upon the proof of 
existence of the historic title 1 2 9. With the advent of the LOSC, however, the territorial sea 
entitlement was extended up to 12 M; and the existence of a historic title beyond that limit 
became very unlikely. With regard other maritime areas - as the EEZ or the continental 
shelf, the existence of a historic title is difficult to conceive in practice. Inasmuch as the 
juridical validity of any claims would have to be assessed in the light of the general theory 
of historic title (notably longa possessio), their existence becomes highly improbable. These 
are relatively recent maritime claims130; a sufficiently long possession over those areas is at 
least problematical, and the requisite of acquiescence or recognition by the international 
community as a whole could not yet have been met. Moreover, historic titles are primarily 
related to the exercise of full sovereignty. 
Where referring alternatively to "historic title or other special circumstances", the 
textual element of the delimitation rule seems to indicate that historic title is just another 
type of special circumstances, which may or may not justify a departure from equidistance. 
This view cannot be supported. Because the overlapping of potential entitlements is a 
conditio sine qua non for the delimitation131, and because historic titles are exclusive in 
nature, it may be affirmed that the existence of a historic title precludes any delimitation of 
the area pertaining thereto. Furthermore, i f historic title has a juridical relevance equivalent 
to that of an "explicit agreement", then formally the equidistance-special circumstances rule 
should not be applied132. Indeed, "full recognition" must be given to historic titles. As Gidel 
puts it, the delimitation rules are not to be applied to historic waters133. As acknowledged in 
the 1958 Conference, historic titles allow states "to go further in delimiting its territorial 
sea from that of neighbouring states than the median line would allow"134. 
(128) ICJ/Reports/1951, pp. 130-139. 
(129) Blum/1965, pp.295-296. 
(130) Weil/1989a, p. 138 (fh. 103). 
(131) Para.4.3. infra. 
(132) The equidistance-special circumstances rule was intended to apply in the absence of an agreement. The expression "in a way 
which is at variance with this provision" was used exactly to reflect an almost free definition of a boundary-line entailed by the 
existence of historic title (Off.Rec.-1958(111), p.239). Supporting this view, cf. Tanja/1990, p.44, fn.128. Weil makes the same 
distinction implicitly (Weil/1989a, p. 138, fh.103). Some authors, although considering historic title as a special circumstance, 
conclude that they "must be given full recognition" (Ahnish/1993, pp.46-47; Jayewardene/1990, pp.274-277). The existence of 
"historical special circumstances" has also been suggested (Brown/1992, p.82). But the distinction between these two concepts is 
not always made (O'Connell/1989, pp.673-679, 713-714; Dipla/1984, p.135; Caflisch/1980, p.77; cf. also, Ceylon, 
Off.Rec.-1958(in), p. 191). 
(133) Gidel/1934, p.774. 
(134) F.R.Germany, Off.Rec.-1958(ni), p. 187. 
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A situation of acquiescence, and/or recognition, of a certain boundary-line is similar 
to that of a historic title. Historic titles emerge in effect from acquiescence or recognition. 
The difference is that in the cases of historic titles, these titles refer to a certain 'maritime 
area' the precise limits of which are yet to be established. Where a dividing line has been 
acquiesced to, or recognised, the boundary is agreed, and delimitation is no longer required. 
Unlike historic title, historic rights are no more than possible special circumstances. 
Whatever their weight in the delimitation, it can only be decided on a case-to-case basis. 
Because the exercise of these non-exclusive rights is not incompatible with the sovereign 
title of another state, sovereignty/jurisdiction over the area in question may be disputed. 
And delimitation may be required to establish the dividing lines between the states 
involved. Departures from equidistance have to be justified by a situation of manifest 
unreasonableness or hardship in casu. In this light, the references made to "navigable 
channels"135 and "fishing interests" during the ILC works, as types of special circumstances 
not related to the coastlines of states, seem to be explained. It is essential to distinguish 
between historic title and historic rights (that only amount to special circumstances). 
Treating both equally would downgrade the true juridical nature of a historic title. 
1.3.c)(iii) Delimitation of the Contiguous Zone 
The delimitation provision concerning the contiguous zone resulted from the work 
of the Conference. For reasons not totally clear, this provision refers only to equidistance, 
and not to special circumstances (or historic title for that matter)136. Notwithstanding this, 
one would argue that this provision should be the object of a corrective interpretation, so 
that it is applied in a way similar to that of the equidistance-special circumstances rule. 
Indeed, some arguments appear to support the view that the absence of reference to special 
circumstances was not intended. First, the Committee of Experts explicitly stated that the 
boundaries of the zones contiguous to the territorial sea should be drawn on the same basis 
as the boundary for the territorial sea137. Secondly, in the Conference states overwhelmingly 
expressed the intention to keep a similar structure for all delimitation provisions138. Thirdly, 
Yugoslavia made proposals in relation to the continental shelf and the territorial sea similar 
to that of the contiguous zone, and they were rejected by the Conference. In short, this 
provision should perhaps be seen as having substantively the same contents as those 
concerning the territorial sea and the continental shelf. 
(135) These interests may be linked to rights of passage and access to ports. On the concept of thalweg, cf. para.5.3.b) infra. 
(136) TS/CZ Convention, Article 24(3). 
(137) rLC/Yearbook/1953(n), p.79. 
(138) Cf. e.g. Turkey, Ceylon and Italy 0ff.Rec.-1958(III), pp.190-191. For the voting majorities, Off.Rec.-1958(II), pp.15, 64. 
- 4 4 -
TOWARDS THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF MARITIME DELIMITATION 
1.3.c)(iv) Oppositeness and Adjacency in Continental Shelf Delimitation 
The article concerning continental shelf delimitation kept the distinction between 
situations of oppositeness and of adjacency, following verbatim the Committee of Experts' 
report139. Neither the report of the Committee of Experts, nor the travaux preparatoires, 
present clear-cut evidence that the two provisions were meant to have a different content. It 
is likely that, during the Conference, the two paragraphs were not combined simply because 
the delimitation provisions on the territorial sea and those concerning the continental shelf, 
were drafted by different Committees, the latter being decided before the former140. The 
view that this distinction consists of an improper use of terms has indeed been advanced141. 
But it might also be the case that the distinction was kept because it was meant to bear a 
different legal-technical meaning142. Whatever the truth, there is little doubt that these two 
provisions were intended to cover all possible situations, being therefore exhaustive. There 
was no question of lacunae in this respect. 
1.3.c)(v) The 'Procedural Element' 
All three delimitation provisions incorporated in the 1958 Conventions have one 
further element in common. They all prescribe that the substantive criteria set down thereby 
apply only in the absence of an agreement. Indeed, if there was any aspect of delimitation 
that the ILC was able to identify in state practice - with particular emphasis on the Truman 
Proclamation - as raising little or no controversy, it was the necessarily bilateral nature of 
the delimitation. In fact, in the travaux preparatoires, the members of the ILC soon 
concluded that it was the only guidance on this matter provided by state practice143. 
More important than anything else is to enquire what is the requirement underlying 
the mention of "agreement". One would argue that is a reference to a procedural element. 
Understanding it as setting down a strict stipulation to negotiate, and to reach agreement, 
seems to overstep the perspective of the ILC and the intention of the states present in the 
1958 Conference. Beneath the said reference was, in reality, merely acknowledgement of 
the necessarily consensual nature of maritime boundaries. Agreement appeared as a 
reflection of the need to obtain the mutual consent of the parties involved144. 
(139) ILC/Yearbook/1953(11), p.79. 
(140) Para.i.3.b) supra. 
(141) Francalanci/1989, p.83. 
(142) Paras.5.2.a)(i), 5.2.e) infra. 
(143) ILC/Yearbook/1950(I), p.233; ILC/Yearbook/1950(II), pp.49-51; ILC/Yearbook/1951(i), pp.285-294. Para. 1.2.b)(i) supra. 
(144) For further elaboration on this issue, cf. para.3.6. infra. 
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Chapter 2 
R E L E V A N T C A S E L A W PRE-1982 
2.1. The Selected Case Law 
Understanding the debates held during the Third Conference requires an analysis of 
previous jurisprudence. Alongside the 1958 Conventions, case law forms the background 
for interpreting the 1982 delimitation rules. Of the cases examined, one was decided long 
before the ILC work that preceded the First Conference: the Grisbadarna arbitration. Its 
impact on delimitation law has to be evaluated in this light. The Anglo/French arbitration 
and the North Sea cases, which were resolved in the inter-conventional period, have a more 
direct and relevant impact upon the debates and controversies that took place in the Third 
Conference, particularly in regard to continental shelf and EEZ delimitation. 
Other cases decided before 1982 could have been examined. However, because 
their importance for understanding the background of the delimitation provisions of the 
LOSC is negligible, they are not formally examined at this stage. The Beagle Channel 
arbitration deals primarily with the attribution of sovereignty over land territory. The issue 
of territorial sea delimitation raised therein involves the application of specific treaty 
provisions governing the situation between the two states involved. Thus it is not a typical 
maritime delimitation case. In the Aegean Sea case, as the ICJ considered that the 
requirements for establishing its jurisdiction had not been met, it passed no judgment on the 
merits. Finally, insofar as the Dubai/Sharjah arbitration and the Tunisia/Libya case were 
both decided not long before the end of the Third Conference, they are unlikely to have had 
any bearing on the debates or the draft texts. 
State practice is another important element of interpretation of the delimitation 
rules, and is usually referred to in case law. References thereto will be made whenever 
required, especially as a basis for comparison with jurisprudence. Essentially, this chapter 
continues to focus on providing elements of interpretation of the substantive delimitation 
standards embedded in LOSC provisions. Emphasis is put on the international law-making 
process as a continuum, in which state practice and case law both play a central role. The 
juxtaposition between jurisprudence on delimitation and the 1958 delimitation rules, 
previously addressed, will thus come up naturally. 
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2.2. The Grisbadarna Arbitration 
2.2.a) Overview: The Dispute and the Award 
The 1909 Grisbadarna arbitration, decided by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 
relates to a dispute between Sweden and Norway. Regarding a territorial sea boundary (in 
the vicinity of fishing grounds known as the Grisbadarna Banks), it may be looked at as the 
first adjudication on maritime delimitation. It concerned a 1661 treaty, which in principle 
had fixed the boundary between the states mentioned. In an attempt to overcome their 
disagreement in the interpretation of this treaty, the two states appointed a Joint 
Commission. Its task was to define the precise course of the boundary as fixed in the treaty. 
An agreement as to where the line ran landward of point XVIII was eventually reached. The 
dispute concerned, therefore, the course of the boundary seawards of that point up to the 
territorial sea limit (which at the time was 4 M for the two states). The Tribunal was first 
asked to decide whether the 1661 treaty had fixed the boundary wholly or in part, and 
where the line should be traced. Should the boundary be viewed as not having been 
delimited (to any extent), the compromis empowered the Tribunal to fix its course in 
accordance with "the circumstances of fact and the principles of international law"1 4 5. 
Sweden claimed that westward of point XVIII the boundary had not been 
completely defined, and in part had not been fixed at all. The Norwegian argument was that, 
even if the boundary had not been completely defined, since the eastward segment of the 
line followed the median line, the same principle should apply throughout the boundary. 
Sweden rejected this claim. Nevertheless, in regard to points XVIII and XIX the two claims 
coincided. As far as point XX was concerned, the only divergence was related to the choice 
of basepoints on the Norwegian side. Only westward of this point did the two claims differ 
substantially. In essence, whereas Norway contended that the boundary should run south of 
the Grisbadarna Banks, Sweden argued for a line traced to the north of these banks. 
The Award rendered by the Tribunal has two key points of departure. On the one 
hand, it is an Award that involves the interpretation of a boundary treaty. On the other hand, 
in accordance with the principle of intertemporal law, the Award was decided on the basis 
of the principles of law in force in the 17th century. The Tribunal concluded that it had not 
been demonstrated that the boundary fixed by the 1661 treaty was based on the median line 
rule. Concluding also that the treaty did not fix the whole of the boundary, it stressed that, 
even if the inner sector of the boundary was based on the median line, this would not 
necessarily mean that the same rule would apply to the outer sector. 
(145) AJ1L/1910/4, pp.226-227. For an illustration of this case, see Figure 1. 
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With regard to the precise course of the boundary, the Tribunal noted that both 
parties agreed on the location of point XIX. As to the further delimitation up to point XX, 
the conclusion was that a "division along the median line" had in practice been accepted by 
both states as the rule stemming from the 1661 treaty. Considering that it could be 
concluded "with sufficient certainty" that Heiefluer reefs, which Norway claimed should be 
used on its side as the basepoints to determine point XX, had not yet emerged from the 
water at the time of the 1661 treaty, the Tribunal upheld the Swedish contention and used 
Hejeknub rock instead. Notably, in this sector, the boundary is not (in strict technical terms) 
a median line, because not all of its points are equidistant from the nearest basepoints. 
Along the boundary-line, only points XVIII, XIX and XX are at an equal distance from the 
selected basepoints. Such a line is merely 'broadly based' on equidistance146. 
Faced with delimitation proprio sensu in the outer sector, the Tribunal turned to the 
applicable normative standards. The median line rule was deemed as not finding "sufficient 
support in the law of nations in force in the seventeenth century". The thalweg rule was also 
rejected, on the grounds that it had not been demonstrated that this rule had been followed 
in the present case. To the Tribunal, "much more in accord with the ideas of the seventeenth 
century" was the idea that the delimitation should be effected by a perpendicular to the 
general direction of the coast of which the maritime territory constituted an appurtenance147. 
The effective presence of Sweden in the Grisbadarna region was central for the 
decision. Incidentally, the Tribunal observed that lobster fishing had been carried out in 
these banks "for a much longer time, to a much larger extent, and by much larger fishers by 
the subjects of Sweden than by the subjects of Norway". It further stressed that Sweden had 
performed various acts related to fishing that denoted its conviction as to its rights over the 
Grisbadarna Banks148 - and against which Norway never objected. Similar acts performed 
by Norway were deemed less relevant - for they had taken place after the Swedish acts, had 
not spread over a sufficiently long period, and could not be compared in terms of 
expenses149. The fact that fishing was of greater importance to the inhabitants of Koster 
(Sweden) than to those of Hvaler (Norway) was viewed as strengthening the previous 
points. Relying on the principle quieta non movere150, the Tribunal thus concluded that the 
status quo should not be disturbed by the delimitation. The agreement between the parties in 
(146) This line appears to be a sort of pseudo-equidistance; cf. para.5.2.e) infra. 
(147) AJIL/1910/4, p.232, emphasis added. 
(148) These acts included the installation and maintenance of a light-boat, the placing of beacons, and the measurement of the sea, 
and were deemed to involve "considering expense", and to demonstrate that Sweden acted not just in the exercise of her right, but 
was in fact performing its duty. 
(149) These acts (seen as less relevant than those of Sweden) comprised the placing of a bellbuoy, and some measurements of the 
sea. 
(150) The Tribunal referred to it as "a settled principle of the law of nations" according to which "a state of things which actually 
exists and has existed for a long time should be changed as little as possible" (AJIL/1910/4, p.233). 
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relation to "the great unsuitability of tracing the boundary across important banks" 
allowed the Tribunal to approach the allocation of the fishing grounds in an 'all-or-nothing 
fashion', and to draw the boundary in such a way as to leave the whole of the Grisbadarna 
Banks to Sweden. 
Having due account of the de jure and de facto circumstances, as well as the advice 
of an expert, the Tribunal concluded that the general direction of the coast was "about 20 
degrees westward from due north" (i.e. true azimuths 160°-340°), and that the perpendicular 
thereto would "run toward the west to about 20 degrees to the south" (i.e. true azimuths 
070°-250°). To avoid cutting across the Grisbadarna Banks (while leaving Skjcttegrunde 
Bank to the north) the boundary-line was fixed as running "from point X X westward to 19 
degrees south" (i.e. true azimuths 071°-251°). 
2.2.b) Critical Analysis 
An analysis of the Grisbadarna arbitration has to consider two aspects previously 
stressed. The fact that the delimitation of the outer sector of the boundary was founded on 
international law as in force in the 17 th century cannot be dismissed lightly. It must be duly 
considered when referring to the normativity resorted to by the Tribunal. Furthermore, it 
must be noted that the inner sector of the boundary was defined through an interpretation of 
the treaty provisions, which took into account the posterior practice of the two states. 
Anderson draws interesting parallels between this decision and recent developments 
of delimitation law 1 5 2 . In his view, the ILC's conclusions153 (subsequent to the advice of the 
Committee of Experts) as to the vagueness of the perpendicular method for the purposes of 
law did not stand the test of time. Contending that the same criticism might be directed 
against the equidistance-special circumstances rule, he notes the similitude with the North 
Sea cases, in regard to the conclusion that equidistance was not a rule of law. He also draws 
a parallel between the expression "just and lawful determination of the boundary" utilised 
by the Tribunal, and the expression "equitable solution" used in Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of 
the LOSC. Observing that perpendiculars to the coast have been used in state practice, in 
litigation and in jurisprudence, he suggests that the method of perpendicular stood the test 
of time and should be retained as potentially usable. 
Whilst not disagreeing with the conclusion that the method of perpendiculars to the 
coast might be of extreme utility in delimitation, attention must be devoted to other 
(151) /ftW.,pp.233-235. 
(152) Anderson/1996, pp.158-164. 
(153) ILC/Yearbook/1953(H), p.78, and commentary to draft Article 14, iLC/Yearbook/l 956(11), p.272. 
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propositions. A perpendicular to the general direction of the coast is simply one possible 
simplification of equidistance; and as such, it allows a high degree of subjectivity. There is 
also the question of the scientific knowledge in the 17 lh century. Computing accurately a 
strict equidistant line was probably impossible at the time 1 5 4 . As to the juridical status of 
equidistance in international law, the comparison with the North Sea cases must be seen 
cum grano salis. In the Grisbadarna arbitration, "all evidence presented on the relevant 
'principles of international law' that had evolved between 1661 and 1909 was discarded, 
and the opportunity to consolidate the norms rejected"155. Extrapolating therefrom to the 
law of the 20 t h century is thus far from being an easy step. Further, with respect to the North 
Sea cases, the rule under scrutiny should have been the equidistance-special circumstances 
rule, not strict equidistance156. Another issue is the reference to a "just and lawful 
determination of the boundary". The term "just" was used not so much in the sense of 
"equitable" or "fair", but as meaning "well grounded", "justified", and "legitimate". This 
interpretation is supported by the original French version of the Award, which refers to 
"une determination legitime et justifiee de la frontiere"]S1. The aim apparently was to stress 
that the solution devised (the use of a perpendicular to the coast) was a reasoned decision, 
founded on law. 
For contemporary delimitation law, the most notable feature of this Award is the 
way in which the Swedish and Norwegian activities in the Grisbadarna area were 
weighed-up in the delimitation process. The approach adopted, in which the provenance, the 
nature, the relevance and the timing of certain acts were balanced-up in relative terms, 
resembles the adjudication of a sovereign ti t le 1 5 8 . Indeed, this arbitration already led authors 
to the conclusion that, in regard to sovereignty over sea areas, the "actual exploitation of the 
resources of the disputed area is probably the most decisive consideration"159. 
Weighing-up the evidence, the Tribunal concluded that assigning the Grisbadarna 
Banks to Sweden [was] "supported by all of several circumstances of fact" 1 6 0. The fact that 
the Tribunal referred not only to private fishing activities, but also considered the sovereign 
acts of Sweden in the area must be emphasised. Arguably, this adjudication is perhaps more 
about the existence of a historic title over the Grisbadarna region rather than a question of 
historic fishing rights. In effect, this approach provides a good example of how the proviso 
(154) Paras.5.2.a), 5.2.e) infra. 
(155) Johnston/1988, p.m. 
(156) Para.2.3.c) infra, and Conclusions to Part I. 
(157) RIAA/XI , p. 160. 
(158) Sharma/1997, pp.196-197. 
(159) Munkman/1972, p.101 (referring to the Grisbadarna, North Atlantic Coast Fisheries, Gulf of Fonseca and Fisheries cases). 
(160) AJlU1910/4, p.233. 
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on historic title in the rule for territorial sea delimitation might be interpreted. What the 
Tribunal did, arguably, was to recognise the Swedish title over the Grisbadarna shoals161. 
To what extent the outcome was shaped by the agreement between the parties as to 
not cutting across important banks is difficult to assert. The terms of the Award are unclear 
as to the relevance attributed thereto in the reasoning. It is particularly so in the light of the 
fact that the Tribunal emphasised the principle of quieta non movere as the decisive legal 
argument for attributing the Grisbadarna Banks to Sweden. The elements weighed-up in the 
process include not only aspects related to historic rights - the fishing activities, but also 
aspects which are true displays of state authority - the activities performed by Sweden in 
the Grisbadarna Banks a titre de souverain. 
2.3. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 
2.3.a) Overview of the Judgment 
2.3.a)(i) The Dispute 
The North Sea Continental Shelf cases involved disputes of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (hereinafter "Germany") with both The Netherlands and Denmark as regards their 
continental shelf delimitation. The geographical setting is illustrated in Figure 2. In simple 
terms, it may be said that the German North Sea coastline forms a corner lying adjacent to, 
and between, the Dutch and Danish coasts. A partial delimitation of the continental shelf, 
based on equidistance, had already been effected through negotiations162. An agreement 
respecting the further course of the boundaries, however, could not be reached. In the 
meantime, another agreement between Denmark and The Netherlands, defining a boundary 
on the basis of strict equidistance - and imposing a Injunction point on Germany - led to a 
dispute as to the location of the boundaries between these three states163. The International 
Court of Justice was then requested to declare "what principles and rules of international 
law [were] applicable to the delimitation" 1 6 4. It is noteworthy that the Court was not, 
however, asked to define or draw the boundary-line165. Although the parties were during the 
course of the proceedings very discreet as to the economic motivations underlying this 
dispute, it seems clear that the access to oil and gas was one key point in question166. 
(161) As to giving full precedence to historic titles in maritime delimitation, cf. paras. 1.3.c)(ii) supra, 3.4. infra. 
(162) Appendix 2, B23-B24. The boundaries extended 25 M and 30 M from the end of the territorial sea boundary. 
(163) Appendix 2, B20. 
(164) Special Agreements between Germany and both The Netherlands and Denmark; cf. ICJ/Pleadings/1968(l), pp.6, 8. 
(165) For a summary of the claims of both parties, cf. ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.9-22. 
(166) Lang/1970, pp.9-11. 
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Germany based its case primarily on the so-called principle ofjust and equitable 
share: each state would be apportioned a just and equitable share of the continental shelf, 
"in proportion to the length of coastlines". It also argued that the equidistance method and 
the rule of Article 6(2) of the CS Convention had not become a rule of customary law. 
Subsidiarily, it alleged that even i f the rule of Article 6(2) would be applicable, "special 
circumstances within the meaning of that rule would render the equidistant method 
inapplicable. The 'cut-off effect resulting in casu therefrom would originate an inequitable 
solution, for it would not attain "a just and equitable apportionment of the continental shelf 
between the states concerned". Notably, the German case attempted to treat equidistance 
separately, downgrading it to a mere method, while elevating to principle concepts like "just 
and equitable share" and "sectoral division" 1 6 7. 
The Netherlands and Denmark both claimed that the delimitation should be effected 
according to the "principles and rules of international law expressed in Article 6(2)"; and 
that Germany had "unilaterally assumed the obligations of the Convention". The argument 
that practice post-1958 had elevated Article 6 to "generally recognised rules of international 
law applicable to delimitation of continental shelf boundaries", although not explicitly 
presented in the Submissions, is implicitly made. Equidistance was in the view of the two 
states "inherent" in the continental shelf concept. Consequently, since agreement had not 
been reached, and no special circumstances existed in casu, the boundary should follow the 
equidistance-line. Subsidiarily, these states argued that, should Article 6(2) be seen as 
inapplicable, the delimitation should be effected in a way that would "leave to each party 
every point of the continental shelf [lying] nearer to its coast than to the coast of the other 
party". Appurtenance - they contended - equated to proximitym. 
2.3.a)(ii) The Reasoning 
The Court did not uphold the German pretension to a just and equitable share of the 
continental shelf. In its view, delimitation was not a "de novo" apportionment of seabed 
areas to littoral states. Due to the ipso facto and ab initio character of the continental shelf, 
it was stated, delimitation was to be seen instead as a "process of [. . .] drawing a boundary 
line between areas which already appertain" to the states involved 1 6 9. Turning next to the 
alleged acceptance by Germany of the conventional regime, the Court endorsed a restrictive 
view of estoppel where the elements of reliance and detriment assumed a fundamental part. 
(167) German Memorial and Reply, ICJ/Pleadings/1968(l), pp.30-36, 80-84, 391-395,425-432, and pp.91,435. 
(168) Danish and Dutch Memorials and Common Rejoinder, ICJ/Pleadings/1968(1), pp.163-164, 190-198, 318-320, 343-351, 
477-479,491-521, and pp.221, 375, 537. 
(169) ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.22-24, paras.18-20; emphasis added. 
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Thus, considering that Germany had not "accepted the regime of Article 6(2) in a manner 
binding upon i tself , it rejected the Dutch and Danish claims 1 7 0. 
The first conclusion as regards the applicable normative standards was that natural 
prolongation and absolute proximity were irreconcilable. In the Court's view, this was due 
to the fact that delimitations based on strict equidistance would sometimes attribute to one 
state an area that would encroach upon the natural extension of the land territory of another 
state. What appertained to a state could be closer to the territory of another state171. It 
should be observed that, to prove its point, the Court resorted to the example of the 
Norwegian Trough. However, since it is impossible to make any division based on natural 
prolongation or on any other geological or geomorphologic elements in the disputed area of 
the North Sea, this argument is flawed. This is to be highlighted because it was by recourse 
to the notion of natural prolongation that the Court dismissed the Dutch and Danish claims, 
and concluded that equidistance was not inherent in the continental shelf concept. Secondly, 
the Court analysed the emergence of the notion of continental shelf in international law. 
Giving great significance to the Truman Proclamation, it concluded that this instrument 
confirmed the non-obligatory nature of equidistance. For the Court, the historical beliefs 
had remained that no single method would be satisfactory in all circumstances, and that 
delimitation should be effected by agreement on the basis of equitable principles1 7 2. 
Thirdly, as to Article 6, the Court rejected the idea that it embodied a rule of customary law. 
In its opinion, that rule had been proposed by the ILC "at most de lege ferenda, and not at 
all de lege lata or as an emerging rule of customary law". The fact that reservations had 
been permitted thereto was deemed to be confirmation of this view. As a conventional rule, 
it was concluded, Article 6 could not be binding upon Germany. Looking then at the 
requirements of formation of customary law, the Court considered state practice had been 
quantitatively and qualitatively insufficient to generate customary law. Hence, it deemed 
unnecessary to determine whether or not the configuration of the German coast constituted 
a special circumstance173. 
The arguments of both parties failed to impress the Court. Hence, the Court then 
went on to articulate the grounds on which it considered that delimitation should be hinged. 
In its view, the "opinio juris in the matter" was, "from the beginning", that "delimitation 
[should] be object of agreement between the states concerned, and that such agreement 
[should] be arrived at in accordance with equitable principles". Pointing out that it was not 
(170) Ibid., pp.26-28, paras.27-33. 
(171) Ibid., pp.30-33, paras.39-46. 
(172) Ibid., pp.33-37, paras.47-56. 
(173) Ibid., pp.38-47, paras.60-82. 
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"a question of applying equity as a matter of abstract justice", it named the pivotal aspects 
in delimitation: meaningful negotiations, relevant circumstances, equitable principles, 
natural prolongation and non-encroachment174. 
Referring to the role of the "rule of equity", the Court affirmed that there could be 
no question of an ex aequo et bono decision. Equity did not imply "equality"; and it could 
not lead to "totally refashioning geography". For the Court, the problem was that, due to 
"the effects of an incidental special feature" - coastal concavity, equidistance resulted in an 
"unacceptable" enjoyment of "considerably different" rights by states having coastlines 
"comparable in length". Therefore, seeking a goal - an equitable solution, rather than a 
method, was seen as translating the required impact of equity 1 7 5. 
Related to this point was the issue of the facts relevant for delimitation. The Court 
found that they could not be exhaustively identified; for their existence and relative weight 
was variable and dependent on the circumstances of each situation. As relevant in casu the 
Court indicated "geological aspects", such as natural prolongation and appurtenance, the 
"geographical configuration of the coastline" as an expression of the principle that the land 
dominates the sea, the "unity of deposits" of natural resources, and a "reasonable degree of 
proportionality" between the length of coastlines and the areas of shelf appertaining to each 
state. For the Court, i f these factors were considered, "the choice and application of the 
appropriate technical methods [was] a matter for the parties"176. 
2.3.a)(iii) A Brief Initial Comment 
The dispositif of the Judgment summarises the Court's findings. It reaffirms that 
equidistance is not obligatory, and that there is no single method obligatory in delimitation. 
It further asserts the need to effect delimitations by agreement, in conformity with equitable 
principles, considering all relevant circumstances; and it concludes by noting that each state 
is entitled to the continental shelf constituting the natural prolongation of its land territory, 
subject to the non-encroachment upon other states' shelves. Among the factors to weigh-up 
in delimitation, the Court identified the general configuration of coastlines, the presence of 
any special features, the physical and geological structure of the shelf, natural resources, 
and a reasonable degree of proportionality1 7 7. 
The Court's conclusion that the use of strict equidistance in casu would lead to an 
inequitable boundary is incontestable. The relevance given to equity is thus understandable. 
(174) Ibid, pp.47-48, paras.83-85. 
(175) Ibid, pp.49-51, paras.88-91; emphasis added. 
(176) Ibid., pp.51-53, paras.92-99; emphasis added. 
(177) Ibid., pp.54-55, para.101. 
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Furthermore, looking at the boundary agreed a posteriori between the states, it seems 
indisputable that this Judgment contributed to attain an equitable boundary, arguably with 
its share of pragmatism. However, the legal reasoning supporting a judicial decision is as 
important as the decision itself, because the "essential purpose of adjudication is to resolve 
disputes by reference to law", and "judgments which are inadequately reasoned [.. .] are 
defective"1 7 8. Well-reasoned decisions promote the 'acceptability' of the rule of law in 
international affairs; and "the more a decision is supported by a process of reasoned 
progression, the more impartial and judicial it appears"179. With all respect for the Court, 
the reasoning appears to be the Achilles heel of this Judgment. The analyses of three issues, 
namely the assessment of customary law, the conflict between equidistance and natural 
prolongation, and the normative standards of delimitation identified to by the Court, seek to 
demonstrate this assertion. 
2.3.b) The Assessment of Customary Law 
2.3.b)(i) Summary of State Practice Post-1958 
With the exception of Germany, the states in the North and Baltic Seas had agreed 
to delimit their continental shelf boundaries consonant with the conventional rules, despite 
of the fact that not all were parties to the CS Convention1 8 0. Germany applied equidistance 
to delimit part of its continental shelf boundaries with Denmark and the Netherlands, but it 
declared that it did not accept its use in the further course of the boundaries181. Importantly, 
most post-1958 agreements on continental shelf delimitation reflected some recourse to 
equidistance (e.g. Denmark/United Kingdom, Norway/Sweden, Norway/United Kingdom, 
Denmark/Norway, Netherlands/United Kingdom, Bahrain/Saudi Arabia) 1 8 2. Relevant in this 
respect was equally the joint declaration by the USSR, the German Democratic Republic 
and Poland, concerning the delimitation of their continental shelf boundaries in the Baltic 
Sea183. Unilateral acts, including those of states non-parties to the CS Convention, also 
revealed a general support to the Article 6 rule (or equidistance)184. Significantly, 
(178) Merrils/1998, p.308. 
(179) Shaw/1998, p.34 (pp.31-38). 
(180) Appendix 2, B20-B22, B27-B31. 
(181) Appendix 2, B23-B24. 
(182) Appendix 2, B18-B33. The three exceptions, being approximately perpendiculars to the general direction of the coast, might 
be seen as simplified equidistances. One is the Senegal/Portugal (Guinea-Bissau) boundary. The second is the Bahrain/Saudi 
Arabia boundary. Germany argued in relation to this boundary that it did not follow equidistance. But it did not argue that it did 
not comply with Article 6 rule (ICJ/Pleadings/1968(1), p.438). The third is the 1965 Finland/USSR agreement, which Germany 
argued that it did "not follow the equidistance-line", where it forms a lateral boundary (ICJ/Pleadings/1968(1), p.439). However, 
this line stemmed from a former peace treaty. As to the 1957 Norway/USSR agreement, although defining a line in an atypical 
manner, it seems to resort to a "selective utilisation of the equidistance principle" (LS/17/1970, p.5). 
(183) Appendix 2, B34. 
(184) Appendix 2, B1-B17. 
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Germany's 1964 declaration made no reference to equitable principles - it simply 
proclaimed that delimitation would be subject to agreement. The only post-1958 unilateral 
act that made reference to equitable principles is a Philippine proclamation of 1968. 
Another argument in favour of the preponderance of the Geneva Convention criterion is 
given by the agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Having made references to equity 
and equitable principles in unilateral acts prior to 1958, these states delimited their 
continental shelf boundary in 1965 on the basis of equidistance. This approach was kept in 
the 1968 agreement, which was induced by equity-related concerns185. Again, equitable 
principles appeared normatively associated with the use of equidistance186. It must also be 
stressed that the recourse to equidistance in state practice had led some scholars to change 
their views on the subject187. Finally, it must be mentioned that the term "special 
circumstances" had already started to acquire a more palpable content. The presence of oil 
fields and the effect of islands on the equidistance-line had already been considered in state 
practice as 'justifications' for adjusting strict equidistance188. 
2.3.b)(ii) The Court's Approach 
Having set the stage with a brief description of state practice, it is now necessary to 
appraise the Court's reasoning in regard to the existence of customary law. The German 
contention was based on the idea that continental shelf delimitation was governed by a 
principle of just and equitable share189. As to state practice referring to equitable principles, 
however, Germany only indicated in support to its contention unilateral practice that dated 
exclusively to the pre-1958 period190. No reference to equitable principles was identified in 
bilateral state practice, most probably because state practice addressed considerations of 
equity through adjustments of the starting equidistance-line. In contradistinction, Denmark 
and The Netherlands argued that Article 6 had acquired a customary nature. To prove the 
existence of a general and settled post-1958 state practice, these states presented examples 
of unilateral acts and bilateral agreements concerning maritime delimitation in general, and 
continental shelf in particular1 9 1. Germany rejected the argument on several grounds. For 
one thing, it contended that the examples presented referred only to cases of oppositeness. 
(185) Pietrowski, Jr., IMB/Report 7-7, pp. 1519-1524. 
(186) Para.\.2.a) supra. 
(187) Young/1965, p.516; Young/1951, p.237. 
(188) Cf. the Bahrain/Saudi Arabia, Iran/Saudi Arabia, and Italy/Yugoslavia agreements (Appendix 2, B19, B25-B26). 
(189) Memorial, ICJ/Pleadings/1968(l), pp.30-33. 
(190) German Memorial (ICJ/Pleadings/1968(l), p.31); cf. para. 1.2.a) supra. 
(191) Counter-Memorials and Common Rejoinder, ICJ/Pleadings/1968(l), pp.190-198, 343-351,477-503. 
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For another, it argued that these examples either did not apply equidistance or applied 
derivations from equidistance192. 
The Court's reasoning deserves attention. Reviewing the history of the continental 
shelf, and the work of the ILC, it concluded that "the Geneva Convention did not embody 
or crystallise any pre-existing or emergent rule of customary law". Noting the primacy of 
agreements, the controversies as to the meaning of special circumstances, and the fact that 
reservations to Article 6 were allowed, it deemed that this provision was 'limited' in its 
"norm-creating character" 1 9 3 . This assertion is, to say the least, highly controversial. As any 
conventional or customary rule, the rule embodied in Article 6 must necessarily bear a 
normative nature. Otherwise it could not be a legal rule. What is so different about Article 6 
that led the Court to consider that it had no "norm-creating character", whilst recognising 
that Article 1 had become customary law, is by no means clear. Undoubtedly, the Court's 
views may be challenged194. Besides this, it seems clear in the statements of ILC members, 
and in the comments of states made during the travaux preparatoires, that the delimitation 
rules were derived from legal principles. The references to agreement and to special 
circumstances are perfectly understandable i f seen in light of the historical background of 
the norm. They should have been seen as mere interpretative issues concerning Article 6 1 9 5 . 
They did not affect its normativity. 
In respect of the possibility to enter into reservations, the conclusions of the Court 
are truly unexpected. The number of reservations was noticeably small when compared with 
the number of interested states; and not one of these reservations opposed in general terms 
equidistance. Venezuela and France claimed the existence of special circumstances in 
certain stretches of their coasts. Yugoslavia asserted that it would not recognise any special 
circumstances. Instead of weakening Article 6, these reservations did in effect reinforce it. 
They all referred to its interpretation, and not to its non-validity. Importantly, the idea that 
customary norms must have a universal nature and do not allow reservations is contradicted 
clearly by the regional practice of states196. A l l in all, nothing seemed to impede the rule in 
Article 6 from acquiring a customary nature under international legal standards197. 
(192) Reply, ICJ/Pleadings/1968(l), pp.404-416,437-440. 
(193) ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.33-42, paras.47-69. 
(194) Jennings/1981, pp.64-65; Marek/1979, p.58. By 1951, it was not just the delimitation criteria that had to be developed; the 
very definition of continental shelf remained unclear (para.l.2.b(i) supra; ILC/Yearbook/1951(II), pp.101-102). Article6 might 
indeed have been a proposal de lege ferenda; but no acceptable reason was given to justify why it could not become lege lata. 
(195) Paras.1.2., 1.3. supra. As to the reference to agreement, cf. e.g. Fitzmaurice (ILC/Yearbook/1956(1), p. 152). 
(196) Lang/1970, p.98. 
(197) Judges Koretski, Lachs, Serensen, Dissenting Opinions, North Sea cases, ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.164-165, 224-226, 253-254. 
See the reservations of France, Iran, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, ICJ/Pleadings/1968(1), pp.230-233. The way in which the Court 
limited the existence of reservations to conventional law, while apparently denying that possibility in relation to customary law is 
also notable (ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.39-42, paras.63-69). 
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In the course of its reasoning, the Court declared that customary rules could only 
surface from a "settled practice", "both extensive and virtually uniform", evincing an opinio 
juris, i.e. the "belief that [such] practice [was] rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule 
of law requiring i t " 1 9 8 . As far as Article 6 was concerned, it concluded "that state practice 
[had] been insufficient" for it to have become a rule of customary law 1 9 9 . 
The reasoning substantiating this conclusion is somewhat unconvincing. First, the 
Court was too stringent in relation to the fulfilment of the requisites for the formation of 
customary law 2 0 0 . It departed from its views in the Fisheries case, in which the unilateral 
practice of Norway, and the "general toleration of the international community", led to the 
acceptance of a conduct that had been rejected by the majority of states in the 1930 
Conference201. Secondly, its 'objectivist' and 'anti-voluntarist' analysis in this case departs 
from the PCIJ's findings in the Lotus case202. Thirdly, while states attempted to demonstrate 
the existence of customary law by reference to state practice, scholarship and municipal 
law, the Court examined only state practice - and even that in a superficial manner203. 
Fourthly, it is also surprising the way in which the Court discarded unilateral declarations of 
states non-parties to the CS Convention (e.g. Belgium and Iraq). Inasmuch as unilateral acts 
do not reflect a trade-off between two opposing positions, their evidentiary value in relation 
to the existence of an opinio juris is greater than that of bilateral acts2 0 4. Thus, "[ i ]n view of 
the complexity of [the custom-forming] process, and the differing motivations possible at its 
various stages, it is surely over-exacting to require proof that every state having applied a 
given rule did so because it was conscious of an obligation to do so"; indeed "the general 
practice of states should be recognised as prima facie evidence that it is accepted as law" 2 0 5 . 
It seems fair to assume that a widespread "consistent state practice establishes a customary 
rule without much (or any) affirmative showing of an opinio juris, so long as it is not 
negated by [clear] evidence of non-normative intent" 2 0 6. 
Compelling arguments may be advanced to submit that a settled practice emerged, 
as to the recourse to the equidistance-special circumstances rule. First, the Court discarded 
(198) ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.44-45, paras.74, 77. According to the working definition of the 1LA, "a rule of customary international 
law is one which is created and sustained by the constant and uniform practice of States and other subjects of international law in 
or impinging upon their international legal relations, in circumstances which give rise to a legitimate expectation of similar 
conduct in the future". Cf. ILA, Final Report of the Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International Law, p.8. 
(199) ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.44-46, paras.75-81. 
(200) Brownlie/1998b, p.21; Marek/1979, p.59; Lang/1970, pp.118-121. 
(201) ICJ/Reports/1951, pp. 138-139; Waldock/1951, p. 114. 
(202) WCR(II), p.35. 
(203) Marek/1979, p.64. 
(204) Judge Morelli, Dissenting Opinion, ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.202-203. 
(205) Judge Lachs, Dissenting Opinion, ICJ/Reports/1969, p.232. As to the formation of customary law, the ILA considers that "it is 
not always, and probably not even usually, necessary to prove the existence of any sort of subjective element in addition to the 
objective element" - cf. Final Report of the Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International Law, p.31. 
(206) Kirgis/l987, p.149. 
- 5 8 -
TOWARDS THE CONCEPTUALISA TION OF MARITIME DELIMTA TION 
fundamental aspects of the travaux preparatoires and the First Conference. The fact that 
most states had shown a clear intention to have a substantive criterion for continental shelf 
delimitation was not even mentioned in the Judgment. Nor was allusion made to the 
overwhelming majorities by which the delimitation rules were approved or, even more 
significantly, to the rejection of the proposals to modify i t 2 0 7 . Secondly, post-1958 state 
practice evinced almost unanimous support to the equidistance-special circumstances 
rule 2 0 8 . I f any settled, extensive and virtually uniform state practice existed at the time, it 
could only be a practice that supported the application thereof. Thirdly, the conclusion that 
in most cases bilateral state practice had dealt with delimitations between opposite states, 
and that these situations were sufficiently distinct from those of adjacency not to constitute 
a precedent is questionable209. This assertion is geographically inaccurate. For instance, 
long segments of the United Kingdom/Netherlands and Denmark/Norway boundaries refer 
more to situations of adjacency, rather than of oppositeness210. Fourthly, it must be 
observed that, paradoxically, after discarding some agreements as precedents of the use of 
the Article 6 rule, the Court resorted to them afterwards as evidence of the relevance of the 
"unity of deposits" as delimitation factor 2 1 1. 
Brown argues that, at the time, Article 6 "had attained the status of international 
customary law" 2 1 2 . Less categorically, Tanja nevertheless notes that "some obvious trends 
in state practice" were ignored2 1 3. Indeed, it might be suggested that it would have been less 
controversial to conclude that Article 6 had acquired a customary nature. Notwithstanding 
this, since the identification of customary law forms a difficult and complex assessment, 
always bearing a certain degree of 'subjectivity', the Court's conclusion could be accepted. 
The problem was that the rejection of Article 6 led to another type of difficulties. Having 
'created' a vacuum in the legal system, the Court "faced a risk to declare non liquet"214. 
Undoubtedly, that "was perfectly possible in theory"; but the Court seems to have been 
"guided by a presumption against the existence of gaps in the law" 2 1 5 . One would argue that 
it was to overcome the possibility of declaring non-liquet that it proclaimed equitable 
principles as part of customary law. And this is where the Court appears to contradict its 
own reasoning. In fact, to discard the customary nature of equidistance, the Court affirmed, 
in relation to state practice, that 
(207) Paras.!.2., \.l.h)supra. 
(208) Appendix 2, Table B. 
(209) ICJ/Reports/1969, p.46, para.79. 
(210) See Figure 2. 
(211) ICl/Reports/1969, pp.52-53, para.97. 
(212) Brown/1992, p.74. 
(213) Tanja/1990, p.l 19, emphasis added. 
(214) Rossi/1993, p.224; Thirlway/1989, p.78; Jennings/1989, p.400; Degan/1987, p.108. 
(215) Thirlway/1989, pp.77-78. 
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over a half of the states concerned [...] were or shortly became parties to the Geneva 
Convention, and were therefore presumably [...] acting actually or potentially in the 
application of the Convention. From their action no inference could legitimately be 
drawn as to the existence of a rule of customary international law in favour of the 
equidistance principle. As regards those states [...] which were not, and have not 
become parties to the Convention, the basis of their action can only be 
problematical and remain speculative?16 
As shown here, the Court considered that no conclusions could be drawn as to the 
psychological element of all state practice. On what basis did it then conclude that there 
was an opinio juris in international law requiring the application of the so-called equitable 
principles? This is an unsolvable enigma - a true paradox. 
In the case of the Article 6 rule, its dismissal resulted from the conclusion that there 
was no evidence that states viewed its application as mandatory. Apparently, the existing 
practice allowed no conclusion for one of two reasons: states parties to the CS Convention 
were presumably acting in conformity therewith; and the practice of states non-parties to the 
CS Convention was deemed to be problematical and to have to remain speculative. The 
problem in the Court's reasoning is that it did not examine equitable principles on the same 
basis. No settled, extensive and virtually uniform state practice using equitable principles in 
continental shelf delimitation was ever identified. Unsurprisingly, a survey undertaken by 
this author reveals that, by 1969, state practice supporting equitable principles was scarce, i f 
at all existent217. How then could an opinio juris have surfaced? This is the striking question 
to which the Judgment provides no answer. 
A l l in all, the conclusion that the opinio juris was that delimitation had to "be 
arrived at in accordance with equitable principles" appears not only as paradoxical, but also 
as juridically incoherent. Without a general state practice, and a high degree of certainty as 
to the opinio juris thereby conveyed, the existence of a rule of customary law with contents 
'opposite' to that of the Article 6 rule could not have been ascertained. 
It has been contended that the principles and rules of international law considered 
applicable by the Court "must presumably be taken to be entailed in the concept of the 
continental shelf and of the rights over it established by customary law on the basis of 
practice beginning from the 1945 Truman Proclamation"218. This explanation does not stand 
close examination. First, the ILC debates show that until 1958 customary law incorporated 
no clear concept of continental shelf; let alone of its delimitation standards219. And it is even 
clearer that equitable principles could not have become custom between 1958 and 1969; for 
(216) ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.44^15, para.76, emphasis added. 
(217) Para.3.3.b)(iv) and Conclusions to Part I infra. For a summary of pre-1969 state practice, cf. Appendix 2, Tables A and B. 
(218) Thirlway/1990, p.61. 
(219) Para. 1.2.b)(i) supra. 
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Article 6 rule was then dominant in state practice. Secondly, the unilateral acts referring to 
equitable principles were, when compared to the number of states potentially interested, 
negligible in number - and most pre-dated 1958. Thirdly, the proposition that equitable 
principles were antithetical to equidistance is unconvincing2 2 0. Fourthly, unilateral acts of 
states supporting equitable principles were considered during the ILC's debates; and states 
expressed in their comments to the draft articles, and during the First Conference, their 
unwillingness to support this type of 'vague' criteria 2 2 1. Fifthly, the adherence of a 
significant group of states, whose interests were especially affected, to the Article 6 rule 
would at the very least have prevented the nascence of an opposite settled practice. This 
suggestion is further strengthened by the support given to this rule in the First Conference. 
It is difficult to conceive that states would overwhelmingly vote in favour of a conventional 
rule that would oppose existing customary law. Sixthly, no example of bilateral agreements 
making use of the so-called equitable principles as interpreted by the Court existed at the 
time. Finally, having concluded that no inference could be drawn as to the psychological 
element of the practice of states non-parties to the CS Convention, the Court could not have 
considered equitable principles as customary law. I f the practice of states non-parties to that 
convention could not be interpreted in terms of opinio juris, it is hardly conceivable how 
equitable principles could have been seen as customary in nature. 
The concern of the Court with equity cannot be criticised. In effect, the steps taken 
then to bring equity into the heart of international law must be praised222. Moreover, the 
relevance of equity in maritime delimitation did become evident during the ILC debates and 
the First Conference. But an equity-oriented interpretation of Article 6 would have sufficed 
to address these concerns. There was no need for 'attacking' the combined formula. For the 
sake of argument, one might even accept the conclusion that Article 6 was not part of 
customary law. What is rejected is the assertion that, in customary law, delimitation was to 
be effected in accordance with equitable principles. Either the practice of states non-parties 
to the CS Convention was relevant, and their support to the rule of Article 6 (added to that 
of states parties to the CS Convention) would have hampered the emergence of a consistent 
and settled practice opposing thereto; or that practice was "problematic" and had to "remain 
speculative", and no opinio juris could have been identified 2 2 3. 
The suggestion that the Court "misidentified the source of equitable principles", for 
it should have made reference to the general principles of international law instead, is 
(220) Para 1,2.a) supra; Conclusions to Part I infra. 
(221) Cf. ILC/Yearbook/1951(II), pp.50, 93; paras. 1.2.c), \.i.h)supra. 
(222) On the principle of equity in maritime delimitation, cf. para.6.4.b) infra. 
(223) As to the threshold of "extensiveness" and "representativeness" of state practice, and the subjective element of custom, cf. 
ILA, Final Report of the Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International Law, pp.20-42. 
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striking . Incontestably, the Court had either to show that the mandatory use of equitable 
principles stemmed from a settled, extensive and virtually uniform state practice, or that 
equitable principles were general principles of law applicable to delimitation 2 2 5. As it was, 
no acceptable reasoning was provided. Why equitable principles were regarded as the 
applicable law remained somewhat of a 'mystery'. Perhaps this is why the Judgment has 
been deemed to amount to an ex aequo et bono decision rendered in exces de pouvoir226, 
and to be "by any standards, a remarkable exercise in law-making" 2 2 7. 
2.3.c) Equidistance-Special Circumstances versus Natural Prolongation 
The way in which the Court delved into Article 6 equally raises some difficulties. 
Why it refused to examine the combined equidistance-special circumstances rule, and why 
it instead focused on strict equidistance, is not understandable. Not even when the Counsel 
for the Dutch and Danish Governments affirmed that it was pausing to, "for the hundredth 
time, [ . . .] say that it [was] the equidistance-special circumstances rule, not the equidistance 
method, which [was] before" i t 2 2 8 , did the Court alter its approach. The non-existence of 
agreement within the majority of the Court, as to the interpretation of the combined rule, 
was deemed to be the explanation for the Court not looking into i t 2 2 9 . This is a striking 
proposition. Surely, the "unresolved controversies as to the exact meaning and scope" of 
special circumstances230 cannot be an argument for not interpreting a rule that was being 
argued by one of the parties as being applicable. Other terms used by the Court were no 
less indeterminate. For example, the indeterminacy of the term "special circumstances" is 
no different than that of the expression "reasonable degree of proportionality". Further, it is 
difficult to understand how it could be concluded that the rule incorporated in Article 6 had 
not become a part of customary law, without even interpreting it. 
It is not being denied that the concepts of continental shelf and natural prolongation 
are deeply intertwined2 3 1. That only fortuitously would an equidistance-line coincide with 
the natural prolongation of a state is obvious - but also irrelevant. These are not sufficiently 
(224) Rossi/1993, pp.224-227. This view finds support in the arguments that Germany put forward during the oral hearings (cf. e.g. 
Oda, ICJ/Pleadings/1968(2), p.62). Brownlie affirms that this Judgment "does not purport to reflect pre-existing principles or a 
pattern of state practice" (Brownlie/1998b, p.29). 
(225) Cf. Degan/1987, p.l 14. 
(226) Jennings/1989, p.401; Friedmann/1970, p.236. Arriving at the same conclusion by arguing that proportionality had never been 
used in delimitation law, cf. Tanja/1990, p.75. 
(227) Brownlie/1998b, p.30. 
(228) Waldock, ICJ/Pleadings/1968(2), p.245. 
(229) Oude Elferink/1994, p.53. 
(230) ICJ/Reports/1969, p.43. 
(231) The Truman Proclamation referred to the continental shelf as an "extension of the land mass of the coastal nation [...] 
naturally appurtenant to it". This same idea is conveyed in the CS Convention by the expression "adjacent to the coast" 
(Article 1); cf. Judge Bustamante y Rivero, Separate Opinion, North Sea cases, ICJ/Reports/1969, p.59. 
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strong reasons for discarding equidistance, and concluding that proximity could not be used 
as a standard for delimiting the continental shelf 2 3 2. More importantly, these reasons are not 
justification for not interpreting the rule of Article 6 properly. 
From the outset, it is crucial to note that the distinction between equidistance as a 
juridical concept and as a geometric method was never made; and this is essential. The 
equidistance method involves technical problems concerning the definition of a certain line 
whose points are equidistant from defined basepoints233. Article 6 of the CS Convention (as 
well all provisions incorporating the combined rule), although an expression of this method, 
incorporates another notion embodied in equidistance: it translates the idea that 'closer 
proximity' to coasts should be taken as the starting point for delimitation. However, this is 
explicitly qualified by equity, under the veil of 'special circumstances'. Properly speaking, 
when qualified by special circumstances, equidistance and "absolute proximity" cannot be 
seen as synonymous234. Failing to make this distinction, the Court fatally downgraded a 
valid juridical concept235, and blighted all its reasoning from the beginning. There is "no 
good reason why the 'principle' of equidistance, or the 'notion' of proximity should not be 
a 'fundamental or inherent rule' of law when the whole armoury of equity exists to qualify, 
or even inhibit, its application in certain kinds of cases where it would produce injustice" 2 3 6. 
For it is equitable to assume that, prima facie, the dividing line lies as far from one state as 
from the other. Natural prolongation is insufficient to deny a 'legal notion of equidistance' a 
role in continental shelf delimitation. Clearly, the conclusion is that the Court had to isolate 
equidistance from special circumstances and downgrade it to a mere method. I f it had not 
done so, and had allowed the effectively equitable character of Article 6 to surface, it could 
not have discarded its application on the basis of natural prolongation2 3 7. Consequently, it 
would have been 'forced' to accept the use of equidistance as the starting point for the 
delimitation. 
(232) ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.29-33, paras.37-46, in particular. Arguing that equidistance was rejected due to its incompatibility with 
the notion of natural prolongation, cf. Highet/1993, p.167; Rossi/1993, p.234; Nelson/1990, p.847; Weil/1989a, p.23; 
Jennings/1969b, pp.823-825; contra cf. Thirlway/1993, pp.19-20. 
(233) ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.24-29, paras.21-36. Cf. para.5.2.a) infra. 
(234) ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.30-32, paras.40-43. Cf. Waldock, ICJ/Pleadings/1968(2), p.247. Grisel states that for cases of adjacency 
Article 6 is "based on a sole idea, namely, that of proximity", although considering that "natural prolongation" and "equitable 
apportionment" on the basis of the length of coastlines should be considered for purposes of delimitation (Grisel/1970, p.579). 
(235) Para.6.3.d) infra. Brown affirms that in Article 6 "the principle of equidistance was adopted both as denoting the abstract 
concept of equidistance and as a legal principle" (Brown/1992, p.84). Cf. also Ahnish/1993, pp.58-59; Weil/1989a, pp.144-145; 
Jennings/1989, pp.398-399. 
(236) Jennings/1989, pp.399-400. 
(237) This prevented the Court from accepting the German argument in respect of the relationship between equidistance and special 
circumstances, according to which there seems to be no hierarchy in between equidistance and special circumstances (Jaenicke, 
ICJ/Pleadings/1968(2), pp.43-52); and led it to discard also the German proposal for applying equidistance in relation to different 
baselines - the facade of the coasts (Jaenicke and Oda, ICJ/Pleadings/1968(2), pp.47, 62-63). 
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On another level, using a geology-oriented delimitation standard is questionable . 
Geologically, the North Sea seabed forms one single shelf. Identifying on geo-scientific 
grounds which part of the seabed is an extension of which (politically defined) territory 
would be impossible. A perfectly valid geography-standard (equidistance) was therefore 
replaced by an unsuitable geology-standard (natural prolongation). Moreover, "the concept 
of natural prolongation belongs to the problem of the seaward extension of the continental 
shelf, not to its delimitation as between opposite or adjacent states"239. Indeed, the lack of 
differentiation between criterion of entitlement (natural prolongation) and standard of 
delimitation (equidistance) was the root of various misunderstandings in this Judgment240. 
Equally debatable are the conclusions of the Court in respect of the differences 
between paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 6 of the CS Convention, as well as their relationship 
with natural prolongation. The analysis of the Court in relation to the legal contents of the 
two provisions does not cover all relevant arguments, and is therefore unconvincing. To 
affirm that in oppositeness "a median line divides equally [. . .] areas that can be regarded as 
being the natural prolongation of the territory of each" state, and that in adjacency "a lateral 
equidistance-line often leaves to one of the states concerned areas that are a natural 
prolongation of the territory of the other"2 4 1 would call for a demonstration that the Court 
did not - could not - provide. Geo-scientifically, natural prolongation has no relationship 
with equidistance in terms of the distinction between adjacency and oppositeness. 
Strikingly, the Court presents arguments against its own reasoning when referring to 
the Norwegian Trough, and affirming that the areas beyond it, up to the equidistance-line 
with the United Kingdom, were not ("in any physical sense") natural prolongation of the 
Norwegian territory 2 4 2. This is incorrect. Scientific studies and statements of both states had 
already ascertained that the Norwegian (legal and geological) shelf extended beyond the 
Norwegian Trough 2 4 3. Let it be assumed, for the sake of argument, that the United Kingdom 
and Norway had not delimited their continental shelf boundary by agreement. I f the notion 
of natural prolongation were applied as understood by the Court, an 'equitable delimitation' 
would mean giving the United Kingdom all areas from its coasts up to the Norwegian 
(238) Highet/1993, p.171; Rossi/1993, pp.234-235; Brown/1992, pp.96-103; Johnston/1988, p.139. What physically constitutes a 
continental shelf depends on assessments concerning inter alia geology (particularly sediments), plate tectonics, geomorphology, 
geophysics, bathimetry, geomagnetism, and gravimetry. The unsuitability of natural prolongation as a delimitation standard was 
noted in subsequent adjudications, starting in the Anglo/French arbitration (paras.2.3.b)(ii), 4.3.a) infra). 
(239) Brown/1992, p.58; cf. also Johnston/1988, p.139. 
(240) Paras.6.3.b), 6.3.d) infra. 
(241) ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.37-38, paras.57-59. As already said, only by mere coincidence would any equidistance-linc coincide 
with natural prolongation, either in oppositeness or in adjacency. 
(242) Referring to the Norwegian Trough and natural prolongation, ICJ/Reports/1969, ppl4-15,32-33, paras.4,44-45. 
(243) UNESCO Secretariat - Scientific Considerations Relating to the Continental Shelf, Off.Rec.-1958(1), pp.39-46, at pp.43-44; 
statements of the British and Norwegian delegations to the First Conference, Off.Rec.-1958(VI), pp.41, 48 respectively. 
Concurring, cf. e.g. Goldie/1973, p.257. For an illustration of the location of the Norwegian Trough, see Figure 89. 
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Trough. More accurately, perhaps there would be no need for delimitation; for the areas to 
which the two states would be entitled would not overlap. 
To Thirlway, such a criticism is "only valid on the assumption that the 'natural 
prolongation' refers only to geophysical facts". He argues that this would be "a misreading 
of the Judgment", because the use of the adjective "natural" was not intended as a reference 
"to 'nature', in the sense of the geographical and [. . .] geological facts". Allegedly, 
"natural" would be an "idea of the geographical pattern of the relevant region as suggesting 
that a particular area of continental shelf 'ought' to belong to a particular coast". It would 
thus be "a question of deciding what looks, on the map, like a 'natural' prolongation of the 
land territory, rather than any more profound (in any sense) study of the area"244. 
This approach must be strongly rejected. The idea of 'natural' conveyed by the 
Truman Proclamation undoubtedly referred to 'facts of nature' 2 4 5. The continental shelf was 
viewed therein as "an extension of the land mass of the coastal nation [. . .] naturally 
appurtenant to it", the resources of which "frequently form a seaward extension of a pool 
or deposit lying within the territory". Inasmuch as the Court based all its reasoning on the 
assertion that the Truman Proclamation "must be considered as having propounded the rules 
of law in this field", it cannot be seen how it is logically possible to consider in this context 
'natural' as not implying 'nature'. More importantly, i f natural prolongation did not 
correspond to that of the Truman Proclamation, the Court should have explained what was 
meant by it, and why such a 'novel' notion was part of international law. 
More importantly, "what looks, on the map, like a 'natural' prolongation" had never 
been used in state practice as a standard for delimitation, and could therefore not be a part 
of customary law. In addition, this kind of subjectivity (which would potentially amount to 
the possibility of deciding ex aequo et bono) was rejected by states in their comments to the 
1951 ILC draft articles2 4 6. Unsurprisingly, this idea of natural prolongation as an "invention 
of the legal mind" has been severely criticised 2 4 7. Furthermore, an analysis based on the 
visual impression caused by charts or maps bear an overlooked (but significant) danger. 
Judges are laypersons insofar as cartography is concerned; and since manipulating maps to 
convey a certain impression of the reality is far from difficult to cartographic experts, such 
an approach is normatively untenable. One underlying truth about cartographic information 
must be borne in mind: "if not harnessed by knowledge [...] the power of maps can get out 
(244) Thirlway/1993, pp.18-24. 
(245) Brownlie/l998a, pp.226-227; Wallace/1992, pp.12-13; Brown/1992, pp.56-60; Attard/1987, pp.133-134; Jennings/1969b, 
pp.821-825; Judge Bustamante y Rivera, Separate Opinion, North Sea cases, ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.58-62. 
(246) For the 1951 ILC draft articles, and the correspondent comments by states, cf. paras. 1.2.b)(i), 1.2.c) supra. The "large degree" 
of subjectivity of this expression is not denied by Thirlway, who considers that "the essential doctrine of the 1969 Judgment, that 
of the application of equitable principles, is of the same nature". 
(247) Jennings/1989, pp.403-406. 
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of control . Cartographic materials never present neutral information, and never are a 
'portrayal of the truth'. Perception, manipulation and biases are always present. 
2.3.d) Normative Standards of Delimitation 
The North Sea Judgment may also be criticised from another angle. The Court was 
required to decide which were the principles and rules of international law applicable to the 
delimitation between the three states. Principles and rules of law convey always some 
normative guidance. It can be asked, however, whether the Court truly enunciated material 
standards for delimitation; and i f the answer is in the affirmative, whether such normative 
standards are after all different from those contained in Article 6. 
Elaborating further on what was meant by effecting a delimitation in accordance 
with equitable principles, the Court assured that this "was not a question of applying equity 
simply as a matter of abstract justice". It affirmed, that such a rule rested "on a broader 
basis", namely that "decisions must by definition be just" and "in that sense equitable". 
Finally, it asserted that since "i t is precisely a rule of law that calls for the application of 
equitable principles", this would not amount to decide ex aequo et bono2*9. This is as far as 
the Court went as to the normativity of delimitation law. References to proportionality, to 
cut-off effects and to the unity of deposits are not normative in nature. They are matters of 
fact (coastal lengths comparison, coastal geography, and location of natural resources), to 
be appraised in the light of the normative standards. 
Ultimately, the idea that the Court decided the case "along the lines prescribed by 
the conventional combined rule", using as basic normative standard 'legal-equidistance', is 
striking. Apparently, equitable considerations seem to warrant mere modifications of the 
starting (equidistance) line 2 5 0 . The mention of "abating the effects of an incidental special 
feature" (concavity of the coast) reflects this approach. I f the Court mentions abating the 
effects, it is undoubtedly referring to the cut-off effect that occurs by applying equidistance 
to the case, which should somehow be reduced. Furthermore, the dispositif equates clearly 
'special circumstances' to equity; which signifies that a similar argument could have been 
made on the basis of Article 6 2 5 1 . Had the Court been willing to examine it, the justification 
(248) Monmonier/1996, pp. 184-186, emphasis added. This author shows in simple terms how variables of maps (e.g., projection, 
scale, colours, symbology, selection and density of information, optical principles) can be manipulated, and conjugated, to attain a 
certain visual impression that departs from reality. Also Wood/1992; Keates/1982, pp.107, 138-144. 
(249) ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.47-49, paras.85-88. 
(250) Tanja/1990, p.73. Cf. ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.36-38, 50-51, paras.53-59, 89-91. 
(251) The Court was fully aware of the teleological nature of the caption 'special circumstances': to provide equitable relief from 
strict equidistance (ICJ/Reports/1969, p.37, para.55). While voting with the majority of the Court, Judge Ammoun advocated the 
idea that the inequitableness of the application of strict equidistance could have been avoided by applying Article 6 rule, and 
considering the German coastline as a special circumstance (Separate Opinion, ICJ/Reports/1969, pp. 149-151). 
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for departing from strict equidistance would have been easily found. . The references 
made by the ILC to problematic geographical settings (to which specific consideration had 
to be given) included "coastal configuration", "concavity" and "convexity" 2 5 3. 
While denying so, the Court indeed seems to have furthered the interpretation of the 
combined formula of Article 6. First, it confirmed that equidistance could in some instances 
yield inequitable results, and it declared the cut-off effect as one of the possible inequitable 
repercussions demanding adjustment. Secondly, it noted that special circumstances could 
not be exhaustively enumerated, and emphasised the need to consider "the relative weight 
to be accorded" to each circumstance in concrete254. Thirdly, it identified proportionality as 
means to assess the inequity of cut-off effects caused by equidistance255. In this respect, it is 
notable that the reference to a "reasonable degree of proportionality" entails only the ruling 
out of situations of unreasonable lack of proportionality. Finally, the "known or readily 
ascertainable" natural resources (and the "unity of deposits") were also confirmed as factors 
to be considered for purposes of the determination of the course of the boundary256. 
This 'non-acknowledged recourse' to Article 6 emerges fairly obviously from other 
parts of the Court's reasoning, especially when affirming that the equitable principles only 
operate to delimit the overlapping area, i.e. the "disputed marginal or fringe area"257. This 
area therefore had to be determined. Since equidistance had been dismissed, such areas had 
then to be defined necessarily through the concept of natural prolongation. The problem, 
however, is that the North Sea is geologically one single shelf. Unless natural prolongation 
is defined in terms of 'what looks on a map' (which was already rejected), it would not be 
possible to make any practical use of this concept to determine the marginal area. Hence, 
the notion of marginal (or fringe) area to be divided in accordance with equitable principles 
was defined by reference to an equidistance-line258. Or to put it differently, equidistance 
was in reality central to the whole argument. The Court simply declared that, taking into 
(252) Considering that the idea of having equidistance as the basis from which to derive equitable boundaries was from the very 
beginning in the mind of those who first addressed the issue of continental shelf delimitation, this conclusion is unsurprising; cf. 
the reference to Boggs's writings (para. 1.2.a) supra). 
(253) Hsu, ILC/Yearbook/1951(I), p.288; Alfaro, ILC/Yearbook/1952(I), pp.182, 190. Even if not autonomously mentioned, 
concavity and convexity could be included in the concept of "exceptional configurations of the coast" (ILC/Yearbook/1953(11), 
p.216); cf. e.g. Grisel/1970, pp.582-583. Disagreeing with the idea of seeing the German coastline as a special circumstance, cf. 
e.g. Friedmann/1970, pp.239-240; Judges Tanaka, Lachs and Serensen, Dissenting Opinions, ICJ/Reports/1969, pp. 186-187, 
240-241, 254-257. Amongst those that criticised the Court's lack of "close investigation" of the travaux preparatoires of the First 
Conference, the ILC discussions, and state practice, cf. e.g. Tanja/1990, pp.70-71; Ahnish/1993, pp.60-63. 
(254) ICJ/Reports/1969, p.51, para.93. 
(255) Tanja takes the view that by resorting to proportionality (which "had never been referred to in delimitation law") the Court 
rendered an ex aequo et bono decision (Tanja/1990, p.75). If the Court applied proportionality as an equitable principle, and if 
equitable principles were not part of international customary law (as one would argue), then the Court appears to have rendered an 
ex aequo el bono decision. Speaking of a "legislative role", cf. Lauterpacht/1991, p. 127. 
(256) Para.2.3.b)(ii) supra. 
(257) ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.23,50, 53, paras.20, 89, 99. 
(258) Jennings/1989, pp.403-405. Cf. para.6.3.dX") infra. 
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account certain factors, Germany should be attributed more than it would get i f delimitation 
would be effected on the basis of strict equidistance. 
Corroboration of this view may be found in the way in which the actual boundaries 
were defined in the agreements that later effectively applied the decision. Considering that 
"one German demand had to be met - its continental shelf had to border on the British one", 
the starting equidistance-lines "were gradually shifted in such a manner that Denmark and 
the Netherlands both gave up areas of more or less the same size, but as little as possible 
until the German delegation declared itself satisfied"2 5 9. To overcome the cut-off effect, 
Germany claimed a corridor up to the equidistance-line with the United Kingdom. 
Proportionality was then used as criterion to determine the area of that corridor. The precise 
position of known natural resources also seems to have played a part therein. Existing oil 
fields under Danish exploitation, for instance, influenced some of the precise 'shifts' in the 
course of the Danish/German boundary260. 
Had the Court been asked to define the boundary-line, and had it not resorted to 
equidistance as a starting point (as the states did afterwards), on what grounds would it have 
justified the precise course of the line? One can only speculate. Nevertheless, it can be 
safely affirmed that the answer is far from being easy to devise. As shown, natural 
prolongation was of no help as a delimitation standard. In addition, the requirement of 
attaining an agreement is a formal one; and "i t is difficult to see how [state] practice could 
support an opinio juris that agreement was a matter of obligation" 2 6 1. Finally, by simply 
asserting that agreement was to be reached in accordance with equitable principles, taking 
account of certain factors, the Court gave virtually no normative guidance. As mere factual 
circumstances, these factors do not amount to principles or rules of law, the identification of 
which the states had asked262. 
A quick glance over the notion of equitable principles is enough to conclude that a 
mere reference thereto falls short of actually providing workable normativity 2 6 3. The Court 
presented them as "actual rules of law" founded on "very general precepts of justice and 
good faith". They were said to prescribe an obligation to enter "into negotiation with a view 
to arriving at an agreement" on the basis of equitable principles, taking into account all 
(259) Langeraar/1998 (unpublished). Franck confirms this suggestion (Franck/1995, p.36). 
(260) Anderson, IMB/Reports 9-8, 9-11, 9-18, pp.1802-1805, 1836-1839, 2498-2499; Smith/1982, pp.7-8. Anderson considers that 
this boundary has a "pragmatic" nature. The Court seems not to have intended to consider the location of oil-fields as factors 
relevant to delimitation. Thirlway takes this view, when affirming that "on a classical approach based on the North Sea decision, 
the presence of wells would be irrelevant" (Thirlway/1993, p.15). 
(261) Thirlway/1989, p.78. Supporting this view, cf. paras.3.6.c), 6.1 .b)(i)(ii) infra. 
(262) Jennings/1989, p.407. Arguably, the Court would have not been able to show that equitable principles had any normative 
content different from that of the principle of equity; cf. para.6.4.b)(iv), Conclusions to Part 11 infra. 
(263) Considering that they provided little guidance, e.g. Rossi/1993, p.223; Lauterpacht/1991, p.127; Grisel/1970, p.592. 
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circumstances, while complying with the principle of natural prolongation . The various 
confusions in this statement appear to be obvious. Good faith constitutes not only a basis for 
equitable principles, but for all the law. Equally, justice is, side-by-side with certainty, one 
of the integral aims of law, and again not only of equitable principles. Then, stating that 
equitable principles require the use of equitable principles in delimitation is, to say the very 
least, tautological. The exegesis of this part of the Judgment unveils in effect a totally sterile 
intellectual game2 6 5. What are the normative contents of equitable principles, or how they 
operate, is simply not explained. Since the same comment was made from early on in 
relation to the Truman Proclamation266, this comes as no surprise. 
The argument so far suggests that, insofar as equitable principles only emerged as 
delimitation criteria with this decision, the Court was bound to clarify their contents. This, 
however, has not been done. Asserting that agreement must be achieved in accordance with 
equitable principles conveys no more than the obvious idea that a reasonable accord, 
acceptable to all parties, must be sought. Configuration of coasts, proportionality, natural 
resources, and geological features, are mere facts, whose appraisal was suggested in this 
case. Consequently, equitable principles appear to be whatever considerations states wish to 
weigh-up with a view to reaching agreement. Since the only limit imposed on states as to 
the methods and factors used in the determination of a boundary is jus cogens16'', this is 
again stating the obvious. The problem is that this shows no clear normative content. I f this 
is the rule upon which delimitations by adjudication are hinged, then courts are entitled to 
decide ex aequo et bono; for they would have a freedom of choice as to the methods to use 
and factors to weigh-up that would equate to that of states. Besides having been explicitly 
rejected by state practice, this was also explicitly excluded by the Court 2 6 8. 
A l l things considered, this Judgment has two different facets. On the one hand, it 
asserts the obvious by stating that, in negotiation, states may agree to use any methods and 
to ponder any factors that they consider adequate. On the other, it surfaces as an unclear 
statement as to which normative standards are binding upon courts in the adjudication of 
maritime boundaries, thus leaving many doubts as to the what differences ( i f any) exist 
under international law between their competencies in adjudication and the powers of states 
in negotiation. It is therefore with hesitation that conclusions are drawn in relation thereto. 
First, the fact that the Court was asked to declare what rules and principles of international 
(264) ICJ/Reports/1979, pp.47-48, para.85. 
(265) Marek/1979, p.71. 
(266) Vallat/1946,p. 336. 
(267) ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.47, 51-52, paras.84, 92-94. As to the limits of states in negotiation, cf. para.6.1 .b)(ii) infra. 
(268) This is the reason why the ILC was mandated by states to look for suitable delimitation criteria was to provide courts and 
tribunals with normative decision-making standards (para. 1.2.c) supra). 
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law were applicable in the course of negotiations, and not to define a boundary-line 
between the three states, seems to have had a profound impact on the approach adopted269. 
Secondly, it was the combined "cut-off effect" of the Dutch and Danish coasts that gave 
Germany the opportunity to impress the Court with cartographic material stressing its 
disadvantageous position 2 7 0. Had The Netherlands and Denmark not tried to delimit their 
boundaries with Germany simultaneously, the outcome of the Judgment might have been 
quite different 2 7 1. What is clear today, is that the development of maritime delimitation law 
was disturbed unnecessarily, much as a result of conceptual misunderstandings. Perfectly 
justified concerns with equity were not enough reason to discard equidistance. Other, more 
'subliminal' elements seem thus to have conditioned this Judgment272. 
2.4. The Anglo/French Arbitration 
2.4.a) Overview 
2.4.a)(i) The Dispute 
In July 1975, after four years of unsuccessful negotiations, the United Kingdom and 
France agreed to resort to arbitration to resolve the dispute concerning the delimitation of 
their continental shelves. By the Arbitration Agreement, the Tribunal was asked to decide 
the course of the boundary (boundaries) of the continental shelf westward of the 30 minutes 
west of the Greenwich Meridian, as far as the 1,000-metre isobath2 7 3. The delimitation area 
encompasses the central and western parts of the English Channel (Manche) and its (south-
western) Atlantic approaches (Figure 79). 
To this effect, the Tribunal was asked to apply "the rules of international law 
applicable in the matter as between the Parties". This was the first point of disagreement 
between the two states274. Whereas France argued that the delimitation should be carried out 
by reference to customary law, as stated by the ICJ in the 1969 North Sea cases, the United 
Kingdom argued that the 1958 CS Convention should be applied. France contended that the 
fact that it had entered reservations to Article 6 of this convention was paramount. Either 
the whole convention, or at least Article 6, would thus not apply to the dispute. In the 
(269) This is why in the Anglo/French arbitration the Tribunal was also asked to draw the line (Anderson/1999b (unpublished)). 
(270) For examples of how Germany utilised visual perception to its advantage, see Figures 45-46. 
(271) It is noteworthy in this respect that, in the Anglo/French arbitration, the Tribunal asserted that the boundary between the two 
parties depended in no way "on any nice calculations of proportionality based on conjectures as to the course of the prospective 
boundary between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland". It viewed such problem as being "manifestly outside [its] 
competence". Cf. RIAA/18, pp.26-27, paras.27-28, emphasis added. 
(272) Conclusions to Part I infra. 
(273) RIAA/18, pp.5-7. 
(274) For a summary of the positions of each state, cf. RIAA/18, pp.9-17. 
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United Kingdom's view however, the French reservations (to which it had objected) did not 
preclude the application of the conventional regime. 
To the United Kingdom, because no proof had been presented in terms of existence 
of special circumstances, the delimitation consisted of a straightforward application of the 
equidistance principle based upon all basepoints on each side. Consequently, in the Channel 
Islands vicinity, the boundary would deviate from the mainland-to-mainland equidistance, 
turning southwards to encircle these islands. It further contended that, even i f customary 
law would be applied, the boundary would run along this equidistance-line, which arguably 
would leave each state a continental shelf area that abided by the notions of natural 
prolongation and non-encroachment. Subsidiarily, it argued that i f any geological 
discontinuity existed, defining different limits for the natural prolongation of each state, it 
would follow along the Hurd Deep Fault (situated south of the equidistance-line). 
The French contention as regards delimitation was slightly more complex. Claiming 
the existence of special circumstances in the Bale de Grandville, it argued that the Channel 
Islands should only be attributed an enclave of 6 M . Similarly, the Atlantic area, westwards 
of a line joining the Scilly Islands and Vile cfOuessant, was also seen as requiring a special 
approach. There, the equidistance-line should allegedly be drawn from lignes de lissage 
reflecting the general direction of the Channel coasts of the two states. As to the rest of la 
Manche, France accepted the use of the equidistance-line (although rejecting the use of 
Eddystone Rock as a basepoint). 
2.4.a)(ii) The Award 
The Award refers to the 'arbitration area' as the limit of the 'spatial competence' of 
the Tribunal. After consultation with both parties as to the extent of the powers conferred on 
it, the Tribunal concluded also that it was not empowered to effect the delimitation of the 
boundary between the Channel Islands and the coasts of Normandy and Brittany. France 
was of the view that the mandate given by the "Arbitration Agreement" to the Tribunal 
merely comprised the seabed and subsoil beyond the 12 M of the (French) territorial sea275. 
As to the 'arbitration area', moreover, the Tribunal found that it was not open to it to decide 
on the position of a (potential) trijunction point with the Republic of Ireland. It observed in 
this respect that the Award would only be binding upon the parties to the case276. The 
question concerning the rules and principles of international law in force between the two 
states was then examined. Article 6 was deemed applicable to the delimitation in general, 
(275) The dispute in this area also involved fishing issues with roots dating back to the 1839 Fishery Convention. 
(276) RIAA/18, p.24-27, paras.20-28. 
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only being excluded to the extent of the French reservations. The Channel Islands region 
was therefore seen as an area where customary law would be applicable277. 
In light of the circumstances of the case, the distinction between conventional and 
customary law was deemed insignificant. Customary law was seen as leading "to much the 
same result as the provisions of Article 6". And the equidistance-special circumstances rule 
and customary rules were viewed as having the same object: the delimitation of continental 
shelf boundaries according to equitable principles. For the Tribunal, the former only gave 
"a particular expression to a general norm that, failing agreement, the boundary between 
states abutting on the same continental shelf is to be determined on equitable principles"; 
and the latter were "a relevant and even essential means of both interpreting and completing 
the provisions of Article 6". In this context, the Tribunal emphasised, there was no question 
of attributing just and equitable shares; and it was clear that the natural prolongation of one 
state could not encroach on the natural prolongation of another state278. As to Article 6, the 
Tribunal concluded that its two paragraphs articulated the same combined rule, that this 
provision was "to be understood as dealing comprehensively with the delimitation of the 
continental shelf, and that all situations, in principle, fall under" one of its paragraphs279. 
Before turning to the delimitation in concreto, the Tribunal dismissed the relevancy of the 
Hurd Deep Fault. Noting the "essential geological continuity" of the area, it held the view 
that this feature was not "capable of exercising a material influence in the determination of 
the boundary"280. 
As a first step towards the required equitable solution, the Tribunal 'homologated' 
the agreement reached between the parties concerning the use of equidistance as the basis 
for delimitation 2 8 1, exception made to the Atlantic and the Channel Islands regions. In spite 
of this agreement, there was still an outstanding issue: France did not agree with the use of 
Eddystone Rock as a basepoint. The Tribunal deemed it unnecessary to pronounce itself on 
the "precise legal status" of this feature. Considering that France had previously acquiesced 
to its use as basepoint for defining the United Kingdom's fishery limits, it concluded that 
Eddystone Rock was to be taken into account282. 
Examining the Channel Islands region, the Tribunal started by observing how the 
two states had put their claims on a double basis, i.e. both considering that they should be 
(277) Ibid, pp.28-48, paras.29-75. 
(278) Ibid., pp.44^*9, paras.65-79. 
(279) Ibid, pp.44-45, 55-56, paras.68,94. 
(280) Ibid, pp.59-61, paras. 104-109. 
(281) Ibid., pp.61-65, paras. 111-120. Queneudec considers that this part of the boundary is not really work of the Tribunal; but adds 
that to the extent that the Tribunal effected the control and registration of what had been agreed between the parties, it in fact 
homologated the agreement conferring to it "la force obligatoire dune decision du Tribunar (Queneudec/1979, p.86). 
(282) RIAA/18, pp.65-74, paras.121-144. 
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upheld under either conventional or customary law. For the Tribunal, this confirmed "that 
the different ways in which the requirements of 'equitable principles' or the effects of 
'special circumstances' are put reflect differences of approach and terminology rather than 
of substance"283. One point became central to the delimitation: with the exception of the 
Channel Islands, the situation was one of oppositeness between two states "having almost 
equal coastlines". In respect of these islands, attention was drawn to three points: their 
detached location - on the "wrong side" of the equidistance-line; their close proximity to 
the French coast; and the fact that the geographical context allowed almost no scope for 
redressing inequities. Regarding the effects of the Channel Islands as a "radical distortion of 
the boundary creative of inequity", the Tribunal concluded that to attain a "more equitable 
balance" a two-fold solution was needed. A mainland-to-mainland equidistance-line was 
drawn as the primary boundary between the two states; and the Channel Islands were only 
attributed a 12-mile enclave (Figure 3) 2 8 4 . 
Turning to the Atlantic region, the Tribunal identified one "pertinent dissimilarity 
between the two coasts". Whereas I lie dOuessant lay westwards of the Brest peninsula at 
a maximum distance of roughly 14 M , the Scilly Isles extended up to 31 M westwards of 
Land's End. The resulting southwards shifting of the course of the equidistance-line was 
deemed to lead to an inequitable disproportion "in the areas of continental shelf accruing 
to" each state. The location of the Scilly Isles was thus viewed as a "special circumstance", 
to which only a half-effect was to be given. The actual boundary defined by the Tribunal is 
a line bisecting the angle formed by two equidistance-lines: one calculated between Ushant 
and the Scilly Isles; the other calculated between Ushant and Land's End (Figure 3) 2 8 5 . 
2.4.b) Some Points of Contrast with the North Sea Cases 
A comparative approach between this Award and the 1969 Judgment is justified on 
two grounds: the former is the jurisprudential milestone on which the ICJ relied 15-odd 
years later to complete the 'overturn' of the jurisprudence that it had started with the latter; 
this approach offers a better basis for understanding the developments in delimitation law. 
2.4.b)(i) A Different Task 
The task assigned to the courts in the two instances had a different scope. Whereas 
in the 1969 cases the ICJ was asked to declare what principles and rules of international law 
(283) Ibid., p.75, para. 148. 
(284) Ibid., pp.93-96, paras. 196-203. 
(285) Ibid., pp. 109-118; emphasis added. 
- 7 3 -
TOWARDS THE CONCEPTUALISA TION OF MARITIME DELIMITA TION 
were applicable to the delimitation, in this instance the Tribunal was also asked to define 
the actual course of the continental shelf boundary. The different challenges posed by the 
need to define the course of the line led to further dispute, regarding its technical definition. 
For reasons of brevity, but without prejudice of brief mentions at a later stage286, this issue 
wil l not be analysed in-depth in this study. 
2.4.b)(ii) The Clarification of Certain Issues 
Whilst correcting some misconceptions that arose in the 1969 Judgment, this Award 
has furthered the understanding of maritime delimitation law. At one level, while admitting 
that some pronouncements of the ICJ had "a general character", the Tribunal noted that not 
all of them could be seen as a general statement of law, and should therefore not be 
extrapolated lightly. This is clear in the assessment concerning the use of equidistance in 
situations of adjacency287, as well as in the assertions dealing with the role of natural 
prolongation and of proportionality, which are now examined. 
Drawing attention to the fact that it is precisely where the territories of two or more 
states abut on a single continuous area of continental shelf that problems of delimitation 
arise, the Tribunal stated that natural prolongation was not a generally suitable criterion for 
delimitation. The 'dogma' of a geology-oriented concept of natural prolongation, with 
absolute character, was dismissed when the Tribunal affirmed that this notion could also 
"be subject to qualifications in particular situations". Its effects were deemed to depend on 
"the particular geographical and other circumstances", and on "any relevant considerations 
of law and equity" 2 8 8. This approach is important in cases like the English Channel, where 
the shelf is geo-scientifically the prolongation of all territories that abut upon it; so much so 
that France was allocated continental shelf areas north of the Channel Islands, up to the 
equidistance-line between the mainland coasts289. This approach comes as confirmation that 
natural prolongation was to be viewed as geological-oriented notion. In casu, however, its 
role was negligible. The Award asserts clearly that only in very exceptional circumstances 
would natural prolongation bear on continental shelf delimitation 2 9 0. With this approach, 
natural prolongation arguably started to be "seen as referring [primarily] to geographical 
circumstances rather than geological factors"2 9 1. 
(286) Paras.4.2.b)(ii), 5.1.C), 5.3.a) infra. 
(287) For an analysis of this issue, cf. para.2.4.c)(ii) infra. 
(288) Vicufia contends that the influence of this principle "was considerably down-toned" also in view of the emergence of the 
concept of EEZ in international law (Vicufia/1988, p. 122). 
(289) RIAA/18, p.49,91-92, paras.79, 191-194; emphasis added. 
(290) Brown/1992, pp.99-103. Cf. also Tanja/1990, p.173; Attard/1987, p.232; Bowett/1979, p.206; Queneudec/1979, p.76. 
(291) Bowett/1979, p.221. Later, the Dubai/Sharjah arbitration evaluated natural prolongation very similarly (ILR/91/1993, 
pp.675-677); cf. Vicuna/1988, p. 122. Considering the existence of two meanings for the concept of natural prolongation, cf. 
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In relation to proportionality, the Tribunal did not deny that it was "inherent in the 
notion of delimitation in accordance with equitable principles". It did however, confine its 
scope by noting that it is not for application in all cases, and it should not be considered as a 
source of title to continental shelf. Proportionality, stated the Tribunal, should be seen as a 
factor to be taken into account hi appreciating the equitable or inequitable character of a 
delimitation, and in particular for determining the reasonable or unreasonable effects of 
particular geographical features or configurations upon the course of an equidistance-line 
boundary. "[I] t is disproportion rather than any general principle of proportionality which is 
the relevant [.. .] factor", it added292. Conceding to proportionality only a secondary part in 
delimitation 2 9 3, this approach conceptualises its function within the equidistance-special 
circumstances rule, as a means to detecting unreasonable distorting effects caused in certain 
contexts by specific geographical features294. 
2.4.b)(iii) The Contribution to International Law 
This Award's contribution for the development of delimitation law is significant in 
relation to two key aspects. First, it restates the relevancy of state practice as a factor of the 
international law-making process. Secondly, it demonstrates that the correct interpretation 
of Article 6 of the CS Convention is perfectly compatible with the requirements of equity. 
State practice was 'devalued' in the North Sea Judgment in order to 'complete' the 
rejection of equidistance in maritime delimitation. This was fully reversed by this Award. 
The enclaving solution in the Channel Islands was considered on the basis of precedents of 
semi-enclaving solutions found in state practice, concerning situations where small islands 
lay "on the right side of or close to the median line". By analogy, the fact that the Channel 
Islands lay "on the wrong side" of the equidistance-line, and were "wholly detached 
geographically from the United Kingdom" led the Tribunal to accept the French proposal of 
enclaving the Channel Islands295. In the Atlantic region, the half-effect solution was also 
inspired by state practice - having the Tribunal referred to the examples of "delimitations in 
which only partial effect [had] been given to offshore islands situated outside the territorial 
Evans/1989, pp.99-118. Dipla seems to support the perspective that natural prolongation is "what looks on a chart" (Dipla/1984, 
p. 183), thus close to Thirlway's proposition (Thirlway/1993, p.24); cf. paras.2.3.c) supra); also para.8.2.g) infra. 
(292) RIAA/18, pp.57-58, 115, paras.98-101,246; emphasis added. 
(293) Tanja asks if this was not "a friendly way of indicating that the ICJ had exceeded its competence in 1969" when elevating 
proportionality to a delimitation principle (Tanja/1990, p. 169). Evans considers that the Court "misconstrued the role given to 
proportionality in the North Sea cases", because proportionality "is not a 'criterion for application' at all", but concedes that the 
use of proportionality in this arbitration was "in full accord with that of the Court in the North Sea cases" in that it was used "to 
assess the application of equitable principles" (Evans/1989, pp.225-226). 
(294) Brown/1992, pp.110-112; Weil/1989a, pp.237-238; Jagota/1985, p.146; Dipla/1984, pp.l84-|85; Queneudec/1979, p.76; 
Zoller/1977, pp.383,406. To Jaenicke, "it would have been inappropriate" to use proportionality in the Atlantic region owing to 
"the uncertainty of the lateral and seaward limits of the area to be tested" (Jaenicke/1986, pp.62-63). 
(295) RIAA/18, p.94, para.199. 
- 7 5 -
TOWARDS THE CONCEPTUALISA TION OF MARITIME DELIMIT A TION 
sea of the mainland" . No explicit indication was given, however, as to which state 
practice had been examined in either instance. 
More importantly, state practice provided arguments to uphold the view that the 
choice of the delimitation method is neither absolutely free, nor merely equity-oriented. In 
the Channel Islands, the solution is in some measure still equidistance-related; it comprises 
a "primary boundary" based on strict equidistance from the mainland coasts. The enclaving 
line was utilised to accommodate the equity concerns by reflecting the local geographical 
eccentricities297. The most significant pronouncements came perhaps with the delimitation 
in the Atlantic region. State practice was deemed to reflect how departures from strict 
equidistance were to be justified. Stating that it was not empowered with "carte blanche to 
employ any method that it chooses", the Tribunal also added that, besides remedying 
unreasonable distorting effects, the method utilised ought to have a "relation to the coasts of 
the parties actually abutting on the continental shelf of that region". Particular emphasis 
was placed on the idea that fact that, in similar circumstances, state practice showed some 
preference for using a "modification or a variant of the equidistance principle rather than 
to have recourse to a wholly different criterion of delimitation". Ultimately, the Tribunal 
held the view that equitable delimitations should - as done in state practice - rely on, and 
favour, solutions grounded on the appropriate adjustments to the strict equidistance-line, 
instead of rejecting it in toto29*. 
2.4.c) Article 6 of the CS Convention 
2.4.c)(i) Interpretation 
This was the first instance in which Article 6 of the CS Convention was interpreted. 
As it was also the first time that an international court was called upon to, proprio sensu, 
delimit a continental shelf boundary, this Award inevitably had to have an impact on the 
development of maritime delimitation law. In addition, since in the North Sea Judgment the 
ICJ failed to give Article 6 dispositive effects, while declining to interpret it, the reasoning 
of this Award acquired even more relevance. 
The relationship between equidistance and special circumstances had already been 
approached from diverse angles. Different interpretations had for example been proposed in 
the individual opinions attached to the North Sea Judgment. In their Dissenting Opinions, 
Judges Tanaka, Lachs and Sorensen considered special circumstances as a stricto sensu 
(296) /&</., p. 117, para.251. 
(297) Ibid., pp.94-95, paras. 199-202. Cf. Brownlie/1983, p.61. Cf. also para.5.3.a) infra. 
(298) RIAA/18, p.l 14-117, paras.245-251; emphasis added. 
- 7 6 -
TOWARDS THE CONCEPTUALISA TION OF MARITIME DELIMIT A TION 
exception to a rule, thus requiring a strictissimae interpretations . Holding a different 
view, Judge Morelli regarded special circumstances as an autonomous "exception-rule" to 
be interpreted separately from the equidistance rule 3 0 0 . Diversely, to Judge Ammoun, 
special circumstances were an element of a rule that combined equidistance and special 
circumstances towards an equitable result3 0 1. 
The interpretation of Article 6 followed in this decision seems to be very close to 
the last of these interpretations. To start with, the Tribunal affirmed that Article 6 embodied 
a single combined equidistance-special circumstances rule. Further, it regarded this rule as 
giving "particular expression to a general norm that, failing agreement, the boundary 
between states abutting on the same continental shelf is to be determined on equitable 
principles". Consequently, it reached the conclusion that both this rule and the rule of 
customary law had the same object 3 0 2. 
The conclusion that Article 6 did not differ in content from customary law was 
seemingly unanticipated. This approach was in fact severely criticised on the grounds that 
this provision's drafting history does not provide any support for an extensive interpretation 
of the notion of special circumstances. According to this view, only exceptional geographic 
situations should be considered303. In this respect, O'Connell affirms that, in the Channel 
Islands region, "the Court came perilously close to doing what it had theoretically 
repudiated, [i.e.,] refashioning nature"304. Notwithstanding this criticism, the Tribunal's 
approach found support in part of the scholarly writings 3 0 5. There is clearly a duality of 
opinions in this regard. 
One ought to ask, therefore, to what extent were these two standpoints influenced 
by the fact that certain elements of this Award admittedly favoured the French case306. In 
principle, this should not be taken into account in juridical analyses. For this reason, it is 
firmly believed that the Tribunal's approach to Article 6 must be examined in two separate 
phases: one, its interpretation in abstrato; another, its application in concreto. 
(299) ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.187, 240, 257, respectively. 
(300) /6/rf.,p.209. 
(301) /i>W., pp.149-151. 
(302) RIAA/18, pp.44-48, paras.68, 70, 75. 
(303) Brown/1992, p.104; O'Connell/1989, pp.697-698, 708 (this author considers that each paragraph of Article 6 contains a 
different rule); Attard/1987, p.233; Bowett/1979, p.201. Weil regrets that the rule of Article 6 was deprived "of all particularity 
vis-a-vis customary law" (i.e. equitable principles), and argues that Article 6 should have been adopted as reflecting the contents 
of customary law (Weil/1989a, p.147). Dipla, although supporting the Court's approach, observes that the notion of special 
circumstances was clearly enlarged, and that this notion is in Article 6 subordinated to the equidistance method - but it does not 
explain what is exactly the nature of such subordination (Dipla/1984, pp.183-184). 
(304) O'Connell/1989, p.725. 
(305) Supporting, or not criticising, this view, cf. Ahnish/1993, pp.65-69; Lauterpacht/1991, pp.128-130; Caflisch/1991, p.459; 
Tanja/1990, p.166; Jagota/1985, p.146; Symonides/1984, p.42; Queneudec/1979, pp.72-75; Zoller/1977, pp.372-377. 
(306) Queneudec/1979, p.102; Zoller/1977, p.407. 
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The nascence of the notion of "special circumstances" was unarguably intended to 
prevent inequitable delimitations307. Despite its uncertainty, the reality is that the ILC was 
unable to agree on another, more explicit term. Establishing more accurately the latitude to 
concede to judges in maritime delimitation proved to be impossible. After considering the 
proposal for specifying the special circumstances, the ILC concluded that the draft rule 
should leave the assessment of the scope of this term to judges. The examples mentioned in 
the comments to the draft article were mere examples308. In their assessment, judges would 
have to consider any situations of "undue hardship" or "manifest unfairness"309. During the 
1958 Conference, the essence of the views expressed in the travaux preparatoires did not 
change310. Article 6 was therefore intended to allow judges to categorise as special 
circumstances any facts that would cause strict equidistance to yield a manifestly unjust 
course of the boundary (thus justifying adjustments thereto). 
The Tribunal's interpretation of Article 6 is reconcilable with these premises. The 
equality between customary and conventional rules concerned only the obligation to reach 
an equitable delimitation. As observed, both approaches had to consider "geographical and 
other circumstances"311. The similarity existed because arguing on the basis of equitable 
principles or of special circumstances reflected "differences of approach and terminology 
rather than of substance"312. Further, when asserting that an equitable delimitation did not 
imply equality of shares313, the Tribunal indeed highlighted that the purpose of delimitation 
is avoiding an inequitable result, rather than promoting a division on an equal basis. To this 
extent, the suggestion that Article 6 and customary rules have similar contents is de jure 
perfectly acceptable; so much so that the proposition that Article 6 was intended to ensure 
that delimitations would not result in unfair boundaries finds support in the ILC's work and 
in the scholarly writings 3 1 4. 
Notwithstanding this, the assertion that the object of Article 6 is a delimitation of 
the boundary in accordance with equitable principles must be seen with caution 3 1 5. Indeed, 
this appears to have alternative interpretations. It might be read as meaning that the norm 
contained in Article 6 was deemed to convey the view of the ICJ in the North Sea cases as 
regards maritime delimitation. When read in context, however, the reverse idea is equally 
(307) Paras. 1.2.b)(i), 1.3.a), 1.3.c)(i) supra. 
(308) ILC/Yearbook/1956(II), p.300; the cases of "exceptional configurations of the coast", "the presence of islands or of navigable 
channels" where mentioned. Other examples, such as the existence of special mineral exploitation rights or of mineral deposits, 
were mentioned during the debates of the First Conference (0ff.Rec./1958(VT), pp.91-98, in particular pp.93,95). 
(309) rLC/Yearbook/1953(I), pp.131-133. 
(310) Paras.l.3.b), 1.3.c)(i) supra. 
(311) RIAA/18, pp.45-46, paras.69-70. 
(312) /6W.,p.75,para.l48. 
(313) Ibid., pp.48-49, para.78. 
(314) Ibid., p.45, para.70. Cf. para.l.3.c)(i)™/?ra. 
(315) Ibid., pp.45-48, paras.70, 75. 
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possible. It can also mean, similarly to what Judge Ammoun suggested, that delimitation in 
accordance with equitable principles equates to the proper interpretation and application of 
the combined equidistance-special circumstances rule. Insofar as this approach was averred 
15-odd years later, in the Jan Mayen case, this proposition must be accepted; for "the Court 
used this linkage to justify exporting the equidistance method into customary law" 3 1 6 . 
In casu, this was consonant with what was affirmed as to the actual determination of 
the boundaries. The Tribunal stated not only that the existence of special circumstances did 
not give it carte blanche to employ any method that it chose, but also that state practice 
utilised special circumstances as justification for adjusting equidistance, which it preferred 
to discarding equidistance altogether317. It was this that led it to utilise equidistance as the 
starting point for the delimitation, in both the Channel Islands and the Atlantic region 3 1 8 . 
This view is reinforced by the conviction that such interpretation envisaged a more 
settled development of delimitation law. The Tribunal was careful enough not to contradict 
the 1969 decision, but it did not endorse its contents in terms of delimitation standards319. 
Aware of the 'rupture' between conventional and customary law created by that Judgment, 
the Tribunal sought a 'reconciling interpretation'. The antithetical positions assumed in the 
Third Conference, which resulted in a formula that attempted to conjugate equitable 
principles, equidistance and "all relevant circumstances"320, was also weighed-up by the 
Tribunal 3 2 1. The assertion that the Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT) did "not appear 
to visualise the solution of cases like the present one on principles materially different from 
those applicable under the 1958 Convention or under general international law" appears to 
support this idea 3 2 2. This view, whereby international law-making process is portrayed as a 
continuum, brought about a re-evaluation of state practice. I f this proposition is accepted, 
the Tribunal's interpretation of Article 6, besides being acceptable de jure, is to be seen as 
an attempt to bring together state practice, customary law and conventional law, and to 
bridge the 'gap' created in 19693 2 3. 
(316) Evans/1999, p.160. 
(317) RIAA/18, pp. 114, 116, paras.245,249. 
(318) Near the Channel Islands, the equidistance-line between the mainland coasts was viewed as the "primary boundary". 
(319) It should not be forgotten that two of the arbitrators were also judges of the ICJ. The intention of not contradicting the 1969 
decision is clearly present in the way in which the Court dealt with the concepts of natural prolongation and proportionality. 
(320) Articles 62(1) and 71(1) of the Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT), Off.Rec.-1973/82(V), pp. 164-165; Articles 74(1) 
and 83(1) of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT), Off.Rec.-1973/82(VIII), pp.16-17. 
(321) Anderson/1999 (unpublished). 
(322) RIAA/18, pp.37, 56-57, paras.48, 96. This point was made in order to answer France's argument that general customary law 
had undergone material changes that rendered obsolete the 1958 Conventions. Cf. Brown/1992, pp.102-103; Queneudec/1979, 
pp.70-72; Symmons/1979, pp.182-183; Colson/1978, pp.102-103, 111. 
(323) Colson/1978, p . l l l . 
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2.4.c)(ii) Conventional and Customary Law 
The conclusions of the previous paragraph are however not enough to clarify some 
aspects of the reasoning in relation to the relationship between Article 6 and customary law. 
State practice and the work in the Third Conference could have been analysed in greater 
depth. Having concluded that state practice showed, first, that the choice of method was not 
totally free, and secondly, there was some preference for modifying equidistance rather than 
discarding it in toto, it was advisable to assert what conclusions, i f any, should be drawn as 
to the existence of an opinio juris supporting Article 6 3 2 4 . The conclusion that this provision 
and customary law both envisaged an equitable delimitation required further elaboration. 
Whether state practice formed a settled practice showing that equidistance was legally the 
starting point for delimitation was one essential question. The fact that the findings of the 
North Sea Judgment as regards customary law had been far from unanimous, amongst both 
judges and scholars, was enough for attempting an answer thereto. 
Associated with this, is another aspect that deserves attention. By 1976, the Third 
Conference had already agreed that natural prolongation would only have relevance, as root 
of title to the continental shelf, in relation to areas beyond 200 M . Such an idea was clearly 
reflected in the draft articles3 2 5. Consequently, the main argument upon which the rejection 
of equidistance in the North Sea cases had been supported - i.e. that natural prolongation 
and proximity were irreconcilable - had disappeared326. Distance to the coast, i.e. proximity, 
had prevailed over natural prolongation as entitlement criterion. The consensus in the Third 
Conference deserved a closer examination because it was supported by state practice 3 2 7. Its 
impact on delimitation law is recognised in the Award only implicitly, with the emphasis 
(324) On the conclusions of the Tribunal, cf. para.2.4.a)(ii) supra. 
(325) Cf. RSNT (Article 64) and ICNT (Article 76), at Off.Rec.-l973/82(V), p.164 and Off.Rec.-1973/82(VIII), p.16. The key 
question that remained unresolved was the definition of the outer limit of the continental margin, that is, the precise way in which 
geological features would entitle states to claim a continental shelf beyond 200 M (Nordquist/1993, pp.841-856, in particular 
p.854). However, it must be noted that, taking no account of these developments, the ICJ reaffirmed in 1978 the doctrine of the 
1969 Judgment. In the Aegean Sea case, it stated that natural prolongation was "a criterion for determining the extent of a coastal 
state's entitlement to continental shelf as against other states" (ICJ/Reports/1978, p.37, para.86). Undoubtedly, the ICJ had 
previously affirmed in the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, as regards the works in the Third Conference, that judgments could not be 
rendered "sub specie legis ferendae, or anticipate the law before the legislator has laid it down" (ICJ/Reports/1974, pp.24-25, 
para.53). But this assertion was made in a totally different context. First, the Icelandic claims concerned fisheries jurisdiction, and 
not continental shelf rights. Secondly, whereas in that case the issue in discussion implied an extension of coastal states' 
jurisdiction, in respect of the continental shelf the Third Conference intended to limit claims based on the exploitability criterion. 
Finally, while in 1974 the Third Conference was in its initial stage, by 1977 some major issues had already been settled with wide 
support from states. Besides all this, the ICJ did not affirm that customary law in 1974 did not allow the exercise of fisheries 
jurisdiction beyond 12 M. It simply concluded that the exclusive fishing rights claimed by Iceland were "not opposable" to the 
United Kingdom (ICJ/Reports/1974, pp.35-36, para.79). Apparently the Court "deliberately evaded the question" as to "whether 
Iceland's claims [were] in accordance with international law" (Declaration of Judge Ignacio-Pinto, ICJ/Reports/1974, p.37). This 
view is apparently supported by judges Forster, Bengzon, DeArechaga, Nagendra Singh and Ruda, in their joint Separate Opinion, 
when asserting that they voted favourably only inasmuch as the Judgment did "not declare [...] that such an extension [of 
jurisdiction was] without foundation in international law and invalid erga omnes" (ICJ/Reports/1974, p.46). 
(326) Paras.2.3.a)(ii), 2.3.c) supra. 
(327) On the relevance to customary law of deliberations and consensus in plenipotentiary conferences, cf. Danilenko/1993, p.283; 
DeArechaga/1978, p. 14; D'Amato/1971, pp. 164-165. 
- 8 0 -
TOWARDS THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF MARITIME DELIMITATION 
put on the geographical configuration of coastlines rather than on natural prolongation 
However, the Tribunal failed to analyse the effects of the concatenation between state 
practice and those developments in the Third Conference. 
Avoiding potential contradictions with the 1969 Judgment was clearly one major 
concern of this Award. This is patent in the way in which the Tribunal sought to reconcile 
another aspect of the interpretation of Article 6. In the North Sea cases, the ICJ considered 
that the two paragraphs of this article were materially different, and did not encompass all 
situations of continental shelf delimitation. Equally, it attempted to distinguish the effects of 
natural prolongation and equidistance in the attribution of continental shelf on the basis of 
the distinction oppositeness-adjacency329. Without openly criticising the North Sea cases, 
the Tribunal adopted a different view. Considering that no inference to the contrary could 
be derived from state practice or from the travaux preparatoires, it affirmed that the two 
paragraphs incorporated the same rule, and that no casus omissus existed. All situations 
would "fall under either paragraph 1 or paragraph 2" of Article 6. The association with 
natural prolongation was rejected, implicitly, by asserting that oppositeness and adjacency 
were characterised exclusively by the geographical relationship between coasts. This was 
said to find support in the work of the Third Conference, insofar as no material distinction 
between these situations was made in the RSNT draft provisions330. Hence, it is argued that, 
although equidistance was treated as a normative standard - not as a mere method331, the 
juridical status of the combined rule remained unclear. Whether the Article 6 rule had 
acquired a customary nature was a carefully avoided issue, particularly as to the use of 
equidistance as the starting point for delimitation. It was asserted, on the basis of state 
practice, that the existence of special circumstances did not warrant per se the full dismissal 
of equidistance. Why it was so however, remained unexplained332. 
Reluctant to contradict the North Sea cases, the Tribunal avoided the conclusion 
that an opinio juris had emerged from the actual use of the Article 6 rule in state practice. 
The contents thereof, of customary law, and of the LOSC draft articles, were not compared 
in abstrato. What was said was that in "cases like the present one" all three formulae would 
"lead to much the same result'™. The fact that the repercussions of asserting that Article 6 
and customary law envisaged both an equitable delimitation were not fully determined is 
(328) This was deemed to be "a salutary development" of the delimitation law (Bowett/1979, p.221); cf. also Dipla/1984, p. 183. 
(329) ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.36-38,46, paras.54, 57-59, 79. 
(330) RIAA/18, p.53-56, 97-103, 110-111, paras.89-95, 206-218, 237-238. However, it must be noted that the Tribunal seemed to 
consider that the terms "median" and "equidistant" were not exactly equivalent, and should apply to situations of oppositeness and 
adjacency respectively (RIAA/18, p.56, fn.12). Cf. para.l.3.c)(iii) supra; Brown/1992, pp.112-115; Tanja/1990, p.165; 
Dipla/1984, p.180; Bowett/1979, pp.210-212; Queneudec/1979, pp.95-97; Zoller/1977, pp.381-382, 399-401. 
(331) RIAA/18, pp.44-45, paras.68, 70. 
(332) As argued later, that this seems to equate to the use of state practice as opinio aequilalis; cf. paras.7.1., 7.4.c) infra). 
(333) RIAA/18, pp.43-44, 56-57, paras.65, 96; emphasis added. Cf. Brown/1992, p.104. 
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explicable perhaps as judicial restraint334. Owing to the controversy raised by the North Sea 
Judgment, and the debates in the Third Conference, one would nevertheless suggest that a 
less restrained approach would have been justified. 
2.4.c)(iii) Special Circumstances. Geography and Equity 
As stated above, the application of Article 6 in concreto must be seen separately 
from its interpretation in abstrato. Asserting that the combined rule contained in Article 6 
amounted to seek an equitable solution is hardly debatable. What is perhaps questionable is 
the way in which this provision was applied in casu. 
Incidentally, it must be stressed that the underlying interpretation of the Tribunal 
appears to have in mind a very practical problem: the need to define the precise course of 
the boundary. This crucial point offers further explanation as to why Article 6 was viewed 
as having the same object of customary law. Only Article 6 could equip the Tribunal with a 
practical standard. Although equitable principles appeared as 'customary law', they offered 
no guidance. States overwhelmingly utilised the Article 6 rule. For the Tribunal, it became 
clear that the 'discovery' of the boundary-line had to be grounded on an adjustment of the 
equidistance-line. Clearly, equitable principles remained somewhat of a 'mystery'. Should 
account be taken of the way in which after the North Sea Judgment the states concerned 
conducted themselves to agree on a boundary-line335, the proposition above holds true. 
Criticism of the interpretation of the concept of special circumstances adopted in the 
Award stems only from the actual solutions reached. Before addressing this point, it must 
be remembered that the cautious statements made by the ILC in relation to that notion 
reflected the difficulties of foreseeing all possible situations. An exhaustive enumeration of 
special circumstances was not given because it was thought that case-to-case assessments 
were inescapable. The idea that no onus probandi stricto sensu lay on the state claiming the 
existence of special circumstances was in this light adequate336. Under the principle jura 
novit curia, provided that the facts are brought before the court, judges are empowered to 
gauge which circumstances are "special", i.e. which facts result in inequity337. The dictum 
that "geographical and other circumstances" had to be balanced to achieve an equitable 
delimitation is therefore accepted without difficulty 3 3 8. Equally, that the function of equity 
is to abate inequitable effects of distorting geographical features is uncontroversial339. 
(334) Analysing judicial caution in the light of the development of international law, of which the scope of the decision is one 
aspect, cf. Lauterpacht/1958, pp.75-152 (in particular pp.75-84). 
(335) Para.2.3.d) supra. 
(336) RIAA/18, pp.44-45, para.68. 
(337) Dipla/1984, pp. 172-173. On the existence of a burden of proof in relation to special circumstances, cf. para. 1.3.c)(i) .supra. 
(338) RIAA/18, pp.45, 57, 112, paras.70, 97,239. 
(339) /&K/.,p.ll7,para.251. 
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What must be realised, however, is that not all circumstances creative of inequity 
can be brought into the delimitation process340. Although the Tribunal endeavoured to look 
for guidance in state practice, the practical outcome is not totally satisfactory. The steps are 
clear; but the justification is not. The criticism of Bowett, stating that "the Court could have 
rendered more assistance by giving some actual citations of state practice, at least in those 
cases where it is by no means obvious what practice the Court has in mind", is perfectly 
understandable. As he notes, the "reference to semi-enclaves" does not present justification 
for the "complete enclave solution"; and it is questionable to assume that the attribution of 
partial-effect to islands reflects what the states had considered until then to be an equitable 
delimitation341. This author cites the 1971 Italy/Tunisia agreement as a possible precedent 
considered in terms of semi-enclaving islands close to the equidistance-line; and the 1965 
agreement between Iran/Saudi Arabia seems to be the precedent from which the idea of 
half-effect equidistance-lines stemmed. Here, the island of Kharg (lying at roughly 17 M off 
the coast of Iran) was only given half-effect in determining the equidistant boundary. 
However, the 1965 agreement was not ratified, being the line altered by an agreement of 
1968, which taking into account the discovery of petroleum structures in the area envisaged 
a more equitable solution. The resulting boundary-line zigzags across the said half-effect 
equidistance-line342. 
The 'distortive' effect produced by the Channel Islands and the Scilly Isles on the 
equidistance-line seemed sufficient to classify them as special circumstances, creative of 
inequity. But the reasoning of the Tribunal as to the modification of the equidistance-line is 
somewhat unclear. First, since no enclaving examples existed in state practice, the solution 
found for the Channel Islands had to be carefully reasoned. What factors justified the mere 
attribution of what was (for practical purposes) a territorial sea belt is a question that should 
have been elaborated further. It is especially so because, at that time, the consensus in the 
Third Conference was that all states were in principle entitled to 12 M of territorial sea. As 
it stood, it appeared that the Channel Islands were attributed no continental shelf area343. 
(340) Para.7.2. infra. 
(341) Bowett/1979, pp.228-229. Rosenne criticises this solution because "the notion of giving half-effect to geographical features 
does not appear in [...] the Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958" (Rosenne/1988, p.97). 
(342) Pietrowski, Jr, IMB/Report 7-7, pp. 1519-1524. On the influence of the Iran/Saudi Arabia agreement, cf. also Dipla/1984, 
p. 181. Other examples of treating islands as circumstances allowing the departure from equidistance may also have influenced the 
Tribunal. The 1968 Italy/Yugoslavia agreement is one example in which some islands located close to the equidistance-line from 
the mainland coasts were given a reduced effect similar to 12-mile semi-enclaves. In the 1969 Qatar-Abu Dhabi agreement, 
Dayinah Island was allocated only a 3-mile belt. In the 1973 Canada/Denmark (Greenland) agreement, partial or no-effect was 
given to some islands. On these agreements, cf. Appendix 2, B25-B26, D12, D45, D57. 
(343) RSNT, Articles 2 and 128(3), Off.Rec.-1973/82(V), pp.154, 172; ICNT, Articles 3 and 121(3), Off.Rec.-1973/82(VIII), pp.6, 
21. Whether by 1977 the 12 M territorial sea was customary law is a question that should have been addressed. Another question 
concerned the idea that only islands that "could not sustain human habitation or economic life" would not be entitled to at least 
some continental shelf. In scholarship, Brown argues that the delimitation had to be equitable in relation to the United Kingdom 
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A second point concerns the use of half-effect (and not another partial-effect) to 
adjust the equidistance in the Atlantic region, and the fact that the actual application of that 
technique was again severe for the United Kingdom. Even admitting that the effect of the 
Scillies had to be mitigated, the way in which the half-effect was applied is not equitable. 
To have a parity of treatment, it is preferable to use a bisector-line computed in relation to 
the angle formed between the equidistance-line from the mainland coasts, and an 
equidistance-line between the Scillies and Ushant. All insular features off the mainland 
coasts would thus be treated equally. The resulting line runs between the awarded line and 
the equidistance-line giving full-effect to the Scillies (Figure 3) 3 4 4 . The abatement would be 
predicated on the mainland coasts' relative location and, importantly, it would not give 
Ushant full-effect while attributing only half-effect to the Scillies. The fact that Tribunal's 
solution produces a line close to the midway-line between the two claims is perhaps more 
than just coincidence. 
The most relevant contribution of this Award is the idea that even if equidistance 
leads to inequity, that does not justify dismissing it without further reasoning. Seeking 
reasonable adjustments thereto is an indispensable step, consecrated by state practice345. 
The notion of "primary boundary" in the Channel Islands region and the use of half-effect 
equidistance-lines in the Atlantic region are exemplificative of this approach. These 
examples reflect the prevalence that must be given to geographical circumstances, and set 
constraints to the role of equity. Important is also the idea that 'geographical special 
circumstances' are those that cause inequitable shifts on the equidistance-line. Which are 
the "other circumstances", and how to assess their 'special status', is a question that should 
have been subsequently answered. Surely, there are limits to the "other" considerations that 
courts may balance for attaining equitable delimitations. Admitting otherwise would entail 
ascribing to judges an ex aequo et bono competence. Indeed, i f this Award has a weakness, 
it is precisely the failure to identify the limits to weighable circumstances346. 
References, for instance, to the broad notions of "navigation defence and security 
interests", even complemented by the assurance that they could not 'negative' conclusions 
derived from the geographical, political and legal circumstances, illustrate the confusion 
thereby maintained347. The Truman Proclamation, which the ICJ considered as the juridical 
source of the whole doctrine of continental shelf, clearly stated that continental shelf claims 
(Brown/1992, pp.119-120). Lauterpacht questions why the enclave was 12 miles, and "not 6, nor 18 or more" (Lauterpacht/1991, 
p.129). Raising similar difficulties, cf. Dipla/1984, p.185. 
(344) Although applying the half-effect method differently, Bowett suggests a similar solution (Bowett/1979, pp.231-240). 
(345) RIAA/18, pp.114-117, paras.245-250. 
(346) Judicial restraint seems to explain this approach (para.2.4.c)(ii) supra). One would suggest that, in view of the development of 
international law, the Tribunal could have had a more elaborative approach. 
(347) RIAA/18, pp.90, para. 188. 
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were related only to the "exercise of jurisdiction over the natural resources of the subsoil 
and seabed". It was affirmed therein, that "the character as high seas of the waters above the 
continental shelf and the right to their free and unimpeded navigation" would not be 
affected in any way. The idea that navigation interests were irrelevant for purposes of 
continental shelf delimitation was also mentioned during the ILC debates348. Whatever the 
weight, in continental shelf delimitation, the assessment of navigation and security factors is 
indeed open to question349. Equally, the political status of islands, their demography and 
economic life, are considerations that only arguably can be taken into account350. All in all, 
what had been a crucial question in the North Sea cases - the identification of the relevant 
non-geographic factors in continental shelf delimitation - thus remained unanswered. 
(348) Francois, ILC/Yearbook/l953(I), p.129. 
(349) Arguing that the continental shelf regime does not include defence-related and navigation-related rights, cf. O'Connell/1989, 
pp.467-503 (p.488, in particular); Andrassy/1979, pp.49-53; Anand/1976, pp.31-75, 81-99; Auguste/1960, pp.29-103 (and 
pp.243-343, for the practice of states in Latin America). 
(350) These factors were used mainly for the delimitation in the Channel Islands region; but they were also mentioned in relation to 
the Atlantic region; cf. RIAA/18, pp.88-89,93, 116, paras. 184, 186, 197, 248. 
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Chapter 3 
MARITIME DELIMITATION IN THE LOSC 
3.1. Introduction 
The key steps in the evolving process of maritime delimitation law pre-LOSC were 
described in the two previous chapters. In the LOSC, Articles 15, 74(1) and 83(1) are the 
provisions that govern the delimitation of the territorial sea, the EEZ and the continental 
shelf respectively. Their drafting history, in particular that of Articles 74(1) and 83(1), have 
already been thoroughly reviewed and discussed. Describing exhaustively the evolution of 
these provisions, and the debates within the Third Conference, is not the purpose of this 
chapter. Insofar as these provisions have been interpreted by scholarship in discrepant ways, 
further examination of the questions raised thereby is however required. Thus, references 
will have to be made to specific aspects of the drafting history. 
During the Third Conference, the topic of delimitation was deeply intertwined with 
the topic of entitlement of islands to maritime zones. This fact had become obvious since 
the opening statements in 1974. As the Irish representative put it, "all states were greatly 
interested in the question of islands and rocks, their precise definition and their effect on 
delimitation"351. Other states - Greece, Tunisia, Turkey, and Cyprus - also made reference 
to the relationship between the two issues352. Ultimately, however, the LOSC delimitation 
provisions made no distinction between continental and insular territories. No autonomous 
references to islands will therefore be made in this chapter. 
At this stage, it is worthwhile mentioning several features of the LOSC that contrast 
with the background presented in the two previous chapters. The comprehensive nature of 
the Convention is, in terms of international law of the sea, an important contextual reference 
for the interpretation of its provisions. Its quasi-universal acceptance is another element that 
will probably confer upon the conventional regime (as a whole) a greater degree of stability. 
In relation specifically to the provisions on maritime delimitation, it was noted at the outset 
that, even when they are not applied as conventional law qua tale, they have provided the 
legal framework for effecting delimitation involving states that are not parties to the LOSC 
(e.g. in the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, and in the Qatar/Bahrain case)353. It is indeed 
(351) Off.Rec-1973/82(1), p. 159, emphasis added. 
(352) Ibid., pp.129, 153, 168-169, 175. 
(353) Cf. General Introduction supra. 
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unlikely that the conventional delimitation formulae will change in the years to come, or 
that they will be overturned by customary law. On the contrary, inasmuch as no reservations 
are allowed to the conventional provisions354, the emergence of customary rules stemming 
from, and consonant with, the LOSC is likely to occur355. Customary law conforming to the 
LOSC will be the rule rather than the exception. This also means that courts will now have 
the possibility of elaborating on, and refining, the interpretation of those rules in a steadier 
context - as to maritime delimitation, if only because the LOSC brought a higher degree of 
certainty to the spatial definition of maritime jurisdiction. Hesitations relating to the breadth 
of maritime zones were to a great extent resolved; and the criteria of entitlement to these 
zones were more accurately defined. 
3.2. Brief Notes on Treaty Interpretation 
Most analyses have put great emphasis on the drafting history of the conventional 
provisions on delimitation. Without discounting the relevance of this element, it is possible 
nonetheless to indicate other elements that are equally (if not more) important. For instance, 
it has to be understood that the quasi-legislative and quasi-universal character of the LOSC 
will indelibly bear upon the interpretation of its provisions. The meaning conveyed by each 
provision is embedded in a certain phraseology whose interpretation has to follow the tenets 
of juridical hermeneutics. Before turning to the actual examination of the delimitation rules, 
some essential aspects of treaty interpretation should therefore be considered. 
There are three main theories in treaty interpretation356. The search for the intention 
of the parties characterises the subjective school. The objectivists assert that the 
fundamental aim is to determine the meaning of the text. The teleological approach stresses 
the need to look into the object and purpose of the treaty. The rules of interpretation 
incorporated in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (hereinafter 
"VCLT") contain elements of the three schools of thought357. It is nevertheless clear that the 
objectivist standpoint was favoured. This is confirmed by the ILC comments on the draft 
articles: "the starting point of interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the text, not 
an investigation ab initio into the intentions of the parties"358. The text is therefore the 
primary expression of the common will of the parties - a standpoint which the Court has 
(354) LOSC, Article 309. Analysing the question of'disguised reservations', cf. Nelson/2001. 
(355) Cf. Danilenko/1993, pp.156-162; Schachter/1985, p.98; Virally/1985, p.184; DeArechaga/1979, p.14; D'Amato/1971, 
pp. 162-166; Baxter/1971. 
(356) Cf. Aust/2000, pp.184-202; Nguyen/Daillier/Pellet/1999, pp.250-263; Jennings/Watts/1997, pp.1266-1284; Shaw/1997, 
p.656; Bernhardt/1995, pp. 1419-1420; Sinclair/1984, pp. 114-115; McNair/1961, pp.364-382. 
(357) Articles 31 and 32. 
(358) ILC/Yearbook/1966(11), p.220. 
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deemed to be customary international law . On account of their very general nature, 
however, these rules of interpretation cannot be seen as more than a set of guidelines. The 
relative weight to be attributed to each theory, when interpreting treaty provisions, thus can 
only be established in concreto. 
In the specific case of the delimitation provisions embodied in the LOSC, several 
arguments seem to reinforce the adoption of an objectivist interpretation, focusing primarily 
on the textual element. First, subjectivist interpretations are undoubtedly more appropriate 
to bilateral treaties, and occasionally to multilateral treaties with a very small number of 
parties. The common intention of all parties is in such instances determined more easily. It 
is difficult, perhaps impossible sometimes, to determine a common intention in provisions 
of quasi-universal treaties360. As to the delimitation provisions of the LOSC, since most 
states had in mind a small number of delimitations (the factual details of which are virtually 
unchangeable and somewhat unique), the difficulties in establishing an intention common to 
all states is even greater. Surely, all states would try (and indeed tried throughout the Third 
Conference) to safeguard their own positions in potential or actual disputes. 
Secondly, it must be considered that the Third Conference was based on a consensus 
process - a package-deal approach - in which the substantive discussion often took place 
off the record. Unofficial documents were recurrently used in the negotiations, thus raising 
further difficulties; for the official documents do not give a comprehensive account of the 
debate on most issues. Only a few of the Third Conference documents may really "be 
regarded as travaux preparatoires in the traditional sense" (used in Article 32 of the 
VCLT) 3 6 1. Since the travaux preparatoires are the key evidence of the intention of the 
parties, in the present case this intention is harder to elucidate. 
Thirdly, the interpretation of any provisions ought to be made in light of the wide 
context in which they are integrated, and of the subsequent state practice in relation to the 
treaty362. State practice, contemporary and subsequent to the treaty, normally provides 
sound guidance as to what constituted the intention of the parties. However, inasmuch as 
the proof of acceptance by all (or a significant majority of the) parties is required for state 
practice to be relevant in interpretation363, in the case of a quasi-universal treaty this 
element is of little or no use. It is even more so when the matter at hand is typically 
(359) Cf. Libya/Chad case, ICJ/Reports/1994, pp.21-22, para.41; Qatar/Bahrain case, Judgment on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
ICJ/Reports/1995, p. 18, para.33. 
(360) McNair/1961, pp.412,423. 
(361) Ailott/1983, pp.6-7. 
(362) V C L T , Article 31(2)(3). The context includes the text, preamble and annexes, and any agreement between all parties made in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty, or any instrument made by one or more parties and accepted by the others as related 
to the treaty. 
(363) This results from the actual text of Article 31 of the V C L T . Even before this convention was signed, this view already seemed 
to have been followed by jurisprudence and scholarship (cf. McNair/1961, pp.424-431; Fitzmaurice/1957, p.223). 
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bilateral, as in maritime delimitation, which is why a cautious approach is required in this 
respect. 
Finally, it must be remembered that the LOSC constitutes, in a way, a true 'legal 
system' of its own. The organised structure of principles, institutions, rules, and procedures, 
supported by a basically coherent set of interactions between these elements, is a systematic 
reference of interpretation that must not be overlooked. Thus, the conventional regime as a 
whole appears as a sort of lex specialis. Interpretations of a rule based on the systematic 
element, therefore, are likely to be preferable to interpretations of the same rule outside its 
systematic context. Moreover, account should be taken of the normativity provided by the 
principles that shape the LOSC. 
All in all, interpretations essentially based on objective elements should prevail. In 
terms of the context, the principle of integration, which conveys the notion that treaties are 
to be interpreted as a whole, must be given due consideration. An actualist interpretation 
should also be preferred to a historical one. As the ICJ stated already, "an international 
instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal system 
prevailing at the time of the interpretation"™. Law has to reflect the evolution of the 
society from which it stems. In 'deciphering' the meaning embedded in the textual element 
of the delimitation provisions, attention thus must be drawn to interpretative aspects other 
than the drafting history, namely the context provided by the LOSC and the systematic 
element of interpretation. Only then it becomes possible to grasp their true ratio legis. 
3.3. E E Z and Continental Shelf 
3.3.a) Drafting History 
Contrasting with what happened in relation to the territorial sea, the provisions on 
EEZ and continental shelf delimitation stem from difficult negotiations, which dealt with 
three issues of a different nature: the normative standards to apply in the delimitation; the 
interim arrangements to adopt, pending a final delimitation; and the procedural regime of 
dispute-settlement. This analysis will address only the first of these problems. 
The controversy surrounding the delimitation formulae is reflected in the common 
drafting history of Articles 74(1) and 83(1)365. The intention to have recourse to identical 
(364) Namibia AO, ICJ/Reports/1971, p.31, emphasis added. Similarly, cf. the Aegean Sea Case, ICJ/Reports/1978, p.34. 
(365) For an account of the draft history of these provisions, cf. Nordquist/1993, pp.796-816, 948-985; Oude Elferink/1994, 
pp.27-37, 113-130; Ahnish/1993, pp.72-76; Brown/1992, pp.313-360; Caflisch/1991, pp.477-486; Tanja/1990, pp.81-116; 
Jayewardene/1990, pp.308-316; Jagota/1985, pp.219-271; Dipla/1984, pp.213-231; Symonides/1984, pp.25-46; Caflisch/1983, 
pp.92-96; Judge Oda, Dissenting Opinion, Tunisia/Libya case, ICJ/Reports/1982, pp.234-262, and Separate Opinion, Jan Mayen 
case, ICJ/Reports/1993, pp.106-109. 
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wording in these provisions was manifested by some states at very early stages . Inasmuch 
as both the EEZ and the continental shelf are primarily resource-related areas, the idea of 
negotiating them jointly is understandable. Initially, however, the formulae included in the 
"Main Trends" document were not the same for the two zones367. One reason seems to 
explain this fact: whilst the delimitation of the continental shelf had already been examined 
in the 1958 Conference, and by international jurisprudence, the delimitation of the EEZ was 
being addressed for the first time. 
The negotiation of these provisions soon revealed the existence of two opposing 
groups of interests: the "Equidistance Group" and the "Equitable Principles Group". The 
former argued for the combined equidistance-special circumstances rule, whereas the latter 
favoured the idea of delimitation in accordance with equitable principles368. The first 
attempt to reconcile the 1958 rule and the North Sea Judgment appears in the Informal 
Single Negotiating Text (ISNT, 1975). Articles 61(1) and 70(1) replicated the relevant part 
of the dispositif of that decision, adding a reference to equidistance369. This formula was 
kept in the Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT, 1976) and in the Informal Composite 
Negotiating Text (ICNT, 1977). It provided that delimitation should 
be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, employing, where 
appropriate, the median or equidistance-line, and taking account of all the relevant 
circumstances. 3 7 0 
Neither group was however willing to accept this wording. The delimitation issue 
was eventually considered as one of the unresolved hard-core issues, and was referred to 
Negotiating Group 7 (NG7)3 7 1. The group negotiations started in 1978, and were predicated 
on proposals put forward by each of the delimitation groups. The "Equidistance Group" 
considered that the delimitation should employ 
as a general principle, the median or equidistance-line, taking into account any 
372 
special circumstances where this is justified. 
Differently, the final proposal of the "Equitable Principles Group" suggested that 
delimitation should be effected 
in accordance with equitable principles, taking into account all relevant 
circumstances and employing any methods, where appropriate, to lead to an 
373 
equitable solution. 
(366) Cf. 1974 proposals presented by The Netherlands, Kenya-Tunisia, and France, Off.Rec-1973/82(111), pp. 190-191, 205,237. 
(367) Provisions 82(CS) and 116(EEZ), Off.Rec.-1973/82011), pp.119-120, 126; cf. Platzoder/Documents(III), pp.293-294, 
312-313, and pp.330-331, 351-352, 375-376. In the case of the EEZ, reference was made to "delineation" instead of delimitation. 
(368) On the "Group System" in the Third Conference, cf. Nordquist/1985, pp.68-86; the states included in each "Delimitation 
Group", 24 in the "Equidistance Group" and 29 in the "Equitable Principles Group", are identified at pp.78-79. 
(369) Off.Rec.-l973/82(IV), pp.162-163. 
(370) Articles 62(1) and 71(1), Off.Rec.-1973/82(V), pp.164-165; Articles 74(1) and 83(1), Off.Rec.-1973/82(VIII), pp.16-17. 
(371) Document A/Conf.62/62 (13 April 1978), Off.Rec.-1973/82(X), pp.7-8. 
(372) Document NG7/2 (20 April 1978), Platz8der/Documents(IX), pp.392-393. 
(373) Documents NG7/4 (21 April 1978) and NG7/10 (1 May 1978), Platz6der/Documents(DC), pp.397,402. 
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The proposals helped somewhat to tame the waters. Unsurprisingly, the necessarily 
consensual nature of delimitation was undisputed. It became also clear that the difficulties 
were centred on the operative criteria to apply in the absence of an agreement: either the 
"equidistance-special circumstances rule", or the recourse to "equitable principles". In the 
proposal of the "Equidistance Group", equidistance was attributed the status of a "general 
principle". This idea followed the notion of a "general rule" that had been mentioned during 
the ILC debates, and argued for the advantages of adopting such terminology. Although 
referring to equidistance as a "principle", this proposal kept the balance between objectivity 
(equidistance) and 'subjectivity' (special circumstances) struck in 1958374. By contrast, the 
proposal put forward by the "Equitable Principles Group" argued that equidistance was a 
mere method. The striking feature thereof is that it did not present any objective standard 
for determining the course of the boundary. All standards included therein are 'subjective' 
(equitable principles, relevant circumstances); and it confers unbound discretion through the 
explicit reference to "any method". The ambiguity conveyed by these terms is clearly not 
counterbalanced by any measure of objectivity. Following clearly in the footsteps of the 
North Sea Judgment, this formula may be criticised on exactly the same grounds 3 7 5 . 
The negotiations in NG7 were characterised by a series of proposals that, for one 
reason or another, were not accepted376. In March 1980, the Report of the Chairman of NG7 
advanced another proposal for the delimitation articles, which again attempted to combine 
equidistance and equitable principles377. Although with caution, the "Equidistance Group" 
reacted positively. The "Equitable Principles Group", on the contrary, rejected it "even as a 
basis of negotiation"378. Notwithstanding this objection, the proposal was incorporated in 
the second revision of the ICNT (1980). Subsequently, the states of the "Equitable 
Principles Group" addressed a letter to the President of the Conference formally rejecting 
the text379. 
Further negotiations did not succeed in bringing together the views of the two sides. 
Insofar as it would be possible to pair many states (one from each group) with ongoing or 
potential maritime delimitation disputes, the uncompromising stance of both groups is 
unsurprising380. By 1981, after meetings with the two states representing the delimitation 
groups (Spain and Ireland), the President of the Conference put forward a new proposal381. 
(374) Paras. 1.3.a), 1.3.c)(i) supra, 3.4. infra. 
(375) Paras.2.3.b), 2.3.c), 2.3.d) supra. 
(376) Cf. e.g. Documents NG7/6 (24 April 1978), NG7/9 (27 April 1978), NG7/28 (28 March 1979), NG7/29-Rev.l (5 April 1979), 
NG7/35 (10 April 1979), P!atzoder/Documents(lX), pp.399,401,448, 451,455. 
(377) Off.Rec.-l973/82(XIII), pp.77-78. 
(378) Statements by Spain (Equidistance Group), and by Ireland (Equitable Principles Group), Off.Rec.-1973/82(XIII), pp.13-15. 
(379) Off.Rec.-l973/82(XTV), p.8. 
(380) Cf. Anderson/1999 (unpublished); Manner/1984, pp.630-631. Consider e.g. Turkey and Greece, Morocco and Spain, Libya 
and Malta, Senegal and Guinea-Bissau, Ireland and the United Kingdom. 
(381) Document A/Conf.62/WP. 11 (27 August 1981), PIatz6der/Documents(K), p.474. 
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The text made reference neither to equitable principles, nor to equidistance. This formula 
was eventually accepted by Ireland and Spain on behalf of both delimitation groups382, and 
incorporated without changes as Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of the LOSC383. 
3.3.b) The Interpretation of Articles 74(1) and 83(1) 
3.3.b)(i) Common Intention of the Parties 
Notwithstanding what was said before as to the theories of treaty interpretation, the 
reality is that the drafting history of Articles 74(1) and 83(1) is crucial to interpreting them, 
although formally only the intention common to all the signatories and/or parties should be 
taken as relevant. 
The compromising nature of the text of Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of the LOSC leads 
to one indisputable idea: none of the views of the delimitation groups prevailed in full. As 
the Chairman of NG7 noted early on in the process, i f agreement were to be reached, a 
"neutral formula between divergent opinions" had to be found3 8 4. He expressed also the 
view that a more concise formulation (i.e. not mentioning any operative criteria) would 
certainly gather wider support more easily385. The formula then advanced, stated that 
delimitation should "be effected by agreement in accordance with international law". It 
differed from the final version basically in relation to the reference to "achieve an equitable 
solution". Taking into account that only the intention of all negotiating states is relevant, 
two inferences are possible. First, the two groups agreed that the result of the delimitation 
ought not to be inequitable. Secondly, the adopted wording purposely prescribes neither the 
use of equidistance, nor the use of equitable principles, as means of delimitation. Any 
attempt to go further would be unsuccessful. The records make clear that, amongst the 
states that took the floor at the session in which the proposal was presented to the 
Conference, the majority wanted more time to study the proposal - some of them viewed its 
adoption as a premature decision386. One state at least, expressed its open dissension against 
187 
its contents . 
At that time, the President of the Conference requested the states "to avoid making 
any interpretative statements"™. How a common intention on the means of delimitation 
can be determined without such statements is a striking question, which has however a 
(382) Off.Rec.-1973/82(XV), pp.39-40. 
(383) Draft Convention, Off.Rec.-1973/82(XV), pp.187, 189. 
(384) Document NG7/9 (27 April 1978), Platz8der/Documents(iX), p.401. Adede describes the attempts initially made at neutral 
formulae (Adede/1979, pp.240-244). 
(385) Document A/Conf.62/L.47 (24 March 1980), Off.Rec.-1973/82(XIII), p.77. 
(386) Off.Rec.-1973/82(XV), pp.40-41 (United States, China, United Arab Emirates, Portugal, Venezuela, Qatar, Peru, Oman, 
Kuwait, Egypt, Bahrain, Israel). 
(387) 0ff.Rec.-1973/82(XV), p.41 (German Democratic Republic). 
(388) Ibid, p.41, emphasis added. 
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simple answer: it is not. Fortunately, in the 1982 session, some states made references to the 
text of Articles 74(1) and 83(1) in their statements, stressing two key ideas. First, they 
showed that the agreed text constituted perhaps the only compromise possible under the 
circumstances389. Indeed, references to "equitable principles" and to "equidistance" were 
dropped as a result of a trade-off390. Secondly, those statements demonstrated that states 
from both delimitation groups believed that their position could be subsumed in the wording 
adopted391. Above all, that phraseology stemmed from the conviction that it had become 
impossible to arrive at another (more dense) formula without giving rise to objections by 
either group of states392. Significantly, the formula adopted was vague enough not to 
prejudice the actual interests of any state involved in a potential or actual maritime 
delimitation dispute393. 
The idea that the need to compromise forced states to accept one formula that had 
minimal substantive content is paramount. Spain, which headed the "Equidistance Group", 
noted that the balance attained was a compromise that protected Spanish interests although 
not precisely through the desired regulations394. Its counterpart in the "Equitable Principles 
Group", Ireland, confirmed similarly that only by abandoning efforts to express the relevant 
law substantively had the stalemate been broken395. This interpretation was supported in the 
Tunisia/Libya Judgment, when the Court stated "any indication of a specific criterion which 
could give guidance to the interested states in their effort to achieve an equitable solution 
hafdj been excluded'396. As an unequivocal statement of the Tribunal in the Eritrea/Yemen 
arbitration recognises, 
there has to be room for differences of opinion about the interpretation of 
[Articles 74(1) and 83(1)] which, in a last minute endeavour at the [Third 
Conference] to get agreement on a very controversial matter, were consciously 
397 
designed to decide as little as possible. 
All things considered, one conclusion may be drawn. It is hard to assert, with any 
degree of certainty, which was the common intention of the parties in regard to the means of 
delimitation. When attempting to interpret Articles 74(1) and 83(1), this conclusion must be 
taken in due account. From the whole negotiation process what it is fair to infer is that the 
(389) Off.Rec.-l973/82(XVI), pp.47, 51-52, 55, 58-59, 62-63, 69, 73, 79, 82, 84; Off.Rec.-1973/82(XVTI), pp.24, 71, 77, 90, 105, 
119; in chronological order, Guyana, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Kenya, Spain(l), Cape Verde, Algeria, Chile, Senegal, 
Barbados, Cyprus(l), Bahamas(l), Ireland, Cyprus(2), Turkey, Spain(2), Bahamas(2). 
(390) Evans/1999, p.157; Bedjaoui/1990, p.371; Manner/1984, p.633. 
(391) Supporting equitable principles or principles of equity in general: Algeria (Off.Rec-1973/82(XVI), p.63), Ireland, Turkey, 
and Venezuela (Off.Rec.-1973/82(XVII), pp.24, 76-77, 119). Supporting equidistance: United Arab Emirates, Cyprus, Colombia, 
Spain, and Bahamas (Off.Rec.-1973/82(XVII), pp.50, 71, 82, 90, 105). 
(392) Judge Evensen, Dissenting Opinion, Tunisia/Libya case, ICJ/Reports/1982, p.281, para.4. 
(393) Oxman/1982, pp. 14-15. 
(394) Off.Rec.-1973/82(XVH), p.90. 
(395) rt>K/.,p.24. 
(396) ICJ/Reports/1982, p.49, para.50. 
(397) Eritrea/Yemen-II, para.l 16. 
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delimitation formula constitutes a compromise that embodies only what was common to 
both perspectives: the need to avoid inequitable solutions. The compromise stemmed from 
sensitive trade-off concessions, whereby the balance was struck. Neither equidistance, nor 
equitable principles were collectively endorsed in the Third Conference. The wording of 
Articles 74(1) and 83(1) amounts to a phraseology that allows interpretations reconcilable 
with the two divergent intentions™. It does not reflect a mens legislatoris; which is why one 
should concentrate on delving into its objective content, the mens legis. 
3.3.b)(ii) The Text and the Context 
In broad terms, Articles 74(1) and 83(1) contain three main structural parts, which 
prescribe that delimitation is to be effected: (I) "by agreement", (II) "on the basis of 
international law as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice", (III) "in order to achieve an equitable solution". These parts of the textual element 
raise three outstanding issues that must be examined independently, as absolutely decisive 
for the interpretation. One ought to enquire, first, what constitutes the precise extent of the 
requirement to delimit boundaries by agreement. Under this provision, are states 'forced' to 
negotiate, even i f they consider it not being in their interest to do so? This question concerns 
the 'procedural element', and will be addressed later399. Secondly, it must be asked on 
which normative basis is delimitation to be effected, according to these provisions. The 
following analysis will centre on this question. How is the equitableness of the solution to 
be assessed is the third question, which will be examined only in subsequent parts of this 
study400. 
As the rules in question are part of an international treaty, the text of the relevant 
provisions, and indeed the context in which they were drafted, necessarily forms the basis 
of analysis. The textual element thus will be the starting point for the interpretation, which 
considering the abovementioned difficulties as to the elucidation of the intention of parties 
on the basis of the travaux preparatoires, acquires greater relevance in this case. However, 
the ordinary meaning of the words must be moulded by the surrounding context. Lex non 
est textus sed contextus. Owing to the principle of integration, besides the wider context 
provided by general international law, attention must be drawn to other LOSC provisions. 
(398) Cf. e.g. Oude EIferink/1994, p.31; Ahnish/1993, pp.74-76; Brown/1992, pp.236-239, 345; Caflisch/1991, pp.48(M81; 
Tanja/1990, pp.108-116; Evans/1989, p.31; Oda/1987, p.357; Attard/1987, p.224; Jagota/1985, pp.245, 264-270; Vukas/1985, 
pp.166-167; Manner/1984, p.640; Allott/1983, pp.21-24; Judge Oda, Dissenting Opinion, Tunisia/Libya case, ICJ/Reports/1982, 
p.246, and Separate Opinion, Jan Mayen case, ICJ/Reports/1993, pp. 107-108. 
(399) Para.3.6. infra. 
(400) Para.6.4., Conclusions to Part II; also paras.7.2., 7.3., 7.4. infra. 
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3.3.b)(iii) Normativitv and Equitable Solution 
As far as normativity is concerned, the formula of Articles 74(1) and 83(1) has been 
criticised by scholars as vague, vacuous, indeterminate, virtually meaningless and bearing a 
regrettable degree of juridical uncertainty401. Oxman believes it does not "purport to lay 
down a normative rule to be applied in the absence of an agreement". He affirms, moreover, 
that it "says nothing of significance while, worse still, trying to give a contrary impression 
by introducing unnecessary language and avoiding recognised terminology associated with 
jurisprudence and scholarship"402. In juridical terms, the drawbacks are in fact considerable. 
The failure to lay down true normative standards is hardly understandable403. Nonetheless, 
this reveals an impact of realism on international law, namely the need felt during the Third 
Conference to find a compromise that would gather support from the vast majority of states. 
To the jurist is left the task of interpreting the rules as they are presented. 
Apparently, the said articles establish that delimitation agreements shall "achieve an 
equitable solution". If taken literally on its own, this expression would open the door to any 
reasoning that would lead to equitableness, allowing for wide discretionary powers. Some 
limits have been introduced by prescribing that the solution must be founded on "the basis 
of international law". The meaning of the reference to Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ is 
however not totally clear. It was suggested by Manner, who chaired NG7, that this reference 
to Article 38 of the Statute was intended "to indicate that international law, as a basis of 
delimitation agreements, [did] not differ from the law applied by the Hague Court"404. That 
might have been indeed the intention of the "Equitable Principles Group"405. Other factors 
must however be pondered. Because the reference to Article 38 of the Statute and the 
requirement of attaining an equitable result were a last minute twist that was not discussed 
in detail at the Conference406, no common intention is likely to have emerged. Importantly, 
it is hardly believable that the intention was to effect a renvoi to the law as applied by the 
ICJ. First, the inclusion of a reference to "international law" was 'demanded' by the group 
that claimed an obligatory application of equidistance as the starting point, thus opposing 
the views of the ICJ in 1969407. Secondly, jurisprudence was far from settled. Whereas the 
1969 cases dismissed equidistance in toto, the 1977 arbitration attributed it, de facto and 
(401) Cf. e.g. Evans/1999, p.156; Charney/1994, p.227; Brown/1992, p.48; Caflisch/1991, p.480; Queneudec/1989, p.419; 
Johnston/Saunders/1988, p.4; Allott/1983, p.22; Caflisch/1983, p.98; Judge Oda, Dissenting Opinion, Tunisia/Libya case, 
ICJ/Reports/1982, p.246, para. 143. 
(402) Oxman/1982, pp.14-15, emphasis added. 
(403) The need for substantive delimitation rules was behind the solution devised in the 1958 Conventions. As stressed, there was 
the danger that states would be unwilling to resort to adjudication in the absence of such rules (Lauterpacht, 
ILC/Yearbook/1952(1), p.184; ILC/Yearbook/1953(II), pp.241-269). 
(404) Manner/1984, p.639. 
(405) Cf. e.g. the statements of Algeria and Ireland, Off.Rec.-l 973/82(XVI), p.63, Off.Rec.-l 973/82(XVII), p.24. 
(406) Judge Evensen, Dissenting Opinion, Tunisia/Libya case, ICJ/Reports/1982, p.281, para.4. 
(407) Symonides/1984, p.31. Cf. the statements by Spain and Denmark, both from the "Equidistance Group", supporting openly the 
first proposal where the reference to "international law" appeared (Off.Rec.-1973/82(XIII), pp.13, 18, 77-78). 
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de jure, a primary role. Thirdly, insofar as no delimitation of the EEZ had ever been carried 
out, that view would (at that time) lead to the conclusion that the delimitation standards for 
the EEZ remained undefined408. Quod est absurdum. 
Once again, it must be observed that not too much emphasis should be put on the 
intention of the parties when interpreting these provisions. A more objective interpretation 
should be favoured instead. Unlike domestic legal systems, international law does not have 
a constitution whereby the sources of law are identified. Nor would that be possible with its 
'horizontal nature'. The enumeration of Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ has been widely 
accepted "as the most authoritative statement as to the sources of international law"4 0 9. This 
suggests that it is more appropriate to view the aforementioned reference as entailing a 
juridical limitation concerning the operative-criteria through which the equitable solution is 
to be sought, and the legal foundation on which it rests. Besides leading to a non-inequitable 
result, delimitation must be predicated on operative-standards set by international law. The 
contents of these criteria however, are not explained410. No doubt, it may be argued that 
"[w]hat the Convention [did was] to set the parameters of the delimitation processMXX. 
This conclusion gives rise to problematic questions. It has to be asked whether, in 
negotiation, states parties to the LOSC are bound by normative standards. This possibility 
appears to be upheld by the famous dictum of the North Sea Judgment: "delimitation is to 
be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, and taking account of all 
relevant circumstances"4*2. Taken literally, this statement would imply a limitation of the 
contractual freedom of states, and of the scope of the traditional jus tractuum. This seems 
unreasonable. Strictly speaking, when shaping the content of an agreement, states are only 
bound by imperative rules of international law, i.e. jus cogens. Neither have states to abide 
by any parameters regarding the delimitation process, nor are they bound to take account of 
specific circumstances, should they not want to do so413. 
More importantly, even i f an agreement interferes with or infringes upon the rights 
of a third state, the rule pacta tertiis nec nocere nec prodesse possunt becomes applicable; 
the conventional provisions are unopposable to it. This protection of third states' rights 
means that states do not necessarily have to weigh interests of third parties when shaping 
the content of bilateral delimitation agreements. States are free to choose the circumstances 
(408) As recognised by Nordquist, during the Third Conference, "the question of [EEZ] delimitation had to be approached de novo" 
(Nordquist/1993,p.801). 
(409) Shaw/1997, p.55. This provision was drafted for the PCIJ. The view more commonly held by the doctrine seems to be that, 
nowadays, the enumeration of sources of Article 38 of the Statute is incomplete (cf. Nguyen/Daillier/Pellet/1999, pp.112-114; 
Allott/1983, p.22). The reference to "civilised nations", for instance, has become obsolete and meaningless. 
(410) Judge Oda, Dissenting Opinion, ICJ/Reports/1982, p.246, para.144. 
(411) Allott/1983, p.23. 
(412) lCJ/Reports/1969, p.53, para. 101 (C)(1), emphasis added. 
(413) On the freedom of states in determining the contents of agreements and the nature of the solution that is incorporated therein, 
cf. para.6.1.bXii) infra. 
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(political, strategic, defence, geographical, juridical, environmental, economic, etc.) and the 
methods to consider, irrespective of their legal relevance, just as they are free to determine 
the way in which to weigh the circumstances and to apply the methods. The 'give and take' 
character of negotiations entitles them thereto. One cannot overstress that, in 1969, when 
the Court affirmed that states should consider "all the relevant circumstances", it did so 
because it also considered that delimitation was to be effected by agreement. States might, 
however, not want to lift the veil in regard to the considerations that led to a certain line. 
This explains why the contents of customary law are so debatable, and bilateral state 
practice cannot be taken, in definite terms, as evincing an opinio juris. 
Whether a delimitation agreement must necessarily contain an 'equitable solution' is 
a different problem. It leads us to ask how the equitable character of a maritime boundary is 
to be assessed. Only one answer is possible: all boundaries established by a valid agreement 
must be assumed to be equitable. Furthermore, there are reasons to deny a state the right to 
require the review of an agreement on the grounds that it did not achieve an equitable 
solution. The rule of pacta sunt servanda, as well as the doctrine of finality and stability of 
boundaries (also applicable to maritime boundaries), rule out this possibility414. Actually, in 
the Guinea-Bissau/Senegal arbitration, the Tribunal affirmed that Articles 74(1) and 83(1) 
did not encompass the authorisation to review the equitableness of boundary agreements415. 
A validly agreed boundary may be manifestly inequitable to one of the states, because "as 
far as states are concerned, [maritime delimitation law] is no more than suppletive", i.e. it 
may "be derogated from" by common consent*16 - which is the sole paramount aspect. 
Although Articles 74(1) and 83(1) refer to agreement, seemingly representing states 
as the addressees of the rule, the reference to international law is in fact intended to limit the 
powers of courts. States are neither bound to apply whatever standards international law 
prescribes, nor under the obligation to reach an equitable solution (if only because there are 
no objective parameters on the basis of which to evaluate its equitableness). The explicit 
reference to Article 38 of the Statute reinforces the idea that the addressees of the obligation 
to apply international law are the courts. What discretion is conferred on courts under these 
provisions is thus a cardinal question. 
The proposition that Articles 74(1) and 83(1) give judges the freedom to choose any 
delimitation formulae, method or principle "that is likely to lead to an equitable solution" 
(414) Making the same argument, cf. Jennings/1989, p.402. On the relevance of the doctrine of finality and stability of boundaries, 
cf. Marston/1994; Kaikobad/1983. References to this doctrine may be found in jurisprudence; cf. Guinea-Bissau/Senegal 
arbitration, ILR/83/1990, pp.36-37, para.64; Aegean Sea case, ICJ/Reports/1978, pp.36-37, para.85; Temple case, 
ICJ/Reports/l962,p.34. 
(415) rLR/83/1990, pp.42-43, para.79. 
(416) Weil/1989a, p.8; and Tanja/1990, p.306. Cf. para.6.1 .b)(i) infra. 
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has already been advanced . This would amount to place states and courts in much the 
same position, which is, to say the least, controversial. Discerning any difference between 
such unlimited freedom, and the power to decide ex aequo et bono, would become in all 
fairness very difficult, if not impossible. This suggestion holds true in the light of the textual 
element. As according to Article 38 of the Statute, ex aequo et bono decisions can only 
be rendered if states explicitly agree thereto, the reference to international law and to the 
said Article 38 appears exactly to set limits to a court's freedom. 
With regard to the common intention of the parties, it must be recalled that during 
the preparatory work of the Geneva Conventions states rejected explicitly, and strongly, the 
possibility of ex aequo et bono delimitations418. The need to establish normative criteria of 
delimitation was at the time emphatically supported. Conferring on courts a wide margin of 
discretion, in relation to the methods to apply and the circumstances to weigh, would entail 
a departure from this perspective. Such an interpretation would hold true only if predicated 
on an unequivocal common intention of states. The records of the Third Conference point in 
the opposite direction. The debates were centred precisely on the choice of substantive 
standards to adopt, and showed a clear cleavage between the two delimitation groups. 
A final and decisive argument to dismiss the idea that Articles 74(1) and 83(1) give 
courts the power to decide primarily on the basis of equity can be found in the systematic 
element of interpretation. When referring to the attribution of rights and jurisdiction in the 
E E Z , in cases not regulated by the LOSC, Article 59 establishes that any conflicts "should 
be resolved on the basis of equity and in the light of all relevant circumstances". No doubt 
whatsoever is left as to the freedom to choose any considerations deemed relevant in the 
light of pure equity. This systematic argument finds further support in Articles 69(1) and 
70(1). These provisions refer to the participation of landlocked and disadvantaged states in 
the surplus of E E Z resources, "on an equitable basis, [...] taking into account the relevant 
economic and geographical circumstances of all the States concerned and in conformity 
with the provisions of this Article and of Articles 61 and 62". Here, equity is still the basis 
of decision, account taken of specified circumstances. If the same type of decision-making 
criterion was intended for maritime delimitation, why did states not resort to the same or 
similar phraseology? There is only one answer. No such freedom was ever intended. Legis 
quo volet dixit, quod non volet facet. 
All in all, it is clear that Articles 74(1) and 83(1) distinguish between the result and 
the means. The obligation laid down in the LOSC is one of result: inequitable solutions 
must be avoided. The means whereby these non-inequitable solutions are to be attained are 
(417) Manner/1984, p.641. 
(418) Para. 1.2.c) supra. 
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specified only indirectly, through the expression "on the basis of international law". Courts 
are thus bound to seek in international law the normative basis upon which delimitations are 
to be effected. The circumstances and methods to be considered in maritime delimitation, in 
the search for non-inequitable solutions, are strictly those allowed, and more importantly, 
those required by international law. 
3.3.b)(iv) The Standards of Delimitation in International Law 
The enumeration of sources of law in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ refers to 
"international conventions", "international custom" and "general principles of law". Judicial 
decisions and learned writings are indicated as subsidiary means to determine the contents 
of international law. Although the de facto law-making nature of some judicial decisions 
cannot be denied419, the benefits of such a practice remain undemonstrated. Despite recent 
changes, which gave international organisations an important role, the law-making powers 
in international law remain ultimately with the states. The exercise of similar powers by 
courts may import the risk of unbalancing the horizontal nature of the international legal 
order. Even when fostered by courts, proposals de lege ferenda should not be imposed on 
states420. Furthermore, there is no rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere in international 
law. For these reasons, case law will not be regarded here as a source of law, but rather as 
an auxiliary means of interpretation and crystallisation of its contents. 
Among the important points that may be raised as to Articles 74(1) and 83(1), two 
seem to require specific attention. One, in terms of treaty law, the Geneva Conventions still 
have to be taken into account. It is important to establish whether there is any role for the 
delimitation provisions incorporated therein. Two, the assertion that customary law requires 
delimitation to be effected in accordance with equitable principles taking account of all 
relevant circumstances must be scrutinised in-depth. 
The entry into force of the LOSC gives rise to questions regarding the application of 
successive treaties. The non-existence of a clause of general supersession in relation to the 
Geneva Conventions leaves room to doubt. Stating that the LOSC prevails, as between 
states parties, over the 1958 Conventions falls short of what would be desirable421. It means 
that the 1958 Conventions do not cease to have effect automatically. Whether thgy apply to 
a case then depends on the situation in concreto. The prevalence of the LOSC regime, wheat 
contradicting with the 1958 regime, is unquestioned. But if the two regimes are csrapstifc-Is, 
there seems to be no reason for not applying the Geneva Conventions422. 
(419) Cf. Brownlie/1998b, pp.28-32; Quintana/1997, pp.369-380; Chamey/1994, p.228; Weil/1989a-, p-p.7-8. 
(420) Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, ICJ/Reports/1974, pp.24-25, para.53. 
(421) LOSC, Article 311(1); and VCLT, Articles 30 and 59. Cf. Nordquist/1989, pp.242-243. 
(422) Fleischer/1999, p.352. 
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In continental shelf delimitations involving states parties to the Geneva Convention, 
when at least one of them did not ratify the LOSC, Article 6 of the CS Convention remains 
thus applicable. If both states are parties to the LOSC, the delimitation is to be effected in 
accordance with Article 83(1). Notwithstanding this, since this provision refers solely to the 
result to be attained (an equitable solution) and does not establish an obligation of means, it 
should be asked whether Article 6 (the equidistance-special circumstances rule) may be 
applied between the parties to the LOSC which are also parties to the 1958 Convention. 
The question must be raised because whereas Article 83(1) of the LOSC provides 
no answer as to the means of delimitation (referring only to the result), Article 6 refers to 
the equidistance-special circumstances rule. Since the notion of special circumstances was 
inset as an 'escape clause' aimed at avoiding inequity, the obligation of result contained in 
Article 83(1) would be met. In effect, its drafting history substantiates the idea that the use 
of the equidistance-special circumstances rule is allowed423. As Fleischer states, "Articles 
74 and 83 of the LOS Convention retain, and indeed reiterate, the applicability of the 
Geneva Convention as between the states parties"424. 
Should it be deemed to exist, customary law becomes applicable to continental shelf 
delimitations involving states non-parties to the 1958 Convention, and to E E Z delimitations. 
In fact, the suggestion that the contents of Articles 74(1) and 83(1) do not depart from those 
of customary law has been put forward in jurisprudence and scholarship425. If it were so, 
insofar as the 'equitable principles' are allegedly the substantive standard of delimitation in 
customary law for over thirty years4 2 6, it should presumably be easy to find an extensive, 
settled and virtually uniform state practice, evincing an opinio juris. 
An attempt made by the author to survey state practice in continental shelf and E E Z 
delimitation showed however that no such general practice exists427. Some of the findings 
are striking. Of some 300 cases of both unilateral and bilateral state practice considered, 
roughly one in five mention no operative-standard. References to equitable principles can 
be found in only some 10% of the occurrences, and one third of these references pre-date 
1958. Notably, in the post-1969 practice, clearly less than one in ten acts refer to equitable 
principles. If restricted to the post-1982 practice, this ratio drops dramatically to less than 
one in twenty-five instances. Contrasting clearly, the explicit endorsement of equidistance 
(423) Courts have interpreted Article 83(1) of the LOSC and Article 6 of the CS Convention as having similar contents. On this 
issue, cf. (para.6.4.b)(iii)(iv), Conclusions to Part II infra). On the faimess and balanced nature of Article 6, cf. paras. 1.3.c)(i) 
supra, 3.4. infra. As to the three possible interpretations of this rule, cf. para.2.4.c)(i) supra. 
(424) Fleischer/1999, p.526. 
(425) Cf. Jan Mayen case, ICJ/Reports/1993, p.59, para.48; Guinea/Guinea-Bissau arbitration, ILM/25/1986, p.289, para.88; 
Libya/Malta case, ICJ/Reports/1985, pp.30-31, paras.28-29; Gulf of Maine case, ICJ/Reports/1984, pp.294-295, paras.95-100; 
Oude Elferink/1999, p.462; Kwiatkowska/1997, p.102; Jagota/1985, p.270; Symonides/1984, p.37; Manner/1984, p.639. 
(426) The equitable principles doctrine is understood as rejecting the equidistance-line as the starting point for delimitations, and as 
allowing the consideration of any circumstances that may contribute to an equitable result. 
(427) Cf. Appendix 2. For a brief assessment, cf. also Antunes/2000c, pp. 183-184. 
- 100-
TOWARDS THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF MARITIME DELIMITATION 
occurs in almost 50% of cases. When taking account of the bilateral agreements in which 
equidistance was de facto resorted to in some form or another, this figure rises impressively 
to two thirds of all state practice428. In this light, it is difficult to conclude that there is any 
settled, extensive and virtually uniform state practice supporting the use of equitable 
principles. This conclusion is probably not so surprising. In the early 1950's, the opinion 
appeared to be that customary law provided no standards for continental shelf delimitation. 
Evidence for this can be found in the Report on the "Rights to Sea-Bed and Its Subsoil", 
presented in the 1950 Forty-Fourth Conference of the ILA, which stated: 
Criteria for the division of the sea-bed (and subsoil) of a continental shelf shared by 
two or more coastal states should be developed, taking into account factors such as 
the configuration of the coastlines, the economic value of proven deposits of 
i 429 
minerals, etc. 
The idea that no normative standards existed was corroborated in the 1950 meetings 
of the I L C 4 3 0 . Thus, it is not easily understandable how it could be concluded that a general 
practice bearing an opinio juris supporting the use of equitable principles emerged between 
1950 and 1969, precisely the period when the equidistance-special circumstances rule was 
introduced in international law, and gained support amongst states. The aforementioned 
survey shows that, in that period, the use of equidistance was explicitly supported by state 
practice in some 70% of the cases, and implicitly in a number of other cases. Consequently, 
in legal terms, the elevation of equitable principles to customary law is incomprehensible. 
In E E Z delimitation, the use of equitable principles is even less understandable. The 
historical development of this maritime zone makes scarce reference to equitable principles. 
Two thirds of the unilateral practice refers to equidistance as the prima facie boundary-line 
for E E Z and fisheries zones, in the absence of agreement. To the extent that unilateral state 
practice is not determined by any kind of trade-off, but conveys instead the unconditioned 
view of states, this practice cannot be discarded lightly, especially when the states involved 
are either parties or signatories to the LOSC. Another argument helps to brush aside the 
application of the so-called equitable principles doctrine in E E Z delimitation. The reasoning 
of the ICJ in the North Sea cases, when rejecting equidistance, started from the premise that 
the idea of proximity (related to equidistance) was not reconcilable with the concept of 
natural prolongation. The problem here is that natural prolongation is completely unrelated 
with the notion of EEZ. It was precisely the non-existence of natural prolongation in certain 
oceanic areas that gave rise to the creation of this maritime zone431. 
(428) An explanation for this wide use of some form of equidistance is attempted later- cf. para.6.3.d), Conclusion of Part II infra. 
(429) ILA, Report of the Forty-Fourth Conference, p. 135, emphasis added. Reference was made thereto during the ILC work. 
(430) ILC/Yearbook/19S0(I), pp.232-234. Cf. also para. 1.2.b)(0 supra. 
(431) Considering that no customary law on EEZ delimitation exists, cf. e.g. Caflisch/1991, p.481; Dipla/1984, pp.224-225. 
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For the equitable principles doctrine, equidistance is not mandatory. State practice 
should therefore clearly reflect this point. The truth is, however, that there have been a large 
number of states continuously arguing in favour of the mandatory nature of equidistance. 
The position assumed by the "Equidistance Group" in the Third Conference is utter and 
conclusive evidence of an uncompromising and significant endorsement of equidistance as 
a normative standard, obligatory in some measure. Inasmuch as the potential emergence of 
a customary rule from a certain practice is always hampered by the "strong adherence" of a 
group of states to an opposing practice432, serious doubts are cast on the idea that equitable 
principles are part of customary law. Indeed, there is clear evidence of a "strong adherence" 
of an appreciable number of states to the obligatory use of equidistance as the starting point 
of delimitation. Consequently, because the first prerequisite - an extensive, settled and 
virtually uniform practice - is not fulfilled, the equitable principles doctrine cannot be seen 
as customary law. For similar reasons, the use of strict equidistance cannot be seen as 
mandatory, as far as the final boundary-line is concerned. 
The conclusion to be drawn as to the 'means of delimitation', in light of the relevant 
state practice, is that no customary rule exists. First, the application of equitable principles 
in continental shelf delimitation was never acquiesced to by those states that supported 
equidistance - which rejected it continuously. Secondly, no customary law regarding E E Z 
delimitation could have arisen before the 1970's; and the practice thereafter shows clear 
preference for the use of equidistance. Therefore, the suggestion that Articles 74(1) and 
83(1) embody the rule of 'delimitation in accordance with equitable principles' is 
undoubtedly owed "more to wishful thinking than well found treaty interpretation"433. The 
use of equitable principles (which entails the complete rejection of the mandatory nature of 
equidistance) has never been supported by a general practice, evincing an opinio juris43*. 
3.4. Territorial Sea: Crystallisation of a Balanced Rule 
The drafting history of Article 15 of the LOSC is not very complex, and raised little 
controversy. Although four different formulae were considered initially, Formula A (which 
was materially identical to Article 12 of the 1958 Convention) was eventually favoured435. 
An analysis of the documents of Negotiating Group 7 (NG7) shows that this matter was not 
(432) Nuclear Weapons AO, ICJ/Reports/1996(1), p.255, para.73. 
(433) Brown/1992, p.360. 
(434) Concluding for the absence of any opinio juris, cf. Charney/1993, p.xlii. Cf. also O'Connell/1989, p.731. 
(435) Cf. Nordquist/1993, pp.132-143; Ahnish/1993, pp.47-50; Jayewardene/1990, pp.277-280; Vukas/1985, pp.149-153; 
Symonides/1984, pp.21-24. Informal Working Papers No.l, No.l/Rev.l, No. 1/Rev.2(Reissued), in Platzoder/Documents(III), 
pp.208-209, 215-216, 232-233, 250-251. The proposals were consolidated in the "Main Trends Working Paper", of the Second 
Committee, Off.Rec.-1973/82(111), pp. 107-142, at p. 111. 
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debated extensively . This is explainable on various grounds. Strong objections were 
raised against Formula C (mentioning equitable principles), for being inadequate, subjective 
and ambiguous. Objections of this nature were not raised against Formula A. Further, the 
potential distorting effect of certain features when using equidistance is negligible in the 
vicinity of the coast, and this was explicitly noted in the North Sea cases438. In addition, the 
notion of special circumstances provides enough room to overcome any inequities resulting 
from the use of strict equidistance439. On another level, taking into account the breadth of 
the territorial sea, the number of states concerned with the practical impact of this provision 
was small4 4 0. Finally, it has to be considered that, unlike the continental shelf, the territorial 
sea delimitation remained "unaffected by the theoretical and judicial controversies"441. 
Inasmuch as the delimitation formula adopted in the LOSC remained substantively 
unchanged in relation to the 1958 rule, all considerations made above in relation to the latter 
are thus applicable to the former442. This means that when agreement cannot be reached, 
equidistance is the line beyond which, prima facie, states cannot exercise their sovereignty. 
Equidistance is the starting line for the delimitation443. Reasonable modifications thereto are 
allowed where special circumstances are deemed to exist. 
The Convention does not regulate comprehensively the questions regarding historic 
titles and historic rights over oceanic areas. The Second Committee referred to this issue 
superficially in the territorial sea draft provisions of the 'Main Trends' working paper444. 
These references no longer appeared in the RSNT of 1976445. Ultimately, historic bays and 
traditional fishing rights were the only references in this respect446. This matter continues 
therefore to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law 4 4 7. Clearly, 
the comments made above with regard to historic title in the context of the 1958 rule remain 
valid 4 4 8. A historic title might determine the inapplicability of the delimitation rule to the 
whole or part of the disputed area. In addition, the contradistinction between historic title 
and historic rights still has to be considered. It might happen that a historic legal regime is 
(436) Doc.A/Conf.62/62, Off.Rec.-l973/82(X), pp.7-8; cf. Platzoder/Documents(lX), pp.474. 
(437) Off.Rec.-1973/82(11), p. 119; ibid.(lU), p.l 11. 
(438) Cf. ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.19,38, paras.8, 59; Caflisch/1991, p.442; Vukas/1985, p.150; Symonides/1984, p.23. 
(439) Off.Rec.-1973/82(11), p.l 19. 
(440) Symonides/1984, pp.22-23. 
(441) Weil/1989a,p.l38. 
(442) Cf. e.g. Oude Elferink/1994, p.37; Nordquist/1993, p.136; Ahnish/1993, p.48; Caflisch/1991, pp.439-440; O'Connell/1989, 
p.677; Johnston/1988, p.164; Kapoor/Kerr/1986, p.72; Jagota/1985, p.249; Vukas/1985, p.152-153; Symonides/1984, p.22. 
(443) The definition of the equidistance-line can give rise to various problems of a technical nature, which appear as another level of 
potential disagreement. The identification of basepoints and/or baselines from which the equidistance-line is to be computed can 
become a difficult hurdle to jump in the delimitation process (e.g. the use of low-tide elevations, the use of straight baselines, the 
agreement in relation to the tidal datum to be used in the determination of the normal baseline, etc.). Cf. para.5.2.b) infra. 
(444) Provisions 2, 3, and 17, Off.Rec.-1973/82011), pp.109-110. Cf. proposal by the Philippines, Off.Rec.-1973/82(111), p.202. 
(445) 0ff.Rec.-1973/82(V), pp.154-156. 
(446) LOSC, Articles 10(6) and 51(1). The optional clause included in the dispute-settlement mechanism - Article 298( 1 )(a)(i), 
makes also reference to "historic bays or titles". 
(447) LOSC, Preamble. 
(448) Para. 1.3.c)(ii) supra. 
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spatially superimposed as a separate 'layer of normativity'. The traditional lex pescatoria 
existing in the Red Sea between Eritrea and Yemen offers an example of this situation. The 
Tribunal affirmed that such a regime did "not depend, either for its existence or for its 
protection, upon the drawing of an international boundary", and that "the drawing of the 
maritime boundary [was not] conditioned by the findings [...] of such regime"449. 
Some scholars have argued that Article 15, despite its text, prescribes that territorial 
sea delimitation is to be effected in accordance with equitable principles450. This conclusion 
appears to be flawed on conceptual grounds. Stating that equity is embedded in Article 15 
(insofar as an inequitable result should be avoided) is quite different from affirming that it 
prescribes delimitations in accordance with equitable principles. The delimitation result is 
one thing; the means used to undertake the delimitation is a totally different thing. The 
dictum in the Anglo/French arbitration, from which this idea stems, concerned continental 
shelf delimitation and, importantly, can be read in two different ways. Within the context of 
other considerations in the Award, this dictum can be interpreted as stating that the 
delimitation in accordance with equitable principles simply amounts to the proper 
application of the equidistance-special circumstances rule4 5 1. This suggestion finds support 
is jurisprudence. In the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, the Tribunal concluded that the use of 
equidistance was equitable because no reason founded on historic title or special 
circumstances justified a departure therefrom452. In this respect, the Qatar/Bahrain case is 
even more conclusive. Apparently, the equidistance-special circumstances rule - applicable 
in particular to territorial sea delimitations, was distinguished from the equitable principles 
doctrine - applicable to the delimitation of the other maritime zones. In practice, however, it 
all came down to applying the equidistance-special circumstances rule. Turning the wheel 
full circle, the Court explained how the delimitation rule of the territorial sea operated by 
referring to the Jan Mayen case - a continental shelf and fisheries zones delimitation (which 
de facto consists of an application of the equidistance-special circumstances rule) 4 5 3. 
Absolutely decisive in terms of concluding that the equitable principles doctrine is 
not subsumed in Article 15 is an argument of treaty interpretation. The use of the equitable 
principles formula in the provision on territorial sea delimitation was suggested at various 
stages of the Third Conference, as an alternative to the equidistance-special circumstances 
formula454. Its non-acceptance demonstrates that such a doctrine was rejected. 
(449) Eritrea/Yemen-II, para. 110. 
(450) Cf. Oude Elferink/1994, p.27; Kwiatkwoska/1989, pp.184-185. 
(451) Pares.2.4.c)(i) supra, 6.4.b)(iii) infra. 
(452) Eritrea/Yemen-II, para. 159. 
(453) Qatar/Bahrain-Merits, paras.217, 231. 
(454) Cf. PlatzOder/Documents(in), pp.208-209, 215-216, 232-233, 250-251; Off.Rec-1973/82(111), pp.107-142, at p.l 11; Proposal 
by The Netherlands, Off.Rec.-1973/82(m), pp.190-191; Proposal by Morocco, Platz6der/Documents(rX), pp.394-395; Statements 
of Argentina and Venezuela, Off.Rec.- 1973/82(Xin), pp.17, 20. 
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All things considered, one would argue that Article 15 of the LOSC incorporates the 
same rule as Article 12 of the TS/CZ Convention, and indeed crystallises it. Resulting from 
years of work by lawyers, geographers and politicians, this rule offers a balance between an 
objective element that promotes certainty (equidistance), and an element of flexibility that 
promotes justice in casu (special circumstances). Focusing on the means of delimitation, it 
nonetheless ensures that unreasonableness is avoided455; so much so that it is on the basis 
thereof that courts actually delimit maritime boundaries today. Insofar as the equitable 
principles doctrine rejects equidistance as the mandatory starting point for delimitation, it is 
barely possible to argue that such a doctrine is incorporated in Article 15. 
3.5. Contiguous Zone: The Non-Existence of a Delimitation Rule 
The "Main Trends" working paper contained a provision regulating contiguous zone 
delimitation. It transcribed Article 24(3) of the TS/CZ Convention456. Neither in the ISNT 
(1975)4 5 7 and in subsequent draft texts, nor in the LOSC, was this provision incorporated. 
Apparently three reasons justify this4 5 8. First, states seem to have shown some reluctance to 
further complicate the already difficult negotiations on delimitation. Secondly, the idea that 
a provision for delimitation of the contiguous zone was somewhat dispensable, because that 
boundary would simply follow the E E Z boundary, had acquired some support. Thirdly, 
some states were convinced that the nature of the jurisdictional powers exercised in the 
contiguous zone was reconcilable with the notion of overlapping jurisdictions459. 
Various reasons lead us to argue, however, that the lack of a delimitation provision 
for the contiguous zone may potentially give rise to problems. Since not all states claim an 
EEZ (and might claim a fisheries zone instead), in some cases there will be no boundary to 
apply to the contiguous zone. On another level, the exclusive nature of some powers related 
to the contiguous zone impedes their concurrent exercise. This is the case of Article 303(2), 
on the finding and protection of archaeological and historical objects. Conceptually, this is 
clear in the fact that the contiguous zone is no longer part of the high seas (as happened in 
the 1958 Convention). Finally, concurrent exercise of jurisdiction is likely to raise problems 
at the level of enforcement of law, where the laws and regulations of the states concerned 
(455) On the normative principles underlying this rule, cf. paras.6.3., 6.4, and Conclusions to Part II infra. 
(456) Provision 49, Off.Rec.-1973/82(111), p.l 15; ibid.(l\), p. 121. 
(457) Off.Rec.-1973/82(VI), p. 157. 
(458) Cf. Nordquist/1993, pp.273-274; Caflisch/1991, pp.443-445; Vukas/1985, pp.156-162. 
(459) Advanced during the First Conference by some delegations (Off.Rec.-1958(111), p. 199), this idea assumed that the contiguous 
zone was part of the high seas. 
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differ (e.g. immigration, customs, drug smuggling). It is thus necessary to know how the 
delimitation between adjoining contiguous zones is effected, if required460. 
If two states are parties to the TS/CZ Convention, and at least one of them has not 
ratified the LOSC, Article 24(3) of the TS/CZ Convention is applicable. Here, one would 
maintain that a proper corrective interpretation is required461. The situation is unclear when 
both states are parties to the LOSC, and to the TS/CZ Convention. One ought to consider 
whether the absence of a rule for contiguous zone delimitation means that Article 24(3) is 
still applicable. As aforesaid, the LOSC does not have a clause of general supersession in 
relation to Geneva Conventions462. The term "prevail" used in the wording of Article 311(1) 
provides no clear-cut answer to cases such as this4 6 3. For instance, Cyprus has suggested 
that there is a presumption in favour of the said Article 24(3)4 6 4. Prescribing the use of strict 
equidistance, this article apparently leaves no room for considerations of equity. Such an 
approach is however contrary to one key idea present at all stages of the Third Conference: 
the non-inequitable nature of maritime boundaries. 
State practice on contiguous zone delimitation is virtually negligible, which means 
that no customary law emerged. In this context, the suggestion that Article 24(3) should be 
subject to a corrective interpretation acquires greater relevance. A similar outcome would 
arise from recourse by analogy to Article 15 of the L O S C 4 6 5 . Whatever the interpretative 
path actually followed, the point is that the use of the equidistance-special circumstances 
rule to delimitations of contiguous zones finds support on various grounds. Substantively, 
the protective and preventive jurisdiction that characterises this maritime zone is similar to 
some sovereign powers exercised in the territorial sea. No doubt, these powers are in nature 
different from those of the EEZ. This view is reinforced, systematically, by the inclusion of 
the regimes of the territorial sea and the contiguous zone in the same Part of the LOSC, as 
had happened also in 1958. Furthermore, the historical evolution of the contiguous zone is 
clearly related with the territorial sea, and not with the E E Z 4 6 6 . 
The analogy that allegedly allows the application of the delimitation provisions of 
the E E Z to contiguous zone delimitations seems rather superficial467. The argument behind 
the idea that it is "probably more justified" that delimitations between E E Z and contiguous 
zone are effected by recourse to Article 74(1) is suggestive468. It is difficult, however, to 
(460) According to Vukas, the Netherlands was the only state that denied explicitly the usefulness of a delimitation provision for the 
contiguous zone (Vukas/1985, pp.156-158). 
(461) Para.l.3.c)(iii) supra. 
(462) Para.3.3.b)(iv) supra. 
(463) The regime of the V C L T - Articles 30 and 59 - is not applicable. Article 311 of the LOSC is lex specialis in relation thereto. 
(464) Off.Rec.-1973/82(XVII), p.71. 
(465) Caflisch/1991,p.445. 
(466) O'Connel1/1989, pp. 1034-1061. 
(467) Cf. e.g. Turkey, Off.Rec.-1973/82(XVn), p.77. 
(468) Symonides/1984, p.25. 
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escape the conclusion that the considerations that might be relevant for contiguous zone 
delimitation are not only not necessarily relevant for the E E Z 4 6 9 , but also more likely to be 
substantively linked to those relevant for territorial sea delimitation. Furthermore, since 
Article 74(1) refers only to an equitable solution, and since Article 15 embodies a rule able 
to yield such a solution, the recourse to the equidistance-special circumstances rule is, in the 
absence of a contradiction, systematically and analogically the preferable approach. 
The case of "rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their 
own" provides a decisive argument in favour of this conclusion. Under the LOSC, these 
insular features "shall have no E E Z or continental shelf 4 7 0 . Through reasoning a contrario 
(because this is the exceptional case in which the rule concerning the maritime entitlement 
of islands is excluded) it may be concluded that states are entitled to claim contiguous zones 
around 'rocks'4 7 1. In such a situation, where there will be no E E Z at all, it becomes difficult 
to argue for the application of Article 74(1). There is therefore much reason to believe that 
the analogical application of Article 15 is the correct interpretation. The uniformity of 
regime achieved thereby - the rule applicable to any contiguous zone delimitation would 
always be the same - strengthens such an option472. 
3.6. The 'Procedural Element' of Delimitation Rules 
3.6.a) Introductory Remarks 
At the final stage of this chapter, it is necessary to dwell, however briefly, on one 
specific issue: the 'procedural element' of delimitation rules. All delimitation provisions of 
the LOSC, as well as those of the Geneva Conventions, make reference to "agreement". 
What is the meaning of this reference? Should it be understood that states are required to 
negotiate, and to reach agreement? How does this reference interrelate with the question of 
dispute-settlement in international law in general, and in the law of the sea in particular? 
It must be noted that the aim is neither to discuss dispute-settlement in international 
law, nor to examine the specific mechanisms that the LOSC contains in this respect. They 
are both taken here as givens. Notwithstanding this, mention must be made of the cardinal 
tenet of general international law, which has been uncompromisingly accepted by states: 
disputes are to be settled through peaceful means (e.g. negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, 
(469) Caflisch/1983, pp.56-57. 
(470) LOSC, Article 121(3). 
(471) Cf.Kolb/1994, p.908. 
(472) The use of Article 74(1) where there is an EEZ, and Article 15 by analogy in those cases of insular features which fall under 
the category of rocks defined in Article 121(3), seems to be another solution (Quadros/Otero/Gouveia/1999 (unpublished), 
pp.28-29,42,66,68). 
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judicial settlement) . An important right, indeed the counterbalance of the said obligation, 
has simultaneously been conferred upon states: they "enjoy complete freedom to choose the 
appropriate means of settling disputes", because the political and ideological divisions 
between states have been a hindrance "to reach agreement on the creation of universally 
accepted devices"474. States might waive this freedom of choice by means of a conventional 
obligation, and accept to refer a dispute, or certain disputes, to specific dispute-settlement 
mechanisms475. Nevertheless, they "are not obliged to resolve their differences at all"; all 
procedural means are "operative only upon the consent of the particular states"476. 
3.6.b) Agreements in Maritime Delimitation 
The resolution of maritime boundary disputes does not appear to have any intrinsic 
specificity requiring an exemption from the dispute-settlement regime established in general 
international law, or in the law of the sea. Unless it is clear that states have explicitly agreed 
to waive their freedom of choice of means, the presumption must surely be against the 
existence of any obligation to resort to a specific means of dispute-settlement. As stated by 
the ICJ, "[njeither in the Charter nor otherwise in international law is any general rule to be 
found to the effect that the exhaustion of diplomatic negotiations constitutes a precondition 
for a matter to be referred to the Court"477. In effect, "in the absence of a specific obligation 
to negotiate a state is entitled to suggest that another procedure should be used"478. The 
paramount question is thus whether under the LOSC, or the 1958 Conventions, the freedom 
of states is in any way conditioned. 
That consent is supreme in maritime delimitation; i.e. it is unanimously uncontested 
that states cannot impose boundaries on other states by unilateral declaration479. Whether 
under the LOSC's delimitation provisions states are bound by an obligation to enter into 
negotiations to resolve disputes concerning maritime boundaries, is a different question. To 
be meaningful, such an obligation to reach agreement through negotiations would have to 
amount to attribute to state A the right to demand from state B the initiation of negotiations. 
(473) UN Charter, Articles 2(3), 33(1). Cf. also Resolution 2625 (XXV) of the United Nations, General Assembly, of 24 October 
1970, Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. 
(474) Cassese/1991, pp.213-214. Should states fail to resolve a dispute likely to endanger international peace and security, they 
should refer it to the Security Council; cf. UN Charter, Article 37(1). Nevertheless, especially in fields related to human rights this 
situation seems to be undergoing dramatic changes. 
(475) Nguyen/Daillier/Pellet/1999, pp.788-789. 
(476) Shaw/1997, p.718. Cf. also Brownlie/1998, p.703. The choice of means of dispute resolution in international law has already 
been portrayed as an "international dilemma"; see Evans (ed.)/1998 
(477) Cameroon/Nigeria case, Judgment on Preliminary Objections, ICJ/Reports/1998, p.303, para.56. 
(478) Merrills/1998, p.26. 
(479) Cf. Guinea/Guinea-Bissau arbitration, ILM/25/1986, p.291, para.94; Gulf of Maine case, ICJ/Reports/1984, p.292, para.87; 
Tunisia/Libya case, ICJ/Reports/1982, pp.66-67, para.87; also, Anderson/1998c, p.l 18; Lucchini/Vcelckel/1996, pp.82-83; Oude 
Elferink/1994, p.32; Thirlway/1993, p.38; Nordquist/1993, pp.813-814, 982; Bardonnet/1989, p.3; Kwiatkowska/1989, 
pp.194-195; Weil/1989a, p.107; Attard/1987, p.227; Dipla/1984, p.22l; Symonides/1984, p.35. 
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Or at the very least, negotiations would have to emerge as a conditio for having recourse to 
adjudication. Anything short of this makes such an obligation meaningless, if only because 
state B could almost indefinitely stall the commencement of the negotiations. 
It has been suggested that the concatenation of the "principle of agreement" with the 
"basic duty of international co-operation" means that states are under the obligation to enter 
into meaningful negotiations in good faith in order to reach an agreement on delimitation480. 
This assertion gives rise to two issues: one concerns the understanding of meaningful 
negotiations; the other regards the obligation to enter into negotiation. 
No argument will be made against the idea that, (according to the principle of good 
faith) if states decide to negotiate, they must do so in meaningful terms. This means usually 
that states must be prepared to modify their initial positions on delimitation481. But that does 
not have to happen necessarily. The trade-off approach actually followed in negotiations 
may involve concessions that are unrelated with the determination of the boundary proprio 
sensu. States might negotiate in good faith without considering changes to their position in 
relation to the boundary-line, as long as other forms of 'compensation' (paying reasonable 
regard to the legal rights of the other state4*2) are considered. Such an approach is visible in 
certain examples of state practice483. 
How to understand the so-called obligation to enter into negotiations, and to arrive 
at an agreement, is a more delicate issue. The idea that one state may unilaterally 'force' 
another state to negotiate - against its will - is striking. The decision as to when to enter in 
negotiations (and of course when and if to conclude an agreement) has depended hitherto 
totally on states' discretion. Denying such discretionary power would bring about a major 
departure from the ancient jus tractuum. Because it is hardly plausible that the freedom of 
states to decide, according to their interests, when to negotiate, could be overridden by a yet 
ill-defined duty of cooperation, this problem must be investigated in further detail. 
3.6.c) Is There an Obligation to Negotiate? 
Going back to the early I L C debates on continental shelf delimitation, it is possible 
to show that, historically, no such obligation was intended. During the 1951 debates, Scelle 
and Spiropoulos asserted that it "had never been implied that states should reach agreement 
as to the delimitation of their respective parts of the continental shelf unless they found it 
(480) Kwiatkowska/1988, pp.140-143. Also, Symonides/1984, pp.35-36; North Sea cases, ICJ/Reports/1969, p.48, para.85(a); 
Tunisia/Libya case, lCJ/Reports/1982, pp.66-67, para.87; Gulf of Maine case, ICJ/Reports(1984, pp.292, 299, paras.87, 112. 
(481) North Sea cases, ICJ/Reports/1969, p.48, para.85/a; Kwiatkowska/1988, p. 141. 
(482) Fisheries Jurisdiction case, ICJ/Reports/1974, p.33, para.78. 
(483) Para.6.1.b)(ii)in/"ra. 
- 109-
TOWARDS THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF MARITIME DELIMITATION 
necessary . When, consonant with the advice of the Committee of Experts, the Special 
Rapporteur proposed in 1953 an amended draft Article 7 on continental shelf delimitation, 
no reference was made to agreement485. It was Pal who, affirming that "states should be 
given the opportunity of arriving at an amicable settlement", proposed that the expression 
"unless otherwise amicably determined by them" would be included in the text. In response, 
Francois stated that he "was not opposed to the inclusion" of such words, but "considered 
them to be superfluous". As he put it quite correctly, "when two parties agreed not to follow 
the prescribed rules and arrived at a settlement which did not conflict with the interests of a 
third-party, no objection could be raised"486. However, since the delimitation articles 
stipulated the use of equidistance in mandatory terms, it was decided to keep the reference 
to agreement to make clear that the contractual freedom of states would not be overridden. 
Thus, the travaux preparatoires are unsupportive of an obligation to negotiate. 
Other arguments support this view decisively. The textual element does not impose 
any obligation to reach agreement by negotiation. Reaching agreement, for instance, by an 
adjudicating process, is still an option. Literally, for an obligation to negotiate to exist, 
states would resort to a wording similar to that of Article 41 of the 1978 Vienna Convention 
on Succession of States in Respect to Treaties (hereinafter "VCSSRT"), which refers to 'a 
process of negotiation'. Had such an obligation been intended, the text would certainly have 
made it undisputed - for it would be a departure from general international law. 
No element (literal, contextual, or the travaux preparatoires) was found to support 
the existence of such an obligation in maritime delimitation. States continue to be free to 
choose the procedural means to delimit their boundaries. The reference to agreement in 
Articles 74 and 83 means simply that if states want their maritime boundaries precisely and 
definitively fixed, they must abide by the principle of consent, which can be expressed in 
more than one way. No stricto sensu obligation to negotiate exists. 
The doctrine of stability and finality of boundaries lends further weight to this idea. 
At any moment in time, a state may be transitionally in a critically weak political position. 
If that state could be 'forced' to enter into negotiations at that precise moment, its position 
would be dramatic. Since boundaries are presumably permanent in character, what was a 
transitional weakness would have a lasting impact upon the spatial sphere of jurisdiction of 
that state. Such possibility is certainly everything but equitable. The changeable nature of 
(484) ILC/Yearbook/1951(I), p.293. It is noteworthy in this respect that, in the North Sea cases, the ICJ recognised that the land 
boundaries of a state (which relate to the exercise of full sovereignty) do not necessarily have to be delimited, "and often in 
various places and for long periods they are not" (IGI/Reports/1969, p.33, para.46). A fortiori, no reason exists for imposing on 
states an obligation to delimit their E E Z or continental shelf boundaries (which relate to mere sovereign rights and jurisdiction). 
They may thus remain indeterminate for an indefinite period of time. 
(485) ILC/Yearbook/1953(I), P-106. 
(486) Ibid., pp. 125-126. Sandstrom supported this view. 
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the law - as for example in the case of the entitlement criterion - is another example of how 
timing is so crucial. Negotiating in the immediate aftermath of the North Sea cases, 
Australia arrived in 1972 at an agreement with Indonesia487 - which relied on natural 
prolongation - that would most probably not be possible less than fifteen years later. This 
can be inferred clearly from the I d ' s assertion in the Libya/Malta case, as to the relevance 
of geological and geomorphological elements in maritime delimitation488. Bearing in mind 
the paradoxical relationship between the stability and finality inherent in boundaries, and 
the 'snapshot' character of delimitation, the only reasonable conclusion is therefore that the 
decision as regards whether and when to negotiate {or to conclude an agreement) must still 
be left to the discretion of states. As Anderson puts it, "the duty to negotiate over maritime 
boundaries still leaves decisions about timing in the hands of the two sides"489. No doubt, 
this is a corollary of the fundamental horizontal nature of the international legal system. 
3.6.d) Is the Justiciability of Maritime Boundary Disputes Conditioned? 
The obligation to negotiate is also related to the recourse to judicial bodies, either to 
the ICJ through the use of declarations made under the optional clause of Article 36(2) of its 
Statute, or to the ICJ, the ITLOS or an arbitral tribunal under Part X V of the LOSC. If 
existent, such an obligation would prevent states from resorting to these means without 
previously entering into negotiations over their maritime boundaries. 
In the Libya/Malta case, reasoning under the umbrella of the equitable principles 
doctrine, the Court stated that there was a duty of the parties to first seek delimitation by 
agreement490. How is this to be understood in relation to the LOSC provisions? It was not 
until the Cameroon/Nigeria case that this issue was analysed491. In its seventh preliminary 
objection, Nigeria stated that, as far as maritime delimitation was concerned, there was no 
legal dispute. One of its arguments was that there had not been "sufficient action by the 
parties, on a footing of equality, to effect of a delimitation by agreement on the basis of 
international law'"492. The need to negotiate before having recourse to adjudication was, to 
Nigeria, a requirement prescribed by general international law, also present in Articles 74 
and 83 of the LOSC. 
The Court's answer has left little room for doubt. Noting that it had "been seized on 
the basis of declarations made under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute, which 
(487) Appendix 2, D4. 
(488) ICJ/Reports/1985, p.35, para.39. 
(489) Anderson/1998c, p.l 18. Oxman/1993, p.39; Bowett/1993, p.132. 
(490) ICJ/Reports/1985, p.39, para.46. 
(491) Antunes/2000c, pp.164-165. 
(492) Preliminary Objections of Nigeria, para.7.33(2), emphasis added. 
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declarations do not contain any condition relating to prior negotiations to be conducted 
within a reasonable period of time", the Court rejected Nigeria's objection493. Apparently, 
to seek first an agreement is no longer (if it ever was) a prerequisite. Regardless of whether 
the Court changed its views, it is clear that even if there is a conventional obligation to 
negotiate, that obligation is irrelevant for purposes of establishing jurisdiction under the 
optional clause. As the compulsory dispute-settlement system incorporated in the LOSC 
does not in any way impair "the right of any States Parties to agree at any time to settle a 
dispute between them [...] by any peaceful means of their own choice", this approach is 
irreproachable even between states parties to the L O S C 4 9 4 . 
That exhausting prior negotiations is not a condition of admissibility of applications 
under the optional clause, and that the existence of a dispute is the sole operative criterion, 
has been affirmed since the Aegean Sea case4 9 5. In the recent Cameroon/Nigeria case, this 
view was maintained496. As perceptively noted by Judge Higgins in her Separate Opinion, 
entirely different from establishing whether negotiations are a prerequisite for resorting to 
adjudication, is enquiring whether a dispute exists at all in situations where negotiations 
have yet not been held4 9 7. A dispute exists only when two states are aware of each other's 
claims, and positively and reciprocally oppose them, which in most cases - although not 
always - occurs in the follow-up of negotiations. But as restated in the Tunisia/Libya case, 
"the manifestation of the existence of [a] dispute in a specific manner, as for instance by 
diplomatic negotiations, is not required"498. 
How is the situation to be viewed under Part X V of the LOSC? Must negotiations 
be exhausted before resorting to the means set down in Article 287? One would argue that 
the answer should be given in the negative. Articles 74 and 83 bear primarily a negative 
prescription: maritime boundaries may not be determined unilaterally. This is a reflection of 
the principle of consent, and should be interpreted as nothing more. First, in general terms 
states are clearly unwilling to condition their freedom to negotiate. Secondly, the textual 
element of these provisions is unclear as to the existence of an obligation. Thirdly, evidence 
in the travaux preparatoires of the I L C , and in the work of the Third Conference, is against 
the existence of such an obligation. Fourthly, such an interpretation would benefit primarily 
the state unwilling to negotiate. Because it would impede the other state from resorting to 
adjudication without delay, and because it would place on this state the onus probandi as to 
(493) Judgment on Preliminary Objections, ICJ/Report/1998, pp.321-322, paras.108-111, emphasis added. 
(494) LOSC, Article 280. Cf. also Article 33(1) of the Charter, to which Article 279 of the LOSC makes reference. 
(495) ICJ/Reports/1978, pp. 12-14, paras.27-31. 
(496) Judgment on Preliminary Objections, ICJ/Report/1998, pp.302-303, para.56. 
(497) /6/rf.,pp.345-349. 
(498) Reference to the Chorzdw Factory case in the Judgment on Application for Revision and Interpretation; cf. ICJ/Reports/1985, 
pp.217-218, para.46. 
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the unwillingness to enter into negotiation, it would provide the former state with a highly 
effective 'stalling instrument'. 
Realistically, no state wi l l resort to adjudication without attempting (to some extent) 
to resolve the dispute by negotiation. Whether, and the extent to which, negotiations must 
be held is a matter of judgment for states. One would argue that they have a wide freedom 
in this regard, and that in principle nothing precludes a state from immediately seeking the 
determination of its boundaries by adjudication. It is so equally because an obligation to 
negotiate has "a very limited scope, amounting to little more than the need to negotiate 
rather than pursue non-peaceful means, and to negotiate in order to define the precise point 
at issue"499. 
A l l in all, the requirement of agreement in Articles 15, 74(1) and 83(1) is no more 
than the rejection of the possibility to effect delimitations unilaterally. It is significant that 
agreements are required even when recourse is had to adjudication. The implementation of 
judicial decisions depends thereon; and importantly, in these agreements, states continue to 
be virtually free to shape the contents thereof. They are even entitled to depart from any 
court's decision5 0 0. 
(499) Collier/Lowe/2000, p.22. 
(500) Anderson/1998c, p. 120. This seems to have happened in the North Sea cases 
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CONCLUSIONS TO PART I 
A summary of the key ideas conveyed by the previous chapters is worthwhile. To 
begin, it is crucial to realise that the history of maritime delimitation has always revolved 
around the tension between geography and law, within which equity assumed a central role. 
The interdisciplinary nature of this dialectic, reflected from the outset in the work of the 
ILC, and the participation of the Committee of Experts, has created several difficulties - the 
resolution of which has not always been approached from the most productive angle. 
Notably, technical and juridical issues were often not clearly differentiated. 
The equidistance-special circumstances rule embodied in the Geneva Conventions 
was the result of years of debate whereby juridical arguments, technical issues, and the 
views of states were considered in a balanced process. Lawyers, technical experts and 
politicians all had input, creating a rule that expresses "the effort to balance determinacy 
with concern for justice", and that invites "principled and reasoned fairness discourse"501. 
State practice prior to 1958 and the views expressed during the travaux preparatoires 
(including both the statements by the government of states) leave no doubt that at the time 
this formula amounted to progressive development of law, rather than codification of 
existent law. Important to understanding these provisions is the idea that they were derived 
from principles of law, which the ILC was explicitly invited by states to develop in order to 
provide them with some certainty as to the regime of delimitation 5 0 2. It must be duly 
stressed that states compelled the ILC to abandon any idea of ex aequo et bono resolution of 
boundary disputes. Any approach to discussion of delimitation law must reflect this point. 
The majority of states were unwilling to leave to courts a wide margin of discretion. 
The dismissal of the equidistance-special circumstances rule in the North Sea cases 
was certainly hasty, and unnecessarily upset the whole evolution of maritime delimitation 
law. Knowing that judges are all too aware that their decisions contribute, often decisively, 
to shaping the development of the law, the reasoning of this case must also be viewed from 
a policy-making, or matter of principle, perspective. The ICJ was thus certainly conscious 
of the relevance of its imprimatur to the international law-making process503. The 
(501) Franck/1997, p.6l; Franck/1995, p.34. 
(502) Paras. 1.2.b)(ii), 1.2.c) supra. 
(503) The decisive role of the ICJ in the identification, crystallisation, and sometimes progressive development of international law 
could already clearly be seen in many judgments (cf. Shaw/1997, pp.86-87; Thirlway/1990, pp.127-133, Waldock/1951). Cf. the 
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emergence of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) was already deemed to be one 
of the reasons that led the Court to attribute to equity an over-particular role in the outcome 
of these cases504. Without disagreeing, it ought to be added that i f equity was the sole 
concern, then the Court could have simply resorted to an equity-oriented interpretation of 
Article 6 of the CS Convention. Interpretatio aequior sumenda est. This would have given 
it all the room it required to aver the need to arrive at a non-inequitable boundary505. One 
would suggest that the impact of the concept of NIEO lies not just on the emphasis put on 
equity, but also on the rejection of equidistance at all cost. Having confirmed the customary 
nature of Article 1 of the CS Convention5 0 6, the Court subscribed to the exploitability 
criterion as a basis of entitlement to the continental shelf. An endorsement of equidistance 
would have brought about major difficulties. 
The concatenation of this entitlement criterion with the use of equidistance in 
delimitation would result in a situation that was illustrated in sketch-maps used by Germany 
in its pleadings, showing the whole North Atlantic Ocean divided on the basis of strict 
equidistance. They cannot have failed to impress the Court unfavourably to equidistance. 
States like Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Iceland, Ireland, Portugal and the United 
Kingdom would claim vast areas of ocean floor and subsoil, while inequitably constraining 
the maritime claims of other interested states507. Significantly, Ambassador Pardo's speech 
in the United Nations had been given just before the oral pleadings took place, little more 
than one year before the Judgment was rendered. Had equidistance been endorsed to any 
extent, the idea of a common heritage of mankind would have had little opportunity to 
crystallize. The dismissal of equidistance in toto, leaving equity as the sole deciding 
criterion, should be understood in this light. 
The fact that the Court did not even attempt to interpret the rule contained in 
Article 6, the combined equidistance-special circumstances rule, lends further weight to this 
view. Had the Court applied it, it could later be argued that it had homologated equidistance 
in some measure. The combined rule incorporated in Article 6 of the CS Convention seems 
thus to have been no more than a 'collateral casualty' of the process of ordering the oceans. 
Attempts to bring together the contents of treaty and customary law do not seem to 
have fully succeeded. The approach of the Anglo/French arbitration, though irreproachable, 
Reparations case (ICJ/Reports/1949), the Genocide case (ICJ/Reports/1951), the Nottebohm case (ICJ/Reports/1955), the Certain 
Expenses case (ICJ/Reports/1962), the Temple case (Id/Reports/1962), and the Fisheries case (ICJ/Reports/1951). 
(504) Cf. Rossi/1993, pp.126, 173, 195-200, 202-203,218; Queneudec/1979, p.74; Friedmann/1969, pp.239-240. 
(505) Judge Ammoun, Separate Opinion, North Sea cases, ICJ/Reports/1969, pp. 149-151, paras.52-53. Concurring with this view, 
Anderson suggests that it "would have produced the same broad result" (Anderson/2001, p.6). 
(506) ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.39-40, para.63. 
(507) German Memorial, ICJ/Pleadings/1968(1), pp.62-67. As Lang emphasises, this was one of the most spectacular sketch-maps 
brought before the Court (Lang/1970, p.21). It must be remembered that, by then, it was thought that the wealth existent in the 
deep seabed (in particular the polymetallic manganese nodules) would become a key factor in some aspects of world economy. 
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is far from clear (probably because of the attempt not to contradict the 1969 Judgment), and 
the travaux preparatoires of the LOSC illustrate the difficulties in reconciling the two 
perspectives. As to the role of equidistance in delimitation, the assertion that Article 6 and 
customary law had the same object (the delimitation of boundaries by equitable principles) 
may be interpreted in two opposite ways 5 0 8. Despite their understandable objectives, by 
blurring its contents these attempts at reconciliation damaged even further, at least in the 
years that followed, the combined equidistance-special circumstances rule. 
The decisive impact of jurisprudence in the evolution of maritime delimitation law 
before the LOSC has to be recognised. Although not expressed in very precise terms, the 
averring of the role of proportionality as a standard for identifying inequities is undoubtedly 
an outstanding legacy of the North Sea cases. No less important is the inheritance of the 
Anglo/French arbitration, which recognised that under state practice, whenever equidistance 
would lead to an inequitable result, boundary-lines should be sought through adjustments 
thereof 5 0 9. Hasty or unjustified dismissals of equidistance were then rejected. 
The contribution of case law, however, was not always positive. The approach of 
the North Sea cases, in certain issues, lacks systematisation and legal articulation. Resorting 
to natural prolongation as a delimitation standard, instead of seeing it as root of entitlement, 
is scarcely understandable. Further, parts of the Judgment - which appear to be more obiter 
dicta than ratio decidendi - were extrapolated without due caution, becoming the reasoning 
in other cases. Not surprisingly, this Judgment - already referred to as "admittedly not one 
of the best products of the Hague Court" 5 1 0, or as suffering "from an excess of deductive 
reasoning from vague premises" - has not gained widespread support for its doctrine5 1 1. 
Common to both the 1969 and the 1977 decisions (although clearly less marked in 
the latter), is the flawed idea that equity allows courts to weigh whatever circumstances they 
deem relevant. I f the relevance and weight of delimitation factors were definable only on a 
case-to-case basis by courts in order to justify a specific outcome, and were not limited by 
law, then courts would be empowered to decide ex aequo et bono. That was explicitly 
rejected in both decisions, and in state practice. 
The LOSC was hailed, by jurisprudence and by many authors, as the victory of the 
equitable principles doctrine. It has to be said, however, that the so-called customary rule of 
delimitation has only a spurious existence. For it lacks the tangibility of real-life facts, 
namely its de facto and de jure application outside the courts. State practice has never given 
(508) Paras.2.4.c)(i), 3.4. supra, 6.4.b)(iii) infra. 
(509) Para.6.4.b)(iii) infra. 
(510) Arangio-Ruiz/1987, p.44. 
(511) Brown/1992, p.83. 
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it the necessary general support. In addition, proper treaty interpretation shows that the 
equitable principles doctrine was not adopted in any of the LOSC delimitation provisions. 
Had this been the case, why would some states of the "Equitable Principles Group" vote 
against the LOSC, while attempting to formulate reservations to the delimitation articles?512 
This is a striking question, especially when considering that no state of the "Equidistance 
Group" voted against the Convention or tried to formulate reservations to the delimitation 
articles. Actually, as would be proven by subsequent jurisprudence, the recourse to distance 
as the main operative-criterion of maritime entitlement was a sign that equidistance had not 
been discarded at all. 
The delimitation provisions of the LOSC must be seen as the result of three decades 
of developments in international law. As conventional law, perhaps it is intellectually 
appropriate to distinguish between Article 15 and Articles 74(1) and 83(1). The former 
incorporates the formula "equidistance-special circumstances", the acceptance of which 
raised little controversy during the Third Conference, and which crystallised in customary 
law and conventional law alike. According thereto, equidistance is the mandatory starting 
line for delimitation in the absence of an agreement, which amounts to a juris tantum 
presumption in favour of equidistance, rebuttable only by special circumstances513. As to 
Articles 74(1) and 83(1), their historical evolution leads to the conclusion that - in 
substantive terms - it appears preferable to interpret them as simply setting an obligation of 
result: the boundary must be non-inequitable. Other substantive criteria, of an operative 
nature, are set down only indirectly, through a renvoi to international law. No obligation of 
means was directly set514. It is noteworthy that proposals stating that recourse could be had 
to "any methods" of delimitation were explicitly rejected in the Third Conference. Any 
attempt to interpret Articles 74(1) and 83(1) as conferring upon courts the power to decide 
by reference to "any methods" finds here an insurmountable obstacle. Finally, it is 
important to stress that the differences between Articles 74(1) and 83(1) and Article 15 do 
not necessarily mean that their practical application differs significantly 5 1 5. 
An attempted survey of state practice concerning continental shelf, EEZ and 
fisheries zone delimitation showed that no settled, extensive and virtually uniform practice 
(512) Cf. the positions adopted by Turkey and by Venezuela over this matter; Off.Rec.-1973/82(XVI), pp. 132-134, 223 (Document 
A/Conf.62/L. 108), 226 (Document A/Conf.62/L. 120); Off.Rec.-1973/82(XVII), pp.76-77, 119. The long statement of the Turkish 
representative, emphasising the equitable principles doctrine, only seems to demonstrate that the intention of the parties was not to 
adopt such doctrine, and that Turkey was reserving its position as to the interpretation of those articles. 
(513) The notion of special circumstances should not include historic titles. Equidistance is not applicable in situations where a 
historic title exists, not because it is a special circumstance, but rather because the existence of a historic title means that no 
delimitation is necessary, rendering thus the delimitation rule inapplicable. 
(514) As will be argued, stricto sensu, neither of these obligations is germane to negotiations between states. They are binding 
solely upon courts and tribunals (or equivalent third-party decision-making bodies). 
(515) Conclusions to Part II, and General Conclusions infra. 
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has emerged favouring the so-called 'equitable principles' doctrine. Nor does state practice 
explain what are its contents. Clearly, the few references to equitable principles are far from 
implying the rejection of equidistance as the starting point of delimitation. 
The United States of America, the state which referred first to equitable principles, 
in its 1945 declaration regarding rights over the adjacent seabed and subsoil, and which kept 
that reference in its 1983 proclamation concerning the EEZ 5 1 6 , has used equidistance in the 
vast majority of delimitations5 1 7. Highly reputable American writers have endorsed such an 
association from the beginning. Boggs affirmed, back in 1951, that the "most reasonable 
and just line would be one laid down on the median line principle", and added that this 
method "would provide the equitable principles for accord between the United States and a 
neighbour which are referred to in" the Truman proclamation518. Shalowitz also stressed the 
equitable nature of the recourse to the median line principle in maritime delimitation 5 1 9. The 
only exceptions to the resort to equidistance in boundaries involving the United States are 
the boundary with Canada in the Gulf of Maine, decided by a Chamber of the ICJ, and the 
boundary with Russia in the Bering Sea520, where the line results to a great extent from the 
interpretation of a previous treaty. Equidistance was resorted to even in the delimitation of 
the continental shelf beyond 200 M , with Mexico, where the entitlements that overlap are 
not based on the distance criterion 5 2 1. This lends outstanding support to the idea that the 
expression "equitable principles" was always associated with equidistance522. 
Interestingly, one of the states at the centre of the "Equitable Principles Group", 
Ireland, used the expression "equitable equidistant line" to refer to the criterion to delimit its 
exclusive fisheries zone. Intrinsic in this expression seems to be the idea of equidistance as 
the prima facie delimitation line. Another interesting case is that of the United Arab 
Emirates. Having started by referring to equitable principles as the delimitation criterion for 
the continental shelf in the late 1940's5 2 3, these same states used equidistance in their 1980 
declaration concerning the exclusive economic zone5 2 4. The preference for equidistance, 
due to its "clear and equitable" character, was re-affirmed at the end of the Third 
Conference525. Other state practice combines references to equity or equitable solution with 
equidistance in some form, either implicitly or explicitly (e.g. Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
(516) Appendix 2, E45. 
(517) For the treaties involving the USA in which equidistance was used, cf. Appendix 2, D18, D53, D61-D62, D64, F46, F62-F64. 
(518) Boggs/1951,p.262. 
(519) Shalowitz/1962(I), p.232. 
(520) Appendix 2, F65. 
(521) Appendix 2, F64. 
(522) Para.l.2.a)rapra. 
(523) In 1949, the states that constitute the United Arab Emirates were British protectorates. 
(524) Appendix 2, A1-A2, A4, A9, Al 1-A12, C57. 
(525) Off.Rec.-1973/82(XVI), p.28. 
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Cuba, France, Haiti, Indonesia, Jamaica, Malaysia, Morocco, Seychelles, Tanzania, Turkey, 
and the United Kingdom) 5 2 6. 
At the fulcrum of the interpretation of the conventional provisions on continental 
shelf and EEZ delimitation is one distinction: it is one thing to speak of the means on the 
basis of which the delimitation is effected; and it is another to refer to the result reached in 
the delimitation. Account taken of all elements, it is suggested that the LOSC provides one 
explicit normative parameter: the result must be non-inequitable. Articles 74(1) and 83(1) 
lay down "the aim of any delimitation process [and reflect] the requirements of customary 
law as regards the delimitation both of continental shelf and of exclusive economic 
zones"527. Indeed, both groups of states had converging views in this respect. Doubts 
subsist, however, on how to attain such result. In particular as regards the existence of 
obligatory means of delimitation. It is in this respect that the two groups disagreed. That the 
LOSC, while omitting references to specific standards, effects a renvoi to international law 
in general, seems doubtless528. However, it may be contended, as Charney does while 
stressing the "normative and theoretical uncertainties in this area", that there is no 
customary law on this matter, and "that no normative principle of international law has 
developed that would mandate the specific location of any boundary line" 5 2 9 . This would 
turn the said renvoi into a somewhat hollow statement. The answer to this problem may be 
postponed for the time being. Further investigation wil l provide an answer530. 
(526) Appendix 2, C26, C34, D8, D20, D42-D43, D46, D58, D60, D64-D66, E3, El9 , E21, E33, F4-F6, F12, F14, F19, F21, F27, 
F3I-F32, F44, F47, F53, F55, F58. 
(527) Jan Mayen case, ICJ/Reports/1993, p.59, para.48. 
(528) Arangio-Ruiz/1987, p.46. 
(529) Charney/1993,p.xlii. 
(530) Paras.6.2.c), 6.3., 6.4., Conclusions to Part II infra. 
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II 
CORE ISSUES: 
CONCEPT. METHODS AND NQRMA1WITY 
• 
INTRODUCTION TO PART H 
The conclusions reached in Part I raise many questions in respect of delimitation 
law. Serious doubts are cast upon the argument that customary law prescribes the recourse 
to 'equitable principles' in continental shelf and EEZ delimitation. No general practice can 
be found that to support its key propositions: one, that the mandatory use of equidistance is 
rejected - even as a starting point for the delimitation; two, that courts are empowered to 
choose whatever methods are deemed appropriate, and to weigh whatever circumstances 
they deem to be relevant. Equally doubtful is the suggestion that the 'equitable principles' 
doctrine were incorporated in the provisions on delimitation of the LOSC. 
That international law prescribes that inequitable delimitations ought to be avoided 
is unquestionable. This proposition is part of customary law, and is indeed incorporated in 
the LOSC. However, this obligation of result means little in terms of the normative means 
to be utilised in delimitation. One would argue that there is no consensus generalis, and thus 
no customary rule on the means whereby continental shelf and the EEZ delimitations are to 
be effected. Without identifying a general and settled practice, and the corresponding opinio 
juris, the existence of a customary rule cannot be asserted - unless the whole understanding 
of this source of law is changed. Difficulties of this type, inherent in the identification of 
customary law, have led some authors to question the very existence of customary law, 
primarily due to legitimacy concerns in a multicultural and heterogeneous world 1. Whether 
customary international law is indeed in its twilight, and whether multilateral treaties (of 
which the LOSC is a cardinal example) should be favoured, is a matter of debate. What is 
certain is that weakening the concept of custom by adopting the less than sound approach 
which led to considering the so-called 'equitable principles' as part of customary law is 
unlikely to promote the international legal order. With it, clarity and predictability, as well 
as equity for that matter, are far from being furthered. 
(1) Referring to the twilight of customary law, cf. Kelly/2000. 
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Part I I attempts to set down some conceptualising tenets of maritime delimitation, 
ultimately seeking to overcome uncertainties related to the normative standards applicable 
to delimitation. These conceptual tenets underlie the application of the provisions of the 
LOSC on delimitation, and form the cornerstones of the political-legal determination and 
technical definition of maritime boundaries. In Chapter 4, this study delves into the concept 
of delimitation, and its evolution in case law and doctrine. It is suggested therein that the 
notion of overlapping of entitlements is the object-matter of maritime delimitation, around 
which the whole problem revolves. The idea that there is a certain degree of precedence 
between different maritime entitlements, and the impact of this idea on the delimitation 
process, also deserves particular attention. Chapter 5 offers an overview of the methods of 
delimitation and the line-defining techniques more commonly used. The technical character 
of these concepts, and their relevance in the delimitation process, are examined. One crucial 
point is made in this part: most methods applied in maritime delimitation are technically 
equidistance-related. Finally, Chapter 6 deals with the issue of normativity. It considers at 
an introductory level aspects of the delimitation process, and aspects of the concept of 
normativity in international law. Its core consists of an analysis of the two principles of 
international law that arguably form the normative framework whereby maritime 
delimitation is governed. Understanding what makes equidistance a normative standard, and 
how equity interplays therewith in the delimitation process, are critical questions to which 
an answer is sought. 
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Chapter 4 
THE CONCEPT OF MARITIME DELIMITATION 
4.1. The Need for Conceptualisation 
Despite the numerous studies, attention has seldom been drawn to the conceptual 
aspects of maritime delimitation. Apparently, this stems from the fact that emphasis has 
been put, perhaps too much, on the uniqueness of each case. Such an approach is clearly 
illustrated in a dictum of the ICJ in the Tunisia/Libya case. The Court affirmed that "each 
continental shelf case in dispute should be considered and judged on its own merits, having 
regard to its peculiar circumstances"; and concluded that, for this reason "no attempt should 
be made [. . .] to overconceptualise the application of the principles and rules relating to the 
continental shelf' 2. 
That the application of rules of law to a certain situation must always take account 
of the factual circumstances is unquestionable. But it is hardly possible to overconceptualise 
legal principles and rules, which are necessarily characterised by 'abstraction' and (prima 
facie) by 'generality'. Otherwise how could normativity exist? Conceptualisation is exactly 
the operation through which, whilst understanding the ratio decidendi of legal decisions, 
general and abstract principles and rules may be identified. These principles and rules are 
what allow extrapolation from one case to another. Extrapolation without conceptualisation 
has therefore little ( i f any) juridical support. I f the uniqueness of each case is the paramount 
determinant, it is difficult ( i f not impossible) to rely on a previous decision to assess another 
case - which is again unique. There is good reason to believe that overemphasising the 
uniqueness of each case, while under-conceptualising the maritime delimitation problem, 
has contributed to the emergence of some misunderstandings. The best example is the way 
in which equidistance has been handled. The difficulty in grasping its inherent normative 
content stems from the lack of distinction between different conceptual aspects of maritime 
delimitation. Equidistance embodies not only a geometrical principle, but also a juridical 
rationale. Its role must thus be understood at two different levels3. 
Maritime boundary delimitation has multiple facets. Its interdisciplinary nature, and 
the distinct impact thereof on the different stages of the delimitation process, must be 
(2) ICJ/Reports/1982, p.92, para.132. 
(3) On the normative content of equidistance, cf. para.6.3.d) infra. 
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properly grasped. Nevertheless, the two basic questions to be answered remain those that 
were asked by DeLapradelle a long time ago4: Where does the boundary-line run? By which 
juridical and technical procedures is this line to be fixed? Whilst attempting to shed light on 
conceptual aspects, this chapter endeavours to provide a coherent framework for analysing 
maritime boundary-making. The propositions made, whilst forming the premises for further 
investigation, have two-fold relevance: they form the background against which the actual 
delimitation practice must be construed; to some extent, they amount to an interpretative 
element of the normative standards. 
4.2. Delimitation: A Two-Phase Operation 
4.2.a) Delimitation: Political-Legal Determination and Technical Definition 
First and foremost, it must be clarified that, conceptually, the notion of delimitation 
encompasses two different phases: one is the determination of the boundary; the other is the 
definition thereof. The determination of the boundary consists of the choice of the location 
of the boundary-line. Referring to land-boundary delimitation, Jones speaks of this phase as 
"a compromise between geographical suitability and political necessity", amounting to 
"science and art". As to the definition of the boundary-line, he sees it as "a purely technical 
process that should, and can, be carried out with scientific exactitude"5. This distinction is 
conceptually important because it emphasises the key moment of the delimitation process: 
the decision on the locus of the boundary. On land, the distinction between these phases is 
clear, in particular because delimitation is usually followed by an operation of demarcation. 
In maritime delimitation, the distinction might in practice be difficult. For conceptualising 
purposes however, it should not be forgotten. A number of misconceptions and problems 
might arise i f it is not made. Hence, methodologically, it appears appropriate to clarify the 
scope of these two phases, their relevance, and how they interact with the political, legal 
and technical aspects of maritime delimitation. 
The determination of a boundary's course has a hybrid nature, where politics, law 
and technicalities are intertwined. As a decision-making process however, one should focus 
primarily of the political-legal pendulum. The determination of the boundary is in essence a 
political matter i f stemming from negotiation. When resulting from adjudication, it becomes 
mainly a juridical issue. Technicalities have in this phase a less relevant, supporting role. 
Broadly speaking, the boundary determination may be seen as a weighing-up process that 
(4) DeLapradelle/1928, p. 17. 
(5) Jones/1945, p.57, emphasis added. 
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involves either political and legal considerations (in negotiation), or strictly legal 
considerations (in adjudication)6. 
The definition of the boundary-line, by contrast, is a purely technical matter7. 
During the phase of determination, the process results in a decision that, though determining 
the location of the boundary, does not define its course in a technically precise manner. For 
example, a court may adjudge that the delimitation line between two states wil l be an 
equidistance-line, attributing full-effect to some basepoints but only partial-effect to others. 
The precise course of the line, defined by turning points, the coordinates of which are 
anchored on a specific geodetic datum, is a matter to be dealt with in the phase of definition. 
Another example: states may agree that the boundary wil l be a line following an organised 
series of parallels and meridians. Establishing the precise coordinates of the parallels and 
meridians, and their geodetic reference, belongs to the definition phase. This stage, whereby 
the line determined during the previous phase is expressed in exact technical terms, should 
be governed entirely by technical tenets. 
4.2.b) Case Law 
4.2.b)(i) North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 
In the North Sea cases, decided in 1969, the ICJ was asked to declare which 
principles and rules of law would be applicable to the maritime delimitation between the 
parties8. Because the states involved decided that the boundary-line was to be established by 
negotiation, it may be said that the scope of the competence of the Court was confined to a 
part of the phase of determination. Its competence was restricted to elaborate on the legal 
framework by which the delimitation had to abide, without actually deciding on the location 
of the line in concreto. Since the Court was not empowered to choose the boundary-line, the 
technical considerations involved were scarce. 
4.2.b)(ii) Anglo/French Arbitration 
The situation was quite different in the Anglo/French arbitration, where the Court of 
Arbitration was requested to decide upon the actual course of the boundary9. In the 1977 
decision, unfortunately for negative reasons, the technical aspects played a prominent role. 
Not satisfied with the technical definition of the line effected by the expert of the tribunal, 
(6) For an analysis of this process, cf. Chapter 7 infra. 
(7) Seeing the fixing proprio sensu of the dividing-line as an operation more technical in nature, see Lucchini/Vcelckel/1996, p.9. 
For an overview of some of the technicalities involved in this phase, and of the methods and line-defining techniques that can be 
used in the definition of the boundary-line, cf. Chapter 5 infra. 
(8) ICJ/Reports/1969, p.14, para.2. 
(9) R1AA/18, p. 17-18, para. 1. 
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the United Kingdom filed an application to re-institute the proceedings with a view to 
obtaining an interpretation of the meaning and scope of the decision rendered. Its 
application stated that the techniques and methods employed by the technical expert to trace 
boundary-lines gave rise to certain technical problems involving contradictions between 
segments of those lines and the intentions of the Court set out in the body of the Award. 
Basically, the view of the United Kingdom was that the line defined by the technical expert 
did not comply with the boundary determined by the Court. Insofar as the technical 
definition of the line in the Atlantic region was in contradiction with the ordinary meaning 
of the technical terms used in the reasoning, this view should have prevailed. In any event, 
what must be noted here are the distinctions drawn by the United Kingdom between: (a) the 
determination of the course of the line, (b) its definition, and (c) its depiction on a chart for 
purposes simply of visual illustration10. 
4.2.b)(iii) Dubai/Shariah Arbitration 
In the Dubai/Sharjah arbitration, the technicalities involved were approached in a 
correct manner. Issues such as scale and accuracy of charts, the merely illustrative character 
of charts, the nature of straight lines, and the geodetic datum were properly addressed in the 
1981 Award. They were dealt with in such a way that the determination of the boundary (in 
accordance with the juridical reasoning), and the technical definition of the line, are clearly 
separated - the latter being consonant with the former". 
4.2.b)(iv) Tunisia/Libya Case 
In the Tunisia/Libya case, the Court was requested to determine which principles 
and rules of international law applied to the delimitation of the continental shelf areas 
appertaining to the states involved. But this time it was also asked "to specify precisely the 
practical way in which the aforesaid principles and rules" applied in casu "so as to enable 
the experts of the two countries to delimit those areas without any difficulties". According 
to the Special Agreement, the two states would subsequently meet in order "to determine 
the line of delimitation". Should an agreement not be reached within three months, the 
states would be entitled to address the Court to obtain the necessary "explanations and 
clarifications"12. The separation between the two phases of delimitation is patent in the way 
in which the Court was requested to adjudicate. 
(10) RIAA/18, pp.304-306, paras.48-51, emphasis added. 
(11) ILR/91/1993, pp.677-678. 
(12) ICJ/Reports/1982, pp.21-22, para.2, emphasis added. 
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In rendering its 1982 Judgment, the Court discarded the use of equidistance, and 
found itself in a rather difficult position as to the determination of the boundary's course. 
Without scrutinising the decision here from a juridical standpoint, it is crucial to note that 
some of the technical appraisals of the Court are questionable13. Why was the most westerly 
point in the Gulf of Gabes relevant? This point has no impact either on the general direction 
of the coast, or on the coastal relationship between the two states. Why was the parallel of 
its latitude decisive for the turning point of the boundary? The relevance of a parallel of 
latitude (which is simply an element of the chart-lattice, with no significance whatsoever at 
the level of geographical context) for the delimitation amounts to an "optical illusion"™. To 
use Alexander's words, it results from cartohypnosis15. As aforesaid, this effect might occur 
i f the 'power of maps' is not harnessed by the knowledge of proficient experts16. When the 
North Sea cases were analysed, one important question was asked: On what grounds would 
the Court have justified the course of the boundary i f it had been required to determine it, 
and had refused to resort to equidistance as the starting point?1 7 The Tunisia/Libya case 
answered this question. The I d ' s reliance on 'chart-features' with no juridical relevance for 
the delimitation illustrates the shortcomings of its conceptual approach at that time. 
4.2.b)(v) Gulf of Maine Case 
Fully aware of these previous difficulties, Canada and the United States included in 
the Special Agreement that preceded the Gulf of Maine case some specific provisions on 
technical issues. The Chamber was requested, first, to "describe the course of the boundary 
in terms of geodetic lines, connecting geographic coordinates of points". In addition, it was 
also asked, "for illustrative purposes only, to depict the course of the boundary" on specific 
hydrographic charts. To provide assistance to the Chamber in discharging its functions the 
parties equally asked that a jointly nominated technical expert would be appointed. In fact, 
perhaps it should be said that the parties agreed on the nomination, and the Chamber had no 
choice but to abide by this agreement18. Since then, whenever the course of the boundary 
was to be established by adjudication, technical experts have been appointed to assist courts 
in technical matters19. 
(13) Since no satisfactory explanation was given to discard equidistance (the fact that the parties did not argue on the basis thereof is 
not enough to render it inapplicable, if that were required by law - cf. para.8.4.e)(ii) infra), the Judgment seems to be more an 
ex aequo et bono decision, than a decision based on law (para.6.4.b)(ii) infra). 
(14) Judge Oda, Dissenting Opinion, ICJ/Reports/1982, p.268, emphasis added. 
(15) Alexander/1986, p.74. 
(16) Para.2.3.c) supra. 
(17) Para.2.3.d)s«/wa. 
(18) ICJ/Reports/1984, p.253, Article II of the Special Agreement; see also Article IV. 
(19) Guinea/Guinea-Bissau arbitration, ILM/25/1986, p.257 (Article 9 of the compromis), p.261, para.15; Guinea-Bissau/Senegal 
arbitration, ILR/83/1990, p.l l (Article9 of the compromis), p.14, para.14; Canada/France arbitration, ILM/31/1992, p. 1152 
(Article 2(3) of the compromis), p.l 155, para.31; Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, Article 2(3)(b) of the compromis, Eritrea/Yemen-n, 
para.5. 
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4.2.b)(vi) Jan Maven Case 
The Jan Mayen case is another instance in which the question of technical definition 
of the boundary-line deserves attention. In the oral pleadings, Denmark requested the Court 
to draw the line of delimitation, i f its first submission - to adjudge that the boundary was 
the 200-mile limit from Greenland - would not be upheld. By contrast, Norway asked the 
Court to render a judgment "declaratory as to the bases of the delimitation", leaving "the 
precise articulation (or demarcation) of the alignment to negotiation between the parties". 
Norway agreed "that the Court ha[d] jurisdiction and power to answer the legal question as 
to the rules and principles governing a delimitation". But it argued that, since the parties had 
neither negotiated, nor articulated, the scope of the task, the Court "should exercise judicial 
restraint by stopping short of indicating the details of the specific delimitation itself. 
Affirming that giving "only a broad indication of the manner in which the definition of the 
delimitation line should be fixed" would "not be a complete discharge of its duty to 
determine the dispute", the Court decided to "define the line in such a way that any 
questions which might still remain would be matters strictly relating to hydrographic 
technicalities which the parties, with the help of their experts, can certainly resolve"20. 
The distinct phases of delimitation are clear in these citations. One point however, 
makes the decision peculiar. The Court not only dealt with various technical issues (e.g. 
geodetic datum, nature of the straight lines joining the turning points), but it also carried out 
other technical computations relevant for the determination phase (e.g. calculation of 'equal 
areas' and of distances between points). This however, was done without any expert being 
formally appointed21. Although no significant problems arose here, such an approach should 
perhaps be discouraged - owing to the risks that it entails22. 
4.2.c) State Practice 
The existence of a purely technical phase of definition of the boundary, as opposed 
to a political-legal determination thereof, is patent in various examples of state practice. The 
arbitration agreements that led to the Canada/France and Eritrea/Yemen arbitrations, which 
are for all purposes state practice, illustrate clearly the distinction between determination 
(20) ICJ/Reports/1993, pp.42-44, 77-81, paras.9-10, 88-93, emphasis added. Cf. also Norwegian Counter-Memorial (para.704) and 
Rejoinder (para.658); Verbatim Records, CR93/9, CR93/11, Public Sittings, 11, 27 January 1993. Whether the boundary should 
have been delimited (since there was a clear disagreement between parties in this respect) is a different procedural question. 
(21) In reality, the Court seems to have the support of technical experts, who nevertheless are not appointed as allowed under the 
Court's Statute and Procedural Rules (cf. paras.5.1.a), S.l.c) infra). 
(22) ICJ/Reports/1993, pp.80-81, paras.92-93. For instance, the Court referred to a division of Zone I into two parts of equal area. 
However, rough calculations by the author show that Norway was favoured in the division of Zone 1 in some 45 sq.km, in relation 
to the Danish area. Whether such a level of approximation was intended, or any other for that matter, is unclear. 
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and definition of the boundary-line. In these arbitral compromis, after referring to the legal 
regime on which the delimitation was to be founded, states requested the Tribunal to define 
the course of the boundary "in a technically precise manner"23. 
As to agreements that effect the delimitation of maritime boundaries, the practice of 
states such as India, Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Maldives, Burma (Myanmar) 
and Vietnam provide good examples of the said distinction. In virtually every delimitation 
agreement, there is a provision stating that the actual location of the boundary points at sea, 
and of the lines connecting them, shall be technically defined by mutual agreement between 
the hydrographic experts or the competent authorities of the two Governments. Whilst the 
determination of the boundary is made by diplomatic negotiations, and its description made 
in the agreement, the technical definition of the boundary-line is left to a later stage24. 
4.2.d) Technical Support to Maritime Delimitation 
The distinction between a political-legal phase, and a technical phase, may lead to 
think that the function of technical experts in maritime delimitation is restricted to the latter. 
That is not the case. No doubt, the definition of the boundary involves exclusively technical 
matters. However, the reverse is not true. Technical aspects are not confined to the phase of 
definition. The determination of the boundary requires in all cases some degree of technical 
support, especially in assessing the geographical setting and in appraising the impact of the 
weight given to certain considerations. 
Negotiators and judges embark initially on a 'wide perspective approach'. The first 
goal is to become cognisant of the geographical framework, and to identify which 'main 
variables' influence the delimitation. Cartographic information - the understanding of 
which requires technical expertise - is central to this analysis of the delimitation setting. 
Decision-makers indeed rely from the outset on technical assessments, which interweave in 
the political-legal determination of the boundary's course. The initial assessments made, the 
delimitation process enters into an intermediate stage in which decision-makers require a 
higher level of technical support. Provisional lines are then drawn on maps; and they are 
'iteratively' refined in the light of the weight given to 'delimitation factors'. The subsequent 
number of iterations (i.e. adjustments of the line), is dependent upon the complexity of the 
delimitation setting. At this juncture, agreement on a number of technical points might have 
become necessary. It may also become necessary to calculate maritime areas, coastal 
lengths, and distances, in order to grasp objectively how a certain line effects the division of 
(23) ILM/31/1992, p.l 152, para.l, Article 2(2); Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration Agreement, Article 2(3)(a). 
(24) Appendix 2, Dl 1, D31-D41, F56. 
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the area germane to the delimitation. This is perhaps why Jones refers to the determination 
of a boundary as being both science and art, where geographic suitability must be 
reconciled with political-legal necessity. Such 'tentative approach' may seem improper to 
resolve a fundamental political-legal issue; but it seems to be how the determination of a 
boundary-line is actually attained. Technical aspects acquire even greater relevance as the 
delimitation process approaches its conclusion. The boundary determined in broad terms, it 
becomes necessary to refine its precise course. Potentially, disagreement on technicalities 
may constitute the only pending issue. Advice of technical experts thus becomes crucial at 
this point. When the course of the boundary is finally determined, it is necessary to define 
the line with scientific exactitude. That is when one enters the phase of definition. Legal and 
political arguments are no longer relevant. 
Decision-makers should be fully aware of the difficulties that might arise i f the 
determination of the line does not consider certain technical aspects. Without recourse to 
technical experts, these difficulties are likely to increase. For example, i f a boundary is 
determined merely as 'the straight line perpendicular to the geodesic that joins points A and 
B', and the term 'straight line' is used as meaning a geodesic, the definition of the line is 
technically impossible. A perpendicular to a geodesic can never be another geodesic (with 
the exception of specific situations, highly unlikely to occur). Further, the 'perpendicularity' 
can only be computed in relation to one point on the geodesic (which must be indicated), 
and can only refer to the azimuth of the perpendicular line in that point. 
Two pivotal ideas thus are worth emphasising. The definition of the boundary-line, 
which is a purely technical exercise, is conceptually distinct from the determination thereof. 
Regardless of the procedural means to which recourse is had, the definition of the line is to 
be undertaken in accordance with the leges artis, and should be carried out by technical 
experts. This definition emerges as the 'technical translation' of the determination made by 
the political-legal decision-makers. Notwithstanding this, technical aspects are relevant -
although in different measures - not only for the definition of the boundary-line, but also 
for the determination thereof. 
4.2.e) Legal Significance: Compliance of the Definition with the Determination 
What is the legal significance of the distinction between these two phases is another 
fundamental question. Tanja accepts the distinction between a political-legal phase and a 
technical phase. Importantly, he has clarified that there is a technical side in delimitation, 
which is distinct from, and operates within, the political-legal framework25. Quite correctly, 
(25) Tanja/1990, pp.xvii-xviii, 292. Concurring, cf. Lucchini/Voelckel/1996, p.9; Vcelckel/1979, p.707; Boggs/1940, p.32. 
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his approach emphasises the primacy of the political-legal phase. Some points of his 
conceptualisation must nevertheless be viewed with caution. When speaking of "several 
legal aspects", Tanja seems to consider that all aspects of delimitation exist on the same 
level: the legal level. First, this approach is not totally accurate. Secondly, it reflects the fact 
he analyses the delimitation process from the adjudicative standpoint. The technical phase 
of delimitation is neither a "legal aspect", nor restricted to "the use of delimitation 
methods". Various technical issues must be dealt with independently of the "delimitation 
methods", under strict technical tenets (e.g. computation of areas, computation formulae, 
cartographic projections, geodetic datums, notion of straight line). Further, the "procedural 
aspects" are relevant only for the determination phase; the definition phase is independent 
thereof. On another level, Tanja's distinction between the "identification" of the applicable 
law, and its "implementation" in casu, creates perhaps an unnecessary separation between 
two issues belonging to the determination phase; i f only because the interpretation of the 
law entails the subsumption of the facts into the normative premise. Also, the identification 
of the applicable law does not necessarily have to take place in negotiation, in which case 
the delimitation process might be fundamentally a politics-oriented process. 
Conceptually, the key conclusion is that the definition of the line must abide by the 
determination of the political-legal decision-maker. It is a 'technical translation' that must 
defer to a political-legal decision26. The line might have been attained by negotiation (where 
political factors may be considered), by adjudication (where only legal considerations may 
be weighed), or by non-judicial third-party settlement (where the factors to be weighed 
depend on the specific agreement on which it is based). The way in which the line is 
technically defined however, remains unaltered. As a purely technical operation, it should 
be left to experts only. 
Finally, it must be observed that, in practice, it may be difficult, or simply not 
possible, to differentiate the two phases of delimitation. Because technicalities are involved 
in both the determination and definition phases, in most instances, the determination of the 
boundary leads simultaneously to a certain level of technical definition. In addition, on the 
'temporal axis' the two phases might overlap. The phase of definition might begin before 
the phase of determination is completed. The reality is that, in many agreements and 
judgments (or awards) which only present the final outcome of the delimitation, the two 
phases appear so deeply interwoven that it is not possible to distinguish between them. 
(26) Tanja uses the terms "delineation" and "demarcation" to refer to the technical phase of delimitation. However, this terminology 
seems inadequate (Tanja/1990, p.xvii). Delineation refers to the unilateral establishment of maritime limits, and demarcation to 
the setting-up of conspicuous marks on the ground. Maling uses the term demarcation to refer "to the technology, observing and 
measuring techniques and data processing involved in the establishment of the boundaries [comprising] mathematical concepts in 
geodesy and hydrographic surveying" (Maling/1989, p.525). 
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In the Gulf of Maine case and in Canada/France arbitration, a technical report 
appears attached to the Judgment and the Award, respectively27. The technical definition of 
the boundary-line is thus easily grasped. Reading the technical report moreover, it is 
understood that, although the technical definition of the line is presented separately, the two 
phases overlapped. The Guinea-Bissau/Senegal arbitration is a different situation. Due to 
the reasoning adopted, the Tribunal thought it was not "expedient to append a map showing 
the course of the line". No technical report was annexed to the award, and the work of the 
technical expert appears to have been less relevant28. An intermediate instance is the 
Eritrea/Yemen arbitration. Although no report is provided, the assessments of the technical 
expert are patent. They become clear when the Award 'translates' the legal reasoning into a 
boundary-line (under the title "The Boundary Line Determined by the Tribunal"), and when 
it defines the course of the line in the dispositif. The references made throughout to tidal 
datums, geodetic lines, geodetic datum, and the illustrative use of charts, appear as a token 
of the expert's work29. 
In the 1999 agreement between the United Kingdom and Denmark (Faroe Islands), 
the phases of determination and of definition are hardly discernible. Articles 1 and 3 state 
succinctly that the boundary is constituted by a series of geodetic lines joining the points 
described in schedules appended to the text, in the specified order. The appended list of 
geodetically referenced coordinates of points, being part of the definition of the line, is 
directly referred to in the determination thereof. In the 1997 agreement between the United 
States and Niue, it is easier to differentiate between the two phases. The preamble shows 
that the two states agreed that the location of the boundary should be based on equidistance 
(phase of determination). Article III states that the boundary is constituted by geodesies 
connecting certain turning points defined by coordinates, the geodetic datum of which is 
indicated in Article II (phase of definition)30. 
4.3. Object-Matter of Delimitation: The Overlapping of Entitlements 
4.3.a) Early Developments in Case Law 
In the North Sea cases, the ICJ considered that "the process of delimitation [was] 
essentially one of drawing a boundary line between areas which already appertain[ed] to 
one or other of the states affected". This approach was conditioned clearly by the notion of 
(27) ICJ/Reports/1984, pp.347-352; ILM/31/1992, pp.1178-1180. 
(28) ILR/83/1990, p.47, para.87. Apparently, the technical definition of the boundary was not effected. 
(29) Eritrea/Yemen-IT, paras. 134-135, 161-162, 169. 
(30) For references on these two agreements, cf. Appendix 2, F46, F60. 
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natural prolongation inherent in the coeval "concept of continental shelf entitlement"31. At a 
first glance moreover, this seemed to convey the idea that delimitation had a declarative 
nature, and that the continental shelf boundaries had a natural character. No reference was 
made to overlapping of entitlements. Actually, in the dispositif, the Court considered the 
possibility of overlapping areas continuing to exist after delimitation had been effected; 
which should be divided "in agreed proportions or, failing agreement, equally"32. Such an 
approach illustrates the conceptual weaknesses, and the confusion between delimitation and 
legal entitlement, that affected the 1969 Judgment. 
Courts gradually abandoned this declarative, 'nature-oriented' perspective. In the 
Anglo/French arbitration, although still speaking of areas that already appertained to states, 
the Tribunal departed somewhat from that view. It affirmed that "the very fact that in 
international law the continental shelf is a juridical concept means that its scope and the 
conditions for its application are not determined exclusively by the physical facts of 
geography but also by legal rules"33. Later, in the Tunisia/Libya case, the ICJ referred to the 
definition of continental shelf embodied in Article 1 of the CS Convention, and emphasised 
"the lack of identity between the legal concept of the continental shelf and the physical 
phenomenon known to geographers by that name". It further clarified that, in 1969, it had 
"not regard[ed] an equitable delimitation and a determination of the limits of natural 
prolongation as synonymous"34. The complete dismissal of the 'nature-oriented' perspective 
of maritime boundaries occurred in the Libya/Malta case. The Court held that "there [was] 
no reason to ascribe any role to geological or geophysical factors within [the 200-mile 
jurisdiction] either in verifying the legal title of the states concerned or in proceeding to a 
delimitation as between their claims"35. The cases decided thereafter simply make no 
reference to natural prolongation as object-matter of maritime delimitation. 
Another reason contributed to the abandonment of the idea that the oceanic areas to 
be divided were part of the natural prolongation of the land territory, and had always been 
in the appurtenance of coastal states: the emergence of the notion of the EEZ. In relation to 
the water column, "one is concerned with an element that is featureless and mobile, and 
upon which boundary lines can only be notional"36. Hence, it is not possible to discern "any 
genuine, sure and stable 'natural boundaries' in so fluctuating an environment as the waters 
of the ocean, their flora and fauna"37. The same difficulty emerges if one attempts to apply 
(31) ICJ Reports 1969, p.23, para.20. 
(32) ICJ/Reports/1969, p.54, para. 101.(C)(2). 
(33) RIAA/18, pp.49, 91, paras.78, 191. 
(34) ICJ/Reports/1982, pp.46-47, paras.42-44. 
(35) ICJ/Reports/1985, p.35, para.39. 
(36) 0'Connell(1982) p.635. 
(37) ICJ Reports 1984, p.277, para.54. This statement was made in relation to the delimitation of fisheries zones, but is similarly 
valid for the EEZ. 
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the theory of natural boundaries, for instance, to territorial sea delimitation. This maritime 
zone also comprises the column of water, and has its historical origins not in any physical or 
natural geo-feature, but mainly in aspects of sovereignty and security of the coastal state. 
4.3.b) Overlapping of Entitlements and Overlapping of Claims 
Maritime entitlement hinges today primarily on the omni-directional projection of 
the coastline on the basis of the distance criterion. With this criterion, it became clear that 
delimitation is not the mere declaration of the maritime areas already appertaining to states. 
Behind the idea of natural prolongation as the object-matter of delimitation advanced in the 
North Sea Judgment underlay indeed a misconception. The question of determination of the 
maritime entitlement was not distinguished from the delimitation of maritime boundaries. 
Delimitation appeared to be seen as the determination of the entitlement of states on the 
basis of natural prolongation, rather than a division of the area of overlapping entitlements. 
Because natural prolongation was the criterion of entitlement, initially it became difficult to 
understand how there could be an overlapping of entitlements; i.e. how it could be legally 
conceived that the natural prolongation of two states overlapped. 
The emergence of the distance criterion as the basis of maritime entitlement helped 
in clarifying the distinction between entitlement and delimitation, and to realise that 
maritime boundaries have no pre-existing natural character. It became clear that boundaries 
are set up through delimitation. As regards entitlement, what international law establishes, 
and already did at the time of the North Sea cases, is the extent of the maritime areas that 
prima facie appertain to states, as a corollary of the sovereign title over their territory. Only 
where two (or more) states demonstrate that they are equally entitled to a certain oceanic 
area - i.e. where their entitlements overlap - might delimitation be required. Entitlement 
and delimitation are thus clearly distinct concepts. 
With respect to this, it is noteworthy that the idea of overlapping of entitlements has 
existed in French teachings at least since the 1930s, as illustrated by Gidel's reference to a 
"chevauchement des mers territoriales" in straits38. It is therefore somewhat surprising that 
in jurisprudence the idea of 'area of overlapping potential entitlement' emerged only in the 
Jan Mayen case. The Court observed then that the fact that Norway had restricted its claim 
to the median line did not mean that Jan Mayen had "any less entitlement to 200 M of 
continental shelf and fishery zone than the coast of Greenland". It affirmed moreover, that 
"maritime boundary claims have the particular feature that there is an area of overlapping 
entitlements, in the sense of overlap between the areas which each state would be able to 
(38)Gidel/1934, p.746. 
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claim had it not been for the presence of the other state". It is within this area, initially 
'appertaining' to more than one state, that delimitation is to be effected. 
Why the Court decided, in casu, to found the reasoning on the area of overlapping 
of claims, instead of making reference to the area of overlapping of entitlements, is hardly 
understandable39. This means that the entitlement of Jan Mayen beyond the median line was 
de facto irrelevant40. Given that the access to natural resources was analysed by reference to 
the area of overlapping claims41, this view is regrettable. Imagine that another important 
fishing ground was located close to and westwards of the equidistance-line (i.e. closer to 
Greenland). I f only those resources that lay within the area of overlapping claims were 
considered, Denmark would be attributed the fishing ground west of the equidistance-line, 
and an equitable access to the fishing ground eastwards thereof. That would be anything but 
equitable. If the area of overlapping of entitlements would be used instead, this conceptual 
issue would not emerge. All resources within the area of overlapping entitlements would be 
taken into account. The existence of fishing grounds to the west of equidistance would be 
weighed-up against the existence of fishing grounds to east thereof. 
In adjudication, attributing relevance to the area of overlapping claims - which is 
merely the result of 'litigation strategy', while denying relevance to the area of overlapping 
entitlements - the juridical notion par excellence, is striking. It is especially so because it 
'rewards' the political maximisation of claims in detriment of restrictive approaches based 
on entitlements42. I f true, such an approach would lend support to the 'realist idea' that "it 
may serve the interest of a party to claim the maximum to which it is conceivably entitled", 
for they should expect a decision embodying "a compromise of some sorts"43. One would 
suggest that this criticism ought to be taken seriously by judges44. 
In the Jan Mayen case, the "principle of non-encroachment" (used in the North Sea 
cases) was seen as being based on the notion of overlapping of entitlements45. This confirms 
the idea that natural prolongation was then the object-matter of delimitation. The problem is 
that because the continental shelf was an area already appertaining to each state (which 
merely required declaration), it was difficult to conceive how an overlap of entitlements 
could exist. Thus, the only way of determining where the boundaries lay was to resort to the 
so-called principle of non-encroachment. Delimitation did not have a constitutive nature, 
(39) ICJ/Reports/1993, pp.47, 64, 70, 78-82, paras.18-19, 59, 72, 89-94. 
(40) Figure 80 illustrates the areas of overlapping claims and of overlapping entitlements. Cf. also para.4.3.d)(ii) infra. 
(41) ICJ/Reports/1993, p.70, para.72. 
(42) Judge Oda, Separate Opinion, Jan Mayen case, ICJ/Reports/1993, p. 101, paras.44-46; Judge Schwebel, Separate Opinion, ibid, 
pp.126-127; Weil/1996, p.141; Charney/1994, p.243; Churchill/1994, p.26; Politakis/1994, pp.22-24. Oude Elferink states that the 
area of overlapping claims has to be divided, which is a "basic tenet of delimitation law" (OudeElferink/2001, p. 180). Noting that 
in the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration no recourse was had to the overlapping of claims, see Antunes/2001, p.327. 
(43) Robinson/Colson/Rashkow/1985, p.591. 
(44) Para.6.1.b)(iii)m/ra. 
(45) ICJ/Reports/1993, p.64, para.59. 
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but a declarative one. This 'renewed version' of non-encroachment, which in 1969 had a 
subjective content, becomes now objectively related to the potential maritime entitlement. 
Also in this regard, the Jan Mayen case was a major turning point. As noted by Thirlway46, 
this new approach departs from the perspective adopted in the Libya/Malta case, where the 
entitlement of Malta in abstrato was not considered for the purpose of the delimitation47. 
However, this departure of the Court from its previous view is not at all negative. Inasmuch 
as the new approach in the Jan Mayen case is indubitably a better conceptualisation of 
maritime delimitation, which can contribute to increased predictability in the adjudicating 
process, it should be strongly supported. 
The conceptual coherence of this 'new' approach may be confirmed by a look into 
the 1969 cases. At that time, the continental shelf entitlement stemmed from the notion of 
natural prolongation; its outer limits were to be referenced to the depth criterion and the 
exploitability criterion. Because of the geomorphologic characteristics of the North Sea 
basin, this meant that each state bordering the North Sea would be legally entitled, in the 
absence of all other states, to the whole of the North Sea continental shelf48. Put differently, 
the whole of the North Sea was an 'area of overlapping potential entitlements'. In a way, all 
areas appertained ab initio to all states. This overlapping of entitlements made delimitation 
necessary - and entailed the ex novo establishment of maritime boundaries. 
Relating the reasoning in the Jan Mayen case with one of the German arguments in 
the North Sea cases, Thirlway asserts that "[i]t is difficult to escape the conclusion that 
reasoning of this kind rests on an unstated rule that each of the states concerned should have 
a 'just and equitable share' of the available continental shelf, in the proportion to the length 
of its coastline or sea-frontage"49. This however, is not exactly true. Thirlway's conclusion 
assumes, without submitting evidence to support it, that proportionality is the paramount 
standard in delimitation; which is certainly not the case. Indeed, in most (if not all) cases, 
the area of overlapping of entitlements will be in some way divided. Such a division is 
however not a matter of proportionality alone. Moreover, to the extent that it is utilised, 
proportionality is not a pure mathematical appraisal. Having said this, it will be recognised 
later that, in relation to one point, Thirlway is right to name the German theory in the North 
Sea cases as example of the Court's new approach50. 
The conceptualisation behind the Jan Mayen case, which presents the overlapping 
of entitlements as the object-matter of maritime delimitation, is a major step forward in the 
(46) Thirlway/1993, p. 18. 
(47) ICJ/Reports/1985, pp.51-52, para.72. 
(48) As said, the Norwegian Trough is not an interruption of the North Sea continental shelf ( cf. para.2.3.c) supra). 
(49) Thirlway/1993, p.18. 
(50) Para.4.3.d)(i) infra. 
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theorisation of maritime delimitation. This approach was re-averred in the Eritrea/Yemen 
arbitration and in the Qatar/Bahrain case51. With these three cases considered, it appears 
that the scope of application of the delimitation rules is today defined in jurisprudence by 
recourse to the notion of overlapping of entitlements. 
The claims put forward by states in disputes over maritime boundaries reflect their 
views on maritime entitlement. Disputant states almost always advance delimitation claims 
that positioned between the equidistance and the maximum potential entitlement. Claims 
which fall short of the equidistance-line, or that extend beyond the maximum entitlement 
are extremely rare, i f at all existent. The Jan Mayen case is an instance in which the claims 
advanced are the two extremes. Whilst Denmark claimed the maximum entitlement based 
on Greenland, Norway restricted its claim from Jan Mayen to the equidistance-line vis-a-vis 
Greenland52. Delimitation claims that extend beyond the line of maximum potential 
entitlement are in principle legally untenable. Claims based on historic title are, perhaps, the 
only exception to this proposition. Theoretically, nothing seems to prevent a state from 
claiming, on the basis of a historic title, areas beyond its maximum entitlement. I f the 
existence of this title is proven, the delimitation has to be effected in such a way as to leave 
to the state concerned the whole of the area to which the historic title is referred. These 
extended claims based on historic title are very uncommon. As aforesaid, a historic title is 
to be distinguished from historic rights53. The latter involve the enjoyment of less than 
sovereign powers; and in delimitation it amounts to no more than a consideration to be 
weighed-up amongst others. 
4.3.c) Title, Entitlement and Delimitation 
Some dicta of the ICJ seem to indicate that an analogy existed between land and 
maritime boundaries, in respect of their delimitation. In the Aegean Sea case, for instance, 
the Court asserted that "[wjhether it is a land frontier or a boundary line in the continental 
shelf that is in question, the process is essentially the same"54. A similar analogy was drawn 
by the Chamber in the Gulf of Maine case when considering that "a delimitation, whether of 
a maritime boundary or of a land boundary, is a legal-political operation"55. Following a 
thought-provoking approach, Weil suggests in this respect that in 1969 the Court attempted 
to transpose to maritime delimitation the primary tenet of land delimitation: over the same 
(51) Eritrea/Yemen-II, paras. 128, 154-163; Qatar/Bahrain-Merits, paras. 172-180, 202, 215. It is noteworthy that, when Qatar filed 
its Application in the Registry of the ICJ (8 July 1991), neither Qatar, nor Bahrain, had yet claimed a 12 M territorial sea. Still, the 
Court from considered the 12 M territorial sea for purposes of defining the overlapping of entitlements. 
(52) ICJ/Reports/1993, pp.42-44, paras.9-10. 
(53) Para.l.3.c)(ii)supra. 
(54) ICJ/Reports/1978, pp.36-37, para.85. 
(55) ICJ/Reports/1984, p.277, para.56. 
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space it is not possible to conceive of the existence of more than one title, and delimitation 
consists of searching for its possessor56. Pointing out various conceptual and operative 
differences between the delimitation of land and maritime boundaries, this author brings to 
light difficulties that stem, it is argued, from the distinction between 'title to territory' and 
'entitlement to maritime areas', and the intertwined relation of the latter with 'maritime 
delimitation'. These are key issues in the conceptualisation of maritime delimitation57. 
The question of title over land territory concerns, primarily and in most cases, the 
exercise of full sovereignty - and must be assessed in the light of the modes of acquisition 
of title to territory, inter alia, historical consolidation, discovery and occupation, conquest 
and subjugation, cession, prescription and accretion58. Further, the maintenance of such a 
title through adequate displays of state authority (effectivites) is crucial. Often i f not always, 
the determination of title over a certain territory is a relative issue. It consists of a process of 
identification of the 'better title' among the competing claims; and it depends on the place, 
the time, and the existence (or not) of human settlements59. This type of assessment should 
not be seen as delimitation proprio sensu. It does not directly address the determination and 
definition of dividing-lines separating different spheres of sovereignty or jurisdiction. No 
doubt, it might indirectly lead to the establishment of boundaries. But the search for the 
possessor of the title appears to be in fact a matter of 'allocation' of territory. 
Besides this point, there are other substantive differences to consider, between title 
to territory and entitlement to maritime areas. First, it is the sovereign title over a land 
territory that generates the maritime entitlement60. Secondly, if the existence of a juridically 
valid title over a certain (land or maritime) territory is established, that implies the exclusion 
of any other title over the same territory61. Maritime entitlement, by contrast, stems from 
rules that legally empower states to exercise sovereignty, certain kinds of sovereign rights 
and jurisdiction. Initially, the precise extent of the entitlement of one state has a conditioned 
character (a 'potential' character). That entitlement might be opposed by an equally valid 
entitlement (encompassing the whole or part of the area) vested in another state. 
Before proceeding further, a pause is required to make a clarification. In spite of the 
fact that it became common to refer to potential maritime entitlements, one ought to realise 
(56) Weil/1989b, p. 1022. 
(57) Here, it is considered, first, that the concept of condominium does not entail more than one title, but refers to one title held 
conjointly; and secondly, that 'relative title' is a notion by reference to which territory is attributed within adjudicative processes 
(reflecting the idea of'better title'), which similarly does not mean that two titles exist simultaneously. 
(58) Sharma/1997; Jennings/Watts/1997, pp.677-716; Jennings/1967. For arguments that the regimes governing the delimitation of 
land boundaries and maritime boundaries differ, cf. Judge Bedjaoui, Dissenting Opinion, Guinea-Bissau/Senegal arbitration, 
ILR/83/1990, p.65. For a justification as to why the principle of stability and finality of boundaries applies also to maritime 
boundaries, cf. Marston/1994, pp.152-159. 
(59) Antunes/1999, pp.371-376. 
(60) Para.6.3.c) infra. 
(61) It might happen that there is no title over that parcel of territory - i.e. it concerns terra nullius. 
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that, where there are two competing maritime entitlements, each entitlement has an actual 
existence under international law. It is not potential. This is why it is perhaps preferable to 
refer to sub conditione entitlements, to describe the fact that each entitlement might have to 
be truncated owing to the possible existence of an equally valid, opposing entitlement. 
Further attention must be drawn to another point. Whereas sovereign title over land 
or maritime territory is an all-or-nothing question, a maritime entitlement - if overlapping 
spatially with other valid entitlements - must undergo a process whereby its extension in 
concreto is decided. The expression "all-or-nothing" is utilised because title over a given 
territory, once established under international law, excludes any other title over the same 
territory. Either one state holds the title; or it does not. In a different way, the existence of a 
valid maritime entitlement does not entail the exclusion of other entitlements. Entitlements 
might overlap. The precise spatial limits of the maritime legal-sphere of states can only be 
established in concreto, through delimitation. 
Although 'title' and 'entitlement' are sometimes viewed as interchangeable terms, 
they must be read in context. In the maritime context they might convey a subtle distinction. 
A historic title over a sea area indicates the existence of a 'sovereign title', which is in a 
certain sense 'absolute', as opposed to the 'potential' nature of the 'maritime entitlement'. 
Speaking of overlapping of 'titles' reveals in some measure a contradiction in terms; no 
sovereign title may exist in an area where another sovereign title already exists. Legally, as 
noted before, a historic title must be attributed full precedence in delimitation, and cannot 
be deemed to be a mere relevant circumstance62. 
What might happen, incidentally, is that the same sovereign title is jointly held - in 
condominium - by two or more states. This was explicitly acknowledged both in the Gulf of 
Fonseca and in the El Salvador/Honduras cases. In these decisions, El Salvador, Honduras 
and Nicaragua were deemed to jointly hold a sovereign title over the Gulf of Fonseca63. 
When compared with the entitlement to territorial sea, which also involves the exercise of 
sovereignty, there is one important difference; where there is an overlapping of territorial 
sea entitlements, the spatial area in which each state may exercise sovereignty remains 
undefined. In a condominium, all the states involved are entitled (taking into account all 
restrictions inherent to this juridical notion) to exercise sovereignty over the area to which 
the title is referred. The condominium in the Gulf of Fonseca comprises all waters beyond 
the 3-mile limit, over which the Chamber considered each of the three states had historically 
exercised exclusive sovereignty. 
(62) Para. 1.3.c)(ii) supra. 
(63) AJIL/I917/I I, pp.693-694; IGJ/Reports/1992, pp.580-606,616-617, paras.369-414,431(1). 
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How maritime entitlement is established in international law has a crucial impact on 
delimitation. As stated in the Aegean Sea case, "[a]ny disputed delimitation of a boundary 
entails some determination of entitlement to the areas to be delimited"64. This view was 
endorsed in the Libya/Malta case, where the Court affirmed that the "legal basis of that 
which is to be delimited, and of entitlement to it, cannot be other than pertinent to i t" 6 5 . This 
explains why the question of entitlement of islands to maritime areas was so intertwined 
with the topic of delimitation during the Third Conference66. 
In the Jan Mayen case, Denmark argued that "[fjrom the fact that a maritime 
delimitation situation cannot arise unless there are two coasts under different titles, 
generating overlapping claims, one cannot infer that such title governs the delimitation"67. 
This assertion is conceptually somewhat inaccurate for two reasons. One, although it is the 
overlapping of claims that creates the dispute, delimitation is only required where there is 
an overlapping of entitlements. I f an overlapping of claims exists because, hypothetically, 
one of the states has put forward a claim that extends beyond the spatial limits set out in 
international law, delimitation is not legally required. The non-existence of an overlapping 
of legally valid entitlements renders the overlapping of claims irrelevant. Two, title does to 
some extent govern delimitation. Only a valid sovereign title over a land territory with a 
coast generates a maritime entitlement, which might overlap with another entitlement, thus 
creating the need for delimitation. 
In the footsteps of Gidel's ideas, Weil has further elaborated on the object-matter of 
maritime delimitation. To him, where "the maritime projections of two states meet and 
overlap, each of them must inevitably forego the full enjoyment of the maritime jurisdiction 
it could have claimed had it not had the geographical misfortune to find its appropriation in 
conflict with that of its neighbour". That "is exactly what maritime delimitation is all 
about". Distinguishing between 'title' (i.e. 'entitlement', in the terminology of this study) 
and 'delimitation', he nevertheless notes that "[delimitation cannot be understood without 
title, which lies at its very heart"68. Delimitation stems from entitlement; it is founded on it. 
Clearly intertwined, these two concepts remain nevertheless distinct. Closely following this 
view, Lucchini and Vcelckel consider the litre juridique (juridical entitlement) a basic 
indispensable condition to maritime delimitation. As they observe, it is where (owing to the 
'geographical vicinity' between states) an overlapping between two entitlements emerges 
that delimitation is required69. Analogously, Evans notes that "[t]he sine qua non of a 
(64) ICJ/Reports/1978, p.36, para.84. 
(65) ICJ/Reports/1985, p.30, 34, paras.27, 34. 
(66) Paras.3.1. supra. 
(67) Verbatim Records, CR93/1, Public Sitting, 11 January 1993. 
(68) Weil/1989a, p.3,48-49; also, Dissenting Opinion, Canada/France arbitration, ILM/3I/I992, p.l 198, paras.10-12. 
(69) Lucchini/Voslckel/1996, pp.12-14. 
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delimitation is the basic and often unarticulated premise that there must be an area over 
which each party to a dispute claims sole jurisdiction"70. 
This relationship between "legal title to a maritime zone and delimitation" is also 
emphasised by Tanja, who considers "quite natural" the conclusion reached by the Court in 
1969, as "the process of delimitation [being] essentially one of drawing a boundary line 
between areas which already appertain to one or other of the states affected"71. He argues 
that, since in terms of legal entitlement the distance criterion "gained force" and is now 
embodied in the LOSC, "the legal concept of maritime delimitation has changed". Thus, 
delimitation is no longer "concerned with the determination of legal-political boundaries of 
areas which 'already, in principle', appertain to coastal states", but consists rather of "the 
determination of a maritime boundary in a situation where two (or more) states are 
confronted with overlapping titles"72. 
One ought to ask, however, whether the concept of maritime delimitation has indeed 
changed. The answer must be in the negative. Maritime delimitation has always consisted of 
establishing lines separating the maritime areas in which adjoining (adjacent or opposite) 
coastal states exercise sovereignty or jurisdiction. The determination of such dividing lines 
has always been necessary where overlapping potential entitlements exist, and states want 
to exercise their rights separately. What changed was the criterion on which the entitlement 
to maritime areas is based. By 1969, the continental shelf entitlement was defined by 
reference to an inherent right to the natural prolongation of the land territory based on two 
criteria: depth and exploitability. The vagueness of this entitlement definition obfuscated the 
concept of delimitation. Determining an area of overlapping of potential entitlements was 
virtually impossible, because the exploitability criterion impeded a proper determination of 
the extension of each of the entitlements involved. In the geographical setting of the North 
Sea cases, not even the depth criterion could provide that determination. With the distance 
criterion, it became possible to precisely define the limits of the overlapping area. Hence, it 
is not the concept of maritime delimitation that has changed. Notably, in the Jan Mayen 
case, the ICJ stated that the concept of overlapping of entitlements was subsumed in the 
notion of non-encroachment advanced in 196973. 
A few key ideas may now be lined up. Maritime entitlement appears in international 
law as a corollary of the sovereignty exercised over land territory. The area of entitlement is 
defined through an omni-directional projection of the coastline onto the sea. Importantly, 
this is no novel idea. As Weil reminds us: the idea that "[t]he land dominates the sea and 
(70) Evans/1989, p.64. 
(71) ICJ/Reports/1969, p.23, pata.20. 
(72) Tanja/1990, pp.xv-xvi. 
(73) ICJ/Reports/1993, p.64, para.59. 
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does so in all directions [...] stretches back into the beginnings of the law of the sea" . 
Further, there are different maritime entitlements. The rights to be exercised depend on the 
type of entitlement, which appears characterised both spatially (primarily by reference to 
distance from the coast) and rationae materiae. Where the nearest basepoints of two states 
are at a distance of less than twice the maximum potential entitlement75, an overlapping of 
entitlements emerges. Delimitation is then required, to determine in concreto the limits of 
the jurisdictional spheres of the states involved. 
4.3.d) The Inexorable 'Amputation' of Potential Entitlements 
4.3.d)(i) Overlapping of Entitlements: A Situation of Concurrence of Rights 
How should the concept of delimitation be comprehended from a legal-theoretical 
standpoint? Let the notion of 'potential maximum entitlement' be considered first7 6. It may 
be described as the oceanic area that, according to international law, a state could claim for 
purposes of exercising sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction, should the presence of 
all other states be disregarded. Maritime entitlements - it is worth emphasising once more -
have an actual existence. The adjective 'potential' usually associated therewith must be 
understood cum grano salis. The entitlement is seen as 'potential' only to the extent that it 
is subject to the absence of competing entitlements. However, each of the states involved 
can actually exercise the jurisdiction that corresponds to the entitlement at issue, over the 
area of overlapping entitlements, even before the delimitation is effected. 
The German thesis in the North Sea cases grasped this point correctly77. The ideas 
of indivisum and apportionment upon which it was founded explain, together, the concept 
of delimitation as division of the area of overlapping entitlements. No state is empowered 
by international law to determine unilaterally how the area of overlapping is to be divided 
{indivisum). Each state should be attributed a share of that area {apportionment). The issue 
in relation to which the German theory fails is the apportioning criterion; or put differently, 
the normative delimitation standards. According thereto, states are entitled to a just and 
equitable share of the indivisum. The problem is that legally maritime delimitation cannot 
be presented as a question of distributive justice. For that is not what is required by the 
applicable normative standards. 
(74) Weil/1989, p.63. His criticism in relation to the Canada/France arbitration, which seemed to suggest that coasts might project 
in some cases only frontally, i.e. perpendicularly to its general direction, must be endorsed. Dissenting Opinion, ILM/31/1992, 
pp.1199-1202, paras.9-14 (see the Award, ibid., p.l 171, para.73). On the principle of maritime zoning, cf. para.6.3. infra. 
(75) This is the typical situation. In some cases, entitlements to continental shelf beyond 200 M might be in question. Then, the 
definition of the area of overlapping entitlements cannot be made by means of distance from the coast. 
(76) The maximum entitlement of states depends upon the maritime space in question: 12 M for the territorial sea, 24 M for the 
contiguous zone; 200 M for the E E Z and continental shelf (except for the cases of an extended continental shelf). The question of 
entitlement may give rise to certain problems in the delimitation of continental shelf areas beyond 200 M; cf. para.8.4.b) infra. 
(77) ICJ/Pleadings/1968(1), pp.30, 391,425. 
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The overlapping of entitlements, one would argue, is a situation of concurrence of 
rights. In other words, the states involved concurrently hold legal positions with the same 
scope (maritime entitlement), the object of which is (at least partially) the same: the area of 
overlapping entitlements. The aim of delimitation is to resolve this situation of concurrence 
of juridical positions (which is why it should be seen as constitutive in nature) by reference 
to the normative standards prescribed by international law. In broad general terms, there are 
two juridical positions that 'collide', causing a 'conflict' between rights of the same type. 
Hence, it becomes necessary to reconcile their existence in light of the principles in force in 
the legal order. 
This standpoint was taken by Portugal in the East Timor case, when it referred to the 
existence of a "concurrence ou concours de droits (potentielsf and to a "concours de droits 
ou de pretensions sur les espaces maritimes,m. Learned writings have also advanced this 
proposition79, which underlies Weil's reference - in the Canada/France arbitration - to the 
equally valid rights (entitlements) of the states involved80. 
Conceiving the problem in this way leads to the conclusion that while delimitation 
is not effected, each and any of the states involved might actually exercise their jurisdiction 
over the whole or part of the area of overlapping. This is illustrated by state practice. The 
boundary-line agreed by Denmark and Germany in the follow-up of the North Sea cases 
was devised to take also into account the location of the Danish oil fields the exploitation of 
which had started before the delimitation81. Such an exercise of jurisdiction might in effect 
give rise to disputes that may no longer be merely juridical. In the Nicaragua/Honduras 
case, Nicaragua noted that the disagreement as to the location of the maritime boundary 
"has brought about repeated confrontations and mutual capture of vessels of both nations in 
and around the general border area"*2. 
Thus, some states might and do indeed exercise jurisdiction over the area of overlap 
before the delimitation is effected. The ratio legis of, and the need for, Articles 74(3) and 
83(3) of the LOSC, is explicable perhaps in this light. They prescribe that, pending a final 
delimitation, states shall seek to enter into provisional practical arrangements, which are 
without prejudice to the delimitation. One ought to ask, therefore, whether the unilateral 
exercise of jurisdiction over areas of overlapping of entitlement is lawful. No doubt, states 
are under the obligation to take a course of action that ensures that the boundary dispute is 
not aggravated - which means necessarily, to avoid any course of action that prejudices the 
(78) Memorial, p.201, para.7.10.c), Conclusion, p.236, para.3, respectively. The Court made no pronouncement in relation thereto. 
(79) Teles/1998 (unpublished), paras. 13-20; Lucchini/Voeickel/1996, p 14 ("//'/res concurrents"). 
(80) Dissenting Opinion, Canada/France arbitration, ILM/31/1992, pp.1198, 1203, paras.5, 19. 
(81) Para.2.3.d) .supra. 
(82) Application, para.4, emphasis added. 
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other state . In relation to the specific case of exploitation of resources, an "obligation of 
mutual restraint" has already been identified: "states are obliged to refrain from unilateral 
action when it risks depriving other states of the gains they might realise by exercising their 
sovereign right of exploitation"84. 
4.3.d)(ii) Maritime Delimitation: 'Amputation' of Entitlements of the Same Type 
Maritime delimitation has a practical impact on the political level that is crucial to 
its understanding: it determines the extent to which each state must relinquish its maximum 
potential maritime entitlement in order to avoid the difficulties that would stem from the 
maintenance of the indivisum (the area of overlapping of maritime entitlements). Hence, it 
is appropriate to speak of a maximisation process, whereby the concurrent jurisdictions of 
states are maximised in the light of the relevant factual circumstances. Subsumed in this 
conception is inherently the notion of'mutual compression of entitlements'. Inexorably, this 
entails the ' amputation' of the entitlements that overlap85. This is the paramount conceptual 
axiom of maritime delimitation: politically, what lies at its very heart is an 'amputation' of 
maritime entitlements - not apportionment of areas86. 
This was clearly recognised by both parties in the Canada/France arbitration87. The 
reasoning of the Jan Mayen Judgment however, has a different focus. Although referring to 
the overlapping of entitlements, the Court resorted to the overlapping of claims to effect the 
delimitation. That the overlapping of claims is "of obvious relevance to any case involving 
opposed maritime boundaries" is hardly debatable. Why that area became the reference in 
the determination of how much each entitlement was to be 'amputated' is however not 
totally clear in the reasoning. Apparently, both the Danish and the Norwegian claim-lines 
were deemed to be inequitable in casu, leading the Court to conclude that the boundary had 
to fall within the area defined by the claim-lines88. But no straightforward statement is 
advanced in this respect; and perhaps there should have been one. It has been suggested that 
(83) By an Order of 15 March 1996, on Provisional Measures in the Cameroon/Nigeria case, the ICJ asserted that the parties were 
under the duty not to carry out any actions that could aggravate the dispute. That the conduct of states must sometimes be 
understood as the result of an intention not to aggravate disputes, which is without prejudice of a final boundary settlement, was 
stressed in the Jan Mayen case (ICJ/Reports/1993, p.54, para.35). In the Guinea-Bissau/Senegal arbitration, referring to the fact 
that Guinea-Bissau had "abstained from any activity in the disputed area pending the outcome of the dispute", Judge Bedjaoui 
considered it as "irreproachable" (Dissenting Opinion, ILR/83/1990, p.83). 
(84) Ong/1999, p. 198. Although Ong had in mind the exploitation of petroleum resources, analogically, the same approach seems to 
be valid for resources of the water column. 
(85) Terms other than "amputation" could have been used here (e.g. truncation, curtailment). The use of the term "amputation" is 
justified because it conveys the idea of a "painful process" whereby the states involved are denied areas that each "could hope to 
appropriate if it faced the oceans on its own" (Weil/1989a, p.5); cf. also Weil/I989b, p.1023). In the Anglo/French arbitration, 
reference was made to the term "curtailment" (RIAA/18, p.92, para.195). Tanja refers to "restriction" (Tanja/1991, p.xvi). 
(86) The situation of concurrence of rights is kept, at least to some extent, in the case of joint zones. Either there is no 'amputation' 
of entitlements in the joint area, or the said 'amputation' is 'smaller' (insofar as it does not exclude completely the entitlement that 
is 'amputated' - e.g. the state continues to obtain revenues, although it might have no intervention in the exercise of activities in 
the area). It is because of this fact that joint zones might be preferable choices in certain, highly disputed cases. 
(87) ILM/31/1992, p.l 169, para.67. 
(88) ICJ/Reports/1993, pp.64,68-70, paras.59,68-71. 
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the area of overlapping claims must always be divided between the claimants. This view 
cannot be accepted. Inferring from the Jan Mayen case that there is a rule of international 
law requiring the division of the area of overlapping claims in every case is certainly to 
overstep the Court's line of reasoning. Such an approach would mean that either the Court 
dismissed the entitlement of Jan Mayen beyond the equidistance-line in limine, or Norway 
relinquished that entitlement when advancing its claim. Neither seems admissible. What is 
clear is that maybe the Court should have explained its approach in detail, with a view to 
avoiding the criticism that maritime delimitation by adjudication is no more than a 
'subjective exercise of sharing-out the area of overlapping claims'89. 
For conceptual purposes, the idea that the area of overlapping of claims does not 
necessarily have to be shared-out between the claimants is paramount. The partition of such 
an area only has to take place where required by law. In abstrato, delimitation does not 
require such a division. Hypothetically, it is possible to conceive a scenario in which the 
boundary-line stemming from the application of delimitation law would coincide with one 
of the claim-lines. If only for this reason, the possibility of having to attribute the whole of 
the area of overlapping claims to one disputant must be admitted. Indeed, the sharing-out of 
the overlapping of claims is consequence of the delimitation, not vice versa90. 
No doubt, the areas of overlapping claims and of overlapping entitlements are both 
crucial for delimitation. The former will be virtually shared-out in every instance between 
the disputants. But that is not required. The only legal requirement is that the boundary-line 
falls spatially within the overlapping of claims91. Non ultra petita. 
Maritime delimitation has one key tenet. Insofar as it presupposes the existence of 
an overlapping of entitlements, it entails the 'amputation' of the potential entitlement of at 
least one of the states involved92. Typically, the entitlements of the states involved are both 
'amputated'. In cases where the entitlements that overlap are not of the same type, however, 
this might not be the case. As will be argued, i f the continental shelf and EEZ entitlement of 
one state overlaps with the territorial sea entitlement of another, the latter will in principle 
not be 'amputated', and will be given full precedence93. Only overlapping of entitlements of 
the same type should be considered. Asking why continental shelf and EEZ entitlements do 
not affect the territorial sea entitlements is thus a crucial conceptual point. 
(89) Joint Separate Opinion, Judges Ruda, Bedjaoui and DeArechaga, Libya/Malta case, ICJ/Reports/1985, p.90, para.37. 
(90) ICJ/Reports/1993, p.67, para.64. This was restated recently in the Qatar/Bahrain case (Qatar/Bahrain-Merits, para.234). 
(91) Merrils/2000, p.896; Kaikobad/1999, pp.209-302. 
(92) Luccini/Vcelckel/1996, pp.12-14; Thirlway/1993, pp.39-40; Tanja/1990, p.xvi; Weil/1989a, p.3; Weil/1989b, p.1023. 
(93) This proposition was already advanced elsewhere; cf. Antunes/2001, pp.327-328. 
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4.3.d)(iii) Precedence between Different Entitlements: Case Law and State Practice 
The following examples of case law and state practice, in which continental shelf 
and EEZ entitlements did not affect territorial sea entitlements, provide a starting point for 
delving into the issue of precedence between entitlements. In the Dubai/Sharjah arbitration, 
which concerned the delimitation of a continental shelf boundary, the entitlement of the 
island of Abu Musa (Sharjah) to a territorial sea belt was fully recognised. The Tribunal 
stated that such entitlement could only be restricted if a territorial sea boundary would be in 
question94. Analogously, in the Anglo/French arbitration, a cardinal argument for attributing 
the Channel Islands a 12-mile enclave (and not less) was to allow in the future the full 
extension of their territorial sea95. The case of Alcatraz island, in the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau 
arbitration, is another instance in which the Court guaranteed the 12-mile territorial sea96. 
An approach along the same lines was adopted in the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration. The 
Tribunal recognised fully the territorial sea entitlement of all insular features, proceeding to 
their 'amputation' only where other competing territorial sea entitlements existed. That is 
why for purposes of determination of the middle stretch of the boundary-line it determined 
the area of overlapping territorial sea entitlements. Outside that area, in the area of 
overlapping of EEZ and continental shelf entitlements, the Tribunal discounted the effect of 
some mid-sea islands. Due attention was nonetheless paid to the fact that giving no-effect to 
the Yemeni northern mid-sea islands would not affect their 12-mile territorial sea97. 
Examples of state practice are consonant with case law. The semi-enclave solution 
adopted in the Italy/Yugoslavia and Italy/Tunisia agreements seeks to avoid encroaching on 
the territorial sea of certain small islands98. The Sharjah/Umm al Qaywayn agreement offers 
a similar solution. The continental shelf boundary was described as a line of bearing that, in 
principle, would encroach upon the territorial sea of Abu Musa island99. Because Umm al 
Qaywayn explicitly acknowledged the entitlement of Abu Musa to a territorial sea, that 
boundary was deflected around the belt of territorial sea of Abu Musa. 
4.3.d)(iv) Precedence between Different Entitlements: Rationale 
Having shown that there is a trend according to which continental shelf and EEZ 
entitlements and territorial sea entitlements are not weighed on equal footing, one has now 
to attempt to understand the underlying rationale. Especially, it must be enquired whether it 
(94) ILR/91/1993, p.674. 
(95) RIAA/18, pp.89-90, para.187. 
(96) ILM/25/1986, p.298, para. 111. 
(97) Eritrea/Yemen-II, paras. 119, 124-128, 154-163. The Tribunal had already stated, referring to the mid-sea islands, that "some 
weight is to be or may be accorded to [them], certainly in respect of their territorial waters" (para.83). 
(98) Appendix 2, B26, D45. 
(99) Appendix 2, B33. 
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is possible to speak, in general, of a precedence between different types of entitlements. In 
this respect, the fact that the territorial sea regime allows coastal states to exercise sovereign 
powers that, ratione materiae, are much wider and stronger than those allowed by the 
regimes of the EEZ, the continental shelf or the contiguous zone must be highlighted. That 
is why full precedence has been given to the former. Conceptually, this is again explainable 
by reference to the theory of concurrence of rights: when two rights of a different nature 
collide, the 'superior' right prevails. The 'superiority' of a territorial sea entitlement over a 
contiguous zone, EEZ or continental shelf entitlement has to do with the fact that, having 
account of the rights that are conferred upon coastal states, the former is valued as being of 
greater significance for states. Further, since delimitation might be effected differently in 
each maritime zone, the relevance of this conceptual issue must not be underestimated. 
Whether other situations of overlapping of entitlements of different type exist, in 
which precedence has to be given to one of them, is less clear. It is indubitable that the legal 
rights and the powers of states over maritime areas are less intense and less comprehensive 
as the distance from the coast increases. In contradistinction, there is a strengthening of the 
rights and interests of the international community. This reveals a balancing-up between 
exclusiveness and inclusiveness at sea, in which the relative weight of each set of interests 
is valued differently by reference to distance to the coast100. 
Starting from the coast, it is possible to identify four areas where such balancing-up 
is different (see Graphic 1 below). The first is the territorial sea. From 12 to 24 M, there is a 
second area where the regime of the contiguous zone, the EEZ, and the continental shelf 
subsist together. In the third area, from 24 to 200 M, only the EEZ and the continental shelf 
exist. The fourth is constituted by the continental shelf beyond 200 M. As between the 
territorial sea entitlement and other maritime entitlements, it was suggested that precedence 
should be given to the former. Similarly, it must be investigated whether the entitlement up 
to 24 M has precedence over the entitlement up to 200 M, and whether the latter should 
prevail over the entitlement over continental shelf areas beyond 200 M. 
It may be argued that, since in the three areas identified beyond 12 M coastal states 
are entitled only to exercise powers that amount to less than sovereignty, the difference 
between them is not one of substance. The suggestion that the contiguous zone powers may 
be reconcilable with the idea of overlapping jurisdictions, for instance, may also be used as 
an argument to support the idea of a non-existence of material distinction between Areas 2 
and 3. However, the fact remains that the rights exercisable by coastal states differ in each 
of the three areas beyond the territorial sea. 
(100) Para.6.3.c)(i) infra. 
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The distinction between Areas 2 and 3 may be seen in three of the LOSC provisions. 
The jurisdictional powers conferred on coastal states by Article 33(1) are seldom, if ever, 
concurrently exercisable with EEZ and continental shelf jurisdiction of another state. 
Concurring jurisdictions are even less conceivable under Article 303(2). I f no precedence 
would exist - i.e. if an Area 2 entitlement could be truncated by an Area 3 entitlement, then 
there would be some 'squandered' jurisdiction. An area over which a state A could exercise 
powers referent to Area 2 would be downgraded to Area 3, because under international law 
a state B would not be in a position to exercise the same powers. The decisive argument 
stems from Article 121. This provision equates islands to land territory, and prescribes that 
prima facie islands are entitled to all four maritime zones (paragraph 2). The exception is 
"rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own". They are not 
entitled to EEZ and/or continental shelf (paragraph 3). As an exception to a general rule of 
entitlement, and due to the wording, such restriction ought to be interpreted restrictively. 
Thus, "rocks" do generate entitlements to a contiguous zone101. This reinforces the idea that, 
in terms of maritime entitlements, an entitlement to Area 2 has greater relevance for coastal 
states than an entitlement to Area 3. 
A similar line of analysis may be followed in relation to Areas 3 and 4. The powers 
conferred upon states by the existence of the entitlement to Area 3 are stronger than those 
(101) Para.3.5. supra. 
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derived from the entitlement to Area 4. For instance, within 200 M states may exercise 
certain powers and jurisdiction not only over the seabed and subsoil, but also over the 
superjacent column of water. Further, in terms of protection of the marine environment, the 
powers exercisable by coastal states under certain circumstances include the possibility of 
detention of vessels102. It might be suggested that these difficulties could be overcome by 
adopting different boundaries for the water and for the seabed and subsoil. However, this is 
a solution that unavoidably leads to practical difficulties of administration of the boundary. 
Even i f only the seabed and subsoil are considered, there are still differences that cannot be 
discarded lightly. The delineation of the limits of Area 3 falls totally within the sphere of 
discretion of states. In contrast, limits beyond 200 M depend on a 'technical homologation' 
by the CLCS103. Their final and binding nature is subject thereto, i.e. the precise extent of an 
overlapping of entitlements cannot be established without it. Finally, there is an obligation 
imposed on states to make payments or contributions in kind in respect of exploitation of 
mineral resources in Area 4 1 0 4 . All these aspects appear to support the suggestion that there 
is some legal difference between the entitlements to Areas 3 and 4 1 0 5 . 
One would submit, in conclusion, the there is a very strong presumption in favour of 
giving precedence to Area 1 entitlements over entitlements to Areas 2, 3 and 4. Territorial 
sea entitlements should in principle not be 'amputated' by effect of an overlapping with a 
different entitlement. The difference in powers exercisable by states is perhaps more of 
quantity, rather than of quality, when it comes to precedence between Areas 2, 3 and 4. 
Thus the answer is less straightforward. One would suggest, nevertheless, that there is a 
juris tantum presumption in favour of the entitlements to Areas 2 and 3 over the 
entitlements to Areas 3 and 4, respectively. The distinction between these cases lies upon 
the strength of the presumption. The 'amputation' of 12 M territorial sea entitlements by 
effect of a different entitlement should only take place in exceptional circumstances106. In 
relation to the other cases, the presumption operates similarly (although with less strength). 
Unless rebutted objectively, the 'amputation' of entitlements to Areas 2 and 3 by effect of 
entitlements to Areas 3 and 4, respectively, should also not occur. 
To some extent, this rationale lies behind the solution found in the Canada/France 
arbitration (Figure 10). The entitlement of the French islands to a 12 M belt was considered 
as a given. Then, the Tribunal considered that, in the western sector, France should be 
attributed an additional 12 M, beyond the territorial sea. The "encroachment to certain 
(102) Cf. LOSC, Article 220(6). 
(103) Cf. LOSC, Article 76(8), which refers to Annex II. 
(104) Cf. LOSC, Article 82. 
(105) Lilje-Jensen and Thamsborg concur with this view (Lilje-Jensen/Thamsborg/1995, p.643). 
(106) Possible examples could be the Aegean Sea and the Torres Strait (between Papua New Guinea and Australia). 
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Canadian seaward projections" caused by this approach was deemed to be non-inequitable 
and reasonable. An explicit reference to the jurisdictional powers over the contiguous zone 
was then made to justify this extension of the French jurisdiction up to 24 M, which 
prevailed over the Canadian entitlement beyond 24 M. The Tribunal noted that, to the east, 
the proximity to the Canadian coast, creating an overlapping of entitlements of the same 
type, ought to be viewed differently. Preserving the entitlement of both states to a territorial 
sea, full precedence was given there to the Canadian entitlement up to 24 M vis-a-vis the 
equivalent French entitlement. Why the Tribunal made no finding, and did not aver the 
precedence of the Canadian entitlement up to 200 M vis-a-vis the French entitlement 
beyond 200 M is unclear. Even if the entitlement beyond 200 M would exist, apparently no 
objective reasons supports in casu the attribution to France of areas beyond 200 M, which 
would encroach upon the Canadian entitlement up to 200 M 1 0 7 . 
The proposition that there is a level of precedence between different entitlements is 
grounded in another idea. Today, as ever, the law of the sea revolves around a tension 
between exclusiveness (i.e. the exclusive interests of coastal states) and inclusiveness (i.e. 
the interests common to all states). As the distance to the coast increases, the importance of 
exclusivity declines; and that of inclusivity increases108. The underlying rationale is simple: 
the closer to the coast, the stronger are the exclusive rights and interests of coastal states109. 
I f there would be no level of precedence between entitlements, this rationale would simply 
be brushed aside, without satisfactory justification. More comprehensive rights and interests 
of a state A (stemming from closer proximity) would not be protected to any extent vis-a-vis 
competing, less comprehensive - thus less relevant - rights and interests of a state B. 
There is no question of hard and fast rules concerning precedence of entitlements. 
But discarding the proposition altogether raises significant conceptual problems; and loses 
sight of reality. No doubt, this is without prejudice of reaching equilibrium between the 
states involved, as mandate by international law 1 1 0. That, however, does not preclude the 
existence of a juris tantum presumption. 
(107) ILM/31/1992, pp.1169-1173, paras.66-82. On the entitlements beyond 200 M, cf. para.8.4.b) infra. 
(108) McDougal/Burke/1987, pp.56-63. Cf. paras.6.3.b), 6.3.c) infra. 
(109) It is worthwhile stressing that the precedence between different entitlements ought to be read, and understood, in conjunction 
with the question of emergence of'grey areas', examined below (para.8.4.d) intra). 
(110) On how the equilibrium is to be achieved, cf. Conclusions to Part II infra. 
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Chapter 5 
METHODS AND LINE-DEFINING TECHNIQUES 
5.1. Introductory Notes 
5.1.a) The Need for Technical Expertise 
The technical-scientific nature of the process of definition of the boundary-line has 
already been noted111. What must equally be noted is the fact that amongst the serious errors 
that might occur in delimitation are the mistakes due to the "lack of knowledge of the many 
pitfalls in boundary definition"112. Since the aim of boundary definition is to express the 
technical parameters of a line previously determined, proper technical expertise should be 
available. This is reinforced by the fact that in the maritime context the selection of the 
boundary site can hardly be isolated from the technical issues concerning the methods and 
line-defining techniques involved. In effect, because many of the relevant considerations are 
perceptible only by means of cartographic information (e.g. coastal configuration, coastal 
lengths, general direction of the coast, navigation channels insular features, and fishing 
banks), technical expertise is fundamental"3. 
The prima facie ad eternum nature of boundaries turns the boundary definition into 
a key issue. States are fully aware of its implications on the technical level. Negotiating 
teams set up to resolve maritime boundary disputes include (in the oveiwhelrning majority 
of cases) experts in geography, hydrography and cartography. A correct technical definition 
of the boundary is required with a view to prevent future disputes in regard to its location. 
After an agreement is reached, the course of the boundary has to be technically described in 
the treaty so that no interpretative doubts are left. That is the task for the technical experts 
of the two parties, who are expected to provide an unequivocal definition of the line"4. 
Boundaries delimited through adjudication have no lesser requirements. Courts 
should thus not underestimate the technicalities that might emerge in the definition of 
maritime boundaries. As the full understanding of cartographic information, and the impact 
of certain technically-related decisions, might not be easily perceived by laypersons, judges 
(111) Para.4.2.a) supra. 
(112) Jones/1945, p.57, emphasis added. 
(113) Para.4.2.d) supra. 
(114) Carleton/Schofield/2000. 
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should avoid technical appraisals of their own without expert advice115. Otherwise, they 
face the risk of adjudging inequitably without even realising that possibility. 
Notwithstanding this, it must be stressed that judges should also 'avoid looking for shelter' 
in purely legal arguments when technical matters are under scrutiny, and appear as 
determinant for the outcome of the case. All in all, one can but subscribe to the idea that 
having recourse to impartial technical expertise in international adjudication is a valid 
approach, invariably worth adopting116. 
The recourse to scientific or technical expertise is explicitly dealt with in the LOSC 
and, by consequence, in the procedural rules of the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea (ITLOS). Article 289 of the LOSC prescribes that a court exercising jurisdiction under 
the dispute-settlement mechanism of the Convention may, "at the request of any party or 
proprio motu", select "no fewer than two scientific or technical experts" to sit with it but 
without the right to vote. Courts whose jurisdiction is established through the LOSC system 
of dispute-settlement should consider appointing impartial experts whenever its decision 
requires technical assessments, as in maritime delimitation. As for ITLOS, Article 15(3) of 
its Rules establishes that the experts "shall be independent and enjoy the highest reputation 
for fairness, competence and integrity". No doubt, similar approaches may be adopted 
before the ICJ. Under Article 30(2) of the ICJ Statute (and Articles 9 and 21(2) of the 
Procedural Rules), the Court may (either proprio motu or on request) decide to appoint 
assessors to sit with it without the right to vote. The same might happen in arbitration. For 
example, the compromis between Eritrea and Yemen empowered the Tribunal to resort to 
"experts of its choice after notice to the Parties", whilst stating that such experts should 
perform "their functions impartially and conscientiously"117. Equally, in the Gulf of Maine 
case, the parties demanded that a technical expert would assist the Chamber. 
As Anderson suggests, "[b]oundary disputes are best tackled with the assistance of 
expert hydrographers or geographers or geodesists"118. Clearly, having recourse to 
procedural mechanisms of the aforementioned type would not only improve the evaluation 
of evidence and proof of facts (especially arguments made by the parties on the basis of 
cartographic information), but would also help in bridging the gap between the legal and the 
technical assessments in maritime delimitation. It should also be emphasised that the 
intervention of experts in the proceedings is suggested with a view to bringing in an 
(115) Weil stresses the difficulties of jurists in mastering technicalities (Weil/1984, p.359). If an image is worth more than a 
thousand words, then judges will certainly be influenced by how maps look. However, without proper preparation and advice, 
most judges are probably unable to fully understand many technical issues involved in cartography. 
(116) White/1996, p.540. 
(117) Agreement of 3 October 1996. 
(118) Anderson/1998b, p.81. 
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impartial view on scientific and technical matters. Since cartography is never neutral (maps 
and charts are indeed manipulated with a specific aim, and the parties' experts should not be 
expected to present cartographic information in a neutral way), such an intervention may 
acquire great relevance and become decisive in the 'search for the technical truth'. 
The 'choice of method' is indubitably not a technical question. Nevertheless, the 
political-legal decision-maker ought to consider the technicalities involved119. This is what 
justifies the presence of technical experts in meetings of courts, tribunals, or conciliation 
commissions. It might not be enough to bring in experts after the decision is made. Many of 
the assessments concerning the choice of line rely on cartographic information and related 
data. What the present chapter attempts to do is to introduce the basic notions involved in 
the application of delimitation methods and line-defining techniques. An attempt was made 
to present technical issues from a perspective accessible to non-technical experts, that is, 
avoiding unnecessary technical detail. Its purpose is to draw attention to conceptual aspects 
and technical difficulties that may arise, and not to minutely describe the application of each 
method or technique. No discussion will be held on technicalities such as geodetic datums, 
tidal datums, chart projections, or the nature of straight lines. These are some of the issues 
that for reasons of brevity had to be left out. 
5.1.b) Methods and Line-Defining Techniques 
Before entering into the description of each delimitation method and line-defining 
technique, it is worth setting down the conceptual framework that moulds the following 
description. A few notions adopted in this study depart perhaps from what has been the 
accepted understanding. They are therefore crucial for grasping the ideas herein submitted. 
One point concerns the distinction between determination and definition of boundaries; the 
delimitation methods and line-defining techniques operate as such mainly within the stage 
of boundary definition. In the phase of determination, the support-role that they have in the 
decision-making process is typically illustrative, rather than technical. Marginal situations 
might arise, however, in which the decision will depend on technically exact assessments. 
This explains why the two roles should not be strictly compartmentalised120. 
The second point to make relates to the distinction between delimitation method and 
line-defining technique. A delimitation method is understood as an ordered assemblage of 
technical procedures and operations necessary to construct and define the course of a 
maritime boundary accurately, in accordance with the determination of the political or legal 
(119) On question of choice of method, cf. Conclusion to Part II, and paras.7.1., 7.4. infra. 
(120) Paras.4.2.a), 4.2.d) supra. 
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decision-maker. It has two marking features: it is a systematic procedure; and results in a 
line characterised by technical certainty121. Line-defining technique is a term devised here to 
encompass two types of procedure that fall short of being methods: ad hoc (a-systematic) 
approaches used to define lines; and technical procedures that cannot autonomously result 
in a line, although usable in the determination or definition thereof. 
The following analysis contains a brief description of both delimitation methods and 
line-defining techniques. It seeks to give a brief overview of technical aspects that must be 
considered when applying them. Incidentally, it is also intended to provide the basis for 
distinguishing between technical procedures and delimitation rules. 
The two-fold categorisation of technical procedures has academic purposes only. 
Notwithstanding this, because 'closer proximity' is paramount in maritime delimitation122, it 
is important to itemise separately procedures that stem from the notion of equal-distance 
(equidistance and its variants), and procedures that have no relationship therewith (e.g. 
enclaving, 'corridor solution', coastal length comparison)123. This distinction is significant 
from another, more practical standpoint. Equidistance-related lines have been utilised in the 
vast majority of delimitations. This distinction is justified on a third ground: the rationale 
underlying all equidistance-related methods is the same - equal-distance. They result in 
different types of line only because coastal geography is assessed, or interpreted, differently 
in each case. 
Finally, it must be noted that the techniques described are basic types. Delimitations 
are effected more often than not through a combination and/or variants of these methods 
and techniques. Since in negotiation states are entitled to resort, on a consensual basis, to 
any ad hoc solutions they deem appropriate, the techniques that could be devised are in fact 
virtually numberless. This presentation provides merely an overview of those methods and 
line-defining techniques more commonly used. Historically, others were considered, as for 
instance, the prolongation of the land boundary, or the prolongation of the territorial sea 
boundary (in continental shelf delimitation). 
(121) Roubertou/1996, pp.132-133. 
(122) For the arguments supporting this suggestion, cf. paras.6.3.b), 6.3.d) infra. 
(123) The United Nations proposes a division of delimitation methods that includes: equidistance, perpendicularity, meridians and 
parallels, enclaving, parallel lines (corridor), and other means of achieving a delimitation line (United Nations/2000, pp.47-63). 
Analysing state practice, Nascimento/1999, pp.69-151, groups agreements under four methods: equidistance, simplified and 
modified equidistance, mixed lines (equidistance tempered by another type of line), and other lines (meridians and parallels, 
parallel lines, perpendiculars). Legault/Hankey/1993, pp.206-217, divide methods in two main groups: "Equidistance Methods" 
and "Other Methods". Although the basic cataloguing is similar to that used in this study, the contents of each category are 
different. For instance, "parallels and meridians" and "parallel lines" are presented as methods, whereas here they are dealt with 
under the caption "Ad Hoc Approaches". Equally, "perpendiculars" are catalogued under "Other Methods", whereas here it is 
deemed to be a variant of equidistance. Willis/1993, pp.66-73, referring to "An Inventory of Methods", refers to five categories: 
equidistance and its variants, perpendiculars, parallels and meridians, corridor effect, and effect of islands. The methods 
enumerated by the Chamber in the Gulf of Maine case comprise lateral equidistance-line, median line, perpendiculars, 
prolongation of the land boundary, and prolongation of the territorial sea boundary (ICJ/Reports/1984, p.313, para. 159). 
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5.1.c) Technicalities and Law 
That the technical definition of the line must always comply with the terms set out 
in the determination phase was already affirmed. Delimitation methods (and line-defining 
techniques) are means for defining the boundary-line, not means for determining it. Their 
application has no constitutive nature. The boundary definition must accurately translate, in 
geographical terms, the decision of the determination phase. The former must not depart 
from the latter. For this reason, the 'conversion' of the qualitative evaluation of facts 
(carried out in the determination phase) into a boundary-line is the fulcrum of maritime 
delimitation. This 'conversion' however, gives rise to numerous difficulties, especially in 
adjudication (in which case the line must stem from normative standards)124. For the 
normativity at issue might not be apt to specify the location of any boundary-line125. Despite 
the shortcomings, it is however unquestionable that the technical implementation of the 
determination of the boundary ought not to transgress the reasoning of the adjudicative 
decision. 
For instance, the United Kingdom reopened the proceedings in the Anglo/French 
arbitration exactly because, rightly one would argue, it considered that the way in which the 
method had been applied departed from the reasoning of the Tribunal. Indeed, the Award 
describes the "half-effect method" as consisting of the definition of a bisecting-line between 
two lines defined through the "equidistance method"126. This is confirmed in the report of 
the technical expert, which refers to the equidistance method. The technical misapplication 
thereof in concreto should thus not have been accepted. When it argued that the boundary 
defined by the technical expert was "an equitable variant of the equidistance principle"127, 
the Tribunal misconceived the non-constitutive, technical nature of delimitation methods. 
The same may be said about the proposition that this resulted from "the margin of the lack 
ofprecision inherent in the notion of equity"™. 
Not distinguishing between technical methods and legal principles is indubitably 
misconception. No doubt, "a rule of delimitation cannot be a method of delimitation at the 
same time"129. Rules (and principles) belong to the realm of political-legal determination of 
the boundary. Methods are part of the technical definition thereof, and should follow 
technical tenets. Whereas the determination of the boundary is a political-legal issue, its 
(124) Para.7.1.a) infra. 
(125) Charney/1993, p.xlii. 
(126) RIAA/18, p. 117-118, paras.251 -253. 
(127) Award on interpretation, RIAA/18, p.328, para. 110. 
(128) Proposition advanced by France, Award on interpretation, RIAA/18, p.302, para.42, emphasis added. 
(129) Tanja/1990, p. xvii, emphasis added. 
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definition through the adequate procedures is a technical matter. Unless explicitly qualified 
in some way during the determination stage, the application of any method should be made 
in accordance with the leges artis. 
5.2. Equidistance and Equidistance-Related Methods 
5.2.a) Method of Equidistance 
5.2.a)(i) A Proper Historical-Technical Background 
The concept of equidistance130, and its utilisation in maritime delimitation, must be 
understood in the light of the ILC work, and of the proposals advanced by the Committee of 
Experts. However, as far as technical points are concerned, the report of this Committee to 
the ILC is somewhat unhelpful. It does not completely clarify the terminology used in the 
draft articles. A paper prepared by Kennedy (a member of the Committee), and distributed 
during the 1958 Conference by the delegation of the United Kingdom, is a crucial source of 
information in this regard. It sheds light on the distinct terms used in the two paragraphs of 
Article 6 of the CS Convention - median line and principle of equidistance, used also in the 
ILC draft Articles 12 and 14, applicable to territorial sea delimitation. 
A first point to make is that the Committee of Experts noted clearly that it had made 
an effort to discover formulae applicable to the territorial sea delimitation, and which could 
at the same time serve in continental shelf delimitation. And this observation covered both 
situations of adjacency and oppositeness. This indicates that, unless there are reasons to 
conclude otherwise, the formula used for territorial sea delimitation should be viewed as 
similar to those used in continental shelf delimitation - at least as far as technicalities are 
concerned. As to legal implications, it is unlikely that such an experienced panel of experts 
would fall into the trap of attempting to make definitive pronouncements in that regard. 
The second point to make concerns the exceptions to the proposed methods. The 
Committee noted that, in the case of opposite coasts, there could be special reasons (e.g. 
interests of navigation and fisheries) that would justify departing from the median line. As 
to adjacent coasts, it stated that in certain instances the proposed method would not lead to 
equitable solutions - which should then be sought by negotiation. For both cases, thus, the 
use of the methods proposed was subject to one condition: the reasonableness of the line. 
Notably, no distinction was made between adjacency and oppositeness as to the likelihood 
of existence of justification for departing from the 'prima facie method'131. 
(130) The normative aspects embedded in equidistance will be dealt with at a later stage (para.6.3.d) infra). 
(131) On the conclusions of the Committee of Experts, cf. ILC/Yearbook/1953(11), p.79. 
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The third key idea concerns the distinction between "median line" and "principle of 
equidistance". Neither the report, nor the ILC debates clarify it. As said, the explanation is 
perhaps given in Kennedy's paper. Referring to the case of opposite coasts, he defines 
"median line" as "a line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the 
baselines from which the breadths of the territorial sea of the two states are measured"132. 
This definition is used in Article 6(1) of the CS Convention and Articles 12(1) and 24(3) of 
the TS/CZ Convention. When addressing the case of adjacent coasts, Kennedy refers not to 
one, but three possible methods: (A) adaptation of the median line principle; (B) method of 
equidistances offshore; (C) method based on equidistance from the boundary133. 
The first method amounts to the computation of a median line from two adjacent 
coasts (Figures 48 and 49). As to the second, it "consists primarily of drawing at varying 
distances offshore a series of limits along the coasts of the adjacent states by the arcs of 
circles method", followed by the determination of the points of intersection "of the most 
seaward arcs centred on" each state. The resulting line is formed by the "consecutive points 
of intersection of the limits at the different distances offshore [which] are then joined by a 
series of straight lines". It has "the various dog-legs [that] have different directions and 
lengths from the true and precise median line". Insofar as such line runs fairly close to the 
true median line, and does not escape the effect of controlling basepoints (e.g. islands, 
promontories) located near the terminus of the land boundary, this method is "somewhat of 
an approximation to the median line principle" (Figure 55)'3 4. The last method "is based on 
joining by straight lines a series of points, each equidistant from points on the coast which 
are themselves equidistant from the position where the land boundary meets the coast". This 
method appears to be what Roubertou denominates pseudo-equidistanceiis. It results in a 
line that is usually very different from the two previous lines (Figure 56). 
The proposition that Kennedy's paper reflects the Committee's views finds further 
support in Boggs' writings. In 1951, he had already referred to the 'median line principle' 
and to the 'method of equidistances offshore'. He argued that in cases of cartographically 
ill-defined coastlines, the use of other 'methodological interpretations' of the principle of 
equidistance would be acceptable136. Shalowitz also reinforces the suggestions above. 
Noting that equidistance "is embodied in the median-line concept", he nevertheless takes 
the view that the "distinction between an equidistant line and a median-line seems valid 
from a geometrical point of view, for a true median line presupposes a line that is in the 
(132) Kennedy/1958 (unpublished), para.I. 
(133) Ibid., para.n(A)(B)(C); from which are taken all citations in the following paragraph. 
(134) Boggs/1951, p.262. Cf. also Christensen/1998. 
(135) Para.5.2.e)/n/ra. 
(136) Boggs/1951, p.262. He was also a member of the Committee of Experts. 
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middle". Referring to the "application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest 
points on the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each country is 
measured", he adds that theoretically "a boundary line through the territorial sea between 
two adjacent states, while an equidistant line, is not a true median line" 1 3 7. In other words, 
whereas a median line is an equidistance-line, not all equidistance-lines are median lines. 
Finally, on the interpretation of Article 6 of the CS Convention, he notes that it embodies 
"in substance the same principles for delimiting the boundary between two states through 
the continental shelf as was adoptedfor the territorial sea"138. 
Whether the term "principle of equidistance" was meant to refer to a "median line", 
or to another understanding of equidistance, or all of them, is unclear. Further, the records 
of the First Conference provide no evidence in this respect. One would suggest that the 
technical distinction initially embodied in the two terms aforementioned was not transposed 
to the 1958 Conventions. The ILC, the Committee of Experts, and the First Conference, all 
seem to have agreed on one point. The normative standards applicable to delimitation were 
envisaged for both the territorial sea and the continental shelf. This is prima facie evidence 
that the delimitation rules were meant to be the same. The fact that the two draft-provisions 
on territorial sea delimitation were merged, whereas those concerning the continental shelf 
were not, without further evidence, is insufficient to overturn that idea. As suggested, this 
might have happened simply because different Conference Committees were involved139. 
5.2.a)(ii) Contents and Technical Aspects 
Whatever the correct perspective historically, today the distinction between median 
line and equidistance is formal. These two terms are used interchangeably to convey the 
same meaning: a line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest basepoints on two 
coasts. This view has prevailed in scholarship, which considers that both lines "result from 
the application of the same geometric method"140. Therefore, they are taken as synonymous 
here. Indeed, it has been suggested that this distinction amounts to an improper use of 
terms, caused by a misconception141. The difference in Article 6 of the CS Convention was 
already considered as bearing no juridical relevance, and deemed to be "fictitious" and 
"inadequate" as "juridico-technical terminology"142. In any event, since technically what is 
(137) Shalowitz/1962(1), pp.230-231, emphasis added. 
(138) Ibid., p.253, emphasis added. 
(139) Para.l .3.c)(iv) supra. 
(140) Kapoor/Kerr/1986, p.73. Cf. also, IHO/TALOS-Manual, pp.106-108; IHO/Dictionary, pp.79, 145 (n.1648, 3171); Guy/2000, 
pp.186-187; Carleton/1999, para.6.17; Roubertou/1996, p.375; BeazIey/1994, pp.7-8; Hodgson/Cooper/1976, pp.361-364; 
Vcelckel/1979, pp.702-703; Whiteman/1965, pp.332-333. 
(141) Francalanci/1989, p.83. 
(142) Judge Serensen, Dissenting Opinion, North Sea cases, ICJ/Report/1969, p.252. Jayewardene/1990, pp.294-295; Tanja/1990, 
p.33; Weil/1989a, p.247. Not making distinction in the treatment of the two situations, thus agreeing implicitly, cf. Ahnish/1993, 
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in question is a line formed by equidistant points, the term "equidistance" is used in this 
study to refer to both oppositeness and adjacency (Figures 48 to 54). 
Behind the use of this method is the rationale closer proximity. With it, each state is 
allocated all points at sea that are closer to its coasts than to the coast of another state. The 
sole remark that should be made in relation to the recourse to equidistance in cases of 
adjacency concerns the link between the maritime and the land boundaries. The stretch of 
equidistance in the vicinity of the terminal point of the land boundary may be composed by 
a rather complex sequence of short segments, depending on the coastlines' features. For this 
reason, the graphical definition of the line, which is started on a point at sea and constructed 
landwards, is usually stopped at a certain point, which is then joined to the terminus of the 
land boundary by one segment. Even when appropriate software is used, simplifications 
might be needed, due to the large number of turning points in the vicinity of the coast. 
With this said, attention should now be focused on the technical aspects involved in 
the definition of lines through this method. The first point to make concerns the distinction 
between Euclidean geometry and geodetic computations. In plane Euclidean geometry, the 
definition of equidistance is easy to interpret. It is the perpendicular bisector of the line 
connecting any two points. When a point and a line are considered, it becomes a parabola 
with the focus on that point. Thus, it would be somewhat simple to graphically determine an 
equidistance-line on a chart. On an ellipsoid however, things are much more complex143. 
The use of charts might lead to material errors, as occurred in the Anglo/French arbitration; 
Mercator charts are unsuitable to construct strict equidistance-lines on the basis of plane 
geometry144. To compute these lines geodetically, it is preferable to resort to appropriate 
computer software, thereby circumventing the problems raised by map projections145. 
Notwithstanding this, it must be added that on an adequate Lambert conformal or 
Transverse Mercator projections, equidistance-lines can be constructed according to plane 
geometry principles. On these charts, straight lines may be taken for all practical purposes 
as geodesies146. Because the accuracy of the solution obtained depends more on the chart 
scale than on the inaccuracies involved in graphical computations, the error involved in the 
assumption made becomes in many instances negligible. 
To understand the application of this method, a few other notions must be refined. 
In the computation of an equidistance-line, the normal baseline is in practice reduced to a 
pp.52-57; Dipla/1984, pp.143-148. Contra, cf. O'Connell/1989, pp.684-685. Francalanci sees equidistance as the product of a 
graphical or analytical construction, and median line as the final product of a negotiation (Francalanci/1989, p.83). 
(143) IHO/TALOS-Manual, p. 106. 
(144) For information on chart projections (attributes, simplifications, distortions in the Mercator projection), cf. Appendix 3. 
(145) The formulae (or construction rules) involved in the computation of an equidistance-line belong to the world of geodesy, and 
need not be examined in a study such as this, in which technical issues need to be dealt with only on a conceptual level. 
(146) For an illustration of the difference between using a Mercator chart or a Lambert conformal chart, cf. Appendix 3. 
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sequence of relevant basepoints. The line may be represented by a series of discrete points. 
Just as most points on a baseline are irrelevant for delineating an outer limit, the basepoints 
used for computing an equidistance-line are only a few. The line every point of which (on 
an ellipsoidal surface) is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines of two states is 
usually known as strict equidistance. This line consists of a number of segments that join 
certain points - known as turning points. These points are equidistant from triplets of 
basepoints (two on the baseline of one state and one on the baseline of the other). The main 
advantage in resorting to equidistance is that, in principle, it is always possible to establish 
the line that is equidistant from the coasts of any two states147. 
As is easily understood, the definition of the normal baseline becomes the primary 
concern. The equidistance is only defined i f the basepoints from which the line is computed 
are identified. It does not suffice to establish a boundary as the equidistance between the 
coasts of two states. A strict equidistance, which accounts for all relevant points on the 
low-water line of the states involved, is the line underlying the reference to "equidistance" 
in international law. Legal coastlines (from which equidistance-lines are to be computed) 
might change as a result of natural phenomena (e.g. erosion, accretion, or silting), and of 
artificial works (e.g. harbour constructions, reclamation). 
The key point, technically, is that an equidistance boundary is defined only if there 
is an indication of either the basepoints from which the line is computed, or the turning 
points of the resulting line. Otherwise, doubts might emerge as to the line in question. 
Another question to deal with is that of the scale of the charts on which the normal 
baseline is marked, and the accuracy provided thereby. One further question involves the 
tidal datum to which each of the baselines of the two states is referred148. The geodetic 
datum (ellipsoid and origin) upon which the coordinates of the relevant basepoints are 
anchored is one further point to address149. The geodetic formulae used in the computation 
of the line must also be considered. I f charts are being used for constructing the line 
graphically, the projection upon which the charts are based (and the associated distortion) is 
an aspect to be taken into account. Finally, the understanding of the concept of straight line 
might bear on the definition of an equidistance-line. Even when straight baselines are used 
(147) There are theoretical situations in which it might be impossible to compute an equidistance-line (Roubertou/1996, p.378). 
(148) On the tidal datum issue, cf. Antunes/2000b. 
(149) When charts are used for delimitation, which implies the recourse to graphical methods, it is necessary to confirm whether 
they are all based on the same datum. If charts have different datums, coordinates of basepoints must be converted to the datum of 
the chart used for the delimitation. Even when applying analytical methods, because the coordinates of the basepoints are often 
obtained from charts, this conversion between datums is necessary. Computing equidistance-lines without having coordinates on 
both sides expressed in the same datum is technically incorrect. The following example may illustrate this point. Although the 
legislation of Equatorial Guinea and of Sao Tome' and Principe (cf. Appendix 2, E8, E3S) refer both to an equidistance-line as the 
boundary between them, the coordinates of the points of such line do not coincide. That is most likely caused by cartography 
based on different geodetic datums. 
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in part or the whole of the coast, most of the aforementioned aspects still have to be 
addressed. Geodetic datums, computation formulae, projection and scale of charts, and the 
concept of a straight line will often continue to be inescapable issues. These are the main 
issues that surround the application of the method of equidistance. Because states have 
resorted to this method very often, examples of its use are quite easy to find 1 5 0 . 
One particular case of the equidistance method is the situation in which the coasts of 
three states abut on the same oceanic area. The application of the equidistance method 
leads, then, to the identification of a point that is equidistant from the baselines of the three 
states (Figure 50), usually known as trijunction point (or tri-point). The case of the Gulf of 
Guinea is an example of a geographical context where several trijunction points have to be 
determined (Figure 37). There are a few examples of determination of trijunction points in 
state practice: e.g. the agreements between India, Maldives and Sri Lanka (Figure 28), 
between Poland, Sweden and the Soviet Union, and between India, Myanmar (Burma) and 
Thailand151. It might also happen that bilateral agreements (or unilateral claims to maritime 
zones) extend the boundary (or claim-line) up to the trijunction point with another state (or 
to its close vicinity)1 5 2. 
The decision to resort to equidistance, or to another method, is indubitably a rather 
different question, which must be considered on different grounds, that is, in political-legal 
terms. The method of equidistance, whose application raises the technical issues addressed 
above very briefly, is distinct from the legal notion of equidistance. Importantly, the latter 
concerns the legal-normative aspects relating to the entitlement of states to maritime areas, 
and the limits that are prescribed by international law, in relative terms, to the spatial sphere 
of jurisdiction of states. Understanding why maritime boundaries are delimited by reference 
to equidistance is not an issue that falls within the scope of the equidistance method, but of 
a legal notion whose content is the rationale embedded in equidistance. 
5.2.b) Simplified and Modified Equidistance 
Derivative forms of the equidistance method have been used often in maritime 
delimitation. The possible 'variants' thereof are indeed innumerable. Notwithstanding this, 
it is possible to identify basic types of variant-methods. A first group includes methods that 
may be named modified equidistance and simplified equidistance. Legault and Hankey 
present modified equidistances as lines "composed of segments connecting points whose 
(150) Cf. Appendix 2, B20-B24, B27-B31, D3, D7, Dl 1, D14, D18, D21-D24, D26, D28, D31-D38, D51-D55, D61-D64, F12, F14, 
F21, F27, F31-F33, F37-F38, F46, F52-F53, F58, F62-F64. 
(151) Ibid., D35, F50, F38. 
(152) Ibid., B19-B20, B26, C47(EEZ), D14, D16, D45, D61, E8, E35. 
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position is not strictly equidistant from the territorial sea baselines because certain features 
[...] have not been used or have been given reduced effect". In distinguishing them from 
simplified equidistance-lines, they add that these lines involve usually "a greater departure 
from strict equidistance than does a simplified equidistance-line", and that "whereas a 
simplified line typically involves an equal exchange of areas, a modified equidistance-line 
generally involves the allocation of maritime space to one party at the expense of the 
other"m. These ideas may be used as a starting point for further elaboration. 
First, strictly speaking, it must be noted that the term modified equidistance does not 
refer to a method per se. It refers to a line that may be arrived at by various methods and/or 
ad hoc approaches. In effect, all methods examined below - in particular those that are 
variants of equidistance - may result in modified equidistances. This category includes any 
lines derived from or constructed on the basis of equidistance - but in which the use of 
equidistance was tempered with another rationale. The intent is to allocate to one state areas 
that would be attributed to another state should strict equidistance would be used. Thus, it 
benefits the former at the expense of the latter. That is why this line departs from strict 
equidistance more than a simplified equidistance. How close the line follows equidistance 
depends exclusively on how equidistance and the other rationale are relatively weighed. 
This however, is not a technical issue. It is a political-legal decision. 
Technically speaking, the distinction between modified equidistance and simplified 
equidistance is perhaps more one of degree than one of substance. The issues to address are 
no different, since strict equidistance is the starting point in both cases. The distinction 
exists only in terms of objective to achieve. A simplified equidistance aims at 'a simpler 
line'. Differently, a modified equidistance seeks to alter the area-attribution that result from 
strict equidistance. In the former, the goal is ultimately to simplify the administration of the 
boundary (e.g. resource management, enforcement of laws), while maintaining equidistance 
as the key criterion. The new line deviates "so little [from strict equidistance] that the 
resulting area gained or lost by the states is essentially unmeasurable"154. This is achieved 
usually by reducing the number of turning points - although the new turning points do not 
necessarily have to be located over the strict equidistance-line. In modified equidistances, it 
is possible to speak of a weighing-up of two criteria, one of which is equidistance. 
Either of these lines requires the previous computation of a strict equidistance-line. 
Thus, they both involve all technical aspects pertinent thereto. The question of the geodetic 
datum to which the geographical coordinates are to be anchored is particularly important. 
(153) Legault/Hankey/1993, p.208, emphasis added. 
(154) IHO/TALOS-Manual, p. 109. 
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Furthermore, whereas the segments that join the turning points of a strict equidistance-line 
are geodesies, in simplified or modified equidistances the equivalent segments can be either 
geodesies or loxodromes. What is important is that the intention of the decision-maker 
(whether negotiators or judges) be made clear. In the absence of any explicit determination, 
because the new line is to be derived from a strict equidistance-line, it is argued that there 
should be a juris tantum presumption in favour of geodesies. But i f the line is drawn on 
Mercator charts, and no disclaimer exists as to the binding nature of these charts, that 
presumption should be reversed, and become in favour of loxodromes. 
As a final note, it should be observed that these methodologies share a common 
aim: both preserve the objectivity inherent in equidistance. Differentiating aspects, notably 
the extent to which each of them retains that 'objectivity', and the diverse goals underlying 
their use, are not enough to break this common ground. Whether a line is a simplified 
equidistance or a modified equidistance is far less important than the fact that both are 
variants of equidistance. 
5.2.c) Adjustment of Baselines and Partial-Effect Adjustments 
The method of 'adjustment of baselines' consists in effect of the application of the 
equidistance method. Instead of using all possible basepoints however, the computation of 
the equidistance-line is based on selected points and/or lines. This amounts to an adjustment 
of the normal baseline through a certain rationale. For example, some basepoints might be 
excluded; or straight baselines might be defined (accepted) for purposes of computing the 
equidistance-line. Similar to the adjustment of baselines is the partial-effect technique - in 
which notional basepoints are created for purposes of applying the equidistance method155. 
Baseline and partial-effect adjustments are both conceived on the political-legal level with a 
view to attain a certain objective. It is crucial to understand that the outcome often is a true 
equidistant-boundary (from the basepoints or baselines that were selected). Hence, the 
technical aspects to address will be the same as in the case of the equidistance method. The 
result might be either a simplified equidistance, or a modified equidistance, depending on 
the intention underlying, and the extent of, the adjustment of the normal baseline. 
An example of baseline adjustment, in which certain basepoints were disregarded, 
concerns the uninhabited islet of Filfla, which the ICJ did not consider when calculating the 
provisional median line between Malta and Libya1 5 6. In the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, the 
(155) The exclusion of certain basepoints may be seen as a particular application of the partial-effect technique, in which the effect 
attributed to a basepoint is null. 
(156) ICJ/Reports/1985, p.48, para.64. 
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Yemeni northern mid-sea islands were attributed no-effect157. More recently, in the 
Qatar/Bahrain Judgment, the ICJ asserted that Fasht al Jarim, an insular feature off the 
northern Bahraini coast, should have no-effect in determining the boundary in the northern 
sector158. 
Various examples of basepoint selection may be found in state practice. One is the 
1991 Belgium/United Kingdom agreement, in regard to the role of low-tide elevations and 
harbour works159. Another kind of adjustment appears in the 1994 Cuba/Jamaica agreement, 
where it was agreed to compute the equidistance boundary from points on the normal 
baseline (on the Jamaican side) and on straight baselines (on the Cuban side)160. In other 
cases, such as in the agreement between the Dominican Republic and the United Kingdom 
(Turks and Caicos Islands), straight baselines were disregarded in the computation of the 
equidistance-line161. Finally, it is possible to construct straight baselines specifically for the 
computation of an equidistance-line, as done in the 1977 Cuba/United States agreement162. 
Partial-effect adjustment is sometimes referred to as a delimitation method. From a 
technical viewpoint however, perhaps that is not strictly correct. Inasmuch as the course of 
a boundary cannot be defined without combining the notion of partial-effect with a true 
method, perhaps this should be seen as a line-defining technique. When combined with the 
equidistance method, partial-effect appears as a variant of equidistance. Its rationale lies on 
the reduction of the impact of certain coastline features in weighing-up of the geographical 
context, as reflected in the coastline configuration^. This explains why the technique is 
particularly apt to be applied in combination with the equidistance method. In this case, the 
technique does not differ much from an adjustment of baselines. As Beazley explains, 
traditionally, its use requires the definition of 'notional basepoints', the location of which 
depends on the weight attributed to the geographical feature and on its location in relation to 
the full-effect baseline164. The basic ways in which this technique works in combination 
with equidistance are illustrated in Figures 72 to 74, which portray cases of half-effect lines 
in oppositeness and adjacency, and a particular case of angle-bisecting. 
The partial-effect technique has been resorted to primarily where the presence of 
islands and low-tide elevations raises difficulties in the determination of the boundary. 
Essentially, it seeks to alter the impact of basepoints on the determination of the boundary. 
(157) Eritrea/Yemen-n, para. 148. 
(158) Qatar/Bahrain-Merits, para.248. 
(159) Appendix 2, F6. 
(160) rt>«/.,F14. 
(161) /itt/.,F20. 
(162) /&</., D61. 
(163) On the question of representativeness of basepoints, cf. paras.8.2.b), 8.2.c) infra. 
(164) Beazley/1979. 
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The first instance in which the half-effect technique was applied appears to have been the 
1965 Iran/Saudi Arabia agreement (subsequently altered by a 1968 agreement); the island 
of Kharg was given only a half-effect in the determination of the equidistance-line between 
two opposite coasts165. In case law, equidistance and partial-effect adjustments were used 
for the first time in the Anglo/French arbitration166. In the Atlantic region, the Scilly Isles 
were attributed only half-effect, which was implemented through the use of a bisector 
between two equidistance-lines. The Tunisia/Libya case, in which half-effect was attributed 
to the Kerkennah islands in the definition of the direction of the coast northwards of the 
Gulf of Gabes, offers a different example of partial-effect adjustment of baselines through 
bisectors (Figure 5). The bisector was directly unconcerned with the boundary course; it 
related to the general direction of the coast167. Related to the displacement of a "median 
line" between flattened coasts, the half-effect given to Seal Island in the Gulf of Maine case 
is again a variation of the equidistance/partial-effect combination (Figure 6) 1 6 8. Although 
the half-effect lines are the most common, other partial-effects may be applied (e.g. 
three-quarters, one-third)169. As exemplified in the Qatar/Bahrain case with the Qit'at 
Jaradah and Fasht al Azm insular features, moreover, such a partial-effect might be derived 
from practical considerations as to the course of the boundary, and not be quantitatively 
defined (Figure 13)170. 
A few points concerning the use of this technique must be taken into account when 
applying it. The decision as to the "amount of effect" to be given to a certain feature falls 
within the scope of the determination of the boundary, being thus a political-legal decision. 
Its application allows in concreto wide room for manoeuvre, whatever the relative location 
of coasts. The cardinal point here is simple: there is no such thing as a true partial-effect 
lines171. The use of partial-effect depends on how the necessary adjustment of the line is 
defined; for it may be devised in a number of different ways. With the advent of computer 
technology, technical experts can easily generate lines representing different understandings 
of the partial-effect technique - some of which have not yet been used by courts. 
The work of the technical expert, one would suggest, should be guided by two key 
thoughts: to provide the optional interpretations of partial-effect (in support of the phase of 
determination) when and if that is required by the decision-makers; and to produce an 
accurate definition of the line, in accordance with the decision-makers' reasoning. If charts 
(165) Appendix 2, B24. 
(166) RIAA/18, pp. 117-118, paras.251, 254. 
(167) ICJ/Reports/1982, pp.89-90, 94, paras.129, 133.C(3). 
(168) ICJ/Reports/1984, pp.333-337, paras.214-223, pp.349-350. Apparently contra, Legaul/Hankey/1993, p.209. 
(169) Cf. Appendix 2, F5-F6, F54. 
(170) Qatar/Bahrain-Merits, paras.218-219. 
(171) Beazley/1979,p.l59. 
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are used, the characteristics of the map projections must be duly considered. When applied 
in conjunction with equidistance, a half-effect line remains still an equidistance-line, with 
the difference that it is computed from certain notional basepoints. What the partial-effect 
technique does is to displace, veer or curve the equidistant line, which is why substantively 
it is merely a line-adjusting technique. Finally, one ought to understand that partial-effect 
lines do not necessarily divide the area between full-effect and no-effect lines in parts 
equivalent to the effect adopted (as shown e.g. in Figure 72). 
5.2.(1) "Methodes de Lissage" 
The term methodes de lissage refers to 'methods based on the assumption that 
coasts are flat-lines'. It presupposes the notion of "lignes de lissage", which may be loosely 
translated as 'flattening-lines'. For purposes of application of this method, states' coastlines 
are represented by lines that have no indentations or protuberances whatsoever. Coastal 
geography is simplified to the highest degree possible. The methodes de lissage comprise 
three sub-types: perpendiculars, bisectors, and radial-lines173. Insofar as they all amount to 
the computation of an equidistance-line from 'flattened-coasts', they are in fact simplified 
variants of the equidistance method. 
5.2.d)(i) Perpendicular-Lines 
Clearly associated with the concept of 'ligne de lissage' is the notion of "general 
direction of the coast", and perpendiculars thereto. At the dawn of maritime delimitation, 
the scientific-technological means made the graphical computation of an equidistance-line a 
rather complex operation. The use of simplifications of the coastline should perhaps be 
understood in this light 1 7 4. For example, representing the direction of the coast as a straight 
line meant that an equidistance-line was a perpendicular thereto. Given the technological 
advancements, by the time of the debates in the ILC, the situation had changed somewhat. 
In the 1953 report to the ILC, the Committee of Experts emphasised some of the technical 
shortcomings surrounding the use of this approach. As stated therein, the definition of the 
"general direction of the coast" with any degree of objectivity and certainty might become 
impossible in certain instances. The decision might involve rather arbitrary assessments, as 
those concerning the scale of the chart and the extension of the coastline to be 
(172) On this expression, cf. Roubertou/1996, p.382. 
(173) For an illustration of these methods, see Figure 60. 
(174) The dictum in the Grisbadarna arbitration, as regards the fact that at the time of the delimitation treaty under scrutiny (1661) 
international law required the use of perpendiculars to the general direction of the coast, has to be understood in this light. 
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considered175. Because charts remain the basic reference for determining the general 
direction of the coast, the remarks of the Committee of Experts are as valid today as they 
were then. Nonetheless, there are a few other complementary and updating technical notes 
worth putting forward. 
Visual perception of the sinuosities of the coast is the basis for the operation of 
'flattening the coastline'. Resorting to lignes de lissage thus entails the use of cartographic 
material. Besides the scale, the chart projection might also become important. On Mercator 
charts, loxodromes appear as straight lines and, because they are lines that follow a constant 
azimuth, they are particularly suitable to convey the notion of direction. Because geodesies 
are not lines of constant azimuth, they are not as suitable. Nevertheless, as they may be 
approximated to straight lines on Lambert conformal and Transverse Mercator charts, this 
should not be seen as an absolute proposition. The azimuth variation along a geodesic (over 
short distances) is small. And coastal direction is a notion fluid enough to be susceptible of 
representation through a straight line on a chart based on these projections (as occurred in 
the Gulf of Maine case). 
There are various examples of maritime boundaries delimited by perpendiculars to a 
straight line (general direction of the coast, macro-geographical orientation of the coast, 
closing line). The agreements Argentina/Uruguay, Brazil/Uruguay, and Estonia/Latvia, are 
examples of state practice resorting to this approach176. The outer stretch of the boundary 
delimited in the Estonia/Latvia agreement seems to be defined as a geodesic perpendicular 
to another geodesic at its mid-point. The Grisbadarna arbitration, the Gulf of Maine case, 
and the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau arbitration can be named as examples of recourse to this 
method in adjudication177. 
That a perpendicular to the coastal direction is substantively an equidistance-line is 
unquestionable since Gidel made this point in 1934178. Referring to 'perpendiculars' as a 
method distinct of equidistance is misleading, for it amounts to true misconception179. When 
the baseline is simplified to the point of becoming a straight line, the perpendicular thereto 
is an equidistance-line. No doubt, this presupposes that one is working in plane geometry. 
On an ellipsoid, reconciling perpendicularity with equidistance raises various difficulties. 
Perpendiculars to straight lines on Mercator charts are loxodromes (i.e. non-equidistant 
lines). In ellipsoidal geometry, only in the cases in which the perpendicular coincides with a 
meridian (i.e. a line that is simultaneously a loxodrome and a geodesic) can perpendiculars 
(175) ILC/Yearbook/1953(II), p.78. For an illustration of some difficulties involved at this level, see Figures 75, 84. 
(176) Appendix 2, D l , D10, F23. For the first two agreements, see Figures 17, 22. 
(177) See Figures 1,6,7. 
(178) Gidel/1934, pp.767-769. 
(179) Presenting it as a different method, cf. e.g. Legault/Hankey/1993, pp.213-214. 
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be equidistance-lines. It must be remembered that, in general, a perpendicular to a geodesic 
is not a geodesic; thus not an equidistance-line. With a certain error involved, straight lines 
on Lambert conformal or Transverse Mercator charts may be approximated to geodesies, 
and perpendiculars thereto may approximated to an equidistance-line180. 
5.2.d)(ii) Bisector-Lines 
The second of the methodes de lissage is the bisector-line. Consider the general 
direction of the coasts of two states, represented by straight lines. The bisector of the angle 
formed by these lines might be adopted as the boundary. From the outset, it must be noted 
that this method is the general method of which the method of perpendiculars is a particular 
case. A perpendicular is the bisector of an angle of 180 degrees (whose vertex is the point 
where the land boundary meets the line representing the general direction of the coast). 
In principle, a bisector-line is an equidistance-line from the 'flattened coasts'. But 
this holds true only i f the line starts from the vertex of the angle to be bisected (i.e. the point 
of intersection between the straight lines)181. Attention is drawn to this point because there 
are various instances in jurisprudence in which bisectors and perpendiculars were utilised in 
a different way. That is the case, for instance, of the first segment of the boundary adjudged 
by the Chamber in the Gulf of Maine case. The boundary-line follows the azimuth of the 
bisector of the angle formed by the general direction of the coasts of Nova Scotia (Canada) 
and Maine (United States). However, the segment does not start at the terminus of the land 
boundary, but from a point agreed between Canada and the USA. Technically, it is as i f the 
relevant facades were 'displaced' to intersect at that point. In the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau 
arbitration, similarly, the perpendicular to the general direction of the coast was adopted 
only for the outer stretch of the boundary, starting from a point offshore defined by the 
Tribunal. These cases illustrate clearly that bisectors and perpendiculars do not necessarily 
have to start from the terminus of the land boundary. Whilst there are no conceptual reasons 
against this approach, its impact on area-attribution must be fully understood. 
The technical issues involved in the use of this method are further illustrated by the 
first sector of the boundary in the Gulf of Maine case. The point of intersection between the 
'flattened-coasts' did not coincide with the starting point of the boundary. This meant that 
the 'flattened-coasts' had to be offset, which immediately raised a problem: a line parallel to 
a geodesic is not another geodesic182. On an ellipsoid, transposing geodesies by means of an 
(180) Caution is required in this respect, for this idea is not free from difficulties. Importantly, since geodesies are not bearing-lines, 
the perpendicular only has an azimuth difference of 90 degrees from the straight line at their point of intersection. 
(181) On this point, cf. e.g. Judge Oda, Libya/Malta case, Dissenting Opinion, ICJ/Reports/1985, p. 166. 
(182) A parallel to a loxodrome is also not another loxodrome, which happens only if the first loxodrome is an East/West line. 
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offset, to pass on a defined point, is technically problematic. Thus, the technical expert 
opted for computing a bisector of 'notional perpendiculars' to the 'fiattened-coasts' passing 
at the starting point "A". This line was constructed on a Universal Transverse Mercator 
grid, all lines being approximately geodesies183. On another level, it is also important to 
note that, on the contrary of what the Chamber seemed to imply, the resulting bisector did 
not effect exactly an equal division of the area between the coastal facades184. 
The difficulties concerning 'plane geometry versus equidistance' remain the same 
here. The bisector of the angle formed by two straight lines is an equidistance-line in plane 
geometry only. The loxodrome that bisects the angle formed by two other loxodromes is 
however not a strict equidistance-line. When Lambert conformal or Transverse Mercator 
charts are used, the bisector between two ' fiattened-coasts' may be taken as a geodesic, and 
thus approximated to an equidistance-line. Strictly speaking, however, the line is neither an 
equidistance-line, nor a loxodrome. 
The recourse to this method is driven often by practical reasons. In the 1960's, the 
United Kingdom proposed to the rulers of five of the Emirates that form today the United 
Arab Emirates that their continental shelf boundaries be delimited by bisectors of the angles 
formed by the general direction of the coast at the land boundary terminus. Of all states, 
only Sharjah and Umm al Qaywayn accepted these lines. Behind this approach was 
apparently the inaccuracy of the baseline data contained in the cartography available. For 
this reason, the computation of accurate equidistance-lines was not possible185. 
5.2.d)(iii) Radial-Lines of a Circumference 
No substantive reason impairs the simplification of a convex or concave coastline, 
by turning it into an arc of circumference. The "general direction" of this ligne de lissage 
should be seen in wider terms, as "general orientation" of the coast. The 'flattened-coast' is 
then an arc of circumference. The radial-line of this arc of circumference may be taken as 
the boundary. In plane geometry, the radial-line is a perpendicular to the 'circular baseline'; 
thus an equidistance-line from the 'flattened-coast'. On an ellipsoidal surface, because the 
definition of a circumference may not be simple, caution is required. Resorting to Lambert 
conformal or Transverse Mercator projections may help resolving the problem of 
constructing graphically a true equidistance, which will nonetheless involve some degree of 
error. I f constructed on Mercator charts, the radial-line raises the same questions as any 
(183) ICJ/Reports/1984, p.333-337, paras.213-223; Technical Report, pp.347-350. 
(184) On this issue, cf. Judge Oda, Dissenting Opinion, Libya/Malta case, ICJ/Reports/1983, p. 166. 
(185) Pietrowski/1993, IMB/Report 7-10, pp.1551-1552. 
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other straight line. It is interesting to note that the radial-line method seems to underlie the 
sector partition proposed by Germany during the North Sea cases (Figure 61)1 8 6. 
5.2.d)(iv) Appraisal and Rationale 
As illustrated in Figure 60, the boundary-line resulting from the use of methodes de 
lissage is always a straight line: (a) a perpendicular to another straight line, (b) a bisector of 
an angle between two straight lines, (c) a radial-line of an arc of circumference. Although 
conceived mainly for cases of adjacency, such an approach can be applied also to situations 
of oppositeness, especially in the form of bisector-line (d). Furthermore, these approaches 
might be combined with a view to portray changes in the direction of the coast and to reflect 
them upon the course of the boundary (as illustrated by the Gulf of Maine case). These 
equidistance-variants are particularly useful if, for purposes of simplification, emphasis is 
put on the facade of coasts (and not on the coastline proper)187. 
This approach may be useful also in cases of delimitations between adjacent states 
where the terminus of the land boundary is situated on the 'vertex' of a very pronounced 
headland. The Honduras/Nicaragua boundary, at the mouth of Rio Coco (the delimitation of 
which is sub judice) is a good example (Figure 15). The recourse to equidistance becomes 
problematic because there is a danger that the boundary be solely defined by one basepoint 
on each side, and that minor changes in these basepoints have a dramatic impact on the 
course of the boundary. Between Honduras and Nicaragua, the problem is particularly acute 
due to silting and erosion. The river stream is the main variable in the dynamics of these 
processes, and causes major alterations in the coastal configuration at the river mouth (with 
islands appearing, disappearing, or changing shape)188. The difficulty might be overcome if 
the issue is analysed as a problem between two general directions of the coast that intersect 
at one point, the boundary being the bisector between them (Figure 78). 
In short, the merit of the methodes de lissage is to simplify boundary delimitation, 
turning it into a straightforward geometric problem. Substantively, this approach is no more 
than a variant of the equidistance method. In cases in which the line does not start from the 
intersection of the two facades, the line is still equidistant, but from the 'displaced-facades'. 
Its rationale is primarily to avoid the 'control' of prominent basepoints over the course of 
the boundary, while simplifying certain computations. These methods may also be viewed 
as adjustments of baselines, which i f the coast is assumed as a series of discrete points, can 
(186) ICJ/Pleadings/1968(1), p.85. 
(187) Paras.8.2.a), 8.2.d) infra. 
(188) For an overview of the changes that the coastal area at the mouth of Rio Coco has undergone in the past 200 years or more, cf. 
Sandner/Ratter/1991, pp.290-293. 
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be flattened through the use of mathematical tools (numerical methods). Their application 
however, always entails a certain degree of subjectivity. More likely to lead to a modified 
equidistance, this method might equally lead to a simplified equidistance (if the coast is 
simple or slightly undulated). But its simplicity is merely apparent. First, the method is not 
suitable to certain geographical scenarios. Secondly, it entails the use of charts, which 
means that the lines derived from it carry all the conceptual difficulties inherent in the resort 
to charts (particularly small-scale Mercator charts). Unless harnessed on a proper 
understanding of the principles, and of the results thereof, this method might lead to 
unwanted and inequitable area-attributions. 
5.2.e) Pseudo-Equidistance 
The term 'pseudo-equidistance' is used by Roubertou to refer to a method broadly 
based on equidistance, which corresponds to the third method applicable to adjacent coasts 
in Kennedy's paper'89. Its application is illustrated in Figures 58 and 59. First, basepoints 
along the coasts of the two states are selected. One constraint is imposed to this selection: 
the number of points must be the same on both coastlines. The second step involves one of 
two different operations, depending on whether it is a case of oppositeness or of adjacency. 
In the former, it is necessary to compute the midpoints of the straight lines joining two 
basepoints (one on each coast). The selected basepoints are either located "face-to-face" 
along both coasts, or disposed obliquely, forming a zigzag line. In cases of adjacency, what 
is required is the determination of points equidistant from 'equivalent basepoints' on each 
side of the land boundary terminus. The third step consists of joining sequentially the points 
previously computed, thereby creating a continuous line constituted by straight segments. 
Whilst the turning points of the resulting line are equidistant from the basepoints 
selected on the two coasts, the points on the boundary-line will almost never be equidistant 
to the nearest basepoints. They are equidistant only lato sensu, thus pseudo-equidistance. Its 
main advantage is that, whilst taking some objective account of the coastlines, the method 
mitigates disproportionate effects of certain prominent basepoints, over the computation of 
the equidistance-line. Each point is utilised only once. 
Once again, the emphasis is put on basepoint selection. This brings subjectivity into 
play, inexorably. Selecting the basepoints equally spaced along the coastlines provides 
some degree of objectivity, but the distance between points would still remain a subjective 
assessment. In any event, the basepoints' selection is the controlling variable in the use of 
(189) Roubertou/1996, pp.381-382. Para.5.2.a)(i) supra, method (C). 
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this method. Inasmuch as it requires measurements of distance, it raises questions similar to 
those of the equidistance method. Small-scale Mercator charts should be judiciously used 
when measuring distances. Matters relating to baseline definition must also be addressed. 
And the concept of straight line becomes necessarily an issue when the segments joining the 
turning points are defined. 
Understanding how pseudo-equidistance-lines relate to strict equidistance helps in 
its effective application. Imagine the theoretical case of adjacent states whose coasts form 
one continuous straight line (Figure 53). In this diagrammatic instance, pseudo-equidistance 
coincides with strict equidistance; which also happens with oppositeness (Figure 51). What 
this shows is that for simple coastlines this method is useful because pseudo-equidistance 
and strict equidistance will not depart to a great extent. Furthermore, as the number of 
selected basepoints is increased, the two lines are approximated. Depending thus on how 
the line is derived, so will pseudo-equidistance be a simplified or a modified equidistance. 
But this method has some drawbacks. In certain situations, such as that of Figure 57, the 
application of this method leads to very unsatisfactory results. 
The inner sector of the boundary adjudged in the Grisbadarna arbitration resembles 
the application of the pseudo-equidistance method - rather than the equidistance method. 
Although points XVIII to XX are equidistant from the basepoints from which they were 
derived, the line joining them is not strictly equidistant from those basepoints (Figure 1). 
Lines joining midpoints between selected basepoints was a method used in the 1958 Saudi 
Arabia/Bahrain boundary - although not in exactly the same terms (Figure 21). 
5.2.f) Equiratio Method 
Devised by Langeraar, former Dutch Hydrographer, the equiratio method is another 
method related to equidistance190. An equiratio-line between two states may be defined as a 
line every point of which is at a distance from the nearest basepoint of one of the states that 
bears a constant ratio to its distance from the nearest basepoint of the other state. In other 
words, at every boundary point, the ratio between the distances from the nearest basepoints 
on either side is constant. Geometrically, equidistance is merely a particular case thereof, in 
which the constant ratio is 1.0. In other words, the equiratio method is the generalisation of 
the geometric-mathematical principle underlying the equidistance method. Consider now a 
0.90 equiratio-line between states A and B, favouring state B. All points on the line are at 
distances from the nearest basepoint of state A that are 90% of the distance from the nearest 
(190) Langeraar/I986a; Langeraar/1986b; Langeraar/1986c; IHO/TALOS-Manual, p.l 11. 
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basepoint of state B. What this means is that while the boundary-line is still computed by 
reference to distance to the coast, it becomes possible for the decision-maker to attribute a 
different weight to the basepoints of the two states. 
Some diagrammatic examples illustrate the type of lines that are obtained with the 
application of the equiratio method. Figures 62 and 63 provide examples of equiratio-lines 
between opposite and adjacent states, and illustrate the displacement thereof in relation to 
strict equidistance. Because the coasts are straight lines, the equiratio-lines also appear as 
straight lines. Depicted in Figure 64 are equiratio-lines drawn between two states with 
flat-coasts, but one of which has an offshore island. Figure 66 illustrates a situation where 
the territorial sea boundary is based on equidistance, and a 0.90 equiratio-line is used as the 
EEZ and continental shelf boundary. These examples however, are mere diagrams. Figures 
67 and 68 illustrate more realistically the application of the equiratio method. 
Graphical constructions of equiratio-lines pose exactly the same technical problems 
as equidistance-lines. For they flow from distance measurements. Account has to be taken 
namely of the difficulties concerning baseline definition, the need for a geodetic datum on 
which to anchor coordinates, and the notion of straight line. The distinction between plane 
and ellipsoidal geometry will not be an issue because charts cannot be easily used in the 
application of this method. The graphical construction of equiratio-lines is so complex, and 
time-consuming, that it is rendered virtually unfeasible (in particular because the resulting 
lines are curved lines, whose construction on charts is rather difficult and impractical). 
Hitherto this method was not used in actual delimitations191, perhaps because of its 
complexity. But adequate computer software may delineate equiratio-lines as easily as it 
delineates equidistance-lines192. Even if the equiratio-lines are deemed mathematically too 
complex to be adopted as boundaries, the use of this method should not be simply brushed 
aside. Some of its features might be helpful. For example, it is possible to derive composite 
lines. Nothing prevents the computation of turning points on the basis of a certain 'distance 
ratio', and joining them subsequently with segments of straight lines (either loxodromes or 
geodesies). One has only to be aware that such joining lines will not retain the distance ratio 
of the turning points. Equally, the 'distance ratio' does not necessarily have to be the same 
for the whole line. Different stretches of the boundary might be based on different ratios, as 
shown in Figure 65. The inner segment is an equidistance-line; the outer segment is a 0.95 
equiratio-line favouring state A - thus attenuating the effect of island B l seawards. 
(191) Suggesting the use of this method in the delimitations in the Aegean Sea, cf. Kozyris/1997, pp.45-46, 53 and Kozyris/1998, 
pp.372-373, 388. 
(192) The software Caris LOTS (Universal Systems, Ltd) is equipped to compute, and draw on-screen, this type of lines. 
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Finally, attention must be drawn to the key notion underlying the equiratio method: 
'distance ratio'. It is paramount to understand that, through this notion, basepoints may be 
valued differently; i.e. relevant basepoints may be attributed different weights for purposes 
of the determination of the course of the line. As will be demonstrated193, nothing hinders 
the recourse to the notion of 'distance ratio' (even if the boundary is such that this value 
varies continuously along the line) to express adjustments based on equity. 
5.3. Other Methods and Line-Defining Techniques 
5.3.a) Enclaving 
The method of enclaving has been used in certain maritime delimitations. Although 
not conceptually related to equidistance, enclaving is however inextricably linked thereto. 
Its application occurs in parallel with equidistance. The concept of 'enclave' is defined in 
relation to the equidistance-line. Typically, the method applies where islands are located 
either in the vicinity of the equidistance-line between mainland coasts, or on the 'wrong 
side' thereof. It consists of defining a boundary (or a stretch thereof) on the basis of 
distance to the normal baseline of islands involved. Where islands lie on the 'wrong side' of 
the equidistance-line, the resulting line tends to be an enclave - the area attributed to the 
islands lies entirely within the maritime zone of another state. In cases of semi-enclaves, the 
area attributed to the islands forms a 'bulge' in the equidistance-line. Both cases are 
diagrammatically illustrated in Figure 77. 
When combined with equidistance, it leads to discarding the basepoints of the 
islands to be enclaved. They are taken into account only to generate the belt of maritime 
space around the islands. As far as equidistance is concerned, this is another type of 
adjustment of baselines. The enclaving method generates stretches of the boundary that are 
independent from equidistance. Because it consists also of measuring distances from 
basepoints along the normal baseline, similar technical issues are raised. The definition of 
the basepoints on the basis of which the line is to be computed is the key point; and it 
involves assessments concerning the scale in which the coastline is depicted, the tidal datum 
used, and the accuracy of the surveys upon which the cartographic information is based. 
The boundary-line is a complex curve, described as a belt-line around certain points. The 
geographical coordinates of the basepoints upon which such a belt-line is hinged must be 
anchored to a geodetic datum. To depict the boundary on a chart, it is necessary to compute 
(193) Conclusions to Part II infra. 
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its course through geodetic formulae. Because the distances involved are relatively short 
(e.g. 3, 12, 13, 24 M), large-scale charts may be used in the graphical construction of the 
line. When Mercator charts are used, the construction of the line should take into account 
the inherent distortions. Using charts always entails less accuracy and discrepancies in 
relation to the line obtained by geodetic computation. 
States have resorted to semi-enclaves in a number of occasions as, for instance, in 
the Italy/Yugoslavia, the Iran/Saudi Arabia, the Italy/Tunisia, and the Qatar/U.A.E. (Abu 
Dhabi) agreements194. Perhaps the only example where a full enclave was resorted to is the 
Australia/Papua New Guinea agreement195. In case law, the enclaving method was utilised 
in the Anglo/French and in the Sharjah/Dubai arbitrations, in the form of full enclave and 
semi-enclave respectively196. Whether the solution devised in the Canada/France 
arbitration is an example of an enclave is open to debate. The reality is that the maritime 
area awarded to the French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon falls entirely within waters 
under Canadian jurisdiction (Figure 10). 
The Anglo/French arbitration is illustrative of the difficulties that may arise from 
the use of this method. In its Application instituting the 1978 proceedings, the United 
Kingdom argued the 12-mile belt-line around the Channel Islands had not been drawn by 
reference to the basepoints required by the Court. Except for minor differences related to 
the geodetic datum, France accepted the United Kingdom's contention as regards the 
basepoints used. The Court of Arbitration confirmed the existence of a contradiction 
between the reasoning and the dispositif. Viewing it as a "material error", it then rectified 
the boundary described in the dispositif191. 
5.3.b) Navigable Channel (Thalweg) 
The concept of thalweg belongs to river law. Literally, the term means 'downway'. 
It refers to the course followed by vessels navigating downstream198. Where an international 
boundary on a navigable river is defined by an equidistance-line computed from the nearest 
points on the banks, it might result in a line that denies access to the navigation channel to 
one of the states. Customary law has sanctioned the thalweg (understood as the mid-line of 
the main navigation channel), as the delimitation criterion for these situations (should no 
(194) Appendix 2, B25-B26, D45, D57. On the first three of these agreements, see Figures 18, 19, 25. 
(195) Appendix 2, D6. 
(196) RIAA/18, pp.94-95, paras. 199-202; ILR/91/1993, pp.672-678. 
(197) RIAA/18, pp.296-300, 330, paras.31-37, 114(4). 
(198) Cf. Bouchez/1963, pp.790-796; Lauterpacht/1960, pp.216-226; Hyde/1912, pp.901-906. The United States Supreme Court's 
decisions are helpful to understand the notion of thalweg in river boundary delimitation. Cf. Texas/Louisiana (410 US 702); New 
Jersey/Delaware (291 US 361); Minnesota/Wisconsin (252 US 273); Louisiana/Mississippi (202 US 1); Iowa/Illinois (147 US 1, 
202 US 59); Nebraska/Iowa (143 US 359). 
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treaty, or otherwise agreed line, be in place). Its rationale is one of equality. The navigation 
interests of the two riparian states are the key consideration to weigh. 
More often than not, the middle of the main navigation channel corresponds to "the 
line of maximum depth along a river or lake" (usually also the line of strongest current), 
which is the technical definition usually advanced for the thalweg199. The line of deepest 
soundings might however not coincide with the main navigable channel (which must be 
assessed, as to geomorphologic data, in terms of depth, width, and river-bed profile). It is an 
overall balance of considerations that allows conclusions as to route of the safest channel. 
In the Botswana/Namibia case, while establishing the location of the thalweg, the Court 
viewed as relevant criteria depth, width, flow of water, visibility, bed profile configuration 
and navigability. It concluded, moreover, that although the "terms 'thalweg' and 'centre of 
the channel' are interchangeable, the former reflects more accurately the common intention 
to exploit navigation than does the latter"200. 
The rationale behind the thalweg may be transposed to any coastal "navigable 
channels"201. Navigation interests, in the form of access to harbours and ports, might have 
to be considered in the delimitation of maritime boundaries in terms analogous to those of 
the thalweg in rivers. Since waters are shallower near the coast, thus making safe navigation 
more difficult, it is easy to understand why navigable channels have great importance in the 
territorial sea. Its relevance is even greater i f one links this factor with the legal constraints 
imposed on third states as regards navigation in this maritime zone. In the Beagle Channel 
and the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau arbitrations, for instance, the navigation interests of the 
states involved were taken into account in the determination of the course of the 
boundary202. To what extent they may be weighed-up in the delimitation process is an issue 
to be addressed later203. 
The definition of the mid-line of the navigable channel may involve various 
technical considerations, the assessment of which depends on the circumstances of the case. 
Information concerning the course followed by the navigation in the area is the most 
important. Hydrographic surveys may also be needed to analyse the depth contours, and the 
width of navigation channels. Geological and oceanographic information may also be 
required, especially in cases where the channel is likely to shift by erosion or silting 
processes, as well as due to the impact of artificial (harbour) works. When the boundary is 
(199) IHO/TALOS-Manual, p.l 13; IHO/Dictionary, p.241 (n.5288). See also Gidel/1934, pp.752-753. 
(200) Botswana/Namibia case, paras.32-42, 88-89. In this case, the Court noted that the parties had agreed that the "thalweg was 
formed by the line of deepest soundings". For an illustration comparing the north and south channels in this case, see Figure 85. 
(201) Because strictly speaking the thalweg exists only in rivers, the use of the term "navigable channel" is more appropriate in the 
context of the law of the sea. 
(202) ILM/25/1986, pp.295, 298, 301, paras.106, 111(a), 121; ILR/52/1979, p.185, para.l 10, Annex IV, pp.262-263. 
(203) Paras.7.2., 8.3.c) infra. 
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to be based on the location of the navigation channel, its potential future shifting must be 
considered. Otherwise, the boundary might become meaningless in the light of its primary 
purpose. These specific issues must be addressed prior to, and are fundamental for, the 
determination of the course of the boundary. Afterwards, it is necessary to define the course 
of the boundary, namely as regards the geographical coordinates of the turning points, their 
geodetic reference, and the type of lines used. 
5.3.c) Coastal Length Comparison (Proportionality) 
The terminology coastal length comparison has been used to refer to a methodology 
based on coastline length measurements, area calculations, and successive approximation 
processes204. Some calculations involved therein, however, underlie also the juridical notion 
of proportionality20*. The distinction between them, one would suggest, is similar to the one 
that exists between the equidistance method and the legal notion of equidistance206. 
Whereas the former relates to technical issues, the latter bears a distinct normative content. 
How relevant proportionality is for purposes of determination of the boundary is a question 
to address at a later stage207. For now, one will concentrate on the technical aspects involved 
in coastal length comparison. To start with, it should be noted that its application requires 
the previous ascertainment of the relevant coastline of the states involved and of the 
relevant area to be divided. Although part of the determination phase, this decision relies 
often on technical expertise. The first step is to measure the length of the coastline of the 
states involved with a view to compare them through the definition of a ratio. The second is 
to compute the relevant area for purposes of delimitation. And the third is to divide this area 
according to the coastal length ratio defined in the first step. 
Coastal length measurement and the computation of areas raise various technical 
issues208. Unless computer technology is available, i f the length of the coast is measured 
considering all sinuosities and indentations represented on a chart, in practical terms that 
can only be done with the help of a curvometer. Regardless of the means utilised (charts or 
computers), the scale of cartographic information becomes pivotal209. Measurements made 
on the basis of cartographic information at a scale of 1:10,000 can differ substantially from 
those based on information available at a scale of 1:1,000,000. Perhaps surprising to some, 
(204) IHO/TALOS-Manual, p. 111. 
(205) Weil notes that the theory behind proportionality "is sometimes pushed further" to argue that "the extent of the maritime rights 
accruing to each state should be more or less in the same ratio as the length of the maritime fronts" (Weil/1989a, p.75). 
(206) Paras.5.2.a) supra, 6.3.d) infra. 
(207) Para.8.2.e) infra; cf. also para.2.3.d) supra. 
(208) In the Jan Mayen case, the relevant coastline of Greenland was restricted to the area between the two most extreme points that 
controlled the course of the equidistance-line. Although based on a technical appraisal, this decision is not technical, but legal. 
(209) Anderson/1987. In map-making, scale in intimately related to the generalisation and simplification of the coastline. 
- 176-
TOWARDS THE CONCEPTUALISA TION OF MARITIME DELIMTA TION 
the fact is that, theoretically, by 'zooming in' (i.e. varying the fractal dimension on the basis 
of which measurements are made) the length of the coastline may be increased indefinitely. 
That is why - as Roubertou notes - to speak of length of the coastline, without indicating 
the scale to which it is referred, simply does not make sense210. 
Furthermore, the coastline may be measured without accounting for all sinuosities 
and indentations, that is, by simplifying the coastline. Straight closing lines may be used 
across the entrances of bays, the mouths of rivers, and of all minor indentations in general. 
A higher degree of generalisation is to depict the coast as a sequence of segments (straight 
lines) joining certain basepoints, the selection of which depends on the accuracy required 
and the regularity of the coast. The ultimate level of generalisation is to represent the coast 
by a single straight line. Illustrating three different cases, Figure 76 gives an idea of how 
large the difference between each measurement can be. Naturally, the notion of straight line 
and the projection of the charts (if they are used) are also issues to be addressed. 
As to area calculations, the key moment is the definition of the relevant area by 
decision-makers. Technical experts have little to say about it, except to provide an accurate 
value for such area. What may be said is that computing areas on charts, especially without 
taking account of their inherent distortions, may lead to different results than using proper 
geodesic formulae referred to an ellipsoidal surface. Also, when the notion of straight line is 
used in the definition of the relevant area and of the boundary, the computed areas may 
differ to some extent if the concept is understood as a geodesic or as a loxodrome. 
Noteworthy is the fact that, in adjacency, the definition of the relevant coastline and 
of the relevant area is somewhat more complex and subjective than in oppositeness. The 
overlapping of entitlements will always extend over some hundred miles, in the close 
proximity of both states' coasts. Additionally, the number of basepoints relevant for that 
overlapping is unclear. The overlapping of entitlement shown in Figure 53 is determined by 
only two basepoints: those that are positioned on each side of the land boundary terminus, 
in its infinitesimal vicinity. What constitutes the relevant coast (if seen by reference to the 
overlapping of entitlements) is therefore unclear. 
Given its technical-mathematical nature, one might feel compelled to view coastal 
length comparison as an objective exercise. Nothing could be more misleading. The degree 
of objectivity that it seemingly bears in abstrato is easily overturned by the assessments 
concerning the coastline and the area relevant for the delimitation. The understanding of the 
delimitation problem may actually be manipulated by these assessments. Equally worth 
emphasising is the fact that coastal length comparison does not provide a course for the 
(210) Roubertou/1996, p.366. 
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boundary. The number of possible solutions is literally infinite. Therefore, /'/ cannot be seen 
as a delimitation method. What this technique allows is the determination of "how much" a 
certain line needs to be adjusted in order to divide the relevant area according a computed 
ratio. Substantively, however, this assessment is part of the phase of determination of the 
boundary. The role of the technical experts is to ensure that decision-makers have a clear 
geographical picture as regards the alternatives for coastline measurements, the basepoints 
relevant for the entitlement and for the computation of the equidistance-line, and the area of 
overlapping of entitlements and of overlapping of claims. 
5.3.d) Ad Hoc Approaches 
5.3.d)(i) Basic Notion 
Boundaries agreed by states might sometimes reflect specific circumstances in casu, 
thus appearing as ad hoc solutions. The fact that the rationale behind them is not obvious 
does not mean necessarily that they do not result from a systematic methodology. That 
might indeed be the case. But it might also be that the states involved opted for obfuscating 
deliberately the method used in the determination of the boundary. With the considerations 
weighed remaining unknown, the agreement is less susceptible of criticism. It wins political 
approval more easily. States may equally intend to simplify their boundaries, in order to 
facilitate law enforcement. Another explanation is that the boundary course be designed to 
compensate cut-off effects in specific contexts. 
At first glance, nothing hampers the recourse to ad hoc approaches in adjudication, 
on exactly the same grounds. The technical questions that they might raise are the same 
either in negotiation or in adjudication. Whether courts are legally entitled to resort to these 
lines is a different question, which does not regard a technical analysis211. 
In general terms, it might be said that ad hoc lines appear as a response to specific 
considerations, such as concerns of equity, economic interests, the simplification of the 
boundary, or strategic goals. Whatever considerations are weighed, one thing is common to 
ad hoc solutions: they tend to be simple lines, often defined by recourse to loxodromes. The 
use of parallels and meridians is but one particular case. From these solutions one excludes, 
naturally, those boundaries that stem from the application of other methodologies, namely 
perpendiculars and bisectors resulting from the use of methodes de lissage. 
The first technical concern to be addressed is the concept of straight line, which has 
to be defined in the treaty, or in the judicial or arbitral decision. The geodetic reference and 
(211) Para.7.4., Conclusion to Part HI infra. 
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the geographical coordinates of the points defining each segment of the line are also pivotal 
for an accurate definition of boundary. Depending on how the lines were arrived at, other 
technical issues might have to be addressed. 
Despite the fact that generalisations from ad hoc solutions can hardly ever be made, 
as to the methodology used, these solutions might provide an objective starting point for 
analysing geographically analogous situations. For example, as will be illustrated by the 
examples below, it might be argued that the 'corridor solution' is applicable where one state 
is 'walled' on both sides by the territory of another state, and using equidistance would give 
rise to a cut-off. Equally, it must be observed that, in numerous instances, ad hoc solutions 
do not depart significantly from equidistance (although the relationship with equidistance 
cannot be easily established). A typical case is that of recourse to parallels or meridians 
that follow closely perpendiculars to the general direction of the coast. 
5.3.d)(ii) Parallels. Meridians, and Other Straight Lines 
The course of the boundaries devised in the 1988 Anglo/Irish agreement, which run 
through a "stepped" succession of parallels and meridians, seems an ad hoc solution that 
nonetheless has behind it a certain (equidistance-related) rationale. Equidistance, strict and 
modified, and bisectors of coastal fronts have influenced the basic course of the lines, which 
were also adapted to fit in the 'block systems' of concessions of both parties. 
Making explicit reference to the equidistance principle, the 1976 Colombia/Panama 
agreement resorts to parallels and meridians, both in the Pacific Ocean (a parallel) and in 
the Caribbean Sea (a "stepped" succession of parallels and meridians), to define the course 
of the boundary. This is an example of an ad hoc solution in which equidistance was clearly 
the starting point. The 1984 Argentina/Chile agreement defines the boundary on the basis of 
a succession of loxodromes, including two arcs of meridian and one arc of parallel212. 
Strategic goals, previously awarded boundaries and economic interests are among the 
factors that were weighed in the determination of the boundary. An example of boundary 
simplification, involving a trade-off of areas on both sides of the equidistance-line, is the 
1976 Spain/Portugal agreement. In the north, the boundary is a parallel; and in the south, it 
is a meridian. Equity-related adjustments seem to have played a significant role in three 
agreements in which parallels were used: 1976 Kenya/Tanzania, in the outer stretch; 1976 
Mauritania/Morocco; and 1988 Mozambique/Tanzania213, in the outer stretch. 
(212) Figure 26. 
(213) Figure 24. 
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In 1952, Peru, Chile and Ecuador made the Santiago Declaration in which they used 
parallels to delimit their boundaries in the western coast of South America. At that time 
however, these states were attempting to assert their maritime claims in international law, 
and the normative standards of delimitation remained unclear, if at all existent214. One could 
only speculate as regards the specific considerations behind the utilisation of this line. The 
adherence of Colombia in 1979 to this declaration was preceded by an agreement with 
Ecuador which, conforming to the regional framework, had also recourse to a parallel as 
boundary-line215. 
The boundary determined by the Court in the Jan Mayen case is also an example of 
an ad hoc line, adjusting the provisional equidistance. The course of the line was influenced 
by a combination of two factors: the disproportionality of coastal lengths, and the need to 
allow equitable access to the capelin resources by both sides. This is again a line devised in 
an ad hoc manner to respond to a specific context. The recourse to geodesies to connect the 
turning points, though a perfectly legitimate choice, remains unexplained. But it should be 
noted that nothing prevented the Court from resorting to loxodromes as an interpretation of 
'straight line'. 
5.3.d)(iii) 'Corridor-Solutions' 
The 'corridor-solutions' devised in the certain delimitations are usually based upon 
two loxodromes (not necessarily parallel). What characterises the settings in which this 
solution was used is that the land territory of one state has a projection onto the sea on each 
side the land territory of the other. This approach was utilised in the following agreements: 
1975 Senegal/Gambia, 1984 France/Monaco, and 1987 Dominica/France (Guadeloupe and 
Martinique), in the eastern sector216. From a legal perspective, and despite being based also 
on a 'corridor-solution', the Canada/France arbitration (around St. Pierre and Miquelon) 
shows one important difference in relation to the others. Whereas in the former, the corridor 
was devised as means to favour the 'surrounded state', in the latter such a solution sought to 
favour the 'surrounding state'. To this extent, this solution seems closer related to the 1978 
Venezuela/Netherlands (Antilles) agreement, in which the sidelines are also pushed from 
equidistance towards the 'surrounded state'217. 
The solution devised by Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands in the aftermath of 
the North Sea cases (1971) is also somewhat of a 'corridor-solution'. The chief difference is 
(214) Through its permanent mission in the UN, Peru has stated in January 2001 that it does not recognise the parallel as being the 
maritime boundary with Chile. On the non-existence of normative delimitations standards at that time, cf. para. 1.2.a) supra. 
(215) DeArechaga/1993, pp.285-286. 
(216) Appendix 2, D27, F19, F34. 
(217) Para.7.4.c)/n/ra. 
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that these agreements involved three states, unlike the typical 'corridor solution', which 
involves only two states. However, because of the way in which the cases developed and in 
which the boundaries were delimited in the aftermath, it might be contended that, as to 
delimitation with Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands acted much as if they were only 
one state. The sequence of loxodromes that forms the 'complex corridor' results from the 
specific geographical and legal circumstances in casu. It is owed to the need to consider 
previous oil concessions and to the fact that the 'corridor' was 'opened' by gradually 
shifting the equidistance-lines on both sides of Germany218. 
(218) Para.2.3.d) supra. 
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Chapter 6 
NORMATIVITY IN MARITIME DELIMITATION 
6.1. The Delimitation Process; Choice of Procedural Means 
6.1.a) Preliminary Notes 
Maritime delimitation is a complex, long-lasting and sensitive political-diplomatic 
process. As it concerns a line dividing maritime spaces under jurisdiction of different states, 
where their maritime entitlements overlap, it always has an international facet. Rights and 
interests of more than one state are inexorably involved. Importantly, maritime boundaries 
cannot be determined unilaterally. Competing outlooks on the balance to be struck as to, 
inter alia, political, economic, security, and historical considerations, require a compromise. 
States unavoidably have to relinquish partially their potential entitlements; i.e. they must be 
prepared to accept an 'amputation' thereof. Insofar as each state is certain to attempt to 
minimise its 'losses', this 'amputation' is likely to produce political tension. 
How complex the settlement process becomes depends very much on the diplomatic 
relations between the states involved. It is trite to note that states with 'friendly' relations 
are likely to reach agreement more easily. Notwithstanding this, there can be idiosyncratic 
reasons that make negotiations difficult. Highly sensitive issues of internal politics may 
jeopardise the chances of an agreement if there is no solution apt to win approval internally. 
Equally, the position a state vis-a-vis a third neighbouring state may condition that state's 
position during negotiations. For states with 'strained' relations there are further hurdles. 
Indeed, an agreed settlement may be impossible. When the difficulties in reconciling rights 
are such that states become unable to agree on a boundary, the dispute may necessitate 
referral to a third-party settlement - adjudication (or less often conciliation). 
6.1.b) Negotiation versus Adjudication: Outstanding Considerations 
6.1.b)(i) Operative Distinction between Negotiation and Adjudication 
Maritime boundaries exist in the realm of international politics - delimiting them is 
primarily a political act. Not surprisingly, among the mechanisms of dispute-settlement 
available to states, diplomatic negotiation is the most frequently used. It is the simplest and 
the traditional procedure, and it is successful more often than not. Negotiation leaves the 
solution entirely to the states involved - which have maximum of control over the outcome. 
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"[WJhether the dispute is one that falls to be resolved within the framework of existing law 
or is one of such novelty or proportions that a specifically legislative effort is called for", it 
is "best settled by negotiation and agreement"219. Maritime delimitation is no exception. In 
effect, statistically, adjudication is subsidiary - although qualitatively no less important220. 
Negotiation and adjudication are complementary. They both bear an expression of 
consent by the states for the purpose of settling a dispute221. Where the former is 
unsuccessful in providing the 'tools' to reach agreement, the latter might succeed. As noted 
in the Gulf of Maine case, adjudication is an alternative (un succedane) to direct settlement 
between the parties222. Significantly, the choice of procedural means, i.e. the decision as to 
whether to proceed through negotiation, or through litigation, is not preclusive. States may 
continue to seek settlement through negotiation, even when litigation is underway223. 
Bearing in mind that the choice of dispute-settlement means is not conditioned by 
the reference to agreement in Articles 74(1) and 83(1)224, to which extent is the distinction 
between negotiation and adjudication relevant for the delimitation process? 
The answer to this question is intertwined with the debate on normative standards. 
Germane to the phase of boundary determination, these standards play a de facto role in 
almost all delimitations, regardless of the procedural means utilised. Claims advanced by 
states during negotiations are virtually always founded on international law, even i f peculiar 
interpretations thereof are adopted. What must be understood however, is the fact that, 
de jure, recourse to normative standards is compulsory in adjudication only. In negotiation, 
states are completely free to depart therefrom by mutual consent. As Weil notes, "although 
it binds the international judge or arbitrator, the law of maritime delimitation, as far as states 
are concerned, is no more than suppletive"225. It is simply jus dispositivum226. Hence, it is 
possible to speak of two types of delimitations: those concluded by negotiation; and those 
effected by recourse to third-party adjudication. "The theory that all maritime delimitations, 
whether negotiated or third-party, are identical [...] has had disastrous consequences. It is 
one example of judicial construction it is to be hoped will disappear"227. The corollaries of 
this distinction must thus be more closely examined. 
(219) Lauterpacht/1991, p.6. 
(220) Roughly, only one in ten maritime boundaries are delimited by recourse to adjudication. 
(221) Conciliation may be described as a blend between negotiation (because it is not legally binding on states, it allows solutions 
not strictly speaking based on law) and adjudication (because it leads to a decision by an impartial third-party). 
(222) ICJ/Reports/1984, p.266, para.22. 
(223) Cf. Merrills/1998, pp.17-22; Anderson/I 998c, pp.119-121; Bowett/1997, pp.1-4; Cassese/1991, pp.200-202. 
(224) Cf. paras.3.6.c), 3.6.d) supra. 
(225) Weil/1989a, p.8. 
(226) Mendelson/2002. Cf. also e.g. Charney/1993, pp.xxix, xlii; Willis/1993, p.65; Thirlway/1993, p.46; Oxman/1993, pp.39-40; 
Brown/1992, p.343; Caflisch/1991, p.484; Cahier/1989, p.414; Weil/1989a, p.l 13; Dipla/1984, p.221; AHott/1983, p.24. 
(227) Weil/1989a,p.H4. 
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6.1 .b)(ii) Normativitv in Negotiated Agreements 
The fashioning of delimitation agreements, by recourse to whatever considerations 
they deem relevant, is always a prerogative of states. Negotiations have an "element of give 
and take" which is crucial for their success228. Maritime boundaries may even be 
determined on the basis of a quid pro quo. States' discretion is limited only by jus 
cogens229, which includes no norms specific to delimitation230. States are free to shape 
boundary-lines at their will, and the majority of delimitation treaties do not explain how the 
line was determined (as this is not required). Indeed, states might adopt a policy of 
"deliberate obfuscation"231, evading explanations as to the concessions made. In short, the 
law "can almost entirely be disregarded in negotiated settlements"232. Negotiations have "no 
impartial machinery for resolving disputed questions of fact", and states are virtually free to 
put "forward extreme claims, especially where its bargaining power is very strong"233. This 
is the scope of the contractual freedom inherent in the jus tractuum of states234. 
The Australia/Papua New Guinea and the Argentina/Chile agreements are merely 
examples where such a trade-off approach stands out235. Such a trade-off approach is even 
clearer in a statement of the Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, on 
the negotiations between Australia and East Timor over the Timor Sea area236: 
The extent to which East Timor itself is able to get the royalties, or a share of the 
royalties, the size of its share, plays into the overall size of the Australian aid 
programme. So there are a lot of issues tied up together here. 
In summary, "[w]hile the Court and arbitration tribunals are required to apply the 
law, coastal states have a greater latitude when fashioning voluntary agreements"237. There 
is thus a first corollary of the distinction between negotiation and adjudication. The 
relevance of negotiated agreements, for the purpose of identifying and/or interpreting 
(228) Merrills/1998, p. 15. 
(229) Some authors affirm that agreements cannot infringe upon the rights of thirds states (cf. Chamey/1999, p.873; Tanja/1990, 
p.xvii.) Because the pacta tertiis rule protects the rights of third states from obligations created by bilateral agreements, however, 
this requirement of not infringing on third states' rights seems unnecessary. Claims against third states cannot be underpinned on 
bilateral boundary treaties. Any curtailment of entitlements continues to require the consent of the third state. For an analysis of 
the pacta tertiis rule, cf. Chinkin/1993, pp.25-144. 
(230) Bardonnet/1989, p.3. For instance, as Chamey notes, "the use of an Article 121(3) rock in an agreement to delimit the 
maritime boundary between state is not violative of international law because Article 121(3) is not jus cogens" (Chamcyl999, 
p.873). 
(231) Anderson/2000 (unpublished). 
(232) Collier/Lowe/2000, pp.7, 24. 
(233) Malanczuk/1997, p.275. 
(234) Cf. Collier/Lowe/2000, pp.20-24; Evans/1999, p.158; Marston/1994, pp.155-156; Oxman/1993, p.10-12; Weil/1989a, 
pp.110-113; Dipla/1984, p.221; Judge Oda, Separate Opinion, Jan Mayen case, ICJ/Reports/1993, pp.108-109, paras.67-68. 
Apparently, distinguishing between EEZ and continental shelf delimitation, cf. Churchill/Lowe/1999, pp.191, 195. 
(235) Appendix 2, D6, F2. Pointing out that maritime boundaries may be delimited in treaties that include aspects that are 
extraneous to delimitation stricto sensu, cf. Anderson/1999 (unpublished). 
(236) Reuters, 9 October 2000. 
(237) Charney/1994, p.228. 
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customary law, should not be taken for granted - just as it is not taken for granted in other 
areas. Observing that "agreed delimitations may have been dictated by legally irrelevant 
considerations", Thirlway concludes that this fact "complicates the quest for customary 
rules of maritime delimitation enshrined in state practice" and "weakens the force of the act 
as evidence of an opinio juris"23*. Hence, "courts have been reluctant to find any evidence 
of generally applicable norms in state practice, and they have been unimpressed by 
statistical surveys demonstrating the preponderance of any particular method"239. 
With this said, care must be taken not to fall in the trap of viewing agreements as 
meaningless for the international law-making process. The underlying idea is that "[w]hile 
it is difficult to imagine adjudication without law, law without adjudication is actually the 
normal situation in international affairs"240. Claims advanced by states are virtually always 
marked by the expression of an understanding of international law. While not necessarily 
determined by normative standards, agreements often incorporate a compromise between 
opposing views on normativity. To this extent, they are likely to encapsulate the common 
ground between them. A large number of negotiated treaties providing solutions that result 
from similar (if not identical) approaches should not - and cannot - be dismissed lightly. 
Since it was concluded that Articles 74(1) and 83(1) only prescribe an obligation of 
result241, how can that obligation be reconciled with the aforementioned contractual 
freedom of states? Once more, the suggestion that states are under the obligation to seek an 
equitable result must be seen cum grano salis242. As Judge Gros observes, agreements often 
include "concessions which are not motivated by reliance on international law"; states may 
(and do) negotiate boundaries that suit them "without going into the question of whether the 
result is equitable"243. Treaties validly signed and ratified must be deemed to incorporate 
equitable solutions244. It is hard to "see how any compromise arrangement could be made 
on a basis which was not equitable"245, because it would "be very odd i f [states would 
succeed] in agreeing a solution which they did not consider equitable"246. 
(238) Thirlway/1993, p.40. 
(239) Willis (1993) p. 65. Cf. also Mendelson/2002; Brownlie/1998b, p. 163; Weil/1993, p. 123; Charney/1993, p.xlii; Tanja/1990, 
p.307; Weil/1989a, p.l 13. In case law, see e.g. Libya/Malta case, ICJ/Reports/1985, pp.37-38, paras.43-44. 
(240) Merrills/1998, p.292. 
(241) Para.3.3.b)(iv) and Conclusions to Part I supra. 
(242) Libya/Malta case, ICJ/Reports/1985, p.39, para.46. Cf. para.3.6.d) supra. 
(243) Gulf of Maine case, Dissenting Opinion, ICJ/Reports/1984, p.370, para. 16. 
(244) As Francois stated during the ILC work, "when two parties agreed not to follow the prescribed rules and arrived at a 
settlement [...] no objection could be raised" (ILC/Yearbook/l953(I), pp. 125-126). The idea that states would agree on 
inequitable solutions could only arise in situations where the validity of the treaty would be questionable. Cf. V C L T , Articles 48 
(Error), 49 (Fraud), 50 (Corruption), 51-52 (Coercion; involving the use of illegal force or threat thereof). 
(245) Amado, ILC/Yearbook/1951(I), p.293. 
(246) Churchill/Lowe/1999, pp.191. Cf. Lucchini/Vcelckel/1996, p.93; Caflisch/1991, p. 484; Thirlway/1990, p.58; Jennings/1989, 
pp.401-403; Calatayud/1989, p.82; Weil/1989a, p.l 11; Johnston/1988, p.244; Vukas/1985, p.172; Dipla/1984, p.221. 
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States are free to agree on any boundary, "even i f what they achieve is seen [by 
others] as an inequitable result". International law on maritime delimitation is "imperative 
only inasmuch as it regulates a field that is of particular concern for the international 
society, [and it] is not concerned with inequitable delimitations of maritime boundaries as 
long as they are the result of free consent from the states involved"247. Analyses of bilateral 
state practice, thus, "must presume that the agreement in question was fair and equitable"248, 
for the states involved see them as equitable249. Importantly, and precisely because of this 
presumption250, when an objective trend is found in the type of solutions devised in treaties, 
it ought to be taken as a matter of reference for discerning the normative standards applied 
to engender equitable solutions. Naturally, since states are free to weigh non-legal factors, 
conclusions should not be drawn lightly. Notwithstanding this however, if recourse is had to 
a certain 'type-solution' by a significant majority of states, it becomes difficult to deny that 
there is some, prima facie normative content in such a 'type-solution'. 
6.1.b)(iii) Adjudication: Realiurisprudenz or Judicial Reasoning? 
Whenever disputing states freely decide to resort to adjudication, unless otherwise 
agreed, the expected outcome is a decision reasoned on the basis of law. Were it not for this 
expectation, they probably would not have been ready to accept the binding decision in the 
first place. The belief that adjudication offers the possibility of settling disputes on the basis 
of law is central in international affairs; it is precisely this belief that sanctions adjudication 
as a means for dispute-settlement. Blemishing it in any way is hardly likely to encourage 
states to resort thereto - for they are perfectly aware of the fact that when resorting to 
adjudication they 'lose control' over the outcome. What makes it acceptable is that the 
worse case scenario within the 'probable outcomes' (which are assessed in the light of the 
law by reference to which the case will be adjudged) appears to be 'bearable'251. 
Notwithstanding this position of principle, the reality is that, as Schachter observes, 
"strict positivism is a chimerical goal" in adjudication. Experienced judges, he adds, "will 
seek not optimal solutions, but those that are seen to do least harm to contending principles 
(247) Cahier/l989, p.414. 
(248) Jagota/1985, p.121. 
(249) Lucchini/Vcelckel/1996, p.175. 
(250) As this presumption refers to maritime delimitation treaties, the overwhelming majority of which are very recent, the issue of 
'unequal treaties' does not emerge. Whether the specific solution incorporated in a treaty is objectively equitable might be debated 
if political pressure is exercised by one state over the other. Although it might be argued that its equitableness can still be assessed 
against a wider political picture, it must be recognised that such agreements do not reflect the application of normative standards 
on maritime delimitation. Thus, no inferences should be made therefrom. 
(251) Jennings suggests that it is not the outcome that must be predictable, but the relevant considerations and the reasoning process 
(Jennings/1981, pp.59-60). On dispute-settlement by adjudication, cf. Lowe/Collier/2000, pp.5-10; Nguyen/Daillier/Pellet/1999, 
pp.827-830; Merrills/1998, pp.292-296; Shaw/1998, pp.31-38; Brownlie/1998b, pp.110-117; Shaw/1997, pp.739-742, 749-751, 
762-764; Jennings/1997, pp.40-41; Bowett/1997, pp.5-12, 18-19; Lucchini/Voelckel/1996, pp.192-193. 
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and interests" - which inexorably implies an act of choice regarding the harmonisation of 
these competing approaches. Although ultimately presenting "their conclusions in a way 
that obscures the act of choice and stresses the 'objective' character of the decision", they 
will "look behind the legal abstractions to the underlying interests and attitudes that may be 
affected by the potential decisions". According to him, "judicial wisdom" might not be "to 
exhaust fully the processes of judicial reasoning in every case or to express principles in 
their full generality" - individualisation "will often be the better way for an international 
court to cope with the inevitable choices it must make"252. Describing the reality of the 
'backstage of courts', realjurisprudenz has nonetheless to be confined to some normative 
canons253. That judges may be seen as de facto 'creators of law' needs scarcely be noted. I f 
there is a field of international law in which the judges' choices have played an outstanding 
part in creating law, it is delimitation law. Vast jurisprudence, starting with the North Sea 
cases has elaborated extensively on the contents thereof (despite some hesitant steps). 
One would argue, however, that it is time to reconsider this de facto law-making 
process. The approach endorsed by several eminent authors is touchstone254. Judges should 
bear in mind that their office is jus dicere (to interpret the law), and not jus dare (to make 
the law). From here stems the authority of courts. Despite its inadequacies, Article 38(1) of 
the Statute of the ICJ should remain the reference-point for identifying the formal sources 
of international law. Concretisation of legal notions in casu, which occurs within the sphere 
of discretion of courts, should not amount to law-making. Further, the distinction between 
ratio decidendi and incidental obiter dicta should not be overlooked255. This finely-drawn 
distinction, typical of precedent-systems, was perhaps not contemplated in the Rules of the 
Court256. However, it has to be recognised that in giving their 'fullest decisions' courts do 
elaborate on incidental issues, and make general pronouncements on the state of the law2 5 7. 
Extrapolations therefore require a prior sieving process, to ensure that the legal reasoning of 
cases is neither misinterpreted, nor overstated. Recourse to 'precedents' as a source of law 
must be judicious and cautious, if only because the undeniable existence of realjurisprudenz 
entails a risk of perpetuating non-normative solutions. 
Where the line between realjurisprudenz and normative decision-making is to be 
drawn is of course not easy to determine. The former should be compressed to the absolute 
(252) Schachter/1991. pp.43-46. 
(253) In an appraisal of the East Timor Judgment, Galvao Teles speaks of realjurisprudenz, when suggesting that "[t]imes are of 
pure Realpolilik, and Realpolitik brought Realjurisprudenz"; cf. Teles/1995, p.31; also Teles/2001 p.625. In an analysis to the 
same Judgment, Lowe has referred to a "businesslike judgment" (Lowe/1995, p.486). 
(254) Shaw/1998, pp.31-38; Jennings/1997, pp.39-44; Jennings/1996, pp.8-12; Jennings/1981, pp.73-76. 
(255) As to the acceptance of this distinction, cf. Esser/1961, p.l 14 (pp.237,248-249); Radbruch, cited in Engish/1988, pp.364-366. 
(256) Rosenne/1961, p.427. It must be noted that analyses of jurisprudence in civil law systems also resort to similar distinctions. 
(257) Judge Lachs, cited in Sturgess/Chubb/1988, p.90. 
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minimum. Opportunities must not be given to the more cynical to observe that in maritime 
delimitation the line chosen by the court "represents a splitting of the difference between 
what each party has claimed should be the boundary"258. In the Tunisia/Libya case, Judge 
Gros affirmed that the decision was meant to "divide the areas said to be in dispute", and 
was reached through a compromise "between the claims of the parties and the opinions held 
within the Court"259. From a similar perspective, Judge Oda suggested that the decision was 
based on a "split of the difference" between the parties' positions approach260. 
The dangers of basing maritime delimitation on the area of overlapping claims have 
already been mentioned above261. Indubitably, such an approach gives states every reason to 
exaggerate their claims, in order to maximise their 'slice of the cake'. Courts must be 
careful not to reward such behaviour. States might also want to consider minimising this 
danger by resorting to 'winner-takes-all' approaches262. Courts' powers may be restricted by 
resort to 'swing arbitration'. Here, the decision becomes a choice between the parties' 
claims. No intermediate solution can be adopted. In the Taba arbitration, for example, 
the Tribunal was "not authorised to establish a location of a boundary pillar other than a 
location advanced by Egypt or by Israel"263. 
'Swing arbitration', besides ensuring that maritime delimitation does not become 
a question of sharing claimed areas, offers some advantages. Owing to the risk of losing 
to a more reasonable claim, the parties will tend to assess their own claims objectively, 
rather than simply maximising them. With it, the claims are brought closer, facilitating 
the resolution of the dispute (perhaps even through negotiation). In addition, because 
the parties are less likely to be surprised by an 'unreasonable' opposing claim, justice in 
the argumentation process is furthered. 
In summary, maritime delimitation law is adjudication-oriented. It not only provides 
the foundations for, but it also imposes the limits to, the discretion of courts. Affirming that 
courts have an absolute freedom of choice of methods, or that they may weigh whatever 
facts they deem relevant, would equate adjudication to ex aequo et bono decision-making. 
(258) Churchill/Lowe/I999,pp.l90-I91. 
(259) Dissenting Opinion, ICJ/Reports/1982, pp.152-153. 
(260) Dissenting Opinion, ibid., p.270. 
(261) Para.4..3.b) supra. 
(262) This can be achieved through the special agreement or arbitral compromis. 
(263) RIAA/20, p. 12, Annex to the Compromis, para.5. As to the restrictions imposed on the Tribunal by the parties, and in 
particular its relation with the "preponderance of evidence", cf. pp.45-46, paras. 176-177. Insofar as, injudicial settlements, courts 
are bound to decide according to law (e.g. in the case of the ICJ, by reference to what is stated in Article 38 of its Statute), 
recourse to this type of clause might not have the desired effect. The Court to whom the issue is referred might conclude that 
neither claim finds support in the applicable law. Notwithstanding this, in the Minquiers and Ecrehos case, for example, the Court 
was asked to determine whether the sovereignty belonged to the United Kingdom or to the French Republic (ICJ/Reports/1953, 
p.49). The parties thus explicitly excluded the status of res nullius as well as that of condominium (ICJ/Reports/1953, p.52). The 
Court was given only two possibilities: to decide that title was vested in the United Kingdom, or that it was vested in France. 
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Courts and states are not in parallel positions. In adjudication, the methods to apply and 
factors to weigh are those required under international law2 6 4. What the Court literally 
affirmed in the North Sea cases was that "there is no legal limit to the considerations which 
states may take account of for the purpose of making sure that they apply equitable 
procedures"265. As recognised in the Jan Mayen case, this was referred to negotiation, and 
not to adjudication266. Regrettably, this assertion was extrapolated too lightly to interpret the 
powers of courts. No matter how wide the scope of the discretion attributed to judges, it is 
always conditioned. To utilise the Court's words in the Libya/Malta case on the scope of 
relevant circumstances, in delimitation, "only those [circumstances] that are pertinent to the 
institution" in question "will qualify for inclusion"267. Whatever choices judges make, they 
must justify them under sound juridical parameters. Notably, it is important to explain why 
other possible choices were dismissed in favour of the solution adopted. Failure to do so 
amounts to moving out of the realm of legal decisions into the realm of arbitrary decisions. 
6.2. The Dogmatics of Normativitv and Maritime Delimitation 
6.2.a) Key Aspects 
When searching for normativity, examining the essential elements of its theoretical 
basis is almost inevitable, even if entering into a detailed level of philosophical analysis is 
to be avoided. Despite whatever refinements one finds appropriate to make, the Kelsenian 
dichotomy between Sein ("is") and Sollen ("ought") remains the starkest foundation of the 
concept of normativity. Facts are entities of the world of Sein, whereas normativity exists in 
the world of Sollen. To put it simply, facts are something that "is", which means that they 
may be the object of empirical recognition based on the observation of natural and social 
realities. Normativity, in contrast, appears as 'guiding-ideals', or 'reference parameters'268. 
Typically, it amounts to general 'ought' prescriptions - deontic statements that can only be 
completely unveiled by means of legal reasoning and hermeneutics. Being elements of an 
on-going debate concerning legal philosophy, these aspects serve to highlight two points: to 
recall that factual circumstances ought not to be confused with normative prescriptions; and 
to pave the way for delving into the contents of normative standards. 
(264) Para.7.1.ro/}-a. 
(265) ICJ/Reports/1969, p.51, para.93, emphasis added. 
(266) ICJ/Reports/1993, p.63, para.57. 
(267) ICJ/Reports/i985, p.40, para.48. 
(268) In more precise terms, normativity may give rise to different legal positions such as 'duty', 'right', 'power' and 'permission'. 
Cf. Kelsen/1970, in particular pp.4-23. MacCormick/1999, pp.122-133; VonWright/1998; Guastini/1998; Raz/1980, in particular 
pp.44-69, 121-167; Ehrenzweig/1977, pp.29-38. 
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At this juncture it is worthwhile examining the 'equitable principles' enumerated by 
the Court in the Libya/Malta case: (i) non-refashioning of geography; (ii) non-encroachment 
on the natural prolongation of another state; (iii) due respect to all relevant circumstances; 
(iv) equity does not necessarily imply equality; (v) rejection of distributive justice269. The 
contrast is striking when comparing these with the 'equitable criteria' named by the 
Chamber in the Gulf of Maine case, namely: (i) the land dominates the sea; (ii) the equal 
division, in the absence of special circumstances, of the area of overlapping entitlements; 
(iii) non-encroachment upon the areas of another state; (iv) prevention of any cut-off of 
projections of the coast; (v) drawing due consequences from any inequalities in the extent 
of coasts into the delimitation area270. First, a different nomen juris was used to refer to 
what are apparently equal entities (criteria in 1984, principles in 1985). Secondly, the fact 
that two cases decided less than a year apart present only one standard in common must be 
stressed. Thirdly, even this common standard is expressed differently. Whereas the concept 
of non-encroachment was viewed in 1984 in terms of proximity to the coast, in 1985 it was 
related to relevant circumstances. The (somewhat) paradoxical content of the notions of 
proximity and of relevant circumstances, as stemming from the 1969 Judgment, seems to 
confer on the two ideas of non-encroachment a striking quasi-contradictory meaning. 
The difference between the standards named in each case is not irrelevant. Although 
expressed formally in 'ought' terms, these 'principles' or 'criteria' seem to have emerged 
by influence of the factual elements in concreto. It is otherwise difficult to determine why 
different principles would be enumerated. Insofar as their formulation takes into account the 
facts in casu, these so-called principles have a blurred normative domain. Indeed, perhaps 
they are not truly normative principles, but expressions of normativity in casu. The problem 
is that deontic statements should be expressible independently from factuality. Normativity 
qua tale is neither descriptive, nor dependent on descriptions of facts. It is prescriptive. 
Typically a normative sentence, "A is allowed to do W", is a proposition not circumscribed 
by facts. It is not re-definable by reference thereto, or as a function thereof. Thus, whatever 
the normativity in maritime delimitation, it must surface as 'ought' prescriptions. 
6.2.b) Legal Systems: Principles and Rules 
Legal systems are often described as bodies of rules that govern the legally relevant 
relations between the subjects of a community. Accepting this definition depends much on 
how the concept of rule is perceived. To confine the normativity of legal systems - on 
(269) ICJ/Reports/1985, pp.39-40, para.46. 
(270) ICJ/Reports/1984, pp.312-313, para.157. 
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which legal discourse is founded - to one type of normative standard is too reductive. 
There are diverse levels of normative density271. It is to explain this differentiated nature of 
normative standards that reference is made to the concept of principle. In broad terms, it 
may be said that "principles operate at a higher level of generality than rules"272, the latter 
having therefore a higher normative density. Embodying a specific determinacy, rules 
provide specific legal consequences for given situations (defined in their facti species). 
Principles bear broader guiding-normative parameters, have no facti species, and lie at the 
structuring base of legal systems. They may be viewed as 'constitutive elements' of legal 
systems273. Applying primarily to situations left uncovered by rules stricto sensu, principles 
appear then as the 'starting point' for reaching case-decisions274. 
A corollary of this distinction is that, unlike rules, which are (or at least tend to be) 
"applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion", principles "should be construed in the context of 
[...] other principles"275. Since rules always incorporate an 'if-clause' (facti species), the 
'collision' between two rules necessarily entails the 'invalidity' (inappropriateness for 
application in casu216) of one of them. In contrast, 'collisions' between principles never lead 
to question the 'validity' of any of them277. Principles always admit exceptions, do not 
apply in terms of exclusion of other principles, and might (and are indeed likely to) 
contradict other principles. Their guiding-normative nature entails an interwoven reciprocal 
restriction with other principles; their implementation depends on a 'normative 
consolidation' through denser standards278. They "function quite differently from rules"279. 
Unlike the latter, they contain no specific binding-instruction, susceptible of immediate 
application in casu280. Due to their broad normative guidance, principles provide legal 
(271) Esser/1961, p.120-123. When speaking of normative standards, the term "normative density" may be seen as referring to its 
degree of refinement, as to the solution conveyed and the means to arrive thereto. 
(272) ILA, Final Report of the Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International Law, p. 11. 
(273) Canaris/1996, pp.76-88. Referring to principles as 'governing ideas', cf. Shaw/1997, pp.77-78. 
(274) Esser/1961, pp.27(fn.59), 88, 120, 236, 252. 
(275) Dworkin/1977, p.24. The expression "tend to be" is a 'safeguard' from MacCormick's arguments against Dworkin's metaphor 
of principles having a dimension of weight He argues that Dworkin does not explain the recourse to rules in arguments from 
analogy, and that no clear line can be drawn between arguments from principle and from analogy. Because hard cases are, in his 
view, decided on the basis of the interaction of arguments from principle and consequentialist arguments, Dworkin's metaphor 
would be unhelpful and misleading if taken too seriously (MacCormick/1978, pp.152-194, 231-258). Nevertheless, MacCormick 
accepts that "[analogies only make sense if there are reasons of principle underlying them" (p. 186); which perhaps makes the two 
views reconcilable. Arguments from analogy seem indeed to be more a variant of arguments from principle, than a mode of 
application of rules. Analogies build on the principles that underlie the rule to be applied. 
(276) Gunther distinguishes between 'validity' and 'appropriateness for application' (cited in Habermas/1996, pp.217-218). On the 
distinction between collisions of principles and of rules, cf. Alexi/2000, pp.295-298. He argues that a "conflict between two rules 
can only be solved by either introducing an exception clause into one of the two rules or declaring at least one of them invalid". 
(277) Canaris states that to speak of contradiction of principles does not reflect the fact that an opposition between principles is 
simultaneously overcome and kept through the compromise that is reached (Canaris/1996, p.206). Arguing that rules like 
principles apply through a weighing-process, cf. e.g. Peczenik/1999, pl79; Utz/1992, pp.39-43. 
(278) Canaris/1996, pp.88-99,204-206. 
(279) Kratochwil/1989, p.237. 
(280) Esser/1961, pp.65-66. He notes also that, as far as the position of the judge is concerned, the continental notion of "norm" is 
slightly different than the Anglo-American notion of "rule", and that the difference between principle and rule bears in continental 
law a much wider reach than in Anglo-American law. 
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systems with a higher degree of 'openness', allowing their application and conformation to 
unforeseeable concrete events. 
Collisions between principles are frequent and indeed inevitable, and occur because 
the constitution of a corpus juris is based on different fundamental normative ideas281. For 
instance, Resolution 2625(XXV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations approved a 
Declaration proclaiming a number of "principles of international law relating to friendly 
relations and cooperation among states". Some of these principles have a clear conflicting 
nature, which is why paragraph 2 states that "each principle should be construed in the 
context of the other principles". 
Alexy very persuasively argues that principles are to be optimised in relative terms. 
As ideal precepts, he says, they "demand more than what is really possible". If a collision 
between principles occurs, that collision is to be resolved by mutual conformation, in the 
light of the circumstances in concreto. What principles require is "to realise something to 
the highest degree possible relative to the factual and legal possibilities" in casu. To him, a 
process of weighing and balancing is thus necessary in order to move "from the ideal prima 
facie ought to the real and definite ought"282. Having different impacts upon each case, 
principles are ever-present entities in legal systems, which emerge dressed as "variable legal 
standards"283. In short, they "are normative propositions of such high level of generality that 
they can as a rule not be applied without the addition of further normative premises and are 
usually subject to limitation on account of other principles"284. 
Because a principle demands more than is realisable in concreto, its scope might 
overlap with that of other principles. This is what the term 'collision' is meant to convey. 
Owing to this fact, the normative prescription of a principle in a certain situation cannot be 
fixed a priori. It is variable. Referring to the question of 'colliding normative standards' in 
German constitutional law, Larenz describes a method for resolving these collisions of 
principles, which consists of weighing juridical values in concrete2*5. This is a substantive 
juridical canon that defines the methodological thread of judicial implementation of 
normativity. It leads to the development of the law when there is no explicit rule stricto 
sensu. Along the same lines Alexi argues that the relative optimisation of principles is best 
attained by the 'maxim of proportionality', operating at three levels: appropriateness, 
(281) Engish/1988, p.318. 
(282) Alexi/1999, p.39, emphasis added. 
(283) Hart/1997, pp. 124-136, 263-268. Despite all the discordance between Hart's and Dworkin's approaches, one would argue that 
they both endorse the idea of spheres of normativity in which the applicable standards are not always specific enough for a strict 
'subsumptive model' to be utilised. 
(284) Alexy/1989, p.260. 
(285) Larenz/1989, pp.490-502. 
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necessity, and proportionality stricto sensu. . Appropriateness (i.e. the adequacy of the 
restriction imposed on each principle) and necessity (i.e. the magnitude of the restriction) 
"stem from the obligation of a realisation as great as possible relative to the actual 
possibilities". Proportionality stricto sensu (i.e. the balance of subjective positions) "stems 
from the obligation of a realisation as far as possible relative to the legal possibilities, that 
is, relative most of all to the countervailing principles"287. 
Whilst rules "enclose a definite ought" (i.e. a "definitive command"), principles 
"enclose an ideal [prima facie] ought" (i.e. an "optimisation command")288. Applied to 
predetermined class-cases, rules set down a concrete legal consequence. Principles are legal 
parameters whose legal consequence lies dependent on the specificities of each case; their 
application requires further normative elaboration. Nevertheless, both "claim to be 
deontologically valid; i.e., they have an obligatory character"289. Independently of 
situational assessments, principles offer normative guidance. Conflicting principles, most 
importantly, can be applied jointly to decide a certain situation. Recourse to a principle does 
not exclude the simultaneous application of another principle. The normativity in casu 
stems from the relative optimisation of both principles. In contrast, rules tend to be either 
applicable, or not applicable. I f they are applied, there is a specific juridical consequence 
derived from it, which determines the non-application of rules with contradicting 
solutions290. Noteworthy also is the fact that rules are manifestations of principles, often 
appearing as the integration of two or more principles. 
Irrespective of establishing whether the differentiation between rules and principles 
is, or is not, a matter of degree291, such a distinction is important for purposes of intellectual 
discipline. Its impact on legal reasoning is pivotal. A 'definite ought' leaves little room for 
elaboration. In contradistinction, an 'ideal ought' is the 'playground' of legal reasoning par 
excellence. Principles interact by relations of precedence, in an intertwined lattice-work 
specifiable only in casu. In some circumstances, one principle has precedence over another. 
(286) The reference to "proportionality stricto sensu" must not be confused with "proportionality" as means of assessing the equity 
of a particular delimitation-line through comparison of coastal lengths and area-attribution (cf. para.8.2.c) infra). 
(287) Alexi/2000, pp.297-298. 
(288) Alexi/2000, p.295; Alexi/1999, pp.38-39. 
(289) Habermas/1996, p.208. He notes, furthermore, that the "distinction between these types of norms must not be confused with 
that between norms and policies. Neither rules nor principles have a teleological structure." 
(290) Because principles can be applied jointly to the same case, the distinction principles-rules has to be made. In a coherent 
system, there ought to be no rules (stricto sensu) that, applying to the same situation, prescribe contradictory legal consequences. 
The question of collision between a rule and a principle is more complex. Here, because the rule does not have the 'malleable 
nature' of principles, the rule is no longer applicable. What might happen is that the solution for the specific conflict be found in 
the optimisation between the conflicting principle and the principle (or principles) that underlie the rule that was dismissed. We 
tend here to depart from Hart's view on this matter (Hart/1997, pp.259-263). 
(291) In the Gulf of Maine case, the Chamber affirmed that the terms "rules" and "principles" amounted to "no more than the use of 
a dual expression to convey one and the same idea". But it also admitted that the term "principles" might be justified when 
referring to rules of "more general and more fundamental character" (ICJ/Reports/1984, p.288, para.79). Hart sees also the 
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I f circumstances change, such precedence might be reshaped and/or reversed. Notably, the 
relation of precedence never entails the complete dismissal of either principle. 
Two final points must be made. First, it must be acknowledged that there is no such 
thing as the 'correct' philosophy of law. However, to advance tangible propositions on the 
conceptualisation of any field of law, it is necessary to pre-define the legal-philosophical 
foundations of the argument to be made. The considerations above thus have a functional 
purpose. Secondly, it must equally be acknowledged that all legal systems strike a balance 
between justice, understood as the need to consider the circumstances of concrete cases 
(often unanticipatable), and certainty, as means for transmitting social standards of 
behaviour to the subjects of law. These are two needs that must necessarily be reconciled. 
They are the 'supreme principles' of Law 2 9 2, and their paradoxical relationship is in effect 
inherent in the existence of any corpus juris. 
6.2.c) Normativity in Maritime Delimitation 
6.2.c)(i) Brief Appraisal 
The premises set, it is now necessary to demonstrate their relevance in the search for 
the normativity applicable to maritime delimitation. Naturally, Article 38(1) of the Statute 
of the ICJ becomes crucial; for it remains - despite all criticism - the most authoritative 
reference-point for identifying normativity in international law 2 9 3. The order by which the 
sources of law are enumerated therein is the order by which they should be considered in 
adjudging a case. It is "un ordre successif «de prise en consideration})", which takes into 
account the fact that the existence of conventional and customary rules is easier to establish, 
and the fact that their content is much denser, thus 'less random' ("moins aleatoire")29*. The 
resort to general principles of law is therefore subject to the non-existence of conventional 
and customary rules295. More than anything else, the mention of general principles was in 
effect meant to avoid lacunae of normativity, thereby evading the issue of non-lique?96. 
distinction as a matter of degree (Hart/1997, p.262). Colliard considers that principles, rules and norms, being all normative 
expressions, are synonymous terms (Colliard/1987, p.92). 
(292) Besides these two fundamental principles, Engish refers to a third principle: "practical opportunity" (Engish/1988, p.319). 
Canaris refers to justice, equity and certainty as the highest juridical values (Canaris/1996, p.61). 
(293) Danilenko/1993, pp.30-42. Cf. also Nguyen/Daillier/Pellet/1999, pp.111-116; Brownlie/1998a, pp.1-4; Jennings/Watts/1997, 
pp.23-25; Shaw/1997, pp.54-56; Malanczuk/1997, pp.35-36; Greig/1976, pp.6-7. Looking specifically into the sources of the law 
of the sea, cf. Churchill/Lowe/1999, pp.5-27; Caminos/Marotta-Rangel/1991, pp.29-42. 
(294) Nguyen/Daillier/Pellet/1999, pp. 346-347. Esser argues that Article 38 of the Statute incorporates a ranking order, and not 
simply an enumeration (Esser/1961, p.46). 
(295) An initial reference in Article 38 to a strict hierarchical application of the sources of law was subsequently discarded, although 
it still seems to apply in some measure as regards subparagraph d) (cf. Rossi/1993, pp.93-99). 
(296) Cf. Churchill/Lowe/1999, p.12; Shaw/1998, p.37; Shaw/1997, p.78; Malanczuk/1997, p.50; Jennings/Watts/1997, p.40; 
Greig/1976, p.31; Esser/1961, p.56. 
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An analysis on the normativity applicable to maritime delimitation must thus start 
by a sequential examination of the normative standards set down, first, in conventional law, 
and secondly, in customary law. For this analysis, an important distinction has to be made 
between territorial sea delimitation, and the delimitation of the maritime zones beyond it. In 
territorial sea delimitation, the use of the equidistance-special circumstances rule is 
prescribed in both conventional law and customary law. The LOSC provision is virtually 
identical to that of the TS/CZ Convention. During the Third Conference, almost no voices 
were heard against the use of the equidistance-special circumstances rule297. Further, 
international jurisprudence has not challenged its customary nature. In the Qatar/Bahrain 
case, the ICJ has in fact averred the customary character of Article 15 of the LOSC298. 
The situation is different when it comes to the delimitation of other maritime zones. 
Here, because the 1982 and 1958 provisions on delimitation differ, the understanding of 
Article 311(1)(2) of the LOSC is paramount to interpreting the succession of conventional 
provisions. One would suggest that, as long as compatible with the LOSC, provisions of the 
1958 Conventions may apply inter partes. With respect to the succession of conventional 
provisions, there are three situations to consider. First, as to contiguous zone delimitation, it 
should be observed that the 1958 provision has no corresponding provision in the LOSC. 
Secondly, as regards continental shelf delimitation, whereas Article 6 of the CS Convention 
prescribes the use of the equidistance-special circumstances rule, Article 83(1) of the LOSC 
only refers to achieving an equitable solution299. Thirdly, since the EEZ did not exist in 
1958, no provision on delimitation preceded Article 74(1) of the LOSC. 
The reasons that explain why the equidistance-special circumstances formula was 
adopted for territorial sea delimitation, but not for the delimitation of the maritime zones 
beyond it, are three-fold. First, as Hsu pointed out during the preparatory work of the ILC, 
in territorial waters, the dividing line would be relatively less important than in the case of 
the continental shelf; for whereas the former were a narrow belt, the latter sometimes had a 
considerable extent300. Ironically, he was not thinking of the problems posed by equidistant 
boundaries, but of those posed by the prolongation of the territorial sea boundary301. When, 
in 1969, the Court noted that any distortions in the course of strict equidistance-lines caused 
by coastal features are in the territorial sea very slight, it was transposing this view3 0 2. 
(297) Para.3.4. supra. 
(298) Qatar/Bahrain-Merits, para. 176. 
(299) As mentioned, between the parties to the CS Convention, Article 6 might be applied, because its content does not contradict 
the obligation of result of Article 83(1); cf. para.3.3b)(iii)(iv) and Conclusions to Part I supra. 
(300) lLC/Yearbook/1951(I), p.288. 
(301) For an illustration of a similar type of situation - prolongation of the land boundary, see Figure 47. 
(302) ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.19, 38, paras.8, 59. 
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Secondly, inasmuch as the number of cases in which territorial sea delimitation is required 
between opposite states is smaller than the number of cases of continental shelf and EEZ 
delimitation, the number of potential disputes is also smaller. Thirdly, one ought to take into 
account the fact that the territorial sea allows the exercise of sovereign powers by states in 
the vicinity of the coast. Inter alia, this means that 'closer proximity' is a paramount factor 
(owing to the need to ensure that security is not compromised by rights exercised opposite 
the coast, in the immediate vicinity thereof303). 
Jurisprudence, as well as some scholarship, has suggested that under customary law 
the delimitation of the maritime zones beyond the territorial sea is to be effected by recourse 
to equitable principles. As shown, however, this proposition does not appear to be founded 
on any general practice of states304. This creates a problem. Approaches of this sort have led 
to questions concerning the very existence of customary international law. For example, 
Kelly argues, inter alia, that customary law lacks legitimacy as a lawmaking process, for it 
allows a manipulation of international law that favours some states to the prejudice of 
others305. Without necessarily endorsing the idea that customary law has reached its 
twilight, it ought to be recognised that this idea has been fuelled by the realisation that, in 
important instances, the existence of rules of customary law has been established without 
the requirements of a settled, extensive and uniform practice, conjugated with an opinio 
juris, being properly met306. Maritime delimitation concerning continental shelf and EEZ 
appears to be one of those cases. Taking into account actual practice, one can but consider 
that the "supposition that the [equitable] principles emerged from practice is a pure 
fiction" 3 0 7. The rules qualified as customary in various instances were determined without 
due regard to state practice, which has effectively been left aside. They are doubtless 
judge-made law 3 0 8. 
What gives rise to concern is not so much that delimitation law on continental shelf 
and the EEZ is judge-made law, but the fact that the way in which it was devised appears to 
have placed in the hands of courts (at least until recently) what amounts to an extremely 
wide discretionary power. While virtually dismissing state practice, courts have claimed the 
power to weigh whatever circumstances they deem relevant, and to choose whatever 
(303) Para.8.3.b) infra. 
(304) Conclusions to Part I supra. 
(305) Kelly/2000. 
(306) Danilenko suggests that "[t]he effective operation of custom as a source of international law obviously requires further 
clarification and systematisation of normative criteria for the formation of customary rules" (Danilenko/1993, pp. 128-129). 
(307) Jennings/198 l,p.68. 
(308) In the field of maritime delimitation, Jennings was the first to use the expression "judge-made law" (Jennings/1981, p.68). 
Other authors have used it more recently; cf. Brownlie/1998, p.28; Quintana/1997, p.373; Schachter/1991, p.58; Bedjaoui/1990, 
p.387; Weil/I989a, pp.6-8; Weil/1987, p.550. 
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methods they consider appropriate. Besides not reflecting the views expressed by a large 
number of states in this respect, this approach is hardly likely to further the rule of law in 
international affairs. It places scant emphasis on certainty. For the rule of law to prevail, 
consideration must be given to "certainty as to what the rules are, [and] predictability as to 
the legal consequences of conduct"309. By not "sufficiently defining [equitable principles] or 
giving them an identifiable objective content", courts have sought "to reach transactional 
solutions on a case-by-case basis"310. The problem is that normativity is left at its lowest311, 
because the "basis of transaction lies in opportunity, rather than in equity and in law"3 1 2. 
In addition, recent case law has resorted to the equidistance-special circumstances 
rule, while asserting that it equated to the application of equitable principles. With this 
approach, doubts were cast on the interpretation of the delimitation rule applicable to the 
territorial sea, leading some authors to suggest that it also amounted to the application of 
equitable principles. 
A number of questions concerning normativity in maritime delimitation thus need to 
be answered. What are the contents of the equidistance-special circumstances rule? How 
precisely does it operate? Since it has been argued that, for the continental shelf and the 
EEZ, conventional law and customary law only prescribe an obligation of result, what are 
the normative means whereby the delimitation is to be effected? In other words, taking into 
account the renvoi effected by Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of the LOSC, and the fact that it has 
been argued that no customary rules on the means of delimitation have emerged, by which 
substantive operative-standards are equitable solutions to be reached? Insofar as the LOSC 
contains no rule on contiguous zone delimitation, and insofar as no customary law in exists, 
how are contiguous zone boundaries to be delimited? From a conceptual standpoint, is it 
possible to justify the proposition that the equidistance-special circumstances rule equates to 
applying equitable principles, and/or vice-versa? 
The answers to all of these questions, one would argue, stem from two principles of 
international law: the principle of maritime zoning, and the principle of equity. Besides 
being the normative standards that apply to delimitation in the absence of conventional and 
customary rules, they explain the balance that was struck through the equidistance-special 
circumstances rule, and how the so-called 'equitable principles' should be viewed. This is 
unsurprising if it is realised that the understanding of legal systems - as well as of fields of 
law, which are sub-structures thereof - is best furthered when the principles underlying 
(309) Watts/2000, p.7. 
(310) Abi-Saab/1996, pp.11-12. 
(311) Weil/1989a,p.l61. 
(312) Degan/1987, p.137. 
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them are properly grasped. These standards bear a level of normativity central to, inter alia, 
the interpretation of rules, the filling of lacunae, and the shaping of indeterminate concepts. 
More important for maritime delimitation, once these principles are properly understood 
'transactional approaches' (typically a-normative) will be no longer required. It is to these 
two principles that govern maritime delimitation that we must now turn. 
6.2.c)(ii) General Principles of Law and Principles of International Law 
The difficulties and dangers underlying attempts to resort to general principles of 
law cannot be underestimated, as is shown by the debates in the Advisory Committee of 
Jurists313. Whether both principles of international and municipal law are comprised by this 
notion is not irrelevant, especially when the existence of universal international law is being 
questioned314. Article 38(l)(c) indeed does not amount to "a blank cheque to go delving 
among selected municipal law"3 1 5 in an attempt to identify (spurious) 'universal principles'. 
'Recognition' and 'validation' of general principles of law is thus problematic. 
Notwithstanding this, a case can be made for the existence of principles predicated "dans la 
conscience juridique mondiale"316. They are "the principles which are in force between all 
independent nations"317, and which have a (quasi-)unanimous acceptance. 
Equity is amongst the general principles of law3 1 8. In maritime delimitation, the first 
relevant references to equity, fairness and justice date back to the early 1950s, to the work 
of the ILC 3 1 9 . How these references are to be seen might be debated. It will be argued later 
that what the Court had in mind in the North Sea cases320, when it referred to "general 
precepts of justice and good faith", was the principle of equity. The reference to equitable 
principles was merely an ill-founded attempt to avoid the debate concerning the existence of 
a tertium genus of normativity in international law, in which the Advisory Committee of 
Jurists had already been embroiled. As will be submitted, it is the 'principle of equity', 
rather than 'equitable principles', that has shaped the history of maritime delimitation law, 
from the early stages of the travaux preparatoires of the 1958 Conventions up to the 
obligation of result incorporated in Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of the LOSC. 
(313) On the notion of general principles of law, cf. Nguyen/Daillier/Pellet/1999, pp. 344-350; Jennings/Watts/1997, pp.36-40; 
Shaw/1997, pp.77-86; Malanczuk/1997, pp.48-50; Danilenko/1993, pp.173-189. 
(314) Green/1985. 
(315) Jennings/1981, pp.71 -73. 
(316) Verdross, AIDI/1932, p.322. 
(317) Lotus case, WCR/1932, p.34. 
(318) As to why it should be seen as a general principle of law, cf. para.6.4. infra. 
(319) Para.l.2.b)(i) supra. Although the principle of equity bears on all delimitations, the facts that determine its operation differ 
slightly in territorial sea delimitation and in continental shelf and EEZ delimitation (cf. para.8.1., General Conclusions infra). 
(320) lCJ/Reports/1969, pp.47-48, para.85. 
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Distinct from general principles of law are principles of international law (which are 
not specifically mentioned in Article 38). Here, one ought to reconsider for a moment the 
philosophical construction of law. A corpus juris entails the existence of cohesion between, 
and coherence amongst, the normative prescriptions that form it. Once again this draws 
attention to the legal-philosophical distinction between rules and principles. Although both 
being normative in character, rules and principles relate to each other in the same way as 
'particularisation' relates to 'universalisation'. Within the realm of normativity, rules are 
elements of particularisation of a 'centrifugal nature'. By regulating class-situations through 
a 'definite ought', these elements move along the periphery of the system. In contrast, 
principles have a 'centripetal nature'. Because they bear an 'ideal ought', they remain at the 
centre of the system, providing it with cohesion, coherence, and structuring equilibrium. 
Principles of international law are normative standards that surface from analyses of 
the totality of the rules in force in the international legal system. They are usually deducible 
from the legal spirit embedded in customary and conventional rules in force. It has already 
been suggested that they have a customary nature321. With the advent of multilateral 
treaties, it can be suggested with equal force that they may have also a conventional nature, 
especially i f related to a field regulated by a quasi-legislative instrument. What states agree 
on quasi-universal instruments may often be enough to create new principles of law. This 
dualism is nevertheless too strict to describe the nature of principles that bear the spirit of 
customary and conventional rules, either when they have similar contents, or when they are 
complementary to each other. From this perspective, principles of international law appear 
in fact to be part of the tertium genus of normativity, side-by-side with general principles of 
law 3 2 2 (both being 'variable legal standards' that embody 'ideal oughts'). 
One would argue that there is a principle of international law - naturally embodying 
legal contents endorsed by states on a universal (or quasi-universal) basis - that is central to 
maritime delimitation: the principle of maritime zoning. With a content often encapsulated 
in the maxim "the land dominates the sea", this is the normative standard that explains the 
delimitation rule incorporated in all 1958 Conventions, which conferred on the legal notion 
underlying 'equidistance' such a paramount role. 
In short, one would argue that international law incorporates a plane of normativity 
(that of 'principles of law') which, providing a framework for conceptualising maritime 
delimitation law, explains its developing stages and the contents of the few existing rules. 
State practice and jurisprudence, it is suggested, have implicitly made use of two principles: 
(321) Nguyen/Daillier/Pellet/1999, p.345. 
(322) The principles of international law are implicit in Article 38(1 )(c) of the Statute of the ICJ; cf. Brownlie/1998a, pp. 18-19. 
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the principle of equity and the principle of maritime zoning. These are arguably the 
principles from which the ILC, mandated by states, developed the equidistance-special 
circumstances rule. Proper intellectual understanding of delimitation leads us to analyse the 
latter first. This however, does not imply any abstract supremacy thereof over the former. 
6.3. The Principle of Maritime Zoning 
6.3.a) Maritime Jurisdiction 
6.3.a)(i) Basic Concept 
Faced with the need to explain how the principle of maritime zoning bears on the 
conceptualisation of maritime delimitation, one must start by introducing the concept that 
lies at its very heart: maritime jurisdiction. Jurisdiction amounts to "the power of the state to 
affect people, property and circumstances", consisting of "an exercise of authority [...] by 
means of legislative action or by executive action or by judicial action"323. Accordingly, 
maritime jurisdiction may be defined "as the exercise, in conformity with international law, 
of legislative, executive and judicial functions over the sea and over persons and things on 
or under the sea"324. It is important to note however, that maritime jurisdiction "has an 
uncertain scope and content because legal philosophy has not yet been able to disengage 
satisfactorily the exhibition of power from abstract sovereignty"325. 
6.3.a)(ii) Ambit of Interest for This Study 
That jurisdiction, being a corollary of sovereignty over land territory, is essentially a 
territory-oriented concept seems indisputable. Besides territory, however, jurisdiction may 
be founded on other 'principles' (also known as 'bases'), notably: the nationality principle; 
the universal principle; the protective principle; and the passive personality principle. 
Taking account of the distinct powers involved, legislative jurisdiction, judicial jurisdiction, 
and enforcement jurisdiction must be differentiated. Bearing in mind these categorisations, 
another point should be added: enforcement jurisdiction is exclusively territorial. 
The prominence of the principle of the freedom of the seas kept states at bay as to 
the exercise of maritime jurisdiction of a 'territorial' type. Jurisdiction was exercised mainly 
on the basis of the flag. Primarily because the main benefits to states (navigation and 
fishing) were seen as 'sharable', this status quo subsisted for a long time. Only in the fairly 
(323) Shaw/1997, p.452. Cf. Jennings/Watts/1997, p.456; Malanczuk/1997, p.109; Schachter/1991, pp.253-254; Greig/1976, p.210. 
(324) Marston/1989, p.316. 
(325) O'Connell/1982, p.734. 
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recent past, as a result of the process of appropriation of vast oceanic areas by states, did 
maritime jurisdiction emerge 'dressed territorially'326. Indeed, the eagerness in acquiring 
control over oceanic areas was for a time such that many thought about the possibility of a 
gold-rush to ocean resources. A balance was eventually struck between the conflicting 
interests of states (coastal and non-coastal, technologically developed or not), in a division 
of the oceans in areas under national jurisdiction and areas beyond national jurisdiction. 
Looking over the LOSC Preamble, the existence of such balance becomes instinctively 
clear327. For the purpose of this study, only the operation of the territorial principle in 
maritime jurisdiction is in question. Only that part of the exercise of authority by coastal 
states over certain oceanic zones will be investigated. In other words, one will delve into 
what might be named in a certain sense the 'maritime territory' of coastal states, or to use 
more common terminology, the zones under national jurisdiction. 
6.3.b) Maritime Zoning: the Spatial Allocation of Maritime Jurisdiction 
6.3.b)(i) Introductory Remarks 
The Roman notion of dominium maris is one the oldest forms of claim to authority 
over sea areas. It is perhaps the first instance in which a political entity sought to establish 
its control over certain coastal waters, which in concreto were primarily for purposes of 
fisheries {locatio piscatus)32*. With Grotius, apparently, the distinction between dominium 
and imperium was related to the distinction between territorial and personal jurisdiction. 
Noteworthy in this regard is the exclusive nature of the former329. This concept of dominium 
seems to underlie, and to be the ancestor of, an idea of maritime zoning, i.e. the allocation 
of maritime jurisdiction to coastal states on the basis of the territorial principle. 
Intrinsic to Grotius' distinction between dominium and imperium was an embryonic 
idea of 'ocean zoning'330. Whereas dominium (implying necessarily imperium) existed in 
relation to coastal waters only {mare particulare), imperium considered autonomously was 
related to the high seas {mare universale)331. To some degree, the authority of states over 
the ocean was already in the 17th century dependent upon 'spatial circumscription'. That 
boundary-making {lato sensu) is "the delimitative aspect of the spatial allocation of 
(326) The Truman Proclamation and its impact in international affairs, the dramatic technological developments post-World War II, 
and the attempt by states to control the access to ocean resources exploitation are key factors of the changes undergone. 
(327) Cf. Guedes/1998, pp.15-75; Jennings/Watts/1997, pp.720-726; Brown/1994(1), pp.5-21; DeMarffy/1991; Schachter/1991, 
pp.274-296; Galssner/1990, pp.1-34; McDougal/Burke/1987, pp.1-56; Anand/1983 (chapters 4-6); O'Connell/1982, p.733-746. 
(328) Guedes/1998, pp.16-17; BrandSo/1971, p.36. 
(329) 0'Connell/1982, p.16. 
(330) Johnston/1988, pp.248-250. 
(331) O'Connell/1982, pp.17-18. 
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authority" is to be understood in this light3 3 2. Latent in the concepts of regime and zone, the 
spatial allocation of authority is indeed the cornerstone of the contemporary law of the sea. 
Paramount to a proper understanding of maritime zoning is equally the idea that claims of 
states over sea areas "may be categorised in terms of [1] inclusiveness or exclusiveness of 
use demanded, [2] the degree of comprehensiveness of authority asserted, and [3] the 
geographical area in which such use and the authority are demanded"333. These are the three 
'vectors' whereby maritime zoning must be explained. 
Until recently, the res communis nature of the oceans led authors to conceptualise 
the exercise of maritime jurisdiction vis-a-vis the principle of the freedom of the oceans. 
The former appeared as a qualitative (substantive) and quantitative (spatial) limitation to the 
latter334. The tide has turned with the LOSC. Both the "High Seas" and the "Area"335, the 
areas of inclusiveness, are defined spatially in residual terms. What the LOSC offers is, 
inter alia, the framework within which the allocation of maritime authority is effectuated. 
Indeed, "[t]he division of the sea into various zones [...] has meant that there are varying 
scales of competence of coastal states and shipping states over things, persons and events at 
sea"336. Spatial limits are set to areas of exclusiveness and to areas of inclusiveness, i.e. 
areas under national jurisdiction, as opposed to areas beyond national jurisdiction. Each 
geographical area under national jurisdiction has a different degree of authority conferred 
on the state, which stems from different balances struck between exclusivity and inclusivity. 
In short, today the international law of the sea incorporates a principle of maritime zoning, 
whereby maritime jurisdiction is allocated to states on a 'territorial' basis. 
6.3.b)(ii) The Paramountcv of Proximity in Maritime Zoning 
Bearing the above in mind, the grounds must be determined on which maritime 
jurisdiction - in its facet of dominium bearing an exclusive and territorial nature337 - has 
been allocated to states under international law. In question, here, are the criteria on which 
the maritime entitlements of states are based. More important than simply stating that the 
LOSC is strong evidence that 'the land dominates the sea' through proximity (adjacency) -
something easily realisable by its endorsement of the distance criterion - is to show that 
proximity has been linked to forms of maritime zoning throughout the history of the law of 
(332) Johnston/1988, pp.42-44. By framing the issue in this way, maritime zones appear as central to, and a condition for the 
application of, the law of the sea (Treves/1990, p.61). 
(333) McDougal/Burke/1987, p.29 (also pp.56-57). 
(334) Bouchez/1964, p.6. 
(335) LOSC, Articles 1.1.(1), 86. 
(336) O'Connell/1982, p.733. 
(337) The term dominium is intended to express the territorial character, and the exclusive-effect, of the powers exercised by coastal 
states over adjacent maritime zones - it conveys no endorsement of it as expression of the juridical nature of any maritime zone. 
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the sea . Prior to this however, attention must be drawn to the notion of proximity, which 
is to be seen in relative terms (i.e. closely related to technological development), and which 
has allowed an increasing ability to effectively control maritime spaces further offshore339. 
One of the first doctrines of maritime zoning, which led certain maritime spaces to 
be equated to terra firma, was the doctrine of inter fauces terrae, which developed into the 
notion of juridical bay. Since centuries ago, states have claimed authority over secluded 
waters located 'within the jaws of the land'. The proximity of these waters to the shores 
soon made it possible to exercise 'sovereign authority' over them. This is the highest degree 
of authority, which corresponds to the highest degree of proximity between land and sea. 
Archipelagic waters, to the extent that they consist of waters circumscribed by the 
perimeter of a group of mid-ocean islands, bear an analogous notion of closeness. The 
waters in question are 'surrounded' by land territory. However, because the land territory is 
not 'continuous', and because the degree of closeness is less, the ties between land and sea 
are weakened. That is why these waters may perhaps be analogised instead to those in the 
vicinity of 'complex coasts', in the sense endorsed in the 1951 Fisheries case. Whatever the 
perspective, there is little doubt that jurisdiction over archipelagic waters is based also on an 
idea of proximity. 
In respect of jurisdiction over the belt of littoral waters, from the 15th to the 17th 
centuries scholarship alluded to various criteria. Amongst them were distance from the 
coast, sailing distance, range of vision (line-of-sight, land-kenning, vue), and canon-shot. 
Each criterion usually reflected a regional practice. By the 18th century, states used different 
criteria still, largely as a result of the historical development. Eventually, distance prevailed, 
and became the sole criterion for defining the extent of territorial waters. Since this was a 
more precise criterion, all other criteria converged thereto through various translations into 
distance. Once more, it is important to highlight that maritime zoning was justified through 
criteria all of which conveyed a notion of proximity to the land. Claims to specific types of 
jurisdiction (customs, policing, security, sanitation, neutrality) beyond the territorial sea 
were put forward by states since the 18,h century, subsequently leading to the emergence of 
the concept of contiguous zone. They also were almost invariably based on distance from 
the coast (or on criteria that later converged thereto). 
The claims to jurisdiction over fisheries beyond the territorial sea, the predecessors 
of the exclusive fisheries zones of the 20th century, date back to the late 17th and early 18th 
(338) This survey is based on the following references: Guedes/1998, pp.17-28; Rocha/1996, pp.23-103; Brown/1992, pp.9-13; 
Westerman/1987, pp.32-74; O'Connell/1982, pp.124-169, 233-258, 338-370, 439-581, 733-746; Fulton/1976, pp.537-740; 
Brandao/1971,pp.35-55; Hurst/1924; Hurst/1923. 
(339) The notions of nearness and remoteness depend on the (technological) means available to travel the distance in question. 
-203-
TOWARDS THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF MARITIME DELIMITATION 
century. The location of fishing-grounds and movements of stocks were certainly central to 
these claims, as especially was the seabed morphology for trawling (which was, and still is, 
carried out in areas of flat seabed, usually in depths of under 200 metres)340. Still, the most 
common criteria upon which these claims were based were the canon-shot rule and distance 
from the coast. Something similar occurred with the EEZ. Underlying the 200-mile limit 
advanced by the Latin American states341 is the up-welling phenomenon off the west coast 
of South America (which leads to the appearance of fishing resources), whose effects 
(although decreasing with distance) extend up to approximately 200 M from the coast. 
Continental shelf zoning is the only case in relation to which the role of proximity is 
not exclusive. The Truman proclamation referred to the continental shelf as "an extension 
o f , and "naturally appurtenant to", the landmass of the state, being "contiguous" thereto. 
This concept of contiguity is undoubtedly a reference to proximity and it is because of this 
duality that no outer limit for this type of maritime zone was advanced therein. The allusion 
to "modern technological progress" amounted, as happened in the CS Convention some 
years later, to the criterion for establishing such a limit. Continental shelf zoning was thus 
based on a duality of criteria - proximity and natural appurtenance - the precise content of 
which however, was conditioned by the available technology. 
The consecration of 'distance to the coast', in the LOSC, as the criterion upon which 
maritime entitlement is founded (therefore defining the geographical area of authority) can 
hardly be seen as surprising342. It amounts to sanctioning proximity as the basis of maritime 
zoning, and merely reflects the role thereof throughout the history of the law of the sea. 
Recourse to geo-scientific criteria for establishing continental shelf jurisdiction is not 
sufficient to diminish the relevance of proximity343. No doubt, when speaking of maritime 
zoning beyond 200 M, attention must focus mainly on geomorphological and geological 
aspects. But these geo-scientific criteria bear a notion of 'geological proximity' {lato sensu). 
(340) Fulton, examining the relationship between the geographical limits of the 200-metre bathymetric and the three-mile limit, 
argues for the inadequacy of the latter as regards fishing jurisdiction (Fulton/1976, pp.737-740). 
(341) These claims (diverse and complex in nature) were a reaction to claims to continental shelf rights, and were advanced by 
states that have very narrow geological continental shelves. They were based on distance for a combination of two reasons. The 
motivating factor was to guarantee the exclusive access to fishing resources; and because the column of water where these 
resources exist is featureless, the limits for this zone could only be established by recourse to distance. Furthermore, this criterion 
created certainty, and was independent of local considerations, which made it exportable to other cases, thus facilitating the 
emergence of an extended practice. The reference to sovereignty was perhaps owed to the fact that international law had, until 
then, placed serious restrictions upon the exercise of jurisdictional powers related to fisheries beyond territorial waters. Dressing 
such claims as extended claims to sovereignty reinforced their relevance. 
(342) LOSC, Articles 3, 33(2), 57, 76(1). All provisions defining the spatial limits of maritime zones resort to distance. In the case 
of the continental shelf, such reference is coupled to a geo-scientific criterion (based on geology and geomorphology). 
(343) The conceptual consequences of the consecration of the distance criterion as basis for continental shelf entitlement do not 
seem to have all been accounted for by the Third Conference. The proposition that the 200-mile continental shelf entitlement 
might continue to be an ab initio and ipso facto right is perplexing. Yet that seems to be the conceptual perspective consecrated in 
Article 77(3). 
-204-
TOWARDS THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF MARITIME DELIMITATION 
One would argue that such a notion is not antonym to 'geographic proximity' (distance). 
Rather, it expresses closeness in a different manner. 
Why proximity has been preponderant as the basis of maritime zoning is explicable 
in light of power-politics, power being understood (in the words of Byers) as the ability "to 
control or significantly influence how actors - in this case states - behave". States "in 
geographic proximity to the area in which [some] rule is to be applied will usually be in a 
more powerful position than states which are more distant", for "the ability to project power 
derived from some sources, especially military capabilities, is at least partly dependent on 
geographic proximity"344. The relevance of enforcement of a claim for establishing such a 
claim, by the exercise of power i f need be, scarcely needs underlining. The emergence of 
the canon-shot rule as a foundation of territorial sea zoning is the paradigmatic and literal 
illustration of how geographic proximity and power have interwoven. 
As one delves into the scope of authority bestowed upon states in international law, 
further weight is lent to the argument that proximity is the paramount notion in attribution 
of maritime jurisdiction. Proximity means power. That is why along a scale of 'distance 
from the coast' maritime jurisdiction appears as a diminuendo. Moving further offshore, the 
degree of comprehensiveness of the authority of states dwindles as a result of the different 
balances that are struck between exclusiveness and inclusiveness. While the relevance of the 
former decreases, that of the latter increases. It is this changing-balance between exclusive 
interests and inclusive interests that lies at the root of the precedence of entitlements in 
maritime delimitation345. 
The use of distance as an expression of the notion of proximity is intimately related 
to a chief aim of legal systems: certainty346. It reflects "a widespread desire for uniformity 
and certainty", which having "the virtue of simplicity [...] is widely, i f not universally, 
expected to result in stability"347. This need for certainty is also expressed in the criterion of 
'geological proximity'. This explains the degree of technical-scientific detail with which the 
limit of continental shelf jurisdiction beyond 200 M was conventionally set down, and 
reinforced by the technical-scientific refinement brought on by the Guidelines of the CLCS. 
The principle of maritime zoning is, therefore, the fundamental normative criterion 
that allows states to claim, and appropriate, maritime zones of various kinds. From it stems 
the maritime entitlement of coastal states, generated on the basis of proximity between land 
and sea. Its existence is noticeable in treaty law and state practice, and has been explicitly 
(344) Byers/1999, pp.5, 60, emphasis added. 
(345) Para.4.3.d)(iii)(iv) supra, in particular Graphic 1. 
(346) Para.6.2.b) supra. 
(347) Johnston/1988, p.239. 
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endorsed by jurisprudence. Essentially, this principle expresses the 'territorialisation' of 
maritime zones348, a phenomenon that resulted from the need to enforce exclusiveness. 
6.3.c) Maritime Zoning versus Maritime Delimitation 
6.3.c)(i) Maritime Entitlement and Overlapping of Entitlements 
Examining the relationship between maritime zoning and maritime delimitation, one 
would argue that it must be understood in light of the notions of maritime entitlement and of 
overlapping of entitlements, respectively. International law confers upon states the right to 
claim and exercise jurisdiction over a certain maritime area, the limits of which are defined 
(primarily) through distance to the coast. Unlike title, which revolves around a right to 
possess a certain land or maritime area, the notion of maritime entitlement consists of a 
prima facie right to exercise jurisdiction over a sea area, and does not presuppose absolute 
exclusiveness. A maritime entitlement is concretised as exclusive jurisdiction in one of two 
situations: (i) where there are no competing entitlements; (ii) in the presence of competing, 
overlapping entitlements, once the concurrence of rights is resolved through delimitation. 
The adjectival term 'potential' that has been used to express the sub conditione character of 
'maritime entitlements' is to be understood in this light3 4 9. 
Whereas maritime zoning concerns the relationship of exclusiveness-inclusiveness, 
maritime delimitation is concerned with two opposing positions of exclusiveness, i.e. an 
overlapping of two potential positions of exclusiveness. In the former, exclusive interests of 
one state conflict with inclusive interests of the community of states. The latter, involving at 
least two states, represents the clash between sets of exclusive interests. For this clash to be 
legally relevant, each competing position has to conform to the standards established under 
international law, bringing into play the notion of overlapping of entitlements. Maritime 
delimitation amounts to the allocation of authority in the area of overlapping prima facie 
jurisdictions - which is effected by the resolution of the existing concurrence of rights. 
Entailing the 'amputation' of the maritime entitlements of both claimants, it determines how 
the area of overlap is to be divided for purposes of exercise of authority (or less likely, to 
which state authority over the whole area of overlap is allocated). 
6.3.c)(ii) Overview of Case Law: The Pre-LOSC Period 
The expression 'the land dominates the sea' encapsulates the substantive core of the 
principle of maritime zoning. For all practical purposes, the two concepts should be viewed 
(348) Arguably, this phenomenon of 'territorialisation' has also extended to maritime boundaries; cf. para.8.4.c)(i) infra. 
(349) On the notions of maritime entitlement and overlapping of entitlements, cf. para.4.3. supra. 
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as synonymous. Two fundamental reasons justify the preferential use of the latter nomen 
juris. First, it avoids potential confusions related to meanings previously attributed to the 
former notion in jurisprudence and scholarship. Secondly, 'principle of maritime zoning' is 
a terminology that conveys more accurately the contents of the 'ideal ought' described here, 
thus making its comprehension easier. Irrespective of terminological quarrels, a survey of 
selected case law is necessary to shed light on the contents of the principle of maritime 
zoning, as well as on the distinction between maritime zoning and maritime delimitation. 
Although not using a specific denomination, in the Grisbadarna arbitration the 
Tribunal stated that the principle "in accordance with which the maritime territory is an 
essential appurtenance of land territory" was a fundamental principle "of the law of the 
nations, both ancient and modern"350. Worthy of emphasis is the idea that entitlement over 
sea areas is derived from sovereign title over land territory. This seems an ever-present 
notion in international law, consolidated historically. The same idea was confirmed in the 
1951 Fisheries case. Alluding to a "close dependence of the territorial sea upon the land 
domain", the Court re-stated that "[i]t is the land which confers upon the coastal state a right 
to the waters off its coasts". A more relevant contribution was the reference to different 
degrees of 'closeness' between sea areas and land territory, "the more or less close 
relationship" between them, which justified a different treatment under the law. This idea 
lies at the root of the differentiated regimes of maritime zones351. 
In the North Sea cases, the Court reaffirmed that a coastal state is entitled to 
continental shelf areas "by virtue of its sovereignty over the land". Its most important 
contribution was to clarify that the principle that the land dominates the sea refers to all 
maritime zones under coastal states' jurisdiction. With this said, it must be observed that 
other aspects of the Court's approach are debatable, as is for instance the lack of distinction 
between criteria of entitlement and standards of delimitation. The failure to identify this 
crucial distinction became obvious when dealing with the "test of appurtenance". Proximity 
and closer proximity were treated as equivalent, and natural prolongation used as a 
standard of delimitation. The drawbacks of these cases result from this misconception. 
Whereas natural prolongation and proximity are related to maritime entitlement, closer 
proximity belongs to the realm of delimitation. Had this distinction been made, the idea that 
proximity also lay at the root of the continental shelf entitlement would have been easily 
accepted352. 
(350) AJIL/1910/4, p.231. 
(351) ICJ/Reports/1951, p.133. 
(352) Id/Reports/1969, pp.23,30-32, 52, paras.19, 39-43, 96. 
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The conceptual core of the principle of maritime zoning is once again restated in the 
Aegean Sea case, which emphasised that "legally a coastal state's rights over the continental 
shelf are both appurtenant to and directly derived from the state's territory abutting on that 
continental shelf. Although it dealt with entitlement and delimitation as being two parts of 
one single issue, when mentioning disputes "regarding entitlement to and delimitation of 
areas of the continental shelf the Court acknowledged for the first time the existence of a 
conceptual distinction between the two notions353. 
In line with previous case law, the Beagle Channel arbitration re-avers the idea that 
"an attribution of territory must ipso facto carry with it the waters appurtenant to the 
territory attributed". Noteworthy about this decision is the fact that the Tribunal labelled 
this principle "an overriding general principle of law". This approach to the principle of 
maritime zoning lends further weight to its role in maritime delimitation. Inasmuch as the 
dividing-line in the channel waters was designed to also effect a "division of the small 
islands lying in it", such a line seems to be a maritime boundary as much as a line of 
allocation. That explains perhaps the subsequent reference that was made to "mixed factors 
of appurtenance"354. 
6.3.c)(iii) Overview of Case Law: The Post-LOSC Period 
By taking into account the draft-LOSC, the Tunisia/Libya Judgment bears the first 
indications of the 'new winds' brought by the Third Conference. The Court then referred to 
the "geographical correlation between the coast and submerged areas off the coast". Most 
importantly, it clarified that "in connection with the concept of natural prolongation, the 
coast [...] is the decisive factor for title to submarine areas". The developments of the 
LOSC apparently compelled the Court to shift the emphasis towards the coast of the state. 
Another conceptual contribution of this case was that it confirmed the distinction between 
the legal status of submerged areas and the delimitation of those areas355. 
In the Gulf of Maine case, the influence of the LOSC criteria in the attribution of 
maritime jurisdiction became even clearer. The Chamber acknowledged that geographic 
proximity can in most cases "be credited with the ability to express, perhaps better than 
that of natural prolongation, the link between a state's sovereignty and its sovereign rights 
to adjacent submerged land". In addition, it stated that it also "express[ed] correctly the link 
between the state's territorial sovereignty and its sovereign rights over water covering such 
(353) ICJ/Reports/1978, p.37, para.86. 
(354) ILR/52/1979, pp. 184-185, paras. 107-110. 
(355) ICJ/Reports/1982, p.61, paras.73-74, emphasis added. 
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submerged land". The relationship between proximity and maritime zoning had inexorably 
surfaced. Less well-conceptualised appear to be other ideas. It is a misconception on several 
grounds to see the principle that 'the land dominates the sea' as one of various equitable 
criteria to apply in delimitation356. The principle of maritime zoning is neither a mere 
criterion, nor one of various 'legal entities'. Nor is it equitable in the sense of being a token 
of justice. Quite on the contrary, it embodies a rationale of certainty. 
Often underrated, the Libya/Malta Judgment is undoubtedly a landmark case, as far 
as conceptualisation is concerned. First, the distinct, although complementary, relationship 
between entitlement to maritime zones and maritime delimitation was properly presented. 
Thus, the misconception that tainted the 1969 Judgment (i.e. the confusion between criteria 
of entitlement and standards of delimitation) was once and for all resolved in this case. 
Secondly, admitting that distance from the coast was common to both EEZ and continental 
shelf entitlements, the Court acknowledged that this element had to be attributed "greater 
importance". Thus the paramountcy of proximity in allocation of maritime zones was fully 
endorsed. Thirdly, it was recognised that the concepts of natural prolongation and distance 
are "not opposed but complementary", and that the latter had not superseded the former357. 
In this light, the Canada/France arbitration is perhaps questionable. The explanation 
that was given as to why the coast of the French islands projected onto the sea in only one 
direction is unconvincing. Apparently implying that certain maritime entitlements might be 
limited in direction when facing competing entitlements, this decision seems difficult to 
justify legally. Conceptually much stronger are the Jan May en case, the Eritrea/Yemen 
arbitration and the Qatar/Bahrain case. Interpreting adequately the principle of maritime 
zoning, they all approach delimitation on the basis of the notion of overlap of entitlements 
(defined through distance from the coast). In the Qatar/Bahrain case, while restating that 
maritime rights stem from coastal states' sovereignty over the land (the land dominates the 
sea), the ICJ noted that, for establishing maritime jurisdiction, all points on the low-water 
line of continental or insular land features under the sovereignty of a state should be taken 
into consideration358. This is the ultimate stage of the paramountcy of distance. It should be 
stressed, however, that because of the distinction between maritime zoning and maritime 
(356) ICJ/Reports/1984, pp.296, 312-313, paras. 102,157. 
(357) ICJ/Reports/1985, pp.29-34, paras.27-34. The use of the term "complementary" was criticised by Judge Oda, who affirmed 
that the two criteria are in effect "alternative" (Dissenting Opinion, ICJ/Reports/1985, p. 157). Undoubtedly, the two definitions 
given in Article 76 are alternative. Nevertheless, to the extent that they complement each other in the definition of the legal 
continental shelf, one would argue that they should be seen as "complementary". Lucchini and Voelckel, while referring to the 
North Sea and Libya/Malta Judgments, speak of a spectacular evolution of the conceptual understanding of the entitlement to 
continental shelf areas (Lucchini/Voslckel/1996, p.204). 
(358) Qatar/Bahrain-Merits, paras. 180-185. 
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delimitation, the fact that all basepoints are relevant for defining the extension of maritime 
zones does not entail that all basepoints are to be considered in maritime delimitation. 
6.3.d) Equidistance ('Closer Proximity') as a Legal Concept 
6.3.d)(i) Recent Trend in Case Law 
Before addressing the issues underlying the legal notion of equidistance ('closer 
proximity'), a clarification is necessary. The equidistance method belongs to the world of 
technicalities, and was examined above359. The scrutiny of equidistance below has nothing 
to do with how this line is defined geographically, but rather with the political-legal division 
of areas of exclusiveness on the basis of the 'closer proximity' criterion. As such it belongs 
to the world of politics and international law. 
That equidistance (usually portrayed as a mere method), or 'closer proximity', is not 
part of customary law is perhaps the most repeated statement in jurisprudence on maritime 
delimitation - at least until 1992360. The Jan Mayen case appears to have brought a shift of 
approach in adjudication of maritime boundaries, and to mark the beginning of a new era. 
Equidistance was definitively consolidated as the provisional delimitation line. The Court 
stated that "it is in accord with precedents to begin with the median line as a provisional 
line" for the delimitation361. This provisional recourse to equidistance was re-affirmed in the 
Eritrea/Yemen arbitration (which nonetheless also considered the fact that both disputants 
explicitly endorsed i t ) 3 6 2 . In the Qatar/Bahrain case, the Court sanctioned the Jan Mayen 
Judgment; and re-averred the proposition that an equidistance-line was appropriate as the 
starting point for delimitation (despite also stating that it did not "have the benefit of a 
presumption in its favour ) 3 6 3 . Attention should thus be devoted to one chief thought. To no 
avail did courts attempt to sideline equidistance from the delimitation process in their earlier 
decisions. Eventually, although without explicitly recognising its obligatory nature, they 
were compelled (by the very nature of things as will be shown) to have recourse thereto as 
the starting point of delimitation. 
The similar recourse to equidistance in the delimitation of the territorial sea and of 
the jurisdictional zones beyond it, in the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration and the Qatar/Bahrain 
case, must be highlighted. This demonstrates how correct Weil was when forecasting that 
(359) Para.5.2. supra. Also making a distinction between the method and the normative standard, cf. Jennings/1989, pp.398-399. 
(360) North Sea cases, ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.30-38, 54, paras.39-59, 101(A); Anglo/French arbitration, RIAA/18, pp.45, 50-51, 
paras.70, 82-85; Tunisia/Libya case, lCJ/Reports/1982, pp.79-80, paras.110-111; Gulf of Maine case, Id/Reports/1984, 
pp.296-298, 315, paras. 102-107, 162; Guinea/Guinea-Bissau arbitration, ILM/25/1986, p.294, para.102; Libya/Malta case, 
ICJ/Reports/1985, pp.37-38, 55-56, paras.43-44, 77; Canada/France arbitration, ILM/31/1992, p.l 163, para.38. 
(361) Jan Mayen case, ICJ/Reports/1993, pp.61-62, paras.51-53. 
(362) Eritrea/Yemen-II, paras. 131 -132. 
(363) Qatar/Bahrain-Merits, paras.227-233. 
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the lost unity of delimitation law seemed "to be reconstituting itself around the rules of 
customary law developed by the Court rather than on the rule of equidistance/special 
circumstances, so much so that it would appear to be the legal regime for the delimitation of 
the territorial sea which is losing its particularity and becoming merged in the legal regime 
appertaining to the delimitation of the continental shelf and the EEZ"364. As if to confirm 
this idea, when delimiting the territorial sea boundary between Qatar and Bahrain, the Court 
cited the Jan Mayen Judgment (which was concerned with continental shelf and fisheries 
zone delimitation) to explain how the provisional equidistance-line was to be adjusted to 
obtain an equitable result365. 
On the effect of the distinction between adjacency and oppositeness, and its impact 
on the recourse to equidistance, from the outset must be remembered the words of the 
Committee of Experts that advised the ILC. They noted that situations could be anticipated 
in which departing from equidistance would be necessary in order to accommodate other 
interests366. Most importantly, this caveat encompassed (although expressed in different 
terms) both cases of adjacency and of oppositeness. No reference whatever was made as 
regards the likelihood of their occurrence in either case. Case law appears to have evolved 
greatly also with respect to this issue. The North Sea Judgment placed great emphasis upon 
this distinction367, which was kept in various subsequent decisions. However, if it is taken 
into account that the views of the Committee of Experts related to strict equidistance, it 
becomes easy to realise that the emphasis placed on this distinction was not only artificial, 
but also technically and legally unjustified368. 
In terms of potential inequitable outcomes, the difference between oppositeness and 
adjacency is less relevant than has often been stated in jurisprudence. The examples of the 
Libya/Malta and the Jan Mayen cases, and the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, all illustrate how 
recourse to strict equidistance might result in inequitable boundaries in situations of 
oppositeness369. These instances, in which adjustments were made to strict equidistance, are 
enough to demonstrate how recourse to strict equidistance in delimitations between opposite 
coasts is as likely to yield an inequitable boundary as in delimitations between adjacent 
coasts. The 'discovery' of equitable boundaries may indeed be approached similarly in both 
oppositeness and adjacency. Such a demonstration, which had already been made in the 
Anglo/French and Dubai/Sharjah arbitrations, came again with the Qatar/Bahrain case. 
(364) Weil/1989a,p.l41. 
(365) Qatar/Bahrain-Merits, para.217. Reaching a similar conclusion, cf. Anderson/2001, p.8. 
(366) Para.5.2.a)(i) supra. 
(367) ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.18-19,36-38, paras.6-8, 54-59. 
(368) Antunes/2001, pp.333-337. 
(369) ICJ/Reports/1985, p.46-53, 57, paras.60-73, 79; lCJ/Reports/1993, pp.59-77, paras.49-86; Erirrea/Yemen-II, paras.|31-168. 
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The delimitation in the northern sector, between coasts that are adjacent, was effected on 
the same basis as the delimitation in the southern sector (between opposite coasts), just as in 
the cases aforementioned. Equidistance was used as the starting line, followed by the 
adjustments necessary to enable an equitable boundary370. 
The insistence that equidistance is non-obligatory is striking. Should this be as 
clear-cut as courts have affirmed, it would hardly need to be repeated. Behind these 
statements indubitably lies the awareness of the disharmony between the bulk of state 
practice and jurisprudence. The downgrading of equidistance to a mere method was no 
more than a stratagem to avoid facing directly the legal content embedded in equidistance. 
The persistent reference to equitable principles as part of customary law (without ever 
showing the relevant state practice) appears to have been but a way of conferring on courts 
a margin of discretion that was never intended by states (as shown since the preparatory 
work of the 1958 Conventions). Notwithstanding this, what matters is to identify the 
reasons that 'forced' courts to eventually follow an approach to maritime delimitation in 
line with that adopted by states in negotiation. 
6.3.d)(ii) A Corollary Emanating from the Principle of Maritime Zoning 
Hitherto, courts have lacked the ingenuity to depart from what is an untenable 
position as to delimitation law: affirming that equidistance (as means of allocating maritime 
zones on the basis of 'closer proximity') has no legal content, being simply a method which 
benefits of no preference amongst others. Insofar as this would amount to admitting that 
they were in error, such position is scarcely surprising. On this matter, however, Weil is 
right when saying that rejecting the intrinsic juridical relevance of equidistance amounts to 
a hangover from the past, which will pass sooner rather than later371. The failure to 
recognise that equidistance is a 'natural law', inherent in maritime delimitation by virtue of 
the principle of maritime zoning, serves no purpose. Indeed, it has a negative bearing on the 
refinement of delimitation law. Fortunately, taking account of recent case law, it appears 
that such a leap might not be too far away. 
Given the fact that this proposition challenges case law, as well as most scholarship, 
the burden of proving it is certainly accepted. The first reason for contending that recourse 
to equidistance in maritime delimitation is immanent to maritime zoning concerns legal 
logics, and systematic coherence. Conceptually, three important relationships (bearing the 
exact same analogy) lie at the nucleus of this argument. Maritime zoning relates to maritime 
(370) Qatar/Bahrain-Merits, paras. 169-170, 176-223, 230-249. For an illustration of the Qatar/Bahrain case, see Figure 13. 
(371) Weil/1989a,p.81. 
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delimitation in the same way in which entitlement and distance relate to the overlapping of 
entitlements and equidistance, respectively (Table 1). 
TABLE 1 
Maritime Zoning and Maritime Delimitation: Analogical Relationships 
MARITIME ZONING < = = > MARITIME DELIMITATION 
ENTITLEMENT < = > OVERLAPPING OF ENTITLEMENTS 
DISTANCE EQUIDISTANCE 
(PROXIMITY) (CLOSER PROXIMITY) 
The Court has acknowledged in the Libya/Malta case that the legal entitlement of 
states to maritime areas off their coasts "cannot be other than pertinent" to the delimitation 
of these areas372. This reflects the first of the aforementioned relationships. Subsequently, in 
the Jan Mayen and the Qatar/Bahrain cases, and in the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, the 
notion of overlapping of entitlements was used as the fulcrum of the delimitation. Of crucial 
importance is the example set by the Jan Mayen case in relation to the determination of the 
relevant length of coastlines for purposes of proportionality assessments, which referenced 
it to the basepoints relevant for the computation of the equidistance (which are potentially 
the same for defining the limits of the maritime entitlement)373. The validity of the second 
correlation was therefore asserted. 
Currently, the step missing in a comprehensive conceptualisation of maritime 
delimitation is to aver, dejure, the mandatory resort to equidistance in the delimitation 
process (which is the recent de facto approach of courts). This is virtually inexorable. 
Maritime zoning exists only insofar as states possess a coastal front, which is the basis of 
maritime entitlement. A certain point at sea falls under state jurisdiction because of the 
'control' exercised over it by a point on the coast - the nearest point on the coast. Where a 
'sea-point' falls simultaneously within the 'control' of the points situated on coasts of 
different states, that 'sea-point' is part of an area of overlapping entitlements. Since 
maritime entitlement is based on distance, then, in principle, 'coastal-points' situated nearer 
to the 'sea-point' in question exercise a 'stronger control'. The exclusiveness imposed by 
the nearest point is, prima facie, stronger than the exclusiveness that results from other 
(372) ICJ/Reports/1985, p.30, 34, paras.27,34. 
(373) ICJ/Reports/1993, pp.47-48, 65, paras.20-21, 61. The same basepoints were utilised as reference to define the limits of the 
relevant area. 
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points. Whether the nearest point is sufficiently nearer to exclude completely the control of 
other points, or whether the strength of the control exercised by the nearer 'coastal-points' 
of state A are to be weighed-up differently than that of the nearer 'coastal-points' of state B, 
are different questions, the answer to which does not alter the 'ideal ought' of the principle. 
The second ground for the contention that equidistance emanates from maritime 
zoning relates to the issue of precedence between different entitlements. That proximity 
means power is axiomatic. It explains why state authority decreases the further one moves 
offshore. This decrease of intensity of state power amounts also to a weakening of the 
maritime entitlement. Stemming from this, the idea of precedence of entitlements is cardinal 
to unravelling the role of 'closer proximity' in maritime delimitation. When an EEZ or 
continental shelf entitlement faces an entitlement to territorial sea, the latter prevails. This is 
merely a particular translation of a wider rationale. The idea that, in general, when any two 
competing entitlements collide, 'closer proximity' provides an 'instinctive' assessment as to 
the relative strength of those competing entitlements as regards each point at sea is far too 
compelling to be ignored. 'Closer proximity' appears - naturally - as the criterion to 
determine the relative prevalence between competing entitlements. 
The third argument in support of equidistance would be decisive on its own. 
Equidistance is the only criterion that reflects the basis on which the maritime entitlement is 
generated (distance); it provides uniformity and certainty in the determination of the course 
of the boundary to the same degree as distance does in relation to maritime entitlement; and 
it tends to allocate maritime areas in a just fashion. 
Of these propositions, only the last has been questioned. Jurisprudence and some 
scholarship have argued that, because in certain cases equidistance yields inequitable 
boundaries, and because the aim of any delimitation is to seek an equitable solution, the 
application of equidistance is rendered non-mandatory. This argument must be refuted. To 
begin with, one is unaware of any principle of law capable of yielding a just outcome in 
every case. Paradoxically, even equity might become inequitable. I f applied as the single, 
exclusive criterion of dispute resolution in every case, equity would create such a level of 
uncertainty in social relations that it would result in injustice on many occasions. Added to 
this, a crucial point has been missed by those who argue against equidistance. Their case is 
centred on the results yielded by equidistance in specific geographical contexts. Analyses in 
concreto however, are conditioned by different perceptions of the case. I f an objectifying 
stance is adopted, by looking at equidistance from a theoretical perspective, the conclusions 
are rather different374. As a final argument, one ought to return to the ideas of certainty and 
(374) Para.6.3.d)(iv) infra. 
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uniformity that lie behind the adoption of distance as an entitlement criterion. Equidistance 
also stems from the principle of maritime zoning because it provides the same certainty and 
uniformity. In effect, were it not for equidistance, one would be left with no objective 
starting point; so much so that Jennings argues that in the North Sea cases equidistance was 
the reference-line underlying the Court's idea of "a disputed marginal or fringe area". As he 
notes, any idea of "marginal" or "fringe" must be related to a potential boundary, which 
could only be the equidistance-line375. All other lines lack reasonableness and certainty. 
More than the logical starting point in delimitation, equidistance is the only reasonable 
starting point, the 'natural line' for first approaching delimitations376. 
6.3.d)(iii) Equidistance as the Reference Point for the Third State Issue 
That equidistance is the only logical and reasonable starting point for delimitation is 
reinforced by the fact that, when more than two states are involved, it is the only valid 
reference-notion on the basis of which to address the issue. One example of case law that 
confers significant weight on this proposition is the Cameroon/Nigeria case. The Court used 
equidistance to justify why questions brought before it did not concern third states. It stated 
that the rights and interests thereof were not at issue in the dispute over the maritime 
boundary from point G landwards because the geographical location of point G was 
"clearly closer to the Nigerian/Cameroonian mainland than is the location of the tripoint 
Cameroon-Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea to the mainland^11. The "tripoint" in question, upon 
which the reasoning was founded, is an equidistant trijunction point*™. 
A similar approach was followed in the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration. The first point of 
the boundary, albeit north of the limit mentioned in Saudi Arabia's letter to the Tribunal, is 
positioned some 20 M southeast of the estimated equidistant trijunction point379. The 
assertion that this location was positioned "well short" of areas that could be claimed by a 
third state was proven right by the subsequent Saudi Arabia/Yemen agreement380. The 
seaward-most point of the maritime boundary is located roughly 30 M northeast of the 
equidistant trijunction point, or some 36 M north-northeast of the endpoint of the boundary 
awarded. The southern endpoint of the boundary was dealt with in a similar manner, the 
difference being that Djibouti did not make its views known to the Tribunal. 
(375) Jennings/1989, pp.403-405. Cf. para.2.3.d) supra. 
(376) Areas closer to the equidistance-line are more easily transferable to the state on the other side of the line, than other areas. 
(377) Preliminary Objections, ICJ/Reports/1998, pp.323-324, para.l 15. See Figure 14. 
(378) Antunes/2001, pp.336-337; Antunes/2000c, p.189. On the third state issue, cf. paras.8.2.f), 9.3.b) infra. 
(379) This equidistant trijunction point was computed by giving full-effect to the Jabal al-Tayr island. The boundary endpoint is 
some 16 M south of the intersection between a Saudi Arabia/Yemen strict equidistance-line, and the northerly prolongation of the 
boundary-line, i.e. of the equidistance-line between the Eritrean and the Yemeni mainland coasts. 
(380) Appendix 2, F51. See Figure 41. 
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Since it is possible to find in state practice a relevant number of cases confirming 
the recourse to equidistant trijunction points for the purpose of delimiting boundaries while 
preserving the rights and interests of third states381, the approach adopted in these two cases 
acquires greater significance. Prima facie, as long as the boundary adjudged stops clearly 
short of the equidistant trijunction point with a third state, there can be no question of 
infringing upon its rights and interests. No doubt, when boundaries between the parties and 
third states are already defined, it is possible for courts to set the terminal points of the line 
much closer to areas which fall under the third state's jurisdiction. In the Qatar/Bahrain 
case, the northern terminus lies less than 1 M southwards of the loxodrome referred to in 
Iran/Bahrain and Iran/Qatar agreements382; and the southern terminus lies some 2.5 M from 
the end-point the boundary agreed between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain (less than 1 M from 
the prolongation thereof further southeastwards)383. 
Taking this same argument one step further, Equatorial Guinea's Application for 
permission to intervene suggested to the Court that the boundary should not be extended 
"across the median line". This contention should be examined in light of the fact that the 
Cameroonian claim-line extended well beyond equidistance384. Should such a boundary be 
adjudged, Equatorial Guinea argued, its rights and interests would be de facto prejudiced 
(for concessionaires would most probably ignore its "protests and proceed to explore and 
exploit resources to [its] legal and economic detriment"). In its view, its ability to negotiate 
its boundaries with Cameroon and Nigeria on the basis of equidistance would also be 
impaired385. As yet, unfortunately, it is not possible to have the benefit of the Court's 
decision in the Cameroon/Nigeria case as to the impact of Equatorial Guinea's intervention 
on the delimitation. Notwithstanding this, it is improbable that the maritime boundary 
delimited by the Court will extend beyond the equidistance-line386. 
6.3.d)(iv) The Equitable Normative Content of Equidistance 
Having argued that the resort to equidistance is mandatory in maritime delimitation, 
it is necessary to elaborate on its normative content. Although the perspective adopted in 
(381) For some clear examples of this practice, cf. Appendix 2, D2, D13, D16-D17, D20, D38, D43, D52, D58, D61, F4, F14, F21, 
F31,F32,F61. 
(382) Appendix 2, D8, D43. 
(383) See Figure 13. It is noticeable that all three agreements are either based on equidistance or on variations thereof. 
(384) For an illustration of the claim-line, see Figure 14. Cameroon's claim-line was described during the oral hearings; see ICJ, 
Public Sitting of 3 March 1998, Verbatim Record CR/98/02, para.35; cf. also Antunes/2000c, p. 176. As to the geographical 
framework in the Gulf of Guinea, see Figures 37-38. 
(385) Equatorial Guinea added also that Cameroon had never "once hinted that it did not accept the median line as the maritime 
boundary between itself and Equatorial Guinea", and had "never protested" the activities authorised by Equatorial Guinea "on its 
side of the median line [...] including the issuance of oil concessions and the active exploitation of continental shelf resources'. 
(386) Referring to possible solutions for this case, cf. Antunes/2000c, p. 181. 
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this study appears to be irreconcilable with the perspective adopted by courts, perhaps this 
is in appearance only. It is irrefutable that international law has never prescribed, either at 
conventional level or at customary level, that maritime boundaries shall follow strict 
equidistance-lines. To this extent, case law raises no difficulty. Yet, this does not signify 
that equidistance is not a normative standard. Indeed, not only is equidistance a normative 
standard, but it is also an equitable one. 
Recourse to equidistance immediately prompts one key question: Equal distance 
from what? This is where all problems spring. What causes equidistance to yield inequitable 
results is not its rationale; but the definition of 'relevant coastline' adopted in international 
law. I f the relevant coasts were defined differently, the outcome of a delimitation effected 
on the basis of equidistance would also be different. Proof that, as a substantive criterion of 
area-allocation, 'closer proximity' is in abstrato irreproachable appears in the diagrammatic 
examples of Figures 51 and 53 (in which the coasts of the two states are straight lines that 
somewhat mirror each other). Whether between opposite coasts, or between adjacent coasts, 
equidistance effectuates an equal division of the overlapping of entitlements. When applied 
to actual geographical circumstances, equidistance tends to result in equality of division 
(Figures 52 and 54). Noteworthy is the situation in the latter, a case of adjacency in which 
Headland A l (a conspicuous point situated near the terminus of the land boundary) appears 
as the controlling basepoint of the equidistant boundary. Even in such a difficult scenario, 
and notwithstanding the need for adjustments, the division of the area of overlapping 
entitlements through equidistance leads to 'reasonable equality'. Insofar as equality means 
equity, equidistance is intrinsically an equitable criterion. Most importantly, it is the only 
normative standard that, simultaneously, offers certainty in the definition of the course of 
the line, and tends to effect just area-attributions. 
This study submits that equidistance (i.e. 'closer proximity') is a legal principle - a 
sub-principle of the principle of maritime zoning. Necessarily, the distinction between rules 
and principles bears on this proposition. Insofar as it is not a rule stricto sensu, equidistance 
does not operate in an all-or-nothing fashion. It amounts to a starting point for reaching 
concrete solutions - and it is to be construed in casu in the light of other principles. The 
extent to which it governs specific situations is thus variable, and must be assessed on a 
case-by-case basis. I f equidistance collides with another legal principle (e.g. equity), both 
principles must be realised to the highest degree possible relative to the factual and legal 
circumstances in casu, through a mutual maximisation. In short, the 'ideal ought' embedded 
in equidistance is an ever-present standard in maritime delimitation, though the specific 
solution derived from it is determinable only in concreto. International law thus prescribes a 
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provisional recourse to strict equidistance, qualified by adjustments imposed in casu, both 
in adjacency and in oppositeness. 
It must be remembered that the introduction of equidistance, although undoubtedly 
due to the intervention of the Committee of Experts, was implicitly advanced in debates that 
took place before 1953, and was related to considerations of equity. Attempting to objectify 
the division of maritime zones, Sandstrom observed that, under Swedish private law, the 
principle applied was that "where the waters extending in front of two properties had to be 
partitioned or divided, each owner took possession of the waters situated nearest to its own 
territory". In the same debate, Spiropoulos suggested that, between states with opposite 
coasts, "half the continental shelf should belong to each of the two states, in the absence of 
other division arrived at by mutual consent"387. Underlying each of these proposals are the 
two vectors of the rationale of equidistance: proximity and division on an equal basis. 
Without a doubt, these views help explain why the recourse to equidistance was eventually 
accepted by the ILC without major discord. 
State practice has reflected this view since the early stages of maritime delimitation, 
as illustrated by the Iran/Saudi Arabia and Italy/Yugoslavia agreements388. Despite what the 
Court affirmed in the North Sea cases, the reality was that the Netherlands, Germany and 
Denmark went on to delimit a boundary by gradually adjusting the equidistance-lines on 
both sides389. The fact that the vast majority of agreements dealing with continental shelf 
and EEZ delimitation have recourse to equidistance, often mitigated to accommodate the 
equities in casu, can be neither overlooked, nor overstressed390. Importantly, the preference 
of states for this type of approach was soon acknowledged. In the Anglo/French arbitration, 
the Tribunal noted that "in a large proportion of the delimitations known to it" states opted 
for having recourse to "some modification or variant of the equidistance principle"391. This 
approach was central to the Award. Less perceptive, subsequent developments however, 
brought an unnecessary degree of uncertainty to maritime delimitation. 
In the Jan Mayen case, jurisprudence definitively recognised this approach. Wisely 
echoing the approach of the Anglo/French arbitration, the Court took the first step towards 
restoring the legal role of equidistance in delimitation, which was subscribed to in the 
Eritrea/Yemen arbitration and in the Qatar/Bahrain case (in which no distinction was made 
between adjacency and oppositeness as regards the use of equidistance)392. The recourse to 
(387) ILC/Yearbook/l95!(I), p.286, emphasis added. 
(388) Appendix 2, B25-B26. 
(389) Para.2.3.d) supra. 
(390) Cf. Appendix 2. For a short summary of the results of the survey of state practice, cf. Conclusions to Part I supra. 
(391) RIAA/18, p.l 16, para.249; cf. para.2.4.cXi) supra. 
(392) Para.6.4.d)(iii) supra. 
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equidistance in delimitations of areas beyond 200 M from the coast, as happens in the 
USA/Mexico and Australia/France agreements393, deserves further attention. Despite of the 
fact that the overlapping entitlements are based on natural prolongation, 'closer proximity' 
still emerges as the basis for an equitable division. 
To adequately grasp equidistance, one ought to differentiate between the rationale 
embedded therein and the effects that result from the definition of baselines adopted in 
international law. Irrespective of the adopted basepoints, the rationale of equidistance -
which the Jan Mayen case refers to as equitable in character394 - remains unaltered. The 
adjustments to equidistance, if and where necessary, operate primary through manipulation 
of baselines (or basepoints). Two important conceptual points should be identified in this 
respect. The first concerns the methods of delimitation. Common to all methods identified 
as equidistance-related is the fact that they all apply the same rationale. Where they differ is 
in the way the coastline is interpreted, or the relevant basepoints weighed395. The second 
point concerns the law-making process. I f it is considered that the lines defined by these 
methods embody the same rationale, then the conclusion must be that the overwhelming 
majority of state practice resorts in some measure to the rationale of equidistance. 
The fact that the application of equidistance as a delimitation principle has been 
anticipated during the travaux preparatoires of the 1958 Conventions is striking; although 
the specific circumstances in which equidistance was to be departed from were not 
comprehensively foreseen. The commentary to the 1956 Draft stated that because "special 
circumstances would probably necessitate frequent departures from the mathematical 
median line" the rule was meant to be "fairly flexible". The median line thus surfaced as the 
"basis for delimitation" (Article 12). Analogous comments appear in relation to Article 14, 
in which it is stated that "the rule should be very flexibly applied", and to Article 72, where 
reference is made to "exceptional configurations of the coast" and to "the presence of 
islands or of navigable channels" as circumstances that would "arise fairly often", and that 
would require a "fairly elastic" application of the rule3 9 6. 
In summary, it is contended that the utilisation of equidistance as the 'starting point' 
of delimitation - a provisional line - stems from the very notion of maritime zoning being a 
(393) Appendix 2, D2, F64. In the Australia/France agreement, the boundaries run only partially beyond 200 M. 
(394) ICJ/Reports/1993, p.67, para.65. 
(395) Para.5.2. supra. This idea has been underlined more than once by Judge Oda. In the Tunisia/Libya case, he affirmed that 
"[p]erhaps the true solution to the problem relating to the method of equidistance is that account should be always taken of 
various elements and factors when determining the baselines from which the equidistance-line is to be plotted" (Dissenting 
Opinion, ICJ/Reports/1982, p.262, para. 168). The approach he proposes in his Separate Opinion in the Qatar/Bahrain case (which 
follows his views as counsel in the North Sea cases) is an example of the application of equidistance as a rationale, but in which 
the relevant coast is interpreted in terms of facades (cf. para.40, and note that this obviously does not encompass his 
enclave-approach around the Hawar Islands). 
(396) ILC/Yearbook/1956(II), pp.271-272,300, emphasis added. 
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principle of law. The existence of a 'principle of equidistance' is rejected only in case law, 
and even then only formally. More often than not there is a "shadow of an equidistance-line 
even in those cases where the courts have expressly renounced the use" of equidistance397. 
State practice has emphatically endorsed this corollary of the principle of maritime zoning. 
The recourse to equidistance as the starting point of delimitation adjusted where and if 
necessary was consecrated by states. This practice is derived from the crystallisation of the 
principle of maritime zoning. Normatively, what equidistance prescribes is that points at sea 
positioned in the area of overlapping maritime entitlements which are closer to state A than 
to state B ought prima facie to be subject to the sovereignty or jurisdiction of state A. 
Which points are closer to each coast is a question that depends on how the delimitation 
factors are balanced in casu. This however, is a different issue. 
6.4. The Principle of Equity in Maritime Delimitation 
6.4.a) Key Thoughts on the Concept of Equity 
6.4.a)(i) An 'Indefinable' Concept 
From the outset, it must be conceded that no comprehensive conceptual analysis of 
'equity' in international law is being sought. The present section, modestly, attempts to 
undertake a functional appraisal of the concept of equity, i.e. an appraisal oriented towards 
unravelling the conceptual position of equity in maritime delimitation law. Critical to this 
investigation is to establish whether or not equity is a normative standard, and if so, what 
are its contents. How the paradoxical coexistence of justice and certainty in legal systems 
intertwines in this problem is a paramount issue. Shedding light on what equity means as far 
as the discretion conferred on courts is concerned, is also an important goal. 
Had one to choose an idea to characterise the concept of equity in international law, 
that idea would come from Schachter's initial statement on the diverse manifestations of 
equity: "No concept of international law resists precise definition more than the notion of 
equity"398. Equity is indeed an 'indefinable' concept. Since it is fastened to individual and 
social ethics and morals, every 'juridical mind' has its own 'subjective' perception of 
equity. Notably, it varies in time. Developments in human-social philosophy are bound to 
bear upon the notion of equity at a given moment. Equity, as a legal concept, also varies in 
space399. Different legal upbringings lead to different conceptions of equity. Whereas 
(397) Willis/1986, p.51. 
(398) Schachtei71991,p.55. 
(399) Nader and Starr conclude that "equity is not universal, but is dependent on time, place, and the restraints set against the 'naked 
power' which the dominant members of a society might use" (Nader/Starr/1973, p.136). 
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Anglo-American jurists probably see it as an everyday part of law , their continental 
counterparts probably tend to associate it with non-normative ex aequo et bono decisions401, 
while Chinese jurists probably view it by reference to Confucianism402. The heterogeneity 
of the community to which the international legal system is applicable therefore gives rise 
to idiosyncratic concerns. As a concept, equity is certainly more prone to poetic evocation 
than to legal-scientific precision403. 
Clearly, equity is more easily comprehended through its practical manifestations404, 
than through textbook definitions. Notwithstanding this, to proceed further, it is appropriate 
to seek a Junctional definition, without prejudice to refinements to be introduced as the 
investigation develops. Such a definition ought to be sufficiently broad to incorporate 
different perceptions of equity, in order to avoid the problems posed by its understanding in 
different legal contexts. The definition advanced in the Norwegian Shipowners' Claims 
arbitration, which referred to "general principles of justice as distinguished from any 
particular system of jurisprudence or the municipal law of any state", appears a sound 
choice405. For the time being, therefore, equity will be portrayed as a broad notion of justice, 
which cuts across all legal orders. 
6.4.a)(ii) Legal Systems. Normativitv and Equity 
The description of equity as a 'sense of justice' spreading through all legal systems 
bears a misleading simplicity. Nothing is straightforward in the interplay of equity, legal 
systems and normativity. In fact, these three notions form a dialectic, the understanding of 
which is a prerequisite to the recourse to equity. Legal systems were described above as 
bodies of rules {lato sensu) providing standards that regulate the conduct of subjects of law 
(the members of a community, which at the international level are primarily states). Here, 
the paradoxical nature of certainty and justice, the supreme principles of Law immanent to 
all legal orders, is also to be emphasised. 
The paradox between justice and certainty not only reflects the disharmony between 
individual justice and predictability (and clarity of law), but also concerns the prevalence of 
(400) Megarry/Bakcr/1973, pp. 5-6. The integration of equity in law is not free from hurdles; "the long history of the administration 
of equitable relief in a separate court has left an impression on the legal mind that is hard to overcome, and has created an obstacle 
to the complete integration of the principles of equity into the main body of the common law" (Newman/1973a, p.20). 
(401) Commenting upon the position of equity in continental systems, Brutau states that equity "is a juridical phenomenon which, 
paradoxically, does not find a place in the system of law in force" (Brutau/1973, p.84). 
(402) Tsao/1973. 
(403) Weil/1996, p.121. 
(404) For example: pacta sunt servanda, rebus sic stantibus, good faith, estoppel/preclusion, prohibition of abuse of rights, exceptio 
non adimpleti contractus, limitation of property rights, equitable relief, denial of relief to the unscrupulous, equality of treatment, 
distributive justice, the maxims of equity in Anglo-American law (equality is equity, he who comes into equity must come with 
clean hands, he who seeks equity must do equity), the maxim of proportionality lato sensu, protection of reasonable expectations, 
unjust enrichment. 
(405) AJIL/17/1923, p.384; cf. also the Cayuga Indians arbitration, AJIL/20/1926, p.585-586. 
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positive law. Juridical certainty demands the application of positive law, even when the 
latter is unjust. Only in circumstances where the injustice of positive law reaches the point 
at which, in the light of such injustice, the certainty guaranteed by positive law becomes 
irrelevant, will the unjust positive law surrender to justice406, and consequently to equity. 
"The injustice of a law is not, in general, a sufficient reason for not adhering to it"; 
non-compliance is dependent "on the extent to which laws [...] are unjust"407. As Alexy 
concludes, following Radbruch's reference to an "unbearable degree" of injustice, only 
"extreme injustice is no law"4 0 8. To summarise it through Akehurst's words, "although it is 
desirable that rules of law should be just, it is perhaps even more desirable that they should 
be certain, clear and predictable,,m. 
Those, like Newman, who delved into the concept of equity, have acknowledged the 
impact of this issue. As he observes, the "conflict between the goals of certainty and of 
individual justice has created an ambivalent attitude of the law toward equity, to which the 
law is attracted by reason of the identity of equity in the general sense with justice, but 
which the law rejects because of the law's concern for certainty". This explains why, both 
in common law and in civil law, there are "wide enclaves of law in which the principles of 
equity are not applied even in cases in which they are relevant"410. 
By presenting the analysis of equity in this fashion, the issue is transposed to the 
quintessence of legal thought: the appraisal of the validity of positive law as an expression 
of the social consciousness as to how the polis is to be regulated. The social 'sense of 
justice' thus becomes the moral threshold for assessing the validity of certainty as a 
social-legal aim. This 'cut-off, scrutinising function of justice is in fact essential to the 
understanding of equity. 
Law being an element of social organisation, it is scarcely surprising that it seeks 
certainty, and in doing so, that it has recourse to generalisation and abstraction. Law could 
not exist were it "not possible to communicate general standards of conduct, which 
multitudes of [subjects] could understand, without further direction, as requiring from them 
certain conduct when the occasion arose". Naturally, law is expressed "predominantly, but 
by no means exclusively, [by reference] to classes of [subjects], and to classes of acts, 
things and circumstances"4", i.e. through rules stricto sensu. Equally, the law appears 
(406) Radbmch, cited in Engish/1988, p.320. 
(407) Rawls/1999, pp.308-309. 
(408) Alexy/1999, p.33. 
(409) Akehurst/1976, p.809, emphasis added. 
(410) Newman/1973a, pp.17-18. 
(411) Hart/1997, p. 124, emphasis added. 
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a priori, and corresponds to an idea of order and certainty; and even i f inspired in justice, it 
will never be in a position to completely realise i t 4 1 2 . 
Normative prescriptions, as expressions of law, are inexorably general and abstract. 
What varies is the degree of generalisation and abstraction. Rules provide specific solutions 
to defined class-events. Principles, potentially applicable to all situations, offer a general 
guidance for the solution. Pure equity, by giving prominence to particular facts of specific 
situations, shapes solutions on a case-to-case basis. Pure (absolute) equity is antithetical to 
pure (absolute) normativity. They are the two extremes of the same scale. I f it is true that 
normativity cannot prescind from a degree of particularisation to be applied, it is no less 
true that equity cannot become a decision-making standard without acquiring a level of 
generalisation. For this reason, Sohn sees equity as falling "along a continuum with respect 
to departure from the rule of law"4 1 3. The permutations between subjects, and acts, things 
and circumstances, cannot be comprehensively foreseen. Solutions devised in general terms 
and applied to concrete situations, by overlooking actual elements thereof, will eventually 
cause unjust results. When the level of injustice becomes clearly unreasonable, one must 
contemplate relief, which entails departure from pure normative solutions. 
In short, within legal systems (all of which seek certainty and justice), equity is to 
justice what normativity is to certainty: the means to reach an end. As Radbruch writes, 
justice considers the particular case from the standpoint of the general norm. Equity seeks to 
discover the very norm of the particular case, to transform it also into a general norm; which 
is why it is part of the normative realm414. 
6.4.a)(iii) Justice In Casu and 'Normative Equity' 
Jus dare, as a function attributed to the legislature, is in principle separated from jus 
dicere, a function conferred on the judiciary. Theoretically, the former precedes the latter. It 
rests on courts to apply the law as made. Only after establishing what is the applicable law 
is a court in a position to establish what result its application in concreto produces. What 
matters, as Newman states, is the fact that "[ejquity is for judges to administer, not for 
legislators to decree by statute". The goal is individual justice. Because such a goal "cannot 
be spelled out in the statute, it must be reached by judicial decision"415. As explained by 
Reuter, it is the relationship between equity and the judge that constitutes the central 
(412) Decenciere-Ferrandiere, AIDI/1934, p.272. 
(413) Sohn/1984, p.307. 
(414) Radbruch/1934, p.49. 
(415) Newman/1973b, p.626. Referring to a "moral mission of the judge", cf. Delbez, cited in Chemellier-Gendreau/1991, 
pp.277-278, and Degan/1970, p.19. On the role of courts in applying equity, cf. also DeVisscher/1972, p.vi. When analysing the 
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problem . The question of respect for equity by the legislator evades the jurist. Where 
from the judge's perspective the strictly legal solution is inequitable, the question is whether 
the hardship can be attenuated. The problem becomes particularly acute where no grounds 
for relief are found in positive law4 1 7. 
How judges apply the Law thus becomes central to this problem418. Elaborating on 
this issue, Esser distinguishes two stages419: the finding of the decision; and the reasoning 
of this decision (which seeks to demonstrate the compatibility of the decision with positive 
law). Judges appear in his view to find first the most adequate decision according to their 
understanding of the Law and the facts in casu. The reasoning appears more often than not 
subsequently, as a function of control which might lead the judge to abandon a decision, i f 
it is insusceptible of legal support. Owing to the scope conferred on judges in interpreting 
the law and in filling lacunae, however, that hardly ever happens. 
Reaching a decision and justifying it thus falls largely within judicial discretion, 
which as regards the international dispute-settlement machinery raises a crucial dilemma: 
the existence of a true 'world society'. This is a key point because "the preunderstanding of 
the judge is shaped by the shared topoi of an ethical tradition"420. Whereas the law is an 
element of social organisation, notes Rosenne, at the domestic level it is possible to identify 
"a strong societal relationship between those who make the law, those for whom it is made, 
and those who administer the law". Society has an integrated conception of justice. But 
"[n]o international tribunal has yet attained such a degree of integration of its judges in to 
the international society"421. The notion of justice in international law is heterogeneous. 
And because jurisdiction is established by consent only, there is the danger that claims 
based on equity advanced by states might not always be susceptible of scrutiny by courts422. 
At this juncture, it is worth pausing momentarily to return to the idea that all 
agreements must be deemed to bear an equitable solution423. Forging a compromise requires 
states to agree upon a common notion of what is acceptable, which is why agreements may 
provide parameters for objectifying the contents not only of normative standards, but also of 
the notion of equity. 
issue of "the nature of the bodies applying equity", Lauterpacht looks into all types of third-party settlement processes, i.e. 
arbitration, judicial settlement, conciliation and mediation (Lauterpacht/1991, pp. 118-119). 
(416) Reuter/1980, p.166. 
(417) Lapidoth/1987, p.163; Degan/1970, p.25. 
(418) Paras.6.1.b)(iii) supra, 7.3., 7.4. infra. 
(419) Esser, VorverslSndnis und Melhodenwahl in der Rechlsfmdung (Pre-Comprehension and Method Selection in Law-Finding), 
cited in Larenz/1989, p. 165. Considering a similar distinction, cf. Anderson/ 1996a. 
(420) Habermas/1996, p.200. 
(421) Rosenne/1988, p.89. 
(422) Akehurst/1976, p.8l 1. Cf. also Rosenne/1988, p.91; Lapidoth/1987, p.165. 
(423) Para.6.l.b)(ii) supra. This approach must be taken cautiously insofar as political balances reached through agreement do not 
always match strictly legal assessments - the former might weigh-up extra-legal considerations. 
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Turning to adjudication, the question that is prompted concerns the basis on which, 
and extent to which, courts may have recourse to equity, bearing in mind that decisions 
must be founded strictly on Law. It was argued that equity is a general principle of law4 2 4. 
To common law jurists, this idea is unlikely to raise major difficulties425. Continental jurists, 
on the contrary, might tend to disagree therewith426. In civil law traditions, the normative 
standards precede the case. The reasoning flows 'downwards'. Equity appears as ''justice 
individualisee" ("justice adaptee a V espece")*21', but referenced to a rule of law. Due to the 
integration of equity in the law, departures from the rule are set also in law. Hence, although 
courts weigh the specificities of each, it becomes difficult to view equity as a source of 
law4 2 8. Since in common law systems normativity is identified mainly from case-solutions, 
through reasoning 'upwards', viewing equity as creative of normativity becomes easier429. 
In truth, knowing whether equity is a source of law, and i f it is, whether it is a 
formal source, a secondary source, a material source, a general principle, or customary law 
is, as Akehurst states, "purely a verbal question"; for "whichever the way the question is 
answered, it is an undeniable fact that international tribunals often apply equity"430. Further, 
the increasing recourse to equity-related notions in treaty law shows that the 'legislator' 
recognises and promotes the role of equity in international law4 3 1. 
Equity may be included amongst the sources of law because it may be expressed in 
normative forms, characterised by generality and abstraction. The focus is thus 'normative 
equity', what Weil denominates 'regie di'equite' (or 'equite juridique'). As he incisively 
notes, this norm is not the only norm marked by a margin of indeterminacy and uncertainty 
that leaves to courts room for discretion. The sole difference is that the general and abstract 
standards that emerge from equity acquire their shape through the resolution of cases, bit by 
(424) Whether equity is a source of law is a question that might have different approaches. Undoubtedly part of the corpus juris, 
equity is sometimes portrayed as a source of law. But if 'source of law' is seen as the fail social or the institution that creates 
positive law, than equity might not be a source of law. This seems to be the view followed by Esser, who sees in Article 38(1 )(c) 
of the Statute permission for the Court to create positive norms of international law (Esser/1961, pp. 169-179). 
(425) Cf. Shaw/1997, p.82; Janis/1995, pp. 109-110; Rossi/1993, p.250; Akehurst/1976, p.814. Brownlie considers that in strict 
terms "equity cannot be a source of law" - although included in Article 38(l)(c) of the ICJ Statute (Brownlie/1998a, pp.25-26). 
Malanczuk states that "it is doubtful whether equity forms a source of international law today" (Malanczuk/1997, p.SS). Jennings 
and Watts, although not including equity in the general principles, present it as "material source of law" (Jennings/Watts/1997, 
pp.43-44). Shearer excludes equity from the "material 'sources' of international law"; cf. Shearer/1994, pp.29-31. 
(426) Cf. Nguyen/Daillier/Pellet/1999, p.354; Baptista/1998, p.72; Moncada/1996, pp.324-325; Pereira/Quadros/1993, p.275; 
DeVisscher/1972, p.7 ; Degan/1970, pp.17, 40. Considering equity a formal source of law under Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, 
Cunha and Pereira do not view it as a general principle of law - which raises difficulties in understanding under which sub-
paragraph of paragraph 1 of the said article it should be included (Cunha/Pereira/2000, pp.305-312). 
(427) DeVisscher/1972, p.3. 
(428) In civil law systems, the legislator protects justice in casu by infusing the code-norms with 'indeterminate concepts' and 
'general clauses', which are concepts very wide in scope that often leave in the hands of judges discretion to mould case-decisions 
to his/her sense of justice, account taken of the whole system and of previous decisions. 
(429) The idea that common law jurists "tend to reason upwards" from the facts of cases, whereas continental jurists "tend to reason 
downwards from abstract principles", is advanced by Lord Goff (Lord Goff/1997, p.753). 
(430) Akehurst/1976, p.808. Agreeing, Weil considers that this debate is "largemenl semantique" (Weil/1996, p.126). Esser argues 
that principles become part of positive law when incorporated, inter alia, through an act of jurisprudence (Esser/1961, p. 169). 
(431) Cf. Chemillier-Gendreau/1991, pp.274-275 ; Bardonnet/1981, pp.39-41. 
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bit, slowly diminishing the discretion of courts, while increasing predictability and juridical 
certainty432. Labelled 'general equity' by Jeanneau, it "is distinguished from individual 
equity", and it penetrates into the corpus juris "under the characteristics of a veritable 
norm". "A simple inspiration for a concrete solution in the first case", it "becomes in the 
second a formal source of law"; it will eventually "engrave itself in a more abstract formula 
expressed in terms general enough to attain universal scope" and to reach directly "the level 
of positive law"4 3 3. 
6.4.a)(iv) Functions and Bounds of 'Normative Equity' 
As aforesaid, courts are central to the practical operation of equity. Not surprisingly, 
equity was at the heart of the debate that took place during the preparation and drafting of 
Article 38 of the Statute of the PCI J. The process behind its wording was already examined 
thoroughly434. No re-examination is necessary. Nevertheless, insofar as some points may be 
helpful for grasping the functions of equity, reference thereto is desirable. Equity is inherent 
in the 'sane application of Law' 4 3 5. Hence, it is unthinkable that it becomes applicable only 
when the parties agree thereto, as happens under Article 38(2). It is therefore fair to suggest 
that the provision on ex aequo et bono had in mind exclusively the power to decide on the 
basis of that equity which has "no direct connection to rules of law"4 3 6, i.e. pure equity437. 
The role of equity within Law - as a principle of application of conventional and customary 
law, and as part of the general principles of law (all of which reflect precepts of justice) -
seems to have remained unaffected by that provision438. 
Equity is incorporated not only in paragraph 2 of Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ 
- its non-normative facet, but also in paragraph 1(c) - its normative facet439. Further, it does 
exist outside the said Article 38, as general guidance in the application of law. Interpretatio 
aequior sumenda est. This widespread presence, interacting with questions of competence 
of courts to legislate, and of non liquet, explains much of the discussion that surrounds 
equity. What must be stressed is that the presence of equity provides the courts of all legal 
systems with a margin of discretion that gives them a de facto quasi-legislative power. Even 
in civil law systems, a number of notions (e.g. good faith, proportionality, abuse of right) 
(432) Weil/1996, p. 124, 127, 143. 
(433) Jeanneau/1973, pp.232-233. 
(434) Cf. Rossi/1993, pp.87-118; Cheng/1993, pp.l-Miyoshi/1993, pp.23-25; VanDijk/1991, pp.3-13; Habicht/1935, pp.17-22; 
Judge Weeramantry, Separate Opinion, Jan Mayen case, ICJ/Reports/1993, pp.227-230. 
(433) AIDI/1937, p.271; expression translated literally from French. 
(436) VanDijk/1991, p.13. 
(437) Rossi/1993, p.l 14; cf. also Cheng/1993, p.20. Insofar as ex aequo et bono decisions may disregard the normative framework, 
and rely solely on the notion of justice of the decision-maker, it may be seen as potentially based on "pure equity". 
(438) VanDijk/1991, p.l I. 
(439) For a summary of scholarship on the distinction between two types of equity, cf. Munkman/1973, p. 16. 
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depend chiefly on assessments of courts in casu, based on equity. Equity is thus integrated 
in the law. Since international law has undeveloped areas, of which maritime delimitation 
law was an example, the fact that courts had a more relevant participation in developing the 
law raises no difficulties440. The same happens i f and when new communal aspirations have 
to be given attention. Equity then emerges as an expression of the 'open texture' of 
international law, seeking to accommodate, and to respond to, these situations. Normatively 
less dense than domestic law, with a structure oriented to 'problem-resolution', international 
law offers to principles such as equity a larger field of operation441. 
Subsumed in this debate are two conceptually significant distinctions. The first 
concerns the traditional three-fold categorisation of the functions (objectives) of equity, set 
by reference to positive law: infra legem (to mitigate unjust results of the law), praeter 
legem (to complement the law by filling its lacunae), and contra legem (to disregard the law 
exceptionally, in order to reach a just solution). DeVisscher criticised this categorisation on 
the grounds that it did not contribute to elucidate the problem, that it had not been followed 
in practice, and that due to its abstract rigidity it was not adaptable to the subtleties of 
moulding rules of law to the particularities of each case442. From an operative perspective, 
because it is difficult to draw strict lines between each of these functions of equity in casu, 
this point must be accepted. Notwithstanding this, such a tripartite categorisation remains 
relevant for purposes of intellectual discipline443, and was endorsed by the Court444. The 
second distinction relates to the decision-making powers of the ICJ. Article 38 differentiates 
between decisions based on law and ex aequo et bono decisions. Underlying this distinction 
are two diverse types of juridical reasoning: one confined to the bounds of Law; another 
where recourse to 'non-normative equity' is allowed. 'Normative equity' was developed in 
international law by resort to this distinction445. The North Sea Judgment is perhaps the 
landmark of 'normative equity'446; for it was here that its thread was set down. The Court 
(440) When compared to the pace of technological and sociological evolution (e.g. nuclear science, space exploration, 
environmental protection, continental shelf delimitation in 1945, the war crimes at Nuremberg), the law-making process in 
international law is remarkably slow - whether concerning customary law or conventional law (though the latter is much faster). 
This means that often, when an international court is asked to adjudge on a certain issue, it will be faced with unclear normative 
standards and a low degree of normative density. The pronouncements in the Nuclear Weapons AO illustrate this idea very well 
(ICJ/Reports/l 996(1), p.226). 
(441) Esser/l961,p.50. 
(442) DeVisscher/1972, p.12. Similarly, Munkman/1972, pp.14-15. 
(443) Cf. e.g. Moncada/1996, pp.325-328; Janis/1995, p.109-110; Pereira/Quadros/1993, p.275; Chemillier-Gendreau/1991, p.272; 
VanDijk/1991, pp.20-21; Schachter/1991, pp.57-58; Singh/1989, p.181; Lapidoth/1987, pp.172-174; Sohn/1984, pp.306-307; 
Akehurst/1976, pp.801-807; Degan/1970, pp.25-35. 
(444) This happened for the first time in the Burkina-Faso/Mali case, ICJ/Reports/l986, pp.567-568, para.28. 
(445) Cf. Weil/1996, pp.126-129; Franck/1997, pp.54-56; Franck/1995, pp.29-31; Miyoshi/1993, pp.14-16; Thirlway/1989, 
pp.50-51; Degan/1987, pp.119-131. 
(446) In the RannofKulch arbitration, the Tribunal endorsed the idea that "equity forms part of international law", and affirmed that 
the parties were "free to present and develop their cases with reliance on principles of equity", but did not refer to the contents 
thereof (TLR/50/1976, p. 18). The Individual Opinion of Judge Hudson, in the River Meuse case, is often referred to as being the 
landmark in the resort to equity in international law. However, because strictly speaking it is not part of the ratio decidendi of the 
-227-
TOWARDS THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF MARITIME DELIMITATION 
then referred to a "rule of equity" calling for the application of equitable considerations, and 
which raised no question "of any decision ex aequo et bono". Described as founded on 
"very general precepts of justice and good faith", the said rule was deemed not to amount to 
the application of "equity as a matter of abstract justice", but to ensure that "a reasonable 
result is arrived at"447. 
Imparting momentum to the resort to 'normative equity' in case law, this approach 
was re-averred in many instances thereafter448. In the mid-1980s, Jennings expressed his 
belief that what appeared "at first sight to be a jumble of different and disparate elements" 
could "be arranged into a pattern which ha[d] some pretensions to simplicity, clarity and 
even elegance"449. A decade later, Weil concluded that following a non-linear development, 
based on an iterative process of "trial and error", the Court had finally managed to accord to 
equity a crucial - yet circumscribed - place in the international legal order, by endowing it 
with a stable and predictable content, a prerequisite of any juridical norm450. As i f to concur 
with the proposition that 'normative equity' has currently a stable and undisputed place in 
international law, recent jurisprudence in maritime delimitation has not felt the need to 
restate the aforesaid distinction451. 
The two aforesaid distinctions, although related, should perhaps not be joined into 
one single categorisation, for they stem from diverse distinction-criteria. Decisions ex aequo 
et bono "may in fact belong to any of the [...] three alternatives: infra legem, praeter legem, 
or contra legem"452. Equity infra legem and ex aequo et bono decisions are reconcilable to 
case, and because it seems to reflect an understanding of equity typical of Anglo-American law, not necessarily followed by other 
systems (cf. Degan/1970, p. 17), its weight in terms of development of 'normative equity' does not seem as decisive as the North 
Sea Judgment. 
(447) ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.47-50, paras.85, 88, 90. Unquestionable in terms of the contents of equity, the views of the Court raise 
nevertheless difficulties when presenting this "rule" as customary law, and not as a general principle of law (cf. paras.2.3.b)(ii), 
6.2.cX") supra, 6.4.b)(iv) infra). 
(448) Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, ICJ/Reports/1974, pp.34, 202, paras.78, 69; Anglo/French arbitration, RIAA/18, p.l 14, para.245; 
Tunisia/Libya case, ICJ/Reports/1982, p.60, para.71; Gulf of Maine case, ICJ/Reports/1984, p.278, para.59; 
Guinea/Guinea-Bissau arbitration, ILM/25/1986, p.289, para.88; Libya/Malta case, ICJ/Reports/1985, pp.38-39, para.45; 
Burkina-Faso/Mali case, ICJ/Reports/1986, pp.567, 633, paras.28, 149; El Salvador/Honduras case, ICJ/Reports/1992, p.514, 
para.262. 
(449) Jennings/1986, p.38. 
(450) Weil/1996, pp.123, 144. 
(451) In the Jan Mayen and Qatar/Bahrain cases, as well as in the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, no reference was made to the 
distinction between''normative equity' and ex aequo et bono equity. References thereto were nonetheless made in a number of 
individual opinions in the Jan Mayen and Qatar/Bahrain cases (judges Schwebel, Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Separate 
Opinions, ICJ/Reports/1993, pp.127-128, 192-197, 226-230; Judge Bernardez, Dissenting Opinion, Qatar/Bahrain case, 
paras.5-6; judges Bedjaoui, Ranjeva, and Koroma, Joint Dissenting Opinion, Qatar/Bahrain case, paras.8-9). 
(452) Lapidoth/1987, p. 172. Perhaps conceptually less accurate, a categorisation that includes the three traditional functions of 
equity and ex aequo et bono might be helpful if, as Sohn does, one views equity in the perspective of "a continuum with respect to 
departure from the rule of law" (Sohn/1984, p.307). He sees equity contra legem as "the use of equity in derogation of the law 
where an exception from the law is needed, given the circumstances, in order to achieve an equitable and just result", and ex 
aequo et bono decisions as "designed to find a solution for the individual case" and "not of necessity guided by the general 
principles of law". Weiss also distinguishes between the equity contra legem ("an exception to the normal application of a rule of 
international law" on moral grounds) and ex aequo et bono decisions - whereby individual cases are decided "in a way that may 
disregard existing law" (Weiss/1989, pp.34-35). Cheng presents also a four-type distinction which (besides equity infra legem and 
praeter legem) considers ex aequo et bono decisions - i.e. disregarding the law "for the sake of expediency", and "absolute 
equity" - i.e. disregarding "merely the letter of the law, and not its spirit" (Cheng/1955, pp.202-211). In his Separate Opinion in 
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the extent that an "ex aequo et bono decision will be contrary to a settlement based on law 
in force [only] in so far as the latter is inequitable"453. On the other hand, equity contra 
legem does not necessarily stem from ex aequo et bono decisions. The particularities in casu 
might justify, under the law, an exception from positive law on equitable grounds. This is 
something of a jus singulare, a ruling that (whilst confirming positive law) concludes that if 
the 'legislator' had foreseen the circumstances, the applicable rule would have provided for 
it. Judicial discretion amounts here to an exercise of de facto quasi-legislative powers. 
These two categorizations thus differ in that ex aequo et bono decisions do "not have to be 
at all related to judicial considerations"454. It "could well be made without the need of 
specifically legal training or skill". By contrast, "a decision according to equity as part of 
the law should mean the application to the case of the principles and rules of equity for the 
proper identification of which a legal training is essential"455. 
6.4.a)(v) Reasonableness as the Scope of 'Normative Equity' 
To shed light on the scope of 'normative equity', one must at a preliminary level 
refer to the question of the relevance to be attributed to equity within the international legal 
order. In the River Meuse case, Judge Hudson affirmed that a "sharp division between law 
and equity, such as prevails in the administration of justice in some states, should find no 
place in international jurisprudence"456. Certain legal systems have in effect reduced the 
immediate-role of equity to a minimum. The 'openness' thereof to justice is referred to 
various 'indeterminate concepts' and 'general clauses'. As the determination in concreto of 
these concepts and clauses forms part of the interpretation of norms, and confers on courts a 
level of discretion similar to that of equity, one might speak of 'mediated-equity'. Since 
international law has a normative density smaller than municipal law, the discretion with 
which courts are endowed is correspondently wider. Should a strict codified-positivistic 
approach be followed, the flexibility of the system would become minimal (if at all existent 
in certain cases). This means that, conceptually, equity becomes pivotal to the application of 
international law, for it is one of the means (if not often the only one) that can 'guide' the 
judge within his/her sphere of discretion. As Lauterpacht observes, equity "introduces into 
the Jan Mayen case, Judge Weeramantry considers five "categories of equity": ex aequo et bono ("depending purely on the 
tribunal's sense of justice"), absolute ("a disregard of the letter for the spirit of the law"), praeter legem, infra legem, and contra 
legem (ICJ/Reports/1993, pp.226-234). 
(433) Habicht/1933, p.22. Conversely, it might be said that where decisions taken in accordance with the law lead to equitable 
solutions, the two notions coexist. 
(454) Lapidoth/1987, p.172; Virally/1987, p.525. However, an ex aequo et bono decision does not equate to arbitrariness, because it 
requires the weighing of objective considerations (cf. Lapidoth/1987, p. 172; Degan/1987, p.l 19). 
(455) Jennings/1986, p.30. 
(456) Individual Opinion, WCR(IV), p.232. 
-229-
TOWARDS THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF MARITIME DELIMITATION 
the system a degree of flexibility [that] enables the judge or arbitrator more easily to 
perform a constructive role in the application of the law"4 5 7. 
While delving into the scope of 'normative equity', it is of major importance to seek 
reference-points. From the outset, it should be noted that the objective is not to give a 
definition of the expression, but to clarify the scope of the recourse to equity within the law. 
Ultimately, the goal is to understand how the principle of equity operates. As suggested, 
equity and normativity in their purest state are antithetical, and become two extremes of one 
scale. What needs to be discerned is the dialectic between jus aequum and jus strictum, and 
its realisation in casu. 
Latent in the recourse to equity has been, notably, the core idea of reasonableness. 
In the North Sea cases, the Court stressed that one was not dealing with abstract justice, but 
with the need to ensure that "a reasonable result" was arrived at458. The same guiding-idea 
emerged in the Barcelona Traction case, where the Court considered that "in the field of 
diplomatic protection as in all fields of international law, it is necessary that the law be 
applied reasonably^. That relief on equitable grounds is associated above all with the 
notion of reasonableness is however a truism requiring further explication, the essence of 
which relates to the question of judicial reasoning. 
In the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, the Court observed that applying equity "is not a 
matter of simply finding an equitable solution, but an equitable solution derived from the 
applicable law"460. What amount to a solution based on law and equity is therefore the 
question to answer. Interwoven here are some issues previously introduced, namely the 
distinction between rules and principles (their different operation), the conflict between 
normativity and equity, and the judicial function of finding and reasoning a decision. Unless 
the judge is directed to decide the case ex aequo et bono, the exercise that he/she faces is, as 
Kratochwil observes, one that amounts to a "going back and forth between 'facts' and 
norms". The corollary is that 'justice' becomes 
not so much an attribute of the formal principles contained in positive law as it is the 
result of reasonable and principled use of norms in making practical judgments 
about factual situations. Viewed from this angle, [one] can understand why 'Law' 
and 'Justice' stand in a certain relationship of tension, as it is only through the 
authoritative decision of a court that it can be established what is fair and 
reasonable in a particular case.461 
(457) Lauterpacht/1991, p.l 17. 
(458) ICJ/Reports/l 969, p.50, para.90, emphasis added. 
(459) ICJ/Reports/l970, p.49, para.93, emphasis added. 
(460) ICJ/Reports/l974, pp.34, 202, paras.78, 69, emphasis added. 
(461) Kratochwil/1989, p.240, emphasis added. On the relationship equity-reasonableness, see also Esser/1961, pp.86-87. 
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Both the Court's dicta and Kratochwil's words refer to the notion of reasonableness 
in two distinct aspects: in the use of means, and in the result to be attained. From the 
conflict between 'social certainty' and 'individual justice', in which by virtue of its 
identification with the notion of 'general principles of justice' equity is entangled, stem the 
requirements of reasonable application of the law, and of reasonableness of the result in 
concreto. 'Normative equity' appears to have thus a functional nature: it bridges the gap 
between normativity (law strictissimo sensu) and equity (justice), through reasonableness, 
in a way that confers upon 'law' greater 'justice'. As Bardonnet states, equity corresponds 
to common sense; it is a standard of reasonableness that seeks balance and equilibrium 
between the rights and obligations of disputant parties462. 
As a legal principle, equity is insusceptible of immediate application to the case. Its 
content can only be established by relative optimisation, account taken of all factual and 
legal possibilities in casu, with a view to translate its 'ideal prima facie ought' into an actual 
and 'definite ought'463. Perhaps in an attempt to objectify equity, Reuter argued that the 
problem of equity might be posed in three very different directions, which correspond to the 
search for a solution of equivalence, a solution of proportionality, or a solution of 
finality***. This approach has the merit of identifying elements whereby equity becomes 
translatable: the balance between the parties, the quantifying parameters of such a balance, 
and the teleological subordination to justice. One would suggest that reasonableness might 
provide another path towards objectifying 'normative equity'. The question to answer is 
how to express reasonableness of means and of result, in the light of a normative framework 
where two principles are integrated. It will be submitted that the best approach is to resort to 
the 'maxim of proportionality'. 
Suffice it to say that the association between equity and reasonableness appears to 
have crystallised indelibly in international affairs, particularly in the "allocation of scarce 
resources among states"465. For instance, the 1987 report of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development refers to the use of transboundary natural resources "in a 
reasonable and equitable manner"466. The 1992 Helsinki Convention on the Protection and 
Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, similarly, refers to the use of 
transboundary waters "in a reasonable and equitable way"467. This approach is followed 
equally in the 1997 Convention on Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 
(462) Bardonnet/1981, pp.41-43. 
(463) Para.6.2.b) supra. 
(464) Reuter/1980, pp.169-184. 
(465) The relevance of equity in resource allocation is emphasised by Franck (Franck/1997, pp.56-79; Franck/1995, pp.31-47). 
(466) Annex 1, Article 9. 
(467) Article 2(2)(c). 
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when speaking of use, development and protection of watercourses "in an equitable and 
reasonable manner"468. The Second Report of the ILA Committee on Water Resources Law 
(2000) presents equity and reasonableness as forming part of a principle: the principle of 
reasonable and equitable utilisation of resources469. 
One last point to address concerns the 'dangers of equity', and judicial discretion. It 
goes without saying that when more than one interpretation of a legal norm is possible the 
more equitable interpretation should be preferred470. But this simply amounts to identifying 
the lowest level of reflection of equity. From here to the point at which equity demands a 
total departure from normativity lie innumerable 'greys' of the equity-normativity blend. It 
is within this spectrum of possibilities that the 'dangers of equity' come into play471: danger 
of arbitrary exceptions to legal rules; danger of subjectivity in choices and in appraisals of 
decision-factors; danger that the parties are not treated on a foot of equality due to the lack 
of predictability in the decision-making process. As will be shown, reasonableness achieved 
through the 'maxim of proportionality' tackles this issue472. Not only does it allow courts to 
justify the 'discovery of solutions'" through proper judicial argumentation, but it ensures 
also that both parties plead on a predictable basis,473. 
6.4.b) 'Normative Equity' in Maritime Delimitation 
6.4.b)(i) First Period (1945-1969) 
The key purpose of the 1945 Truman Proclamation on the continental shelf was to 
ensure that the mineral resources of the seabed and subsoil would benefit the coastal state, 
in casu the United States. Because there were no precedents in international law on this 
matter, the whole declaration was drafted on the basis of a notion of fairness, and the policy 
encapsulated in a (general and abstract) normative formula. The "exercise of jurisdiction 
over the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf was attributed 
in abstrato to "the contiguous nation", and the solution justified as being "reasonable and 
just" on a number of grounds474. Of course, being aware of the fact that neighbouring states 
could advance similar claims, the United States had to tackle the issue of delimitation. 
Again, because no precedents existed, it did so by recourse to the same idea of fairness -
(468) Articles 5 and 6. 
(469) Articles 8, 10, 12 , 58(5), and 60. Cf. also Part II, and Articles 3,4, 6, 7, and 51(1). 
(470) Cf. Weil/1996, p.125; Bedjaoui/1990, p.384. 
(471) Akehurst/1976, pp.808-812. 
(472) Conclusions to Part II; cf. also para.6.2.b) supra. 
(473) As to what is exactly the meaning of the requirement of predictability, cf. para.7.1. infra. 
(474) The expression "reasonable and just" was used by Boggs, when referring to the recourse to the "median line principle" in 
maritime delimitation (Boggs/1951, p.262). This reinforces the suggestion that the use of equidistance in the USA's practice was 
related to the notion of equitable principles; cf. para. 1.2.a), Conclusions to Part I supra. 
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thus the reference to equitable principles . Indeed, it is the absence of a legal regime on 
these issues that explains the recourse to the notion of equity. This illustrates how the 
recourse to equity becomes inexorable whenever there is insufficient normative density. 
Equally noteworthy in this instrument is the association of reasonableness and justness. 
The non-existence of, and the need to develop, criteria for the delimitation of 
overlapping continental shelves was noted during the early 1950s ILC meetings476. Since 
then, it has become clear that a major concern was to guarantee that the delimitation did not 
yield an inequitable boundary. For example, Hsu referred to the potential "unfairness" of 
prolonging the territorial sea boundary to delimit the continental shelf, and suggested that 
the ILC should consider a partition of the continental shelf "on an equitable basis"477. 
Expressing similar concerns, Hudson stated that the prolongation of the land boundary 
"might result in unfairness of delimitation", and El-Khoury suggested that states ought to 
settle "their differences equitably"478. 
As argued, the equidistance-special circumstances formula results from the blend 
between these two thoughts - the idea of equal division of sea areas based on proximity 
(equidistance), and the need to ensure the non-inequitableness of the boundary (special 
circumstances) - of which the members of the Commission were mindful from the very 
beginning. This dual approach, based on equidistance as a principle subject to exceptions 
founded on equity, was followed by the Committee of Experts (which proposed the 
recourse to equidistance whilst noting the existence of cases potentially requiring departure 
from it), and was subsequently supported by the Commission. Endorsing equidistance as the 
general rule, Sandstrom asked whether "rules should not be laid down for such special cases 
where the application of the normal rule would lead to manifest hardship'*19''. The same 
idea is present in Lauterpacht's proposal to define exceptions to equidistance by reference 
to the existence of "undue hardship"480, or in Spiropoulos' waiver of equidistance when it 
"would lead to manifest unfairness"481. Pal's idea that the "only equitable starting point for 
dividing the continental shelf [...] was the median line" was apparently widely accepted482. 
The debate thus focused on how to express the provisional nature of equidistance in the 
text. The expression "as a general rule" was proposed, but eventually the Commission opted 
(475) Brown/1992, p.57. Amado argued that the expression equitable principles in the Truman Proclamation meant simply that the 
parties had to reach a mutually acceptable agreement (cf. Amado, ILC/Yearbook/1951(r), p.293); cf. also Judge Koretsky, North 
Sea cases, Dissenting Opinion, ICJ/Reports/1969, p. 167. 
(476) Para. 1.2.b) supra. Cf. ILC/Yearbook/1950(1), pp.232-234. 
(477) ILC/Yearbook/1951(T), pp.286,288, 290. 
(478) Ibid., pp.287,289. 
(479) ILC/Yearbook/I953(l), p.126. 
(480) /Wrf.,pp.l3l-132. 
(481) /A/rf.,p.l33. 
(482) Ibid., p. 127, emphasis added. 
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for defining the situations that required an exemption from strict equidistance as 'special 
circumstances' - as had been suggested by Spiropoulos483. 
The process that preceded the Geneva Conventions also amounts to the elaboration 
in abstrato of the role of equity in delimitation. Lauterpacht has noted in this regard that the 
Committee of Experts, the ILC, and the First Conference "did not elaborate on what they 
meant by inequitable"484. One would suggest that this happened because, as said, equity is 
not to be decreed by 'statute', but to be administered by courts. What characterises this first 
period is exactly the fact that the role of equity was developed without any contribution by 
courts485. But from 1958 to the North Sea Judgment, the content of the equidistance-special 
circumstances rule was developed by state practice, which began elaborating on how equity 
was to be applied to mitigate unreasonable effects produced by strict equidistance in 
specific cases486. Of all 34 examples of state practice in this period, some 88% resorted to 
the equidistance-special circumstances formula. 
6.4.b)(ii) Second Period (1969-1993) 
The second period in the development of the recourse to equity in maritime 
delimitation stretches from the North Sea cases to the Jan Mayen case (this case being part 
of the third period). The work of courts was at the core of the developments that took place, 
although not always marked by fluency and continuity of thought. As had happened in the 
previous period, it was the need to avoid inequitable solutions that became paramount. But 
because decisions of courts have to be reasoned, an extra level of difficulty emerged: the 
need to explain, and to confine, the discretion conferred on courts by equity. 
The North Sea cases and the Anglo/French arbitration were examined previously. 
The concerns in the 1969 Judgment with the need to avoid inequitable boundaries were not 
only justified, but perfectly in line with the debates in the ILC. What is unclear is why the 
Court deemed it necessary to discard the equidistance-special circumstances formula (as a 
means of delimitation), and to replace it with an undefined notion of "equitable principles". 
It is particularly so when the latter is presented as part of customary law without showing 
any state practice upon which to hinge it. The reason behind this approach is clear: since 
equity was being applied as a result of a renvoi from a rule of positive law, the Court could 
thereby avoid the delicate debate surrounding the general principles of law. The problem 
(483) Ibid., pp. 124-134, at p. 130 in particular. 
(484) Lauterpacht/1991, p.I25. 
(485) The point comes across clearly when realising the concerns that involved the drafting of the provision, especially as regards 
the discretion that would be conferred upon courts (ILC/Yearbook/1953(1), pp. 130-134). 
(486) This is shown by the Tribunal in the Anglo/French arbitration (cf. paras.2.4.b), 2.4.c)(iii) supra). 
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however, is that the notion of special circumstances had been devised explicitly to effect the 
renvoi to equity - which takes us back to the initial, unanswered question. Why was the 
combined formula not applied? The only rational explanation is that the Court sought to 
avoid giving equidistance any endorsement in the process of ordering the ocean space. 
The 1977 award demonstrated, through recourse to examples imported from state 
practice, how the equidistance-special circumstances rule operated. More importantly, it 
showed that state practice did not view equity as an autonomous means of delimitation, but 
rather as a tool to mould strict equidistance to the circumstances of each case. By equating 
the conventional formula to the application of equitable principles, the Tribunal attempted 
(unsuccessfully) to reconcile the 1969 Judgment with conventional law. Although the 
freedom of choice of courts as to the means of delimitation was toned down (by stating that 
courts did not have carte blanche in the choice of methods487), it was insufficient to prevent 
courts from claiming later further discretion, on the basis of equity. 
The 1981 Dubai/Sharjah Award adopts a similar conception of law, and also resorts 
to the equidistance-special circumstances formula to reach an equitable result between 
adjacent states. Analogously, the need to achieve an equitable result was viewed as a matter 
of "remedying distortions" caused by certain coastal features on the equidistance-line, 
which would amount to "inequitable deflections". The Tribunal supported the restrictive 
view of the 1977 Award as to natural prolongation and proportionality, the references to 
which in the 1969 Judgment it considered as dicta (thus not part of the ratio decidendi)m'. 
The process that led to the provisions on maritime delimitation incorporated in the 
LOSC was analysed above. The equidistance-special circumstances formula was kept as the 
means whereby territorial sea delimitations were to be effected. As regards the EEZ and the 
continental shelf, the compromise that was found prescribes that an equitable solution is to 
be achieved. No reference to an obligation of means is made, however, appearing instead a 
renvoi to international law. The role of equity in maritime delimitation was confined, 
strictly speaking, to the result. 
Perhaps because of the question posed by the parties489, the Tunisia/Libya Judgment 
presents the role of equity in maritime delimitation in a different fashion. With the greatest 
respect, however, we must side with those who disagreed with the approach adopted in the 
Judgment490. Considering the approach adopted in the 1977 arbitration, claiming that the 
(487) RIAA/18, p.l 14, para.245. 
(488) ILR/91/1993, pp.662-678. Unfortunately, this award was not made public immediately. 
(489) The parties asked the Court to determine which principles and rules of international law were applicable to the delimitation 
and, in rendering its decision, to have account of three factors: equitable principles, the relevant circumstances which characterise 
the area; the new accepted trends in the Third Conference (Article 1 of the Special Agreement, ICJ/Reports/1982, p.21, para.2). 
(490) Dissenting Opinions of Judges Gros, Oda and Evensen, ICJ/Reports/1982, pp. 147-156,253-260, 290-299. 
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equitableness of the result justified a wide freedom of choice of means would require sound 
reasoning; which the Court did not provide. To state that a principle "cannot be interpreted 
in the abstract", that it is "subordinate" to a goal, and that it acquires the quality 'equitable' 
"by reference to the equitableness of the result" that it attains in concreto is conceptually 
odd4 9 1. Principles embody precisely abstract 'ideal-oughts' - which are neither subordinate 
to a goal, nor determined by factual circumstances or by the results achieved thereby. Most 
importantly, subjecting the resort to (supposedly) normative prescriptions to their ability to 
attain a certain result - that seen by the majority of judges as equitable - appears to amount 
to the exercise of an ex aequo et bono power. 
This 'boundless equity' stems, perhaps to a great extent, from the way in which the 
Court devised the recourse to equity in 1969. At the time, the idea that the freedom to 
weigh-up whatever circumstances were deemed relevant was vested in states only, and that 
courts had no similar power, was not properly emphasised492. Insofar as the recourse to 
equity was seen as stemming from a renvoi effected by customary law, the misinterpretation 
was enhanced. The limits imposed on equity as a result of its interaction with other 
normative prescriptions of the corpus juris became blurred, appearing as i f one were 
allowed legally to apply equity in absolute terms. Had equity been presented as a general 
principle of law, perhaps no such problem would have arisen. The other reason that appears 
to explain this 'boundless equity' concerns the content of the provisions on delimitation 
included in the draft-LOSC - which mentioning the need to achieve an equitable result. 
However, they also prescribe that the delimitation is to be effected "on the basis of 
international law", which means that there are legal limits imposed on equity. The reasoning 
in the Tunisia/Libya Judgment seems to have forgotten these limits. 
The Gulf of Maine Judgment states that international law prescribes only, in general 
terms, the application of undefined "equitable criteria", which are determinable essentially 
in the light of the geographical setting of the area493. The change from 'principles' to 
'criteria' is not devoid of meaning, for the latter "are not themselves rules of law"4 9 4. To the 
Chamber, whereas 'principle' appears to be a term connoted clearly with normativity (being 
thus general and abstract), the term 'criteria' surfaces as related with assessments of fact 
(viewed as unique for each case). In this respect, Degan suggests that the "main merit of 
this Judgment [...] was that it introduced an order between different categories of genuine 
'principles and rules' of international law [...] and of the application of 'equitable criteria' 
(491) ICJ/Reports/1982, p.59, para.70. 
(492) As will be seen, this was made in 1985, in the Libya/Malta case. 
(493) ICJ/Reports/1984, p.278, para.59. 
(494) Ibid., p.313, para. 158. 
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and use of 'practical methods' capable of ensuring an equitable result' . The notion of 
"unicum" emerges as the justification for falling back on a notion of equity that allows wide 
room for discretion496. The problem is that this approach, as that of the Tunisia/Libya case, 
completely obscures the thin line that separates decisions which apply equity as part of the 
Law and ex aequo et bono decisions. A similar view, also referring to the idea of unicum, 
was adopted in the 1985 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau arbitration497. 
The Libya/Malta case, despite bearing a transitional flavour, is a landmark decision. 
While apparently not departing dramatically from the views on equity laid down in previous 
decisions, it has indeed 'rebuilt' the notion of equity on more solid grounds. Equidistance 
emerges as a provisional delimitation line 4 9 8, to be adjusted on the basis of equitable 
considerations related to the specificities of the case (in particular, here, proportionality)499. 
The most important aspect of the Judgment, however, is the way in which equity is confined 
to certain bounds, in order to increase the level of predictability of considerations to weigh. 
The Court's dicta are so relevant that it is worthwhile quoting in full passages regarding the 
limits of equity500: 
[T]he justice of which equity is an emanation, is not abstract justice but justice 
according to the rule of law; which is to say that its application should display 
consistency and a degree of predictability; even though it looks with particularity to 
the peculiar circumstances of an instant case, it also looks beyond it to principles of 
more general application. [...] [Although there may be no legal limit to the 
considerations which states may take account of, this can hardly be true for a Court 
applying equitable procedures. For a court, although there is assuredly no closed list 
of considerations, it is evident that only those that are pertinent to the institution of 
the continental shelf as it has developed within the law, and to the application of 
equitable principles to its delimitation, will qualify for inclusion. 
The Court had finally acknowledged the dangers of the approach that it had adopted 
until then. In a few lines, it addressed all key issues concerning the scope of equity as part 
of Law. First, it stressed that, being part of Law the recourse to equity should display 
consistency and some degree of predictability, and be of general application - which is the 
basis of the certainty borne by normative prescriptions. Secondly, it complemented the 1969 
Judgment by emphasising that the considerations that courts are entitled to weigh, although 
not limited by any "closed list", do not encompass all those that states may consider in 
negotiations. Finally, it offered what is perhaps the most relevant contribution of this 
(495) Degan/1987, p.122. 
(496) ICJ/Reports/1984, p.290, para.81 (French version). 
(497) ILM/25/1986, pp.289-290, paras.87-90. 
(498) Commenting on the fact that the Court's "apologetic" approach in this regard, Evans observes quite rightly that "it is difficult 
to see what other 'starting-point' could have served its purposes so well" (Evans/1999, p. 159). 
(499) ICJ/Reports/1985, pp.37-38, 44-56, paras.43,57-78. 
(500) Ibid., pp.39-40, paras.45,48. 
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Judgment when it established a substantive criterion on the basis of which such 
considerations are to be identified: only those factors legally pertinent to the institution in 
question may be considered. Perhaps for these reasons, Bedjaoui has affirmed that with this 
decision the Court conferred on equity "a normative, security-inducing, predictable 
dimension, general in its application"501. 
The 1992 Canada/France arbitration appears to be a step backwards in terms of the 
incorporation of equity within Law. Again, it presents an understanding of equity based on 
assessments of a somewhat subjective nature where proportionality becomes pivotal. To 
that Tribunal, the "underlying premise of [the] fundamental norm [of maritime delimitation] 
is the emphasis on equity and the rejection of any obligatory method"502 (i.e. equidistance is 
not given any particular role). This is somewhat of a return to the application of equity as 
seen in the Tunisia/Libya case. How to explain this approach is debatable. But there are 
some facts that deserve attention: one is the constitution of the tribunal; the other is the 
majority that voted in favour of the decision. One would suggest that the views of Judge 
DeArechaga (president of the Tribunal), which are well known, determined the outcome 
and shaped the whole reasoning. He had already considered in the Tunisia/Libya case that 
"the application of equity in maritime delimitation is not a mechanism designed to correct 
or mitigate the inequitable effects of a strict rule of law based on equidistance"503, and that 
"the judicial application of equitable principles means that a court should render justice in 
the concrete case, by means of a decision shaped by and adjusted to the relevant 'factual 
matrix' of that case"504. Focusing exclusively on facts, and leaving aside constraints derived 
from the legal framework, he favours interpretations of equity conferring upon courts the 
widest room for discretion. The other element that might shed some light on the decision is 
the fact that the judges chosen by the parties voted both against the decision, while 
considering that delimitation law had not been applied505. This fact suggests that perhaps the 
award was a pragmatic compromise reached between the other three judges. 
6.4.b)(iii) Third Period (1993 to Date) 
The Jan Mayen case, re-averring essential aspects of the Anglo/French arbitration 
and the Libya/Malta case506, marks the beginning of the third period. It reinstated the 
equidistance-special circumstances formula at the heart of maritime delimitation. Indeed, it 
(501) Bedjaoui/2000, p.23. 
(502) ILM/31/1992, p.l 163, para.38. 
(503) DeArechaga/1987, p.238. 
(504) Separate Opinion, Tunisia/Libya case, ICJ/Reports/l 982, p.106. 
(505) ILM/31/1992, pp.1181-1196 (Judge Gotlieb), 1197-1219 (Judge Weil). 
(506) ICJ/Reports/l 993, pp.58-64, paras.46-58. 
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might be argued that it incorporates a "renunciation of the earlier cases' . The Court 
acknowledged that - as to the result of delimitation (to attain an "equitable solution") -
Articles 74 and 83 reflect customary law 5 0 8. As regards the means, while quoting the 1977 
award, it recognised that state practice sought solutions "in a method modifying or varying 
the equidistance method rather than to have recourse to a wholly different criterion of 
delimitation"509. Naturally, the Court found itself "called upon to examine every particular 
factor of the case which might suggest an adjustment or shifting of the median line 
provisionally drawn"510. Noteworthy is equally the conclusion that there is a trend "towards 
assimilation between the special circumstances of Article 6 of the 1958 Convention and the 
relevant circumstances under customary law, and this if only because they both are intended 
to enable the achievement of an equitable result"511. 
Nevertheless, the most notable contribution of the Court in relation to the notion of 
equity is embedded in the conclusion that - as affirmed in the Anglo/French arbitration -
"the different ways in which the requirements of 'equitable principles' or the effects of 
'special circumstances' are put reflect differences of approach and terminology rather than 
of substance"512. In relation to the choice of circumstances weighable under the notion of 
equity, and the limits imposed on such choice in order to ensure consistency and a degree of 
predictability, the Court followed the views advanced in the Libya/Malta case513. 
By framing the resort to equity as a notion 'corrective of equidistance', the Court 
completed the full circle of delimitation law. With respect to the means to 'choose a line', it 
took delimitation law back to the views adopted by the ILC, thus shaking off the "excessive 
scruples" in relation to the recourse to equidistance514. It demonstrated that although the 
LOSC provisions (which reflect customary law) speak of "equitable solution", what is 
envisaged is to avoid inequitable boundaries515. The function of equity is less to positively 
ensure an equitable solution than it is to avoid an inequitable solution516. As previously 
argued, had the aim been to positively seek equitable solutions, the means conventionally 
(507) Evans/1999, p. 161. He also states that this Judgment can "be seen as a rejection of the directions [the Court] was appearing to 
take in [...] earlier cases" (Evans/1999, p. 154). 
(508) ICJ/Reports/1993, p.59, para.48, in fine. 
(509) Ibid., p.61, para.51. Interestingly, in the same sentence equidistance seems to be viewed as "method" and "criterion". 
(510) Ibid., p.62, para.54. Apparently, the Court assumed that the dictum of the 1977 arbitration, as regards the relationship between 
equidistance-special circumstances and equitable principles, meant that equidistance is the starting point of the delimitation also 
under customary law (cf. para.2.4.c)(i) supra). Evans refers to an export of equidistance into customary law (Evans/1999, p. 160). 
(511) ICJ/Reports/1993, p.62, para.56, emphasis added. Judge Schwebel observes that special circumstances cannot be equated to 
relevant circumstances (Separate Opinion, ICJ/Reports/1993, p. 121). 
(512) ICJ/Reports/1993, p.63, para.56. 
(513) Ibid., pp.63-64, paras.57-58. 
(514) Thirlway/1994, p.83. 
(515) The example of "proportionality" is again paradigmatic. As was stressed, again by citing the 1977 award, "it is disproportion 
rather than any general principle of proportionality which is the relevant criterion or factor" (ICJ/Reports/1993, p.67, para.66). 
(516) Weil/1996, p. 139. Cf. also Judge Schwebel, Separate Opinion, Gulf of Maine case, ICJ/Reports/1984, p.353. 
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consecrated thereto would have been "equity" (as happens in Articles 59, 69(1) and 70(1) of 
the LOSC), and not "international law" (as stated in Articles 74 and 83). The Court's 
approach lends support to the idea that the boundary is to be attained through the mitigation 
of any unreasonable effects derived from the application of strict equidistance, whose 
unreasonableness is to be assessed in concreto. Similarly, it leaves no doubt that, in 
adjudication, the relevant factors are substantively limited by the regime of the zone in 
question (although they cannot be enumerated exhaustively)517. 
These views were endorsed in the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, and reaffirmed in the 
Qatar/Bahrain case. Recourse was had again to the equidistance-special circumstances 
formula as means of delimitation. The idea of non-inequitableness of the boundary is again 
presented under the guise of "reasonableness" and "non-disproportion"518. Importantly, in 
the Qatar/Bahrain case, no distinction was made between adjacency (the northern sector) 
and oppositeness (the southern sector) as to the use of equidistance as starting point for the 
delimitation - which is undoubtedly a welcomed and much needed development519. 
After much controversy, the balance between certainty (normativity) and justice 
(equity) in maritime delimitation law finally seems to have been struck. Unsurprisingly, this 
was achieved through recourse to the equidistance-special circumstances formula, which as 
Franck has stated is a rule that exemplifies "the effort to balance determinacy with concern 
for justice"520. Importantly, it brings together state practice, conventional law and case law. 
Noteworthy is also the fact that it confers upon courts the task that had been envisaged by 
the ILC members: the identification of the circumstances which, in the light of equity, 
justify departure from strict equidistance, in order to provide relief from undue hardship. 
Today, the administration of equity by courts seems to finally evolve within the juridical 
framework provided for international law. 
6.4.b)(iv) A Requiem for the Term "Equitable Principles" 
That equity is inherent in maritime delimitation is doubtless. What has raised doubts 
is the way in which it operates, and whether or not it is a normative standard. Interrelated 
here are equally terminological issues. For instance, are "equitable principles" synonymous 
(517) On the question of the choice of factors, cf. para.7.1 .b) infra. 
(518) Eritrea/Yemen-II, paras. 116-119, 130-131, 142, 150, 159-160, 165, 168; Qatar/Bahrain-Merits, paras.218-219, 229-232, 
244-249. 
(519) In a commentary to the second award of the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, the author has already suggested that "the distinction 
between situations of oppositeness and adjacency is of artificial, and not understandable in both juridical and technical terms", and 
that "courts should not distinguish between them". Then, it was equally argued that "equidistance is, in both situations, the most 
equitable, and predictable, starting point that may be used", and that there seemed to be no reason for not applying the 
equidistance-special circumstances formula to both situations in exactly the same terms (cf. Antunes/2001, pp.335-336; although 
published only after the Qatar/Bahrain Judgment, the article was written earlier). 
(520) Franck/1997, p.61. 
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with equity, or should they be understood differently? Is there a "principle of equity", and i f 
so, how does it relate to "equitable principles"? In attempting to answer these questions, it is 
submitted that, in its normative facet, "equity" is a general principle of law, and that 
"equitable principles" stem from it, and are mere expressions of normativity in casu. Their 
existence as normative standards is indeed spurious521. 
The primary distinction to be made is that between 'obligation of result' and 
'obligation of means'. An obligation of result (achieving an equitable solution) does not 
entail an obligation of means - whereby equity is applied with exclusion of other standards 
in the determination of the boundary522. The Jan Mayen Judgment seems to suggest that 
customary law and conventional law cover only the former. I f this is true, then the Court 
has changed the complexion of delimitation law. First, it allows equitable principles to be 
equated to the equidistance-special circumstances rule (as proposed in the Anglo/French 
arbitration). Case law thus converges towards state practice, leading to a higher level of 
crystallisation of delimitation law. Secondly, as a result, because the combined formula 
must be subject to a teleological element - to attain a non-inequitable boundary, "relevant 
circumstances" become subsumed in the notion of "special circumstances" - and are to be 
interpreted in the context of the combined formula. Equity emerges therefore as having a 
corrective role, referenced to equidistance. And it goes without saying that ultimately, this 
approach amounts to aver the substantive emptiness of the term "equitable principles". 
The disuse of the term 'equitable principles' in case law 5 2 3 , instead of being reason 
for concern, should be welcomed. For it is likely to bring some clarity into what have been 
for a long time muddy waters. As noted by Judge Bedjaoui, the truth is that the Court has 
never provided a clear definition of what it meant thereby. As he also acknowledges, the 
(re)discovery of the expression 'equitable principles' is historically related to equidistance, 
to which the former was to serve as counterweight ("servir de contrepoids")514. I f this was 
the true motivation, then courts overlooked in a number of instances that to counterbalance 
equidistance the only thing necessary was a statement averring the teleological element 
embodied in the notion of special circumstances. 
What has never been demonstrated is the existence of an extensive, settled and 
virtually uniform state practice supporting the recourse to equitable principles as means of 
(521) Paras.6.2.a), 6.2.c)(ii) supra, Conclusions to Part II infra. 
(522) Judge Bedjaoui advanced this view in his Dissenting Opinion in the Guinea-Bissau/Senegal arbitration (ILR/83/1990, p.91). 
(523) In the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, this term was used to refer to the Yemeni case (which saw it as the basis for the adjustment 
of equidistance), in the context of citations concerning proportionality that referred to the 1969 Judgment (Eritrea/Yemen-II, 
paras. 19, 39, 165). The references in the Qatar/Bahrain concern a quotation of a letter dated 1946, and a statement of the Court as 
to the close relationship with the equidistance-special circumstances formula (Qatar/Bahrain-Merits, paras.61, 231). 
(524) Bedjaoui/1990, p.370. 
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delimitation . Nor has it been shown that equitable principles are normative standards 
(principles of law or rules stricto sensu the application of which as standards is mandatory 
in every case), or that they have a meaning other than that of the principle of equity. Besides 
being essentially judge-made ("essentiellement pretorieri" in the words of Judge Bedjaoui), 
equitable principles bear a normativity that is derived from the fact that the principle of 
equity is inherent in the 'fundamental norm' of delimitation 5 2 6. 
The reference in the North Sea Judgment to "very general precepts of justice and 
good faith", as the foundation of equitable principles5 2 7, cannot be seen as other than a 
reference to "general principles of justice as distinguished from any particular system of 
jurisprudence or the municipal law of any state", which was taken here as the definition of 
equity 5 2 8. The whole problem, one would submit, revolved around the need to confine the 
scope of equity to its normative facet. Because the debate concerning general principles of 
law would introduce more difficulties in an already difficult Judgment, the Court presented 
"equitable principles" as customary law to circumvent the issue. This expression was part of 
an artifice that, while allowing the recourse to equity within Article 38(1) the Statute of the 
Court, evaded the debate on the existence of a tertium genus of normativity 5 2 9. 
The conceptual problem however, is that equity is a filigree of expressions of justice 
that cannot be captured by a rule of law stricto sensu (which applies to class-events and 
provides specific solutions). This is why the customary rule identified by the Court 
incorporated a permission to apply equity, which because of the Truman Proclamation was 
dressed as equitable principles. The consequence of this renvoi was that the scope of equity 
seemed to have no bounds, because it appeared that it was the law itself that allowed its 
unlimited application with a view to generate an equitable solution. Had 'normative equity' 
been presented as a general principle of law, and the limits on the resort to equity would 
perhaps have become clearer. 
What are then the contents of the principle of equity? And how does it operate in 
maritime delimitation? As "general principles of justice" which cut across all legal orders, it 
is contended, equity equates to reasonableness. It stipulates that both the interpretation and 
application of normative standards, and the result thereof, must be reasonable in the light of 
the factual circumstances of each case530. What is reasonable, however, can be determined 
only in concreto. To courts, this means that they are endowed with a power of discretion the 
(525) Para.3.3.b)(iv), Conclusions to Part I supra. 
(526) Bedjaoui/1990, p.387. 
(527) ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.47-48, para.85. 
(528) Para.6.4.a)(i) supra. 
(529) Para.2.3.b)(ii) supra. 
(530) Para.6.4.a)(v) supra. 
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exercise of which must take place in the context of the whole corpus juris and be justified 
through judicial reasoning. Suffice it to say that important steps taken by courts in 
delimitation are simply justified by equating (in)equitableness with (un)reasonableness or 
(dis)proportionality531. As states virtually have unlimited discretion in exercising, as well as 
disposing of, their rights 5 3 2, what is required in negotiation is that decisions be attained by 
consent of all states whose interests are involved 5 3 3. Either way, reasonableness cannot be 
defined in positive law; it requires a decision in concrete534. 
Being a principle, equity is never to be applied in absolute terms. As mentioned, 
because what principles require is "to realise something to the highest degree possible 
relative to the factual and legal possibilities" in casu, "they are to be optimised in relative 
terms"5 3 5. It is through a process of balancing-up factual and legal circumstances, that the 
'ideal prima facie ought' of principles is converted into a 'definite ought'. Consider the 
principles of equity and of stability and finality of boundaries. The rule whereby boundary 
treaties are excluded from the tabula rasa rule (which applies to newly independent states 
in terms of treaty succession) expresses the prevalence of the latter principle - regardless of 
whether the solution embodied therein is equitable536. The rule excluding boundary treaties 
from the regime of the rebus sic stantibus clause is a similar example537. As observed in the 
Guinea-Bissau/Senegal arbitration, "there does not exist at present in positive international 
law any customary norm or any general principle of law that would authorise states which 
have concluded a valid treaty concerning maritime delimitation, or their successors, to 
verify or review its equitable character"538. These examples express the balance struck in 
international law between the principle of stability and finality of boundaries and the 
principle of equity. However, in delimitation proprio sensu - which presupposes that no 
boundary has yet been established, the weight of equity has to be assessed under a different 
legal light. 
(531) Cf. e.g. North Sea cases, ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.24-25, 50, 52-53, paras24, 90, 97-98; Anglo/French arbitration, RIAA/18, 
pp.57-58, 93-95, 113-115, paras.99-101, 196-201, 242-246; Tunisia/Libya case, ICJ/Reports/1982, pp.60, 88, paras.72, 127; Gulf 
of Maine case, ICJ/Reports/1984, pp.301, 313, 323, 327-328, 335, paras.115, 158, 185, 196, 220; Libya/Malta case, pp.44, 49, 
51-52, paras.56, 66, 72-73; Canada/France arbitration, ILM/XXI/1992, pp.1169-1170, paras.68-69; Jan Mayen case, 
ICJ/Reports/1993, pp.65-69, paras.61-69; Eritrea/Yemen-II, paras. 116-119, 130-131, 142, 150, 159-160, 165, 168; 
Qatar/Bahrain-Merits, paras.218-219, 229-232,244-249. 
(532) Para.6.1 .b)(ii) supra. 
(533) For instance, Article 17 of the 1997 Convention on Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses refers, in the 
framework of the equitable and reasonable utilisation and development of the watercourse, to "negotiations with a view to 
arriving at an equitable resolution of the situation", and states that "negotiations shall be conducted on the basis that each State 
must in good faith pay reasonable regard to the rights and legitimate interests of the other State" (emphasis added). 
(534) Para.6.4.a)(iii) supra. 
(535) Para.6.2.b) supra. 
(536) VCSSRT, Article 11. Cf. Guinea-Bissau/Senegal arbitration, ILR/83/1990, pp.35-37, paras.61-65. But this is not free from 
difficulties; as Judge Bedjaoui stressed in his Dissenting Opinion, the uti possidetis principle might lead to an unjust solution 
(ILR/83/1990, pp.56-85, p.62 in particular). 
(537) VCLT, Article 62(2)(a); see the Aegean Sea case, ICJ/Reports/1978, p.37, para.85. 
(538) ILR/83/1990, p.43, para.79. 
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Until the 1950s, maritime delimitation law was virtually non-existent, even in 
relation to the territorial sea. Why the principle of equity became paramount must be seen 
by reference to two thoughts. The normative density of maritime delimitation law was until 
the 1950s minimal. Adding to this, the delimitation of jurisdictional zones concerned 
primarily the partitioning of and access to natural resources. This meant that the normative 
standards for delimitation had to be developed progressively, in a way that had to leave 
room for accommodating unforeseeable cases, and that would effect a fair division of the 
natural resources. Equity turned into an inescapable standard. In case law, the recourse to 
the term "equitable principles", and its inclusion as part of customary law, was mere 
formalism. It was an attempt to circumvent difficulties related to the debate on sources of 
law and on the exercise of judicial discretion in international dispute-settlement. 
To summarise, it is the principle of equity, rather than the undefined notion of 
equitable principles, that forms part of the normative framework of maritime delimitation. 
Its expression in this field of law might be translated in the following deontic statement. 
Considering those factors which, in casu and according to the substantive legal regime of 
the maritime zones to be delimited, might have an impact on the rights and interests of the 
states involved in the area of overlapping entitlements, the maritime boundary delimited 
between two states ought not to be unreasonable (i.e. manifest hardship is to be avoided). 
Three points are stressed here. Equity is a negative condition, rather than a positive one. Its 
role in the delimitation process is to ensure that the balance of rights and interests attained 
for the overlapping of entitlements is 'not grossly unreasonable'. The factors by reference to 
which such a balance is achieved, although stemming from the factual circumstances in 
concreto, must be selected through the legal regime of the maritime zones to be delimited. 
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CONCLUSIONS TO PART II 
The conceptualisation proposed here is founded on the deconstruction of maritime 
delimitation into three central issues: the concept of maritime delimitation, the technical 
methodologies utilised to define a boundary-line, and the applicable normative standards. 
Far from independent of each other, these issues are constituted by intertwined elements, 
which only when taken as a coherent whole allow a proper understanding of the subject. 
The deconstruction having served its purpose - a separate analysis of each issue, one must 
begin to reconstruct the delimitation problem as an organised set of ideas on the basis of 
which the quest for actual boundary-lines is to be undertaken. 
According to the argument of Chapter 4, maritime delimitation is an operation that 
encompasses the political-legal determination, and the technical definition, of a maritime 
boundary. Naturally, it is presupposed that the boundary has not yet been determined de 
jure, either formally, or tacitly. Central maritime delimitation is an overlapping of at least 
two legally valid maritime entitlements. The object of the 'juridical positions' of the states 
involved is wholly or partially coincident, thus consubstantiating a concurrence of rights. 
Only when this concurrence of rights is resolved through delimitation does the exercise of 
exclusive jurisdictional powers become possible. The question is therefore one of spatial 
allocation of authority within a disputed area, which entails the 'amputation' of at least one 
of the overlapping maritime entitlements. 
In this light, we are exhorted to delve into two focal points. What are the normative 
standards by which the determination of the boundary is governed? Which technical means 
and parameters are involved in this decision, and in the implementation thereof? 
Intertwined in the answer to the first question is one prior distinction concerning the 
procedural means utilised in delimitation. For states involved in the negotiation of maritime 
boundaries all that is required is that the solution be achieved by mutual consent. There are 
virtually no limits to their consensual choices. Courts asked to delimit maritime boundaries 
are however in a different situation. Regardless of the level of normative density with which 
they are faced (which is recognisably low in delimitation law, and which in consequence 
results in a wide margin of discretion for courts), their decisions must be reasoned on the 
basis of international law. Adjudicated boundaries ought to be reached through analyses 
that must be objective, account taken of the applicable normative standards. In other words, 
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binding on courts, delimitation law is merely suppletive to states. Notwithstanding this 
distinction the reality is that states involved in negotiation do consider delimitation law for 
purposes of preparing and justifying their claims. For this reason, the following conclusions 
are relevant for both courts and states. 
With respect to normativity in maritime delimitation, the picture is problematic. Its 
description requires that distinction be made between what is the result to achieve, and the 
means whereby the result is to be sought. That conventional law and customary law both 
require that an equitable solution be achieved - or more precisely, that inequitable solutions 
be avoided - is undoubted. This applies to all maritime zones, the territorial sea included. It 
is true that the delimitation provisions of the LOSC, for the territorial sea, and for the EEZ 
and continental shelf, do not have the same wording. But they do share a common element: 
the delimitation must result in a non-inequitable boundary5 3 9. 
As to an obligation of means, the question is posed differently for the territorial sea 
and for the maritime zones beyond it. The resort to the equidistance-special circumstances 
rule in territorial sea delimitation has raised no controversy. Consecrated in conventional 
law, this formula has been deemed to reflect customary law. In EEZ and continental shelf 
delimitation, while conventional law provides no guidance, the proposition that 'equitable 
principles' are part of customary law faces too many conceptual difficulties to be accepted. 
The rejection of the legal content of equidistance, and the argument that under a rule of law 
prescribing the use of equity courts have a freedom of choice of relevant circumstances and 
applicable methods, find no support in state practice. States have ovemhelmingly upheld 
approaches based on equidistance, adjusted where necessary to accommodate the equities in 
concreto. After the Jan Mayen case, which consolidated the views of the Anglo/French 
arbitration, case law has converged with state practice. Today, the delimitation of maritime 
boundaries is founded on the equidistance-special circumstances formula. Suggesting that 
this results from the fact that this formula equates to 'equitable principles', is unpersuasive. 
Further, it only manages to muddle the understanding thereof. 
Given the systematic and historical elements, as well as state practice and recent 
jurisprudence, another approach is conceptually preferable. This study has argued that the 
normative standards of maritime delimitation are two principles of law: the principle of 
maritime zoning and the principle of equity 5 4 0. It is from the 'normative portmanteau' 
formed by the two 'ideal oughts' incorporated therein that the non-inequitable solution must 
(539) In the ILC preparatory work, it became clear that one of the key concerns of delimitation, whether it regarded the territorial sea 
or the continental shelf, should be to avoid inequitable solutions. The inclusion of navigation and fishing interests amongst the 
possible special circumstances in territorial sea delimitation is the best token of the need to avoid inequitable solutions. 
(540) Antunes/2001, pp.343-344; Antunes/2000c, pp. 188-189. The idea that the I L C , or at least some of its members, sought to 
derive rules from existing legal principles has already been mentioned (cf. paras. 1,2.b)(ii), 1.2.c) supra). 
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stem. Despite not being explicitly mentioned, these two principles are reflected in the 
LOSC. For instance, the principle of equity is patent in the reference to an equitable 
solution. In respect of the relevance of the principle of maritime zoning, it suffices to say 
that it would be odd to accept that the delimitation of maritime states could be effected 
without considering the very basis on which rest the rights of states over the maritime zones 
to be delimited. 
Why the approach adopted here is preferable, and how precisely the two principles 
interact in shaping the legal framework of maritime delimitation, are questions that require 
further elaboration. The first point to emphasise is that state practice should be weighed in 
conceptualising the law (even i f not reflecting the normative content of an opinio juris, as a 
quasi-normative opinio aequitatis)5^. It would be too simplistic to literally dismiss an 
overwhelming number of agreements that endorse equidistance on the ground that 
equidistance is merely a method, and hence legally valueless. The equidistance method 
concerns computations (and related issues) necessary to technically define a line running at 
equal distance from certain pre-established or selected basepoints. Beneath the 
denomination 'equidistance' also lies a corollary legal principle. The principle of maritime 
zoning represents the legal counterpoint between 'exclusiveness' and 'inclusiveness'. In the 
legal order of the ocean, it operates area-attributions primarily on the basis of 'distance from 
the coast'. Maritime delimitation amounts to ordering maritime spaces as between the areas 
of 'exclusiveness' belonging to (at least) two states. Dressed as 'closer proximity', distance 
becomes in this context the 'natural' legal criterion for prima facie area-attribution. 
This brings us to the second point. From a conceptual standpoint, the mandatory use 
of equidistance as the starting point for delimitation is the only logical conclusion. First, i f 
states are entitled to exclude the community of states from enjoying certain rights in areas 
defined by reference to distance to their coasts, then in principle they are also entitled to 
exclude other states individually on the basis of 'closer proximity'. Secondly, delimitation 
consists of the determination of a line that wi l l effect the division of an object-area over 
which (at least) two states hold concurrent rights. To suggest that the concurrence of rights 
might be resolved (maritime delimitation) without somehow weighing-up the foundation of 
the rights concurrently held (maritime entitlements) is untenable. 
The third ground of justification demands a more extensive elaboration, as it covers 
two fundamental questions: why is there no hard and fast rule determining the course of the 
boundary; and related thereto, how is the discretion conferred on courts to be understood. 
Because the normativity is embedded in two legal principles, maritime delimitation must be 
(541) For further elaboration on this point, cf. para.7.1. infra. 
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effected on the basis of an argument of principle. Legal argumentation and discourse thus 
have to bear in mind that the application of a principle is not exclusive of another principle. 
When principles collide, the normativity of the system stems from their mutual influence. 
The two principles must be construed in the light of each other, through a relative 
weighing-up whereby relationships of precedence emerge in casu. Each principle has to be 
materialised to the highest degree possible relative to the factual and legal possibilities. In 
other words, normativity stems from (potentially) colliding principles, the integration of 
which moulds the outcome. 'Closer proximity' and equity therefore, must be reciprocally 
optimised5 4 2. 
The fact that two principles are at issue means that achieving an equitable solution -
the objective of all delimitations - is not an exercise in equity. In the Tunisia/Libya case, 
dissenting voices were heard precisely because equity was arguably applied without regard 
for any proper contextual (legal) confinement. At the time, it was noted that 
[t]here is a profound gulf between an equitable solution which is found upon the 
rules of law applicable to the relevant fact accurately and fully taken into account, 
and an equitable solution which is founded upon subjective and sometimes divided 
assessments of the facts, regardless of the law of delimitation. The equity 
considerations to be applied must be placed in some legal context. If applied in a 
legal void as entirely self-sufficient, equity may easily change the character of a 
decision from being a decision under Article 38, paragraph 1 of the Statute to 
becoming an ex aequo et bono decision. 5 4 3 
Recourse to 'normative equity' as envisaged in this study is not simply a question of 
arriving at "a decision shaped by and adjusted to the relevant 'factual matrix' of each 
case"544. In the transposition from the 'ideal ought' of the principle of equity to the 'definite 
ought' applicable in concreto, account must be taken of the 'legal matrix'. This amounts to 
factoring the principle of maritime zoning into the legal equation of maritime delimitation. 
The dictum in the Libya/Malta Judgment54S, as regards the need to obtain predictability and 
consistency by considering the legal regime of the maritime zone to be delimited, lends 
support to this view. Despite difficulties surrounding equity, seeking a non-inequitable 
boundary is not an exercise in unrestrained 'subjectivity'. Judicial decision-making allows 
only the subjectivity inherent in the 'back and forth journey between facts and normativity'. 
As Kratochwil says, 'justice' is less an intrinsic attribute of formal principles, and more "the 
result of reasonable and principled use of norms in making practical judgments about 
(542) Para.6.2.b) supra. On how this is to be implemented in practice, cf. paras.7.3., 7.4. infra. 
(543) Judge Gros, Dissenting Opinion, ICJ/Reports/1982, p.153; Judge Evensen, Dissenting Opinion, ICJ/Reports/1982, p.294. 
(544) DeArechaga/1987, p.232. Cf. also Judge DeArechaga, Separate Opinion, Tunisia/Libya case, ICJ/Reports/1982, p.106. 
(545) ICJ/Reports/1985, pp.39-40, paras.45,48. 
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factual situations"546. Not surprisingly, reasonableness of means and reasonableness of 
result - as expressions of equity - are concepts not unknown to the Court 5 4 7. 
The wide berth given to 'subjectivity' in maritime delimitation is derived inter alia 
from the fact that the means of delimitation are not set down in any rule. The normativity 
stems from principles - standards with a variable scope. When 'closer proximity' leads to a 
reasonable solution, it is because the factual circumstances in casu do not cause the two 
principles to collide. Conversely, when the equidistant boundary is deemed inequitable, this 
means that the two principles collide. The two principles must then undergo a process of 
optimisation, which as said consists of a juridical appraisal referenced to both the 'legal 
matrix' and the 'factual matrix'. In the 'harmonisation' of concurrent rights inherent in this 
process, recourse should be had to the 'maxim of proportionality', and particularly its three 
sub-parameters: adequacy, necessity, and proportionality stricto sensu54*. The outcome 
must be adequate to resolve the concurrence of rights, entail to each concurrent position 
only the restrictions necessary to reach the balance, and reflect an equilibrium in which the 
legally relevant facts are weighed-up in proportionate fashion. A non-inequitable solution 
results from the optimisation of principles thus effectuated549. 
Here, it is worth noting that the question of concurrent rights has been dealt with in 
Portuguese private law since the 19 th century. The 1867 Civil Code {Codigo de Seabra) 
contained unparalleled norms in this respect550. Article 14 stated: "Whomever exercising its 
own right seeks benefits shall, in case of conflict and in absence of a special provision, cede 
to whomever seeks to avoid damages." And Article 15 added: "In the case of concurrence 
of equal rights or rights of the same kind, those concerned shall cede reciprocally as 
necessary for both rights to be effective, without larger detriment to one party than to the 
other." Under the Portuguese Civil Code currently in force, the solution remains largely the 
same. Paragraph 1 of Article 335 states: "Where there is a collision of equal rights or rights 
of the same kind, those entitled shall cede to the extent necessary for all rights to be equally 
effective, without larger detriment to either party." Paragraph 2 adds: " I f the rights in 
question are unequal or of a different kind, that which is deemed superior shall prevail." 
These provisions have the merit of explaining how concurrence of legal rights is to 
be resolved. Although not explicitly mentioning the 'maxim of proportionality', they have 
enshrined its core ideas. First, a distinction is made between equal rights and rights of a 
different kind, thus raising the question of appropriateness (which lies at the heart of the 
(546) Kratochwil/1989, p.240. 
(547) Cf. paras.6.4.a)(v), 6.4.b)(iv) supra. 
(548) Larenz/1989, Chapter V.3., pp.490-502. 
(549) On the relevant factors, and the problem of optimisation, cf. paras.7.2.,7.3., 7.4. infra. 
(550) Resorting to these provisions for describing conceptually maritime delimitation, cf. Teles/1998 (unpublished), paras. 16-17. 
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concept of precedence between different entitlements)551. Secondly, it refers to 'reciprocal 
cession' between the rights involved, which seeks to preserve the existence of each right. 
This mutual conformation is limited by necessity in that unnecessary restrictions will not be 
imposed on either party; and it underlies the notion of maximisation of principles, equating 
to a minimisation of the 'amputation' of each entitlement552. Thirdly, the balance between 
the detriment caused to either party entails one consideration: there must be a proportionate 
balance between the parties' positions; such an equilibrium is best described as a matter of 
avoiding detriment (negative element) rather as a matter of redistributing benefits (positive 
element). Arguments of equity demand restraint and caution, especially in international law 
where they encompass only the (small) common ground between all systems. The reference 
to avoiding detriment reflects this requirement. The obligation of result (avoiding inequity) 
and the perception that proportionality amounts to avoiding disproportion are examples of 
its reflection in delimitation law. 
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The proposition so far advanced may be better understood through the sliding-scale 
illustrated in Graphic 2 above. The optimisation of principles amounts to the 'discovery' of 
the 'case-norm' whereby the delimitation is decided. This 'case-norm' corresponds to a 
specific point on a 'relative weighing-up curve' oriented along two axes - one representing 
(551) Para.4.3.d)(iii)(iv) supra. 
(552) Para.4.3.dXii) supra. 
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the principle of maritime zoning, the other representing the principle of equity. Should 
equidistance yield a reasonable boundary-line, the role played in concreto by the principle 
of equity is minor. By contrast, i f the equidistance-line is unreasonable, while the principle 
of maritime zoning becomes less dominant, the principle of equity becomes predominant. 
Because equidistance frequently results in boundary-lines that require little adjustment to 
become reasonable, most cases wil l fall in the left-mid part of the scale. Conceptually, this 
approach offers an explanation for two points that have been debated at length. First, the 
equidistance-special circumstances rule is an expression of two principles of international 
law; and must be interpreted in their light 5 5 3 . Secondly, to the extent that these principles are 
reconcilable, the legal argument between those who supported equidistance and those who 
supported equity has indeed been "based on a false antithesis"554. 
From a practical perspective, this signifies that each maritime entitlement may be 
restricted only to the extent appropriate and necessary to reach a non-inequitable solution. 
As the means to reach justice, equity cannot go beyond what justice quintessentially 
requires: that extreme injustice be avoided5 5 5. In ideal scenarios, the 'amputation' of the 
entitlements is minimised equally for both sides, throughout the overlapping entitlements, 
when it is carried out by equidistance. This explains the prima facie equitable nature of 
equidistance556. Only where an equilibrium between the positions of the parties cannot be 
reached through this line may courts depart therefrom. Even then, such a departure from 
equidistance is restricted to the extent needed to arrive at a non-inequitable (reasonable) 
balance, i.e. to avoid a clear detriment to either party. 
The exact course of the boundary depends upon the 'definite ought' that stems from 
the harmonisation of these two principles. This can only be determined in concreto, hence 
explaining why there is no rigid, generally applicable formula to this effect. Nevertheless, it 
is incorrect to suggest that courts have a freedom of choice of line. Owing to the principle 
of maritime zoning, courts are bound to utilise an equidistance-line as the starting point for 
the decision. International law does not ascribe courts a carte blanche to depart therefrom. 
This by no means tantamount to affirming that adjudicated boundaries cannot be other than 
equidistance-lines. Boundary-lines can be, for example, modified versions of equidistance, 
variants thereof, bearing lines, parallels or meridians, 'corridor lines', or even lines based 
(553) The fact that this rule was designed from its inception to "partake of some elasticity", and to confer prevalence upon the 
"major principle of equidistance", "subject to reasonable modifications necessitated by the special circumstances of the case" (cf. 
rLC/Yearbook/1953(II), p.216), corroborates this standpoint. Indeed, it reflects the normative balance that the ILC sought to strike 
between geography and justice (cf. para. 1,2.c) supra). 
(554) Jeruiings/Watts/1997, p.780. 
(555) Para.6.4.a)(ii) supra. 
(556) Para.6.3.d)(iv) supra. 
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on enclaving methodologies. The proviso however, is that such lines stem from a legal 
reasoning based on the adjustment of a mandatory, provisional equidistance-line557. 
For reasons perhaps related with the reluctance of courts in 'back-stepping' from 
previous positions, this view has not yet been explicitly averred. It ought nonetheless to be 
said that the ICJ seems to have implicitly (or subliminally) endorsed it. In the Jan Mayen 
case, it stated that analysing the delimitation problem from the point of view of equitable 
principles or on the basis of the equidistance-special circumstances formula reflected 
"differences of approach and terminology rather than of substance"558. In the Qatar/Bahrain 
case, this view was complemented with the assertion that resort to the equidistance-special 
circumstances rule was the "most logical and widely practised approach" 5 5 9. 
Regardless of terminological quarrels, the conclusion appears to be clear. Just as the 
recourse to equidistance as criterion of division of zones of exclusive maritime jurisdiction 
is subject to the principle of equity, so is the latter (which concerns the choice of facts to 
weigh, how to weigh them, and how to reflect this in the course of the boundary) subject to 
the principle of maritime zoning. 
In his Dissenting Opinion in the Canada/France arbitration, Weil advanced an idea 
that is arguably the best proposal yet to sum up the content of delimitation law. The guiding 
thread is the reasonableness [equity] of the distance of the boundary from each coastline 
[maritime zoning] 5 6 0. In the Qatar/Bahrain case, the Court expressed a similar view when it 
did not attribute full-effect to Fasht al Azm (an insular feature) because it "would place the 
boundary disproportionately close [equity] to Qatar's mainland coast [maritime zoning]" 5 6 1. 
That reasonable distance depends on the circumstances in casu is obvious. Less obvious, 
but equally important, is the idea that reasonable distance depends upon the equilibrium 
between the rights and interests of each state on each point at sea, a question intertwined 
with the regime of maritime zones 
Why it was previously argued that the 'criteria' and 'principles' enumerated in the 
Gulf of Maine and Libya/Malta cases are no more than expressions of normativity in casu 
may now be clarified 5 6 3. Those standards are in effect expressions of the optimisation 
between the principle of maritime zoning and the principle of equity. In most cases, they 
(557) Which adjustments are required, what line is to be chosen, are questions that can only be answered by factoring the 'factual 
matrix' into the delimitation equation. This issue, which has regard to the 'content of equity', stems from absolute and relative 
assessments of factual evidence. Cf. Chapters 7 and 8 infra. 
(558) Jan Mayen case, ICJ/Reports/1993, p.63, para. 56 in fine, citing the Anglo/French arbitration, RIAA/18, p.75, para. 148. 
(559) Qatar/Bahrain-Merits, para. 176. Similarly, Eritrea/Yemcn-II, para. 132. 
(560) ILM/31/1992, p.1209. 
(561) Qatar/Bahrain-Merits, para.218, emphasis added. 
(562) Para.7.2.c) infra. 
(563) ICJ/Reports/1985, pp.39-40, para.46; ICJ/Reports/1984, pp.312-313, para. 157. Cf. para.6.2.a) supra. 
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articulate both principles (e.g. drawing due consequences from any inequalities in the extent 
of coasts into the delimitation area; equity does not necessarily imply equality; the equal 
division of the overlapping of entitlements, in the absence of special circumstances). In 
others, they express only the normativity of one of them (e.g. the land dominates the sea; 
due consideration to all relevant circumstances). They surface therefore as different points 
on the sliding-scale indicated above in Graphic 2. 
The 'principle' of non-refashioning of geography must also be considered in this 
context. The 1969 Judgment, when referring to abating the effects of coastal configuration 
on equidistance, stated that there was no question of "completely refashioning nature". The 
adverbial term 'completely' means that the Court intentionally left the door open to a 
certain refashioning, on the basis of equity 5 6 4. Only a complete refashioning of nature was 
ruled out 5 6 5. The pivotal question is to understand the meaning of "refashioning nature", and 
its relation with coastal configuration. What the Court had in mind was surely not the 
possibility of physical changes of the coast. Underlying this reference can only lie the idea 
of a change at the level of the legal consequences of coastal configuration. Implicitly, the 
Court was referring to an equitable abatement of the effect of the principle of maritime 
zoning - the essence of which is (at least today) coastal configuration, and its projection 
onto the sea on the basis of distance566. 
The analysis undertaken in Chapter 5 on the 'methods of delimitation', by reaching 
the conclusion that the variants of the equidistance method account for the overwhelming 
majority of the delimitation solutions, evince further the dual 'equidistance-equity' ground 
on which delimitation is hinged. These variants appear as different means whereby 'closer 
proximity' is harmonised with 'reasonableness of the boundary'. The Separate Opinion of 
Judge Oda in the Qatar/Bahrain case may be utilised to illustrate this point. While resorting 
to coastal facades to determine the boundary-line he deems best suited, he affirms that the 
"Court's task is to indicate one line from among the many lines that may reasonably be 
proposed". In his perspective, "there is not necessarily a sole and definitive boundary line 
that alone meets the requirements of an equitable solution and the consideration of equity 
does not necessarily lead to the determination of one particular or definitive line" 5 6 7 . There 
are, therefore, a number of methods based on variants of equidistance that might be utilised 
to reach an equitable line. Even combinations of variants seem usable (e.g. to flatten the 
coast, and to subsequently weigh the coastal stretches differently). What courts do not seem 
(564) ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.50-51, para.91. 
(565) Bedjaoui/1990, pp.386-387. 
(566) Para.6.3.a), 6.3.b) supra. As to why replacing the low-water line by a simpler line, for purposes of computing an equidistance, 
might be reasonable and non-inequitable, cf. para.8.2.d) infra. 
(567) Separate Opinion, paras.26-27,41, emphasis added. 
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entitled to do is to have recourse to technical definitions of boundary-lines which do not 
result from adjustments of equidistance; for they are not an expression of the balance 
required by international law 5 6 8 . 
Turning for a moment to the argument that, as a normative standard, equidistance 
should be discarded in toto (arguably because it yields inequitable solutions in some cases), 
it must be explained why it should not be accepted. The problem in maritime delimitation is 
not about the rationale of equidistance ('closer proximity'). It concerns the definition of 
'relevant coast' in international law. What must be asked is "which basepoints are legally 
representative of the coastline for purposes of delimitation?" That explains why so many 
equidistance-related methods have emerged. A l l variants thereof5 6 9 seek to determine a line 
by reference to the notion of 'closer proximity'. The corrections concern the evaluation of 
the coastal configuration and/or the relative weight of basepoints. The Qatar/Bahrain case 
and the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration provide examples of adjudicated boundaries which resort 
to equidistance and discount the effect of certain potential basepoints. The boundaries are 
modified equidistances, arrived at through basepoint selection. 
Bearing in mind these thoughts on the relationship between 'closer proximity' and 
equity, one would argue that the refinement of delimitation law should focus primarily on 
objectifying the impact of relevant facts. This would shed light on what reasonableness 
actually means. Undoubtedly, case-by-case appraisals are inescapable. It is nevertheless 
possible to analyse adjudicated boundaries (as well as negotiated boundaries for that matter) 
more objectively. The goal is to identify elements that might be helpful to ' typify' 
delimitation cases, in order to justify analogical solutions in other cases. This is where 
technical tools and assessments may become valuable; especially since most delimitation 
methods are derived from equidistance. 
The Jan Mayen case provides a useful example. The modification of equidistance, 
though attained by 'displacement' of the strict equidistance-line, may be expressed as an 
adjustment at the level of basepoints. Through an adaptation of the equiratio method it is 
possible to determine, at every point along the boundary, the 'distance ratio' in relation to 
basepoints on either coast570. For instance, point " A " is strictly equidistant from the two 
coasts. It is based on a 'distance ratio' 1:1, which equates to say that an equal 'weight' was 
(568) This position of principle is without prejudice of the possibility of demonstrating, for instance, that a parallel of latitude may 
be taken as a variant of an equidistance-related boundary, i.e. a simplified form thereof. In such cases, however, the line is still 
predicated on an 'equidistance-equity' reasoning. The mere fact that the resulting-line is also a line that could have been derived 
from an ad hoc method becomes an irrelevant coincidence. For instance, the fact that the UK/Ireland continental shelf boundary is 
formed by parallel and meridian segments does not hide the relevance that equidistance actually had in reaching that solution. 
(569) Simplified or modified equidistance, adjustment of baselines, partial-effect, melhodes de lissage (perpendiculars, bisectors and 
radial-lines), pseudo-equidtstance, and equiratio. 
(570) Para.5.2.f) supra. 
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given to the nearest basepoints on each coast. Differently, the 'distance ratio' at points "O", 
" N " and " M " (defined Greenland:Jan Mayen) is approximately 1:0.75, 1:0.55 and 1:0.66 
respectively571. I f only these four points were considered, the average 'distance ratio' would 
be roughly 1:0.71. In other words, the distance from the boundary-line to the nearest Jan 
Mayen's basepoints would be, on average, about 71% of the corresponding distance to the 
nearest Greenland's basepoints. By increasing the number of points analysed, a more 
representative figure may be obtained. The greater the number of computations along the 
line, the more accurate and representative wil l be the average 'distance ratio'. With 
adequate software, these calculations can be easily carried out. Sampling ten points spaced 
evenly along the line, one arrives at an average 'distance ratio' of 1:0.68 (Greenland:Jan 
Mayen). The average distance from the boundary to the nearest Jan Mayen's basepoints is 
thus approximately 68% of the equivalent distance to the nearest Greenland's basepoints. 
A complementary assessment may be undertaken concerning division of the area of 
overlapping entitlements572. The boundary determined by the Court attributed to Jan Mayen 
approximately 27% of the area of overlapping entitlements, and to Greenland the remaining 
73%. The area allocated to Greenland is thus approximately 2.7 times larger than that 
allocated to Jan Mayen. 
The delimitation in the Jan Mayen case may thus be summarised as follows. State 
" A " has a coastal length roughly 9 times longer than that of state "B". It is necessary to 
allow an equitable access to fishing grounds situated in the vicinity of the equidistance-line, 
nearer to state "B". The boundary is located in a way that its points lie at a distance from the 
basepoints of state " B " that is on average approximately 68% of the distance to the 
basepoints of state "A". This line allocates to state " A " a portion of the area of overlapping 
entitlements that is some 2.7 times larger than that allocated to state "B". 
The equiratio method offers the advantages of equidistance (it is unambiguous, 
applicable in all geographical circumstances and results in a line that may be constructed 
easily and accurately). But it is also "able to meet the greatest possible varieties of notions 
regarding equity" 5 7 3. The paramount contribution of this method, it is suggested, is the 
notion of 'distance ratio'. Recourse to it in maritime delimitation has an impact on two 
levels. First, it allows adjustments to equidistance on the basis of distance from the coast, 
while presenting them in a quantified format. Secondly, it facilitates the translation of any 
line into an 'objectifying language', referred to coastal configuration, regardless of factual 
(571) Figure 82 shows how the 'distance ratio' is to be computed, giving as examples points "A" and "N". The distances indicated 
are only approximate geodetic distances (for the precise coordinates of the basepoints utilised are unknown). 
(572) On the use of the area of overlapping entitlements as reference for maritime delimitation, cf. paras.4.3. supra, 8.2.e) infra. 
(573) Langeraar/1986a, p.393. 
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circumstances, or of how facts are weighed. Langeraar has compared various maritime 
boundaries with equiratio-lines. Inter alia, he shows that the boundaries negotiated in the 
aftermath of the North Sea cases run close to the 0.90 equiratio-line, favouring Germany 
(ratio of 1:0.90, Netherlands/Denmark:Germany)574. In the Tunisia/Libya case, the 
boundary runs also not far from a 0.90 equiratio-line favouring Libya. And the Libya/Malta 
boundary lies (on average) near the 0.68 equiratio-line to the advantage of Libya (Figures 
69 to 71) 5 7 5 . 
Interesting parallels may be drawn between, on the one hand, the Libya/Malta and 
the Jan Mayen cases and, on the other hand, the North Sea and the Tunisia/Libya cases576. 
The former are delimitations between opposite states, in which there is a large disparity of 
coastal lengths. No doubt, the Libya/Malta case is a continental shelf delimitation, whereas 
the Jan Mayen case dealt with both continental shelf and fisheries zones. For this reason, 
the facts to weigh were not the same in both cases (as happens e.g. with the access to 
capelin resources in the latter). It nonetheless seems reasonable to say that the disparity of 
coastal lengths between the disputants was the pivotal fact. The ratio is 8:1 between Libya 
and Malta, and some 9:1 between Greenland (Denmark) and Jan Mayen (Norway) 5 7 7. 
Significantly, in both cases the adjudicated boundaries lie at a distance from the state with 
the shorter coastal length that is, on average, approximately 68% of the distance from the 
state with the longer coastal length 5 7 8. What was deemed to be an equitable displacement of 
the provisional equidistance shows, when translated in terms of average 'distance ratio', a 
remarkable degree of consistency. 
This consistency is all the more remarkable when considering that it may also be 
found in the North Sea and Tunisia/Libya cases, despite the fact that in the former the 
boundaries were negotiated, whereas the latter concerns an adjudicated line. Both cases are 
situations of adjacency where a shift in the coastal direction 'pushes' the equidistance 
towards one of the states. The peculiarity of the North Sea cases stems from the fact that the 
shift in the coastal direction extends through all three coasts involved, resulting in the 
equidistance being 'pushed' towards Germany from both sides. Common between these two 
cases is also the non-existence of a large disparity of coastal lengths579. It is noteworthy, 
(574) The Danish/German boundary has an average 'distance ratio* of a little less than 0.90 (some 0.88), whereas the Dutch/German 
boundary has an average 'distance ratio' of a little more than 0.90 (some 0.91). 
(575) Langeraar/1986b, pp.11-12, 17. 
(576) These cases are significant because they provide two examples of oppositeness and two of adjacency, because within each pair 
the cases bear resemblances that allow a degree of generalisation, and because they all had the imprimatur of the Court. 
(577) ICJ/Reports/1985, p.50, para.68; ICJ/Reports/1993, p.65, para.61. 
(578) In this computation, the uninhabited Maltese island of Filfla was not discounted. If the island is not taken into account, the 
average 'distance ratio' will be close to 70%, which is not a dramatically different result. 
(579) ICJ/Reports/1969, p.51, para.91; ICJ/Reports/1982, p.9I, para. 131. The coastal length ratio varies depending on how the 
coastal lengths are measured. In terms of coastal facade, that ratio is less than 2:1. 
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again, that all three boundaries run close to and through a 0.90 equiratio-line, favouring the 
state disadvantaged by the concave coast. The equitableness of the boundary appears once 
more to be translatable by the average 'distance ratio' of the line. 
The conclusions of this part may be summarised by a number of capital points. 
Maritime delimitation is a sensitive political process in which courts sometimes intervene. 
When intervening, there is a delicate line they must tread. That is why their decisions tend 
to include some statements that make them at least partly acceptable to the losers. They 
often seem designed to carry as little pain for the loser as possible, to try to avoid making 
courts unpopular with any part of the international community580. Viewing the maritime 
delimitation as a process that entails the 'amputation' of potential entitlements (where they 
overlap) makes this approach even more justifiable. However, the fact that "the authority to 
seek an equitable solution by the application of a law whose principles remain largely 
undefined affords [courts] an exceptional measure of judicial discretion"581 does not make 
matters easier. Courts should thus continue their effort to remain clear of arbitrariness. For 
the rule of law to flourish, that is a prerequisite. Attempts to place equity within the bounds 
of law, which led to the emergence of 'normative equity', are commendable. Further steps 
in harmonising the generalising nature of normativity with the individualising nature of 
equity are nevertheless required, notably in endeavouring to objectify equity. 
Heretical as it may sound, the equidistance-special circumstances rule remains the 
sole operative formula devised for maritime delimitation. Courts have eventually realised 
that they had to equate the contents of the so-called 'equitable principles' to the said rule if 
they were to determine the course of maritime boundaries. This rule integrates the two key 
principles of international law in this matter: maritime zoning and equity. 
Where circumstances in concreto cause them to collide, a harmonisation process has 
to be undertaken. This consists of maximising each of the principles. The concurrent rights 
(maritime entitlements) of states must be balanced, in a reasonable fashion, with a view to 
minimise the losses of each state. The course of a non-inequitable boundary, it is submitted, 
is a line every point of which lies at a distance from the basepoints on either side that, 
account taken of the 'factual and legal matrices', is reasonable. This corresponds to the 
required optimisation of both the principles of maritime zoning and of equity, to the greatest 
degree possible, by reference to the legal and factual possibilities in concreto, from which 
stems the 'case-norm'. Unique to an extent, the 'case-norm' has a true normative 
foundation. It flows from a conjugation of principles that evolves within a margin of 
(580) These views had in mind the outcome of the 1974 Nuclear Tests case (Sturgess/Chubb/1988, p.215). This approach is adopted 
in virtually all decisions of international courts. 
(581) Judge Schwebel, Separate Opinion, Jan Mayen case, lCJ/Reports/1993, p. 128. 
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discretion - sometimes described as an "interstitial law-making power" - intentionally 
conferred upon the 'judiciary' by the 'legislator'. 
One would also argue that the notion of average 'distance ratio' is crucial for 
objectifying "reasonableness". The expression of maritime boundaries by recourse to the 
average 'distance ratio' presents three significant advantages. First, boundary-lines are 
referenced to the coasts of the states involved, in a quantifiable form related to distance. 
While reflecting the basis of maritime zoning, this approach allows an assessment of the 
overall equitability of the delimitation, which under international law is paramount. The 
delimited boundary may to that effect be objectively compared with other boundary-lines, 
regardless of whether they were negotiated or adjudicated. Secondly, despite allowing 
objective (quantified) assessment, the average 'distance ratio' is nevertheless an extremely 
flexible notion. The same 'distance ratio' figure corresponds to an unlimited number of 
potential lines. Since maritime delimitation might ultimately consist of an attempt to 
reconcile different interests (security, navigation, geographical considerations, access to 
natural resources, etc.), through adjustments of the starting (provisional) equidistance-line, 
this flexibility cannot be underestimated. One is endowed with a tool that is simultaneously 
objective and flexible. Thirdly, it is noteworthy that no coastal features need be discarded. 
All basepoints are weighed in the computation of the different 'distance ratios'. How to 
justify discarding a specific basepoint, for example, might no longer be an issue583. 
With this exercise, which necessarily involves a resort to technical expertise, it is by 
no means suggested that judicial decision-making should become a 'blind' quantifying 
appraisal. It has already been conceded that devising a precise formula for determining the 
course of a boundary-line is virtually an impossible task. Just as courts have endorsed 
assessments of proportionality as expressions of equity, however, nothing seems to restrict 
the recourse by courts (as well as by states for that matter) to other objective assessments in 
the refinement of the quest for non-inequitable boundaries. I f all negotiated and adjudicated 
boundaries are studied on the basis of 'distance ratio' assessments, it will be possible to 
generate a database that will provide a pivotal reference for grasping the idea of 
reasonableness in maritime delimitation, thus becoming the bedrock for deriving analogies. 
Regretfully, the scope of such an undertaking makes its inclusion here impracticable. 
Finally, it ought to be recognised that the calculation of the average 'distance ratio' 
does not resolve the problem of determination of the precise course of the boundary. The 
(582) Hart/1994, p.259; similarly, cf. MacCormick/1978, pp.187-188. 
(583) A different issue, which ought not to be confused with attributing less than full-effect to an insular feature, is to consider that 
such an insular feature does not generate an entitlement to continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (under Article 121(3) of 
the LOSC). And if it does not generate such an entitlement, consequently, it should not be consider for the delimitation. This is the 
question that might be raised, for instance, in relation to the island of Filfla, above mentioned. 
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computation of a 'distance ratio' presupposes in principle the existence of a line. However, 
because there are innumerable lines with the same average 'distance ratio', on its own this 
concept is insufficient to determine the course of a boundary. It operates in a fashion similar 
to that of proportionality - it offers objective guidance as to how much an equidistance-line 
is to be adjusted. The decision-maker is presented with a reference in terms of a relational 
value to be verified, as to what has been deemed equitable in prior cases. The Libya/Malta 
and Jan Mayen cases illustrate once more the point in question. The boundary was reached, 
in the former, through an equal displacement of the provisional equidistance. As a result, 
the values of 'distance ratio' vary very little along the boundary (between roughly 1:0.66 
and 1:0.72). In contradistinction, the adjustments in the latter were sectoral, owing much to 
the need to allow access to the area of capelin resources from either side. The 'distance 
ratio' values have greater variation (between roughly 1:0.48 and 1:1). Ultimately, however, 
the two boundaries have a similar average 'distance ratio'. 
The design of the boundary course is thus to be derived from the equidistance-line, 
adjusted in accordance with the relevant facts. What is a non-inequitable average 'distance 
ratio' is consequently still dependent on the weighing-up of these factors. That is a different 
issue however, an answer to which will be attempted in Part III . 
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III 
DENOUEMENT 
INTRODUCTION TO PART III 
A conceptual framework of maritime delimitation in which the normative aspect is 
formed by legal principles may well be juridically seen as a step backwards. With this, the 
contents of delimitation law appear to be less dense, thus less certain. Taking account of the 
practice of courts in applying the so-called 'equitable principles', one would argue that it is 
only so ostensibly. Much depends on the conceptualisation of how courts are to deal with 
decisions within their sphere of discretion, which is the key issue in this part. Ultimately, 
maritime delimitation seeks to determine the course of a line. How that operation is to be 
undertaken within the conceptualising parameters set before, in particular its normative 
framework, is the basic question. To answer it, a number of other more specific questions 
must necessarily be answered. Which facts therefore are relevant in maritime delimitation? 
How is their relevance to be appraised legally? By what means are they translated into 
adjustments of the provisional equidistance-line? 
In Chapter 7, an attempt is made to rationalise the delimitation process, at the heart 
of which is the determination of the boundary-line. Attention is drawn therein to three main 
issues. First, a proposal is made for 'typification' of the facts to which relevance is to be 
given in maritime delimitation. Looking into the notion of unicum, and the choice of factors 
in adjudicative processes, it proceeds to address the interrelation between the 'legal matrix' 
and the 'factual matrix'. Secondly, it focuses on how the pertinent factors are to be gauged 
in terms of impact on the choice of line - the 'weighing-up process'. The argument is made 
that the existence of a sphere of discretion of courts in this respect is inexorable. The final 
section seeks to examine the modus operandi of delimitation factors. Having concluded that 
there is an area of 'subjectivity' inherent in this type of decision-process, a proposal for the 
recourse to multicriteria decision-making as the basis for reasoning on the choice of line is 
put forward. For purposes of illustration, recourse is then had to the Jan Mayen case, which 
having been already studied at length facilitates the understanding of the argument. 
The following chapter (Chapter 8) seeks to examine the elements germane for the 
'weighing-up process', central to the quest for a boundary-line. A distinction is made, from 
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the outset, between what is named the "delimitation factors" and the facts relevant for the 
delimitation, the former being legal assessments and not mere facts. Based on the argument 
made in the previous chapter as to the 'typification' of relevant facts, the elements of the 
'factual matrix' appear divided in two groups: facts related to the basis of entitlement, and 
facts related to the regime of exclusiveness. A third group of elements, of a hybrid nature, 
deserve separate attention. It is denominated "complementary delimitation elements". 
The final chapter (Chapter 9) is a 'test-case', i.e. a case study on a delimitation that 
is yet to be effected: the delimitation between Australia and East Timor. It delves into the 
factors that would be considered should the delimitation be effected on a strictly legal basis 
by a court of law. Ultimately, its aim is to test the conceptualisation proposed hereinbefore. 
Insofar as this delimitation is still to be effected, the assessments made in this study are not 
influenced by a previous decision. They are thus subject to future confirmation or rejection. 
In broad strokes, this final part seeks to complete, and most importantly to tie in, the 
aspects of the conceptualisation put forward. It offers a conceptualising viewpoint on how 
the 'weighing-up' of relevant facts might be understood in the search for a boundary-line. In 
the process, it advances a proposal on the rationalisation of the reasoning of courts when 
deciding within their sphere of discretion. Notwithstanding this, it is argued that the fact 
that the analysis is primarily orientated to adjudicative processes will raise no difficulties 
when transposing it to negotiation processes. 
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Chapter 7 
DELIMITATION PROCESS: 
A PROPOSAL FOR RATIONALISATION 
7.1. Determination of a Line: The Key Issue 
The tangible outcome of maritime delimitation is a line. Not surprisingly, therefore, 
the determination of the boundary-line becomes a true quest, whether the decision-making 
is political (negotiation) or legal (adjudication)1. Nevertheless, negotiators enjoy a freedom 
that judges do not possess. Legal decision-making is particularly problematic because every 
step amounts to a partial-decision that has to be reasoned. This is why "the choice of means 
or methods for translating the relevant geographical and other circumstances into a precise 
line" has been described as "the most difficult issue in the law of maritime boundaries"2. 
The crux is the identification of "the connection between the relevant circumstances and the 
resultant delimitation line"3 - for the choice of boundary-line often has "had all the mystery 
of a conjuror producing a white rabbit out of a hat"4. 
Negotiation and adjudication differ primarily in this respect. Political decisions are 
based on a counterbalancing of opposing viewpoints. In contradistinction, the weighing-up 
of relevant facts, and their translation into a boundary-line, depends, "in various degrees, on 
the qualitative and therefore intuitive assessment of the judge"5, who ought to balance 
objectively and impartially opposing perspectives. Although conceptually diverse, these two 
types of decision-making are inextricably linked. They constitute the 'ebb-flow sequence' 
upon which the international law-making process rests. The starting point of diplomatic 
negotiations is international law, of which judicial decisions are one of the most formal 
expressions. Courts, conversely, often delineate decisions on the basis of state practice. The 
examples found therein illustrate the genre of solutions that the community of subjects finds 
acceptable. States are hardly ever concerned with the impact of the outcome of boundary 
negotiations in the formation of international norms. Notwithstanding this, because states 
(1) In adjudication, the maritime boundary is delimited on legal grounds. The acceptance of a court's jurisdiction however, is still a 
political decision of states. 
(2) Legault/Hankey/1993, p.206. 
(3) Evans/1989, p.90. 
(4) Churchill/1994, p.26. 
(5) Weil/1989, p.285. 
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are all motivated by similar - but dissociated - narrow political and national self-interests, 
their practice is preponderant in the progressive crystallisation of normative standards6. The 
significant patterns that have emerged from bilateral treaty-making provide empirical data 
that is crucial for maritime boundary-making7. Subject to this distinction between political 
and legal decision-making, one would argue that the discretion ascribed to judges must be 
exercised also by reference to state practice (especially i f no relevant case law exists)8. 
The body of bilateral state practice forms indeed an aggregate of wisdom as to what 
are reasonable boundary-lines in the perspective of states. In the Libya/Malta case, Judge 
ad hoc Valticos used the term opinio aequitatis to describe its relevance. To him, solutions 
embodied in bilateral agreements do not express an opinio juris. However, since they were 
reached "in the light of the legal background", they are opinio aequitatis; they reflect what 
states deemed to be equitable9. Resembling the view of the Tribunal in the Anglo/French 
arbitration, this view is developed further by Mendelson, who affirms that the "recurring 
patterns" in state practice provide maritime boundary agreements with a "quasi-normative 
effect". As he notes, the opinion of states on "what is an equitable solution to a particular 
type of boundary problem can be gleaned, with all due caution, from a consistent tendency 
to reach similar solutions in similar geographical situations"10. 
The choice of line as analysed here is adjudication-oriented. It aims at explaining 
how maritime delimitation law, applied to the facts in casu, results into a certain line. The 
virtually unlimited power of states in shaping the negotiation process turns any attempt to 
describe it into a fruitless exercise. In negotiation, states "may be guided principally, in 
some measure, or not at all by legal principles and legally relevant factors a court might 
examine, and by a host of other factors a tribunal might well ignore such as relative power 
and wealth, the state of their relations, security and foreign policy objectives, convenience, 
and concessions unrelated to the boundary or even to maritime jurisdiction as such"11. But if 
the political decision-making process is perceived as an adaptation of legal decision-making 
to the political scenario in concreto, the latter might be seen as the 'basic process', which 
might be applied mutatis mutandis to the former. 
There is nevertheless another distinction to consider. In negotiation, the tension 
between justice and certainty is defused by the consensual nature of the solution attained. 
(6) Bravender-Coyle/1988, p. 173. 
(7) Johnston/1988, p.xiii. 
(8) Evans accepts that the "broader practical impact [of state practice] will ultimately depend upon the willingness of international 
tribunals to draw upon this body of material in a reasoned fashion", and that hitherto "the ICJ seems to have been relatively 
unswayed by the evidence of state practice that has been placed before it" (Evans/1999, p. 155). 
(9) Separate Opinion, ICJ/Reports/1985, p.108. 
(10) Mendelson/2002. Endorsing this view, cf. Anderson/2001, pp.9-11. 
(11) Oxman/1993, p.l 1. Cf. also para.6.1 .b)(ii) supra. 
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By contrast, courts are faced with the issue of predictability and justness of the outcome of 
the adjudicating process. That is essential for the confidence in third-party settlement. For 
states, apart from (and often more important than) being just and equitable, decisions have 
to be reasonably predictable. What must be predictable, however, is not the outcome of 
litigation, "but the range of considerations used for a decision and the procedures for their 
application"12. The boundary-line often is less important than the reasoning supporting the 
choice of factors considered for purposes of boundary determination, and the weighing-up 
process whereby they are translated into that line. Inasmuch as this is typically the sphere in 
which the principle of equity operates, one faces the danger of arbitrary or 'subjective' 
decision-making. Predictability and arbitrariness appear as somewhat of opposite sides of 
the same coin. Two questions thus are pivotal to predictability in delimitation. Which facts 
are weighable? How to weigh them? 
7.2. Choice of Factors: 'Factual Matrix' and 'Legal Matrix* 
7.2.a) The Notion of Unicum 
The notion of unicum, and its relevance for maritime delimitation, was for a time 
clearly overemphasised. In the Tunisia/Libya case, the Court held that continental shelf 
delimitations "should be considered and judged on its own merits, having regard to its 
peculiar circumstances", and that the application of principles and rules should not be 
overconceptualised13. The underlying argument seemed to be that each case was so different 
from others that the generalisation inherent in legal analogies was virtually non-inexistent. 
For the Court, the reasoning (and the outcome) had to be correspondently unique. The term 
"unicum" was used in the Gulf of Maine case and Guinea/Guinea-Bissau arbitration to 
translate this idea14. Understandable perhaps in the light of the conception of the role of 
equity in delimitation characteristic of the early 1980s15, this is a notion that ought not to be 
overemphasised today. No doubt, the facts of each case are in some measure unique. This 
however, does not hamper the establishment of parallels and a global understanding of the 
issue16. Suggesting otherwise would be arguably a misperception. Regardless of the legal 
field in question, each case always is to some extent unique. Uniqueness however, is not 
antonym of 'typification' - which is the level at which normativity operates. 
(12) Jennings/1986, p.38. Agreeing with this view, cf. Alexy/1989, p.293. 
(13) ICJ/Reports/1982, p.92, para.132 in fine. 
(14) ICJ/Repoits/1984, p. 290, para. 81 (French version); ILM/25/1986, p. 290, para. 89. 
(15) Para.6.4.b)(ii) supra. 
(16) Lucchini/Va:lckel/1996, p.93. 
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Most importantly, achieving a non-inequitable solution is not dependent on a notion 
of unicum. All cases may be 'typified' to some degree, which is why generalisation and the 
derivation of legal analogies are possible. Regardless of whether delimitations are reached 
by adjudication or by negotiation, the emphasis must be placed on identifying 'elements of 
generalisation' that may lead to 'typification'. They form the bedrock of normative thought, 
the key for achieving a truly equitable solution. As stated in the Libya/Malta case, "[w]hile 
every case of maritime delimitation is different in its circumstances from the next, only a 
clear body of [normative standards] can permit such circumstances to be properly weighed, 
and the objective of an equitable result [...] to be attained"17. 
In short, the notion of unicum stems from the 'factual matrix'18, and determines the 
scope of operation of the principle of equity; or in other words, the content of equity in 
concreto. The relevance of factual circumstances has nonetheless to be determined within 
the bounds of legal thought, whose foundation is primarily 'typification'. The comparison 
of average 'distance ratio' between boundaries, for instance, is objectively meaningful only 
where relevant analogies can be drawn between the facts of the cases under appraisal. 
7.2.b) Delimitation Factors: Preliminary Approach 
A problem of a special nature, related with the unicum, regards the identification 
(choice) of considerations to weigh in the maritime delimitation process. The first point is 
concerned with terminology. Henceforth reference will be made to the term 'delimitation 
factors'19, in lieu of the more common expressions 'special circumstances' or 'relevant 
circumstances'20. First, whereas special circumstances and relevant circumstances are terms 
related with the equidistance-special circumstances formula and the equitable principles 
doctrine respectively, 'delimitation factors' is a neutral term. Secondly, insofar as both 
relevant circumstances and special circumstances "are intended to enable the achievement 
of an equitable result"21, the two were fused (at least up to a point). 'Delimitation factors' is 
a term intended to encompass the fusion of these notions. With it, the distinction between 
(17) ICJ/Reports/1985, p.55, para.76. 
(18) The term "matrix" is used in this study in one of two slightly different meanings. First, as in the present case, the term is used to 
refer to a specific set of interrelated elements (e.g. the facts that characterise a case). The second meaning is usually utilised in 
mathematics. Matrix means a rectangular array of information, i.e. information presented in a lattice (in rows and columns). It is 
in a sense similar to the latter that the term "decision-matrix" is to be understood (cf. para.7.4.c) infra). 
(19) At this stage, the terms "fact" and "factor" are being used interchangeably, to refer to those elements that form the 'factual 
matrix'. It will be suggested later that "delimitation factors" are effectively judgments concerning facts, not the facts themselves 
(cf. paras.7.3.c), 7.4.b), 7.4.c) infra). 
(20) Courts have resorted fairly often to the term "factor" to refer to the considerations to be weighed during the delimitation 
process. Cf. Anglo/French arbitration, RIAA/18, p.58, para.101; Beagle Channel arbitration, ILR/52/1979, p.185, para.110; Jan 
Mayen case, ICJ/Reports/1993, p.62, para.54; Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, Eritrea/Yemen-II, paras.6, 130 in particular; 
Qatar/Bahrain case, Qatar/Bahrain-Merits, para.229. 
(21) Jan Mayen case, ICJ/Reports/1993, p.62, para.56. In the North Sea cases, 'special circumstances' were viewed as an exception 
introduced by the ILC in pursuance of the need to effect delimitation on equitable principles (ICJ/Reports/1969, p.37, para.55). 
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the two previous terms is no longer an issue . Thirdly, 'delimitation factors' is a term that 
evinces the existence of an equation - a legal equation - whose 'factors' depend on the 
interaction between the 'legal matrix' and the 'factual matrix'. This idea is paramount to the 
conceptualisation attempted in this study. 
From an historical perspective, it is worth observing that, in the 1950s, one of the 
fundamental contributions of the ILC was to ascertain that special consideration might have 
to be given to certain specific facts, in order to avoid inequitableness. Of equal importance 
was the idea that such facts, deemed decisive for a non-inequitable outcome, could not be 
enumerated exhaustively; hence the use of the expression 'special circumstances'23. This is 
a two-tiered axiom that has remained valid to this day. Around it revolves the debate 
concerning the choice of factors (i.e. factual elements) relevant for the delimitation, which 
has had a decisive impact on the development of delimitation law. 
In the North Sea cases, the parties requested the Court to indicate the principles and 
rules of international law applicable to the continental shelf delimitation between them. The 
delimitation was to be subsequently effected by agreement pursuant to the Court's decision. 
The finding that "there is no legal limit to the considerations which states may take account 
o f in delimitation must be understood in a specific light: the boundary was to be negotiated 
between the parties24. This idea was emphasised in the Anglo/French arbitration. Noting 
that in the 1969 cases "the parties had retained the actual delimitation of the boundary in 
their own hands for further negotiation", the Tribunal reaffirmed that, in adjudication, the 
considerations to be weighed are those that lie "not outside but within the rules of law"25. 
This sound approach seems to have been somewhat overlooked in the Tunisia/Libya 
case (and in the Gulf of Maine case and Guinea/Guinea-Bissau arbitration). Recourse to 
'free equity' (based on facts whose relevance was to be defined by courts), founded on the 
notion of unicum, was preferred. It was the Libya/Malta Judgment that reversed the trend. It 
was stated then that, although the list of weighable considerations is not closed, only those 
pertinent to the delimitation of the zone in question are eligible26. Decisions rendered in 
breach of this tenet, it is argued, amount to exces de pouvoir. Courts and states operate in 
different spheres27. Courts per se are not empowered to choose 'any considerations' they 
see fit. Unless otherwise agreed between the parties, their competence comprises a choice 
(22) For example, in his Separate Opinion in the Jan Mayen case, Judge Schwebel considered that 'special circumstances' could not 
be equated to 'relevant circumstances' (ICJ/Reports/1993, p. 121). Evans has argued that whereas 'special circumstances' have an 
ameliorative aspect, 'relevant circumstances' have an indicative aspect (Evans/1989, p.83). 
(23) Paras. 1.2.b), 1.3.a), 1.3.c)(i) supra. 
(24) ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.13, 50, paras.2, 93. 
(25) RIAA/18, p. 114, para.245. 
(26) Para.6.4.b)(ii) supra. 
(27) Paras.6.1 .b), 7.1. supra. 
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among 'legally relevant considerations'. Recent adjudications have consistently followed 
this view, although some 'fine-tuning' remains necessary. There is thus an obvious question 
to be answered. How to 'typify' the delimitation factors? 
The analyses of this issue in scholarship reflect an empirical basis28, which is a 
token of the difficulties that surround it. Despite these difficulties, Evans' work offers a 
highly detailed point of departure. Some of his thoughts may be summarised as follows. He 
considers that "the categories of relevant circumstances are not closed", and that there is no 
"definitive list" thereof. More importantly, stressing the inadequacy of the limitations 
attempted on the 'open-endedness' of the heads of relevant circumstances, he concludes that 
it is not possible to circumscribe relevant circumstances in general terms, and that the types 
of circumstances have grown continuously. Unsurprisingly, therefore, he contends that it 
would be "misplaced criticism" to object that this approach "does not help determine what 
is to be a relevant circumstance". His initial viewpoint was that relevant circumstances had 
two central functions: to "ameliorate the strict application of a chosen method" ('special 
circumstances'), and to "indicate what that method is to be" ('relevant circumstances'). 
After the Jan Mayen case, he has accepted that special or relevant circumstances were both 
repositioned as "modifiers rather than generators of the method of delimitation". In respect 
of the relationship between the relevant circumstances and maritime entitlement, he 
contends that "[i]t is mistaken to assume that factors which cannot [display a connection 
with the regime of the maritime zone in question] are automatically excluded from 
consideration". To him, the "basis of title does not exclude factors simply because there is 
no correlation between factor and title"2 9. 
That there is no closed categorisation or definitive list of considerations that might 
be weighed in maritime delimitation is an established tenet. As already argued, analogical 
interpretations are possible when determining what constitutes a special circumstance30. 
Equally unobjectionable is the assertion that the basis of title does not preclude the recourse 
to factors unrelated therewith. Other aspects of Evans's views, however, are less persuasive. 
From a conceptual standpoint, it is perhaps more appropriate to enquire whether there is a 
general material criterion by reference to which delimitation factors can be identified. It will 
be submitted that the answer should be in the affirmative. Those considerations may at the 
very least be described negatively. There is a further point that deserves to be noted. No 
doubt, the basis of title is not exclusive of facts with no correlation therewith. What must be 
(28) Cf. United Nations/2000, pp.25-46; Lucchini/Vcelckel/1996, pp.158-176; Charney/Alexander/1993, Global Analyses (I-VII); 
Evans/1991; Evans/1989, Part ri; Calatayud/1989, pp.94-132. 
(29) These ideas were compiled from Evans/1999, pp.162-174; Evans/1991; Evans/1989 (in particular pp.78-94). 
(30) Para.1.3.c)(i) .supra. 
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said, however, is that this is not tantamount to asserting that the regime of maritime zones 
does not circumscribe the considerations to be weighed. Finally, on the basis of the concept 
of normativity explained above, it may be argued that in strict terms courts are not entitled 
to choose 'any' method on the basis of the weighing-up of relevant circumstances. The line 
must be sought through adjustments of the starting equidistance-line, being the delimitation 
factors the legal basis on which that adjustment is justified. 
7.2.c) Delimitation Factors: A Basis for Objective 'Typification' 
'Typification', it should be made clear, operates at different levels. I f all categories 
of factors could be identified explicitly, and their contents described exhaustively, one 
would reach the highest level of 'typification'. Should it be workable, this would probably 
be preferable. In maritime delimitation, however, this is a chimerical target. International 
law has consecrated one of the lowest levels of 'typification'. No enumeration of weighable 
factors is provided; let alone an exhaustive description of their contents. It consists mainly 
of a negative circumscription of delimitation factors. To restate the Court's words, the key 
idea is that, although the list of factors is not closed, "only those that are pertinent to the 
institution [in question] as it developed within the law [...] will qualify for inclusion"31. 
These points may be taken further by referring to the work of the ILC. It sheds light 
on how to interpret this statement of the Court. In 1953, replying to Sandstrom, Francois 
clarified that "navigation and fishing rights" (to which the Committee of Experts had made 
reference) were not to be considered in continental shelf delimitation32. The argument is 
that, since the continental shelf regime ascribes no navigation or fishing rights to states, 
these aspects of exclusiveness are irrelevant for its delimitation33. They are not pertinent to 
the institution of the continental shelf. 
In the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, the 'choice-of-law clause' referred to a decision 
that would take account of the opinion formed by the Tribunal on questions of territorial 
sovereignty, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and any other pertinent 
factor3*. The question to ask is: Which are the "other pertinent factors"? The Tribunal 
found that they included "various factors that are generally recognised as being relevant to 
the process of delimitation such as proportionality, non-encroachment, the presence of 
islands, and any other factors that might affect the equities of the particular situation"*5. 
(31) Libya/Malta case, ICJ/Reports/1985, p.40, para.48. 
(32) 204* Meeting, ILC/Yearbook/1953(I), pp.126-129, paras.14, 35, 55. Cf. also paras.8.3.a), 8.3.c) infra. 
(33) CS Convention, Articles 3 and 5(1); LOSC, Article 78. 
(34) Arbitration Agreement, 3 October 1996, Article 2(3); Agreement on Principles, 21 May 1996, Article 3(2). 
(35) Eritrea/Yemen-II, para. 130, emphasis added. 
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This immediately raises another question. I f the factors that could have been weighed are 
'any' factors that bear on the 'equities' of the case, does that mean that the Tribunal felt that 
it was empowered to decide ex aequo et bono! We think not. As Reisman states, "[i]t is 
unlikely that the parties were signalling an interest in a distributive justice award ex aequo 
et bono" - more likely, that reference acted as an "insurance against a restrictive reading of 
LOS Convention Articles 15, 74 and 83"36. The pronoun "other" suggests clearly that some 
"pertinent factors" had already been included elsewhere, certainly in the reference to the 
LOSC. The expression "pertinent factor" is uncommon. It suggests that it was taken from 
and utilised in consonance with the dictum of the Libya/Malta Judgment. Presumably, 
therefore, "pertinent factors" were seen as relevant factors embodied in either the LOSC, or 
general international law, or both. 
The idea advanced here is that the 'legal matrix' of the maritime zone substantively 
restricts the range of factors which courts are entitled to weigh. To identify the weighable 
considerations, the 'factual matrix' must be sieved through the 'legal matrix'. Only those 
factors somehow subsumable in the zonal regime are eligible. Although negative, there is 
after all a general identification of the delimitation factors. 
Speaking of a limit imposed by the zonal regime does not mean, however, that only 
the basis of entitlement is to be considered. Maritime delimitation amounts to the division 
of areas of exclusiveness between neighbouring states37. It is logical that such a division be 
based on the basis of maritime entitlement. But it is also logical that the legal rights and 
interests embodied in the zonal regime of exclusiveness be taken into account. Viewing 
maritime delimitation as a mere exercise of 'drawing lines', isolated from the true issues in 
question - the exercise of exclusive rights and interests - entails an abstract perception of 
this operation that, one would argue, can only lead to further difficulties. 
Maritime zoning provides the balance between exclusiveness and inclusiveness in 
the public order of the oceans. Setting the legal position of coastal states regarding adjacent 
oceanic areas vis-a-vis all other states, the notion of maritime zoning defines spatially the 
areas of exclusiveness (ratione loci), and elects the aspects of 'ocean utilisation' whereby 
the differentiation is effected (ratione materiae). It establishes which rights and interests of 
coastal states are exclusive, i.e. non-exercisable by other states. Maritime delimitation has 
as its object an area where potential exclusive rights of states overlap. The link between 
maritime zoning and maritime delimitation is to be viewed in this light. Whereas maritime 
zoning seeks to determine the reciprocal limits of exclusiveness and inclusiveness, maritime 
(36) Reisman/2000, p.728. 
(37) Para.6.3.c)(i), Conclusions to Part II supra. 
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delimitation seeks to determine the reciprocal limits of two areas of exclusiveness. It is 
because maritime zoning results in the emergence of areas of potential exclusiveness that 
maritime delimitation is required. Hence, account can - and should - be taken of elements 
relating to either the basis of entitlement (maritime zoning ratione loci), or the rights and 
interests attributed to coastal states (maritime zoning ratione materiae)2%. Ultimately, this is 
no more than a second step in the attribution of exclusive maritime rights. The concurrence 
of exclusive rights and interests of neighbouring states over nearby sea areas is resolved 
through the spatial variable of the equation of the public order of the oceans. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that although emphasis is put on the limitations imposed on 
judges as regards the choice of factors, there is a positive requirement set down by the 'legal 
matrix' that cannot be overlooked. Courts are legally required to examine all considerations 
relevant for the institution in question. There are two corollaries to this. First, courts cannot 
discard relevant considerations without justifying that decision. They might be attributed 
'zero-weight' in a specific delimitation. That must mean, however, that such considerations 
were duly balanced-up, and that giving them 'zero-weight' results from a reasoned decision 
concerning its impact on the delimitation in concreto. Secondly, because of the principle 
jura novit curia, courts are entitled to weigh proprio motu considerations that are not relied 
on by the parties explicitly (as long as the relevant evidence is brought to the process by the 
parties). Only one condition has to be met: both parties should be given the opportunity of 
arguing their views on the consideration in question. 
From an overall perspective, the 'growing nature' of delimitation factors is in fact 
unsurprising. The ILC debates show that the content of special circumstances was to be 
determined by courts when disputes arose. Notwithstanding this, the idea that there is no 
guidance as to what factors are relevant should be rejected39. A limit, which stems from the 
'legal matrix', is imposed on the range of eligible considerations. Factors are rendered 
pertinent by a body of legal principles and rules40. Either it is considered that it is the legal 
system that determines the relevance of factors, and that courts are bound thereby, or this 
issue will be left entirely for courts to decide (in which case it would amount to an ex aequo 
et bono power). The inescapable conclusion is that delimitation factors are relevant by 
effect of international law. For the judge, the freedom of choice of factors is rather more 
limited than occasionally affirmed. Not all parts of the 'factual matrix' are legally relevant. 
Facts unrelated to the basis of entitlement, or irrelevant for the exercise of exclusive rights 
(38) Recognising this, Evans speaks of "a connection with the object of the regime" (Evans/1989, p.93). 
(39) Evans observes that there is no real guide for establishing which factors are relevant (Evans/1991, p.33). 
(40) Reisman/2000, pp.727-728. 
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and interests ought not to be considered. To use Judge Ranjeva's words, relevant facts are 
those "facts which affect the rights of states over their maritime spaces as recognised in 
positive law, either in their entirety or in the exercise of the powers relating thereto"41. 
7.3. The 'Weighing-Up Process' 
7.3.a) A Legal Multiple-Factor Analysis 
Having delved conceptually into the question of which factors are weighable in 
delimitation, it becomes now necessary to enquiry how these factors are to be weighed. In a 
concise yet accurate description of the problem, Charney suggests that delimitation consists 
of "multiple-factor analysis"42. Maritime delimitation, regardless of whether it is effected by 
negotiation or by adjudication, may indeed be described as a process in which multifarious 
factors have to be analysed. As argued, however, when it refers to negotiation, the freedom 
of states renders fruitless any attempt to describe the 'bargaining process' in detail. States 
might opt for following an approach similar to that of courts; but again, that depends on 
mutual consent. Little more can in fact be said about the process, other than that it will in 
principle follow the basic canons of diplomatic negotiation. 
From a conceptual standpoint, delimitation by adjudication is clearly different. The 
process that is conducive to the boundary-line - the 'weighing-up process' - ought to 
amount to an organised sequence of steps whereby relevant factors are translated into a line. 
As a process, it is subject to the canons of juridical reasoning and argumentation. Choices 
made in the quest for a non-inequitable boundary must be justified on legal grounds, even 
when they stem from the exercise of the margin of judicial discretion with which courts are 
endowed. The problem is that "no convincing demonstration of how the factors identified as 
relevant contribute to the equitable nature of the result"43 has yet been given. Questions 
must thus be asked. Is this a failure attributable to courts? Or is there something in the 
delimitation process that places such a demonstration beyond the bounds of possibility? 
Looking into the 'weighing-up process' from the perspective of courts, this section 
attempts to unravel some of its 'mystique'. Modest in its goal, it falls short of seeking to 
conceptualise and comprehensively explain the practice of courts. It attempts nevertheless 
to demystify certain debated issues, to draw parallelisms with decision-making outside the 
realm of law, and to put forward suggestions as to how the process might be conceived. 
(41) Declaration, Jan Mayen case, ICJ/Reports/1993, p.88. 
(42) Charney/1982, p.157. 
(43) Evans/1999, pp.174-175. 
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Ultimately, it endeavours to bring some objectivity to a process where the interveners are 
often deemed to have overused 'subjective' assessments. 
7.3.b) Deciding in an Extra-Legal Context: 'Multicriteria Decision-Making' 
The theory of decision-making (in which emphasis is put more often than not on 
analysis by quantitative methodologies) is a vast subject. Reference thereto in this study 
should be seen in the light of one caveat. The following analysis does not seek to theorise 
any of its aspects. It has a specific functional purpose: to attempt to bridge the gap between 
the appraisals of the relevant delimitation factors and the choice of boundary-line. Through 
a basic conceptual appraisal of some of its aspects, light might be shed on how judicial 
discourse may be organised to deal with the question of how delimitation factors contribute 
to the determination of the boundary course. The following paragraphs advance key notions 
that will be returned to when discussing the weighing-up of factors. 
Decision-making has been broadly defined as consisting of "generating, evaluating, 
and selecting among a set of relevant choices, where the choices involve some uncertainty 
or risk"44. Broadly speaking, it aims at facilitating decisions concerning complex problems. 
A number of procedures are designed to deconstruct the problem into sub-problems, which 
being smaller become easier to handle and to analyse. These are subsequently concatenated 
to reach a decision based on the whole. Naturally, decision-making is applicable only where 
there are multiple choices involved45. Decision-making techniques (particularly those based 
on numerical appraisals) have been proficiently applied in various fields (e.g. economics, 
business, public administration, psychology, education, sociology, geography, politics, and 
military). The normative foundation of judicial decision-making renders them less useful in 
the realm of Law. Difficulties tend to mount when attention is drawn to the ethical-moral 
values subsumed in legal prescriptions. Nevertheless, some elements of the theory of 
decision-making might be crucial for conceptualising judicial decision-making in maritime 
delimitation. For instance, it is possible to rationalise to a greater degree the choices faced 
by judges. In terms of the intellectual process through which judges go before arriving at a 
line, perhaps some parallelisms might be drawn with 'multicriteria decision-making'46. All 
in all, what is important is to construct a model designed to clarify and support reasoned 
legal choices. 
(44) Medin and Ross, Cognitive Psychology, cited in Anderson/1996a, p.54, emphasis added. 
(45) Cf. Malczewski/1999, pp.137-138; Zeleny/1982, pp.74-75; Starr/Zeleny/1977b, p.25. 
(46) On multicriteria decision-making, cf. e.g. Malczewski/1999, pp.81-273; Yoon/Hwang/1995; Goodwin/Wright/1991, pp.7-36; 
Nutt/1990, pp.467-504; Zeleny/1982; Starr/Zeleny/1977a; Bell/Keeney/Raiffa/1977; Keeney/Raiffa/1976, pp.219-353. The term 
"criteria" encompasses usually attributes, objectives and goals (Zeleny/1982, p. 17). 
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Let an example be considered. Suppose that a departmental official is given the task 
of buying, within a sound budgeting, the 'most efficient car' for a senior governmental 
official. The parameters that define the 'car efficiency' must be set down (e.g. mechanical 
reliability, comfort, speed, safety, technical assistance, fuel consumption, incorporated 
extras, etc.). Each attribute will have its own assessment scale. The weight of each attribute 
has then to be established according to government policy and the specific needs of the car 
user. Next comes the budgeting issue. Are there limits to the amount to be spent? Should 
the payment be in full or phased? In each decision, the attributes are virtually innumerable, 
and cannot be indicated outside a concrete context. What attributes to consider, how to 
describe them, and how to weigh them, is ultimately dependent on the decision-maker. 
Decisions such as this are part of day-to-day life, both at the professional and the 
personal level. One of the oldest descriptions of 'multicriteria decision-making' dates back 
over 200 years. It appears in a letter written in 1772 by Benjamin Franklin to Joseph 
Priestly. The description involves no mathematics. It appears presented in conceptual terms 
(which is why it serves our purpose better), reading as follows: 
When those difficult cases occur, they are difficult, chiefly because while we have 
them under consideration, all the reasons pro and con are not present to the mind at 
the same time; but sometimes one set present themselves, and at other times another, 
the first being out of sight. Hence the various purposes or informations that 
alternatively prevail, and the uncertainty that perplexes us. To get over this, my way 
is to divide half a sheet of paper by a line into two columns; writing over the one 
Pro, and over the other Con. Then, during three or four days consideration, I put 
down under the different heads short hints of the different motives, that at different 
times occur to me, for or against the measure. When I have thus got them all 
together in one view, I endeavour to estimate their respective weights; and where 1 
find two, one on each side, that seem equal, I strike them both out. I f I find a reason 
pro equal to some two reasons con, I strike out the three. I f I judge some two reasons 
con, equal to three reasons pro, I strike out the five; and thus proceeding I find at 
length where the balance lies; and if, after a day or two of farther consideration, 
nothing new that is of importance occurs on either side, I come to a determination 
accordingly. And, though the weight of the reasons cannot be taken with the 
precision of algebraic quantities, yet when each thus considered, separately and 
comparatively, and the whole lies before me, I think I can judge better, and am less 
liable to make a rash step, and in fact I have found great advantage from this kind of 
equation, and what might be called moral or prudential algebra?1 
Decision-making from this perspective is about implementing a process (a 'model') 
tailored to optimise the outcome of a decision. As Franklin states, it resorts to algebraic 
concepts to rationalise a 'decision-equation' that seeks to determine where the balance lies. 
(47) Yoon/Hwang/1995, pp.4-5; Zeleny/1982, p. 13, emphasis added; partial citation in Shafir/Simonson/Tversky/1997, pp.69-70. 
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At its heart lies 'better judgment'; judgment reasoned through methodical relational 
information-processing. It does not require high-level mathematics. Decision-making is 
often associated with quantitative approaches because, then, factors become numbers, and 
decisions are based on numerical assessments. With it, communication is improved and 
objectified. Importantly, comparative assessments and relativisations become clearer and 
easier. It is simpler to affirm that, on a scale of 1 to 10, factor "A" is worth 6 and factor "B" 
is worth 9, than to attempt to qualitatively describe their impact on the outcome while 
establishing their relational position in the decision-making process. Franklin's words raise 
another key point: the visualisation of the diverse aspects of the problem in one common 
frame. By putting 'together in one view' the alternatives and information, this method 
furthers the perception of the question in its entirety. Also at this level, the impact of an 
'image' becomes decisive in problem-solving. 
Contrary to what might be thought, this type of decision-making does not exclude 
qualitative assessments and 'subjectivity'48. The 'decision model' relies on appraisals of 
'relevant criteria', i.e. on assessments regarding "all those attributes, objectives and goals 
which have been judged relevant in a given decision situation by a particular decision 
maker (individual or group)"49. The construction of a 'model' is reliant on the experience, 
knowledge and intuition of the decision-maker. More importantly, the decision-maker must 
continue to act as the process 'end-filter'. Quantitative methods have flaws. They are not 
necessarily better than qualitative judgments. The construction of 'models' implies the 
suppression of aspects of the problem to be decided. It entails rejecting all those aspects that 
are not comprised in the 'criteria-definition'. When dealing with quantitative methods, 
decisions do not consist simply of homologating the solution of the 'decision-model'. 
'Models' are by definition incapable of reflecting reality comprehensively. Decisions might 
be centred thereon; but cannot exclude further analysis. 
7.3.c) From Objectivity to 'Subjectivity': An Inevitable Step 
The discussion below is centred on the idea that in a decision-making process (be it 
legal or extra-legal), when it becomes necessary to undertake assessments whereby factors 
are relativised, entering a sphere of 'subjectivity' is inescapable. Intellectually, this type of 
decision-making entails always the drawing of qualitative and/or quantitative comparisons, 
which establish relationships between facts in the light of a specific goal. Such operations 
depend upon the 'subjective' understanding of the goal, the 'subjective' perception of how 
(48) Cf. Larichev/1977. 
(49) Zclcny/1982, p. 17, emphasis added. 
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factors contribute to the outcome, and the 'subjective' interpretation of the restrictions 
imposed on the decision-maker. 
At first glance, it could be thought that in the realm of Law no such 'subjectivity' 
would exist. This is an illusive impression. All legal systems retain necessarily some degree 
of openness (which is probably greater in international law than in any municipal system). 
To judicial decision-making, this is paramount. Eventually, one must resort to 'subjective 
assessments'. It is not 'subjectivity' in the sense of arbitrariness, but it is 'subjectivity' 
nonetheless. The Law cannot close the door completely to 'subjective' ingredients50. Unless 
a theory of law based on a strict 'subsumptive model' is adopted, judges will always have at 
their disposal a margin of discretion, however limited it is". Judicial decision-making in 
maritime delimitation bears no difference. Recognising this, Weil affirms that "[e]ven at its 
tightest, the normative net will always leave room for judicial assessment, an unassailable 
bastion of discretionary power". From here he goes on to state that "[hjowever great the 
legal conquest of maritime delimitation, the most refined of judicial reasoning will never 
lead automatically to a predetermined solution and the 'gap' [...] between the legal 
argumentation of a judicial decision and the actual line will never be completely closed". To 
him, courts "will never be restricted to the passive discovery of the solution"; instead, they 
"will always arrive at it through active intervention"52. 
That judicial decision-making entails a degree of discretion, and that international 
courts have always recognised that such a discretion is not to be exercised arbitrarily, is a 
given in this study. Hence, more important than noting the judicial margin of discretion in 
maritime boundary adjudication is to realise that such discretion is not exclusive thereof. 
Judicial decisions in general can never be reached by subsumptive logic alone. 
Since it was argued that the normativity in maritime delimitation stems from two 
principles, the issue of discretion deserves even greater attention. Decisions on maritime 
boundaries must be reasoned through arguments of principle, specifically as to the relative 
optimisation of principles. In addition, the contraposition between the value of 'justice' that 
equity seeks to ensure, and the value of 'certainty' enshrined in equidistance (as a corollary 
of maritime zoning), brings in further elements of debate. These values are also central to 
the normative pronouncements that underlie the decisions taken. Following in the footsteps 
(50) Larenz/1989, pp.141-142. 
(51) On the openness of legal systems, and the irremovable margin of discretion in judicial decision-making, cf. Hart/1997, 
pp.124-154, 250-254; Canaris/1996, pp.103-126; Larenz/1989, pp.139-203, 253-254, 353-357; Alexy/1989, pp.5-14, 287-295; 
Engish/1988, pp.205-255; MacCormick/1978, pp.152-194, 229-258. In this respect, it may be pointed out as a side-note that 
studies regarding the US Supreme Court suggest that its decision-making process might be explained co-dependently through 
legal and an extra-legal models (cf. George/Epstein/1992), and that there is some degree of correlation between the ideological 
values of the justices and their votes in the U.S. Supreme Court (cf. Segal et o/./1995). 
(52) Weil/1989a, p.286. 
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of other German writers, Alexy has referred to these decisions as 'value-judgments'. These 
'value-judgments' amount to "either the actual giving of preference, or the judgment that a 
particular alternative is a better one, or the rule of preference underlying this judgment"53. 
However tenuous, they are inescapable in the application of law. Amounting to assessments 
concerning facts, they rely always on a reasoning oriented to legally relevant values, which 
is why they are central to judicial decision-making, in terms of both finding the decision, 
and reasoning i t 5 4 . Therefore, perhaps it is more productive to focus on the understanding of 
the normative pronouncements underlying the choices made by the decision-makers; for 
they are central to the balancing between justice and certainty. 
Judge Bedjaoui appears to have recently lent weight to this view. He has set out to 
investigate the role of 'expediency' in the decisions of the ICJ. Whilst emphasising that law 
is the science of security, he goes on to argue that legal security often must be reconciled 
with other values such as equitableness and reasonableness. In his view, 'expediency' is 
intimately linked to discretion, forms part of the tissue of legality, and "is almost inevitably 
present in virtually any international legal decision, even one apparently founded on the 
strict application of international law"55. Judicial discretion is indeed inescapable. As Judge 
Bedjaoui argued elsewhere, it is scarcely possible to wipe out all traces of 'subjectivism' 
from an operation which cannot have the automatism of a machine, for the inevitable share 
of 'subjectivism' is not the product of the laxness of the judge, but the result of a normative 
choice of the 'international legislator'56. The notion of 'value-judgment' covers - although 
not exclusively - what is described by Judge Bedjaoui as decisions of international courts 
"dictated by expediency", "which, while remaining legal, [are] inspired by feelings of 
appropriateness, wisdom and prudence". As he observes, these decisions are justified, inter 
alia, by a court's desire to promote justice57 - the value conveyed by equity. 
A key contributor for the existence of 'subjectivity' in maritime delimitation is thus 
its normative element. Judges are not only faced with a normative framework of reference 
whose density is very low5 8, but have also to address the problem of 'filling' the notion of 
(53) Alexy/1989, p.6, fn.20. The translation of the German term Werturteil (in Portuguese juizo de valor) to English is difficult. 
There seems to be no term better than 'value-judgment', which was adopted by Ruth Adler and Neil MacCormick in the English 
translation of Alexy's work. Throughout this study, 'value-judgment' is used to mean assessments to be made by judges whenever 
the decision (which may nevertheless still be conceived as a negative 'value-judgment') cannot be reached by a mere subsumptive 
process. That 'value-judgments' are part of the legal system is demonstrated by Alexy, who asserts that "legal decision-making 
ought (ought from a legal point of view) to be guided by morally sound 'value-judgments' of a legally relevant kind" 
(Alexy/1989, pp.8-9). Great caution is undoubtedly required in this respect, for the moral-ethical topoi shared by states are not 
always easy to confirm. With this in mind, however, nothing seems to impair the transposition of Alexy's approach to the 
international legal field. For an analysis of the theory of principles and the theory of values, cf. Alexi/1993, pp. 138-172. 
(54) On Esser's reference to the finding of the decision, and the reasoning underpinning it, cf. para.6.4.a)(iii) supra. 
(55) Bedjaoui/2000, p.4. 
(56) Bedjaoui/1990, p.383. 
(57) Bedjaoui/2000, pp.3-4. 
(58) Conclusions to Part II supra. 
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equity, which is cardinal thereto. No doubt, it is the notion of equity that "can easily reveal 
the small areas of 'expediency' available to an international court"59. However, the scope 
for discretion also finds roots elsewhere. Normativity in maritime delimitation stems from 
two principles, legal standards that have a low normative density. Their application always 
leaves a wide room for discretion, which is even greater when, owing to their 'collision' in 
concreto, it becomes necessary to reconcile them in order to arrive at the 'case-norm'. 
To meet the normative prescriptions, notably the need to arrive at a non-inequitable 
line, maritime delimitation turned into a process of multi-factor analysis. This fact cannot be 
underestimated. It means that even if a highly 'dense' and objective 'typification' of factors 
would be attained (which is not the case), the relativisation of factors subsequently required 
to determine the line would lead to the introduction of an element of 'subjectivity'. Whereas 
it is theoretically possible to objectify the choice of factors that are in abstrato weighable, it 
is impossible to evade the 'subjectivity' intrinsic to the relativisation of factors in concreto. 
'Subjectivity' thus emerges as inherent in the type of decision-making involved in maritime 
delimitation. As it happens, the steps for identifying factors, weighing-up their relative 
relevance, and translating that assessment into a line remain largely undefined. 
Since the 'weighing-up process' is juridical in nature, besides the normative density 
of the corpus juris, the scope of 'subjectivity' depends also on the body of practice usable 
as 'yardstick' against which to draw legal comparisons. Many 'value-judgments' in judicial 
decision-making stem from comparative analysis based on previous cases. Legal thought 
has a 'dual-flow': one downwards from normative generalisation to the cases to be decided; 
the other upwards from the individualisation of cases back to normativity60. The measure of 
'subjectivity' depends on the normative density and the existence of 'yardsticks'; the higher 
the level of normative density, and the larger the body of practice, the less scope there will 
be for 'subjectivity'. 
Low normative density, combined with virtual non-existence of a body of practice 
on maritime delimitation, constituted the enzyme - as it were - which catalysed the initial 
difficulties in case law. Added to it, in the North Sea cases (the first post-1958 delimitation) 
state practice was in practical terms deemed irrelevant, thus augmenting the difficulties. 
Slowly, as case law increased, and as state practice developed, these difficulties were 
somewhat overcome. Although the level of normative density remained basically unaltered, 
the growing body of practice provided further 'yardsticks' for orientating the exercise of 
'subjectivity', bringing some stability to maritime boundary adjudication. 
(59) Bedjaoui/2000, pp.22-24. 
(60) Lord Goff71997, p.753; Larenz/1989, pp.351-353. 
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It is noteworthy that although case law on maritime delimitation accounts for what 
is a relatively high percentage of international adjudications, it does not cover all possible 
settings. The suggestion that the scope of discretion ascribed to judges should be referenced 
to state practice finds here significant support61. Indeed, if due account is taken of the fact 
that agreements might weigh-up extra-legal factors, nothing hampers the recourse mutatis 
mutandis to state practice, as 'yardstick' for steering 'subjectivity' away from arbitrariness. 
This approach was followed in the Anglo-French arbitration. Precedents of semi-enclaves 
and of half-effect, and the idea of seeking solutions by modifying or varying equidistance, 
were obtained from state practice62. One would suggest that recent case law, by resorting to 
solutions based on equidistance, adjusted as necessary to achieve a non-inequitable line, 
converged to state practice, thus endorsing implicitly the same idea. 
To conclude, within the limits laid down by the legal system, 'subjectivity' is an 
integral part of the decision-making process in maritime delimitation. The existence of a 
sphere of discretion, however, is not the result of the principle of equity only. No doubt, the 
need to consider equity contributes thereto; but there are other far-reaching motives behind 
it. Judicial discretion appears through the concatenation of three aspects: the low normative 
density of delimitation law, the fact that the decision-making process is based upon a 
multiple-factor analysis, and the relatively scarce body of 'yardsticks'. Because the relevant 
body of state practice has increased over the years, and because courts have recognised that 
account should be taken of state practice, one would argue that the scope of 'subjectivity' is 
today much less than it was two or three decades ago. Strictly speaking, therefore, more 
than having refined the normative standards, what previous adjudications have perhaps 
done is to refine the decision-making process. 
7.4. Modus Operandi of the Delimitation Factors: The Choice of Line 
7.4.a) 'Multicriteria Decision-Making' in the Legal Context: Justification 
Turning now to the question of the modus operandi of delimitation factors proprio 
sensu, it is necessary to set down some premises. The first of these premises concerns the 
goal of the analysis: to contribute, however modestly, to objectify the justification discourse 
in the decision-making process in maritime delimitation. In this respect, the key issue is to 
identify the objective parameters on which the choice of boundary-line is based. 
(61) Para.7.1. supra. 
(62) RIAA/18, pp.94, 116-117, paras.199, 249,251. 
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The second premise concerns discretion in judicial decision-making, and the low 
normative density of maritime delimitation law. As suggested, there is a 'gap' between the 
legal argumentation of a judicial decision and the chosen boundary-line that will never be 
completely closed63. However, is this not true in relation to other more developed fields of 
domestic law? The determination of the precise amount to be paid as compensation (and 
punitive damages), or the precise duration of a sentence of imprisonment, as well as what 
constitutes recklessness and foreseeability, are examples that suggest that conceptually there 
is not much difference. In such cases, the distinction appears to lie primarily on the fact that 
there are recognised 'yardsticks' with which the exercise of discretion is orientated. By 
contrast, in maritime delimitation, unless state practice is used (with whatever provisos) it 
may prove difficult to find a body of practice to be resorted to as recognised 'yardsticks'. 
The approach followed here brings no substantive changes to the idea that the said 
'gap' exists. One should focus, thus, on bridging it to the extent possible, by improving the 
reasoning upon which the finding of the 'case-norm' hinges. Even when deciding according 
to equity, judges can never interpret their competence as that of an amiable compositeur. 
Judicial decisions cannot become "une operation principale de portage, et subsidiaire de 
delimitation"64. The boundary must stem from a systematic review of normative standards 
in force, account taken of the parties' claims. 
Since the 'case-norm' stems from an argument of principle, through an optimisation 
of two principles65, it is necessary to realise that "[t]he problem of reasoning from principles 
consists not so much in the justification of the principles but much more in the fact that the 
norm to be justified does not usually follow logically from the principles"66. The crux of the 
matter is therefore the need for a concretisation of the principles with the help of further 
normative statements. The number and scope of 'value-judgments' are naturally greater 
than in those instances in which rules stricto sensu determine the outcome of a case. 
The third premise is related to the substantive contents of delimitation law. It is 
presupposed that, in adjudication, the delimitation of a maritime boundary starts from a 
provisional equidistance-line; adjustments thereto are subsequently introduced, i f necessary 
to reach a non-inequitable solution. The adjustments result from, and are made by reference 
to, the weighing-up of delimitation factors. The optimisation of principles mentioned above 
must result in a line that reflects the legal and factual 'matrices'. This process concerns 
ultimately the choice of a boundary-line; but it is so in mediate terms only. From this point 
(63) Para.7.3.c) supra. 
(64) DeLapradelle/1928, p.143. 
(65) Conclusions to Part II supra; cf. also para.6.2.b) supra. 
(66) Alexy/1989, pp.243-244. 
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of view, it is submitted that the idea of 'choice of method' should be accepted only i f 
qualified by the understanding that what is in question is the exercise of judicial discretion. 
Recourse to a 'technical method' is subject to its 'ability' to translate properly the outcome 
of the legal propositions advanced above, notably that equidistance is the starting-point to 
which adjustments are to be made if and where necessary. 
A further clarification as to the scope of delimitation law concerns the maritime 
entitlement of states. Strictly speaking, the verification of the existence of entitlements does 
not form part of the delimitation process; it is a prius in relation thereto. Only after it is 
established that two states hold legal entitlements over certain maritime areas that overlap to 
some extent can the question of delimitation be raised67. The determination of entitlement is 
conceptually unrelated with delimitation factors. These factors are relevant only where a 
boundary has to be delimited, which presupposes the actual existence of an overlapping of 
entitlements. Speaking of delimitation factors that condition maritime entitlements would be 
a conceptual misconstruction. In some instances, however, this distinction might not be easy 
to draw with practical consequences; for example, the question of entitlement of islands68. 
The three premises, taken together, shape the scope of this analysis. The attempted 
objectification deals with the sphere of judicial discretion within the process of weighing-up 
delimitation factors. A number of questions must be answered in this respect. How should 
adjustments of the provisional equidistance be reasoned? How can 'value-judgments' be 
rationalised in terms of guidance for the courts, in their 'journey' through the sphere of 
discretion? Furthermore, what steps should be taken to arrive at the 'case-norm'? Finally, 
assuming that bridging totally the 'gap' between judicial reasoning and the boundary-line is 
impossible, is it at least possible to shorten that 'gap'? 
The proposition made in this study is that, account taken of the analogies in terms of 
intellectual process, 'multicriteria decision-making' provides a framework to rationalise the 
weighing-up of delimitation factors. It must, however, be emphasised from the beginning 
that no attempt is being made to surrender judicial decision-making to a quantitative model. 
Not even in extra-legal decision-making should that be done. 
A non-inequitable solution, it was argued, equates to find a line lying at a reasonable 
distance from the coastline of each state, which means considering both the legal and the 
factual 'matrices'. The process through which all relevant delimitation factors are to be 
weighed, involves attributing to each factor a weight that is determined by its importance in 
comparison with that of other relevant factors, with a view to reaching a conclusion on the 
(67) Para.4.3.b) supra. 
(68) Para.8.2.c) infra. 
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basis of the whole. The 'discovery' of the 'case-norm' (from which the boundary stems) 
exists therefore in the sphere of judicial discretion. For this reason, legal discourse becomes 
paramount. The idea offered for consideration is that, because it will bring about discourse 
rationalisation, the recourse to 'multicriteria decision-making' (more accurately, to aspects 
thereof) is likely to improve the quality of judicial reasoning. 
Various reasons support this proposition. First, it seems indisputable from the given 
description of maritime delimitation that one is dealing with a multi-factor analysis. This 
analysis shows conceptual analogies with 'multicriteria decision-making', a process devised 
to start with a 'problem definition' and to end with a 'solution recommendation'. Secondly, 
as observed in Benjamin Franklin's letter, its application allows a problem deconstruction 
that is central to better perception of it, and thus to better judgment. Issues that could evade 
the decision-maker are identified and made clearer by the parameterisation implicit therein. 
Thirdly, through 'multicriteria decision-making' the choice of line might be summarised in 
a single framework whereby all delimitation factors are weighed and relativised, improving 
the perception of hierarchical and coordinate relations. This improves key aspects of 
collective decision-making. All variables of the problem may be visualised simultaneously, 
thus furthering the understanding of the whole69. Exchange of information on the relevance 
of delimitation factors, both in absolute and in relative terms, is facilitated, leading to 
clearer argumentation. Fourthly, this technique reflects a key prerequisite of the delimitation 
process, in that it enables the decision-maker to tailor the framework of criteria selection 
and weighing-up, by reference to the situation in concreto10. The precise scope of each 
criterion is for the decision-maker to define. No less relevant is the possibility to undertake 
assessments on the basis of either quantitative or qualitative scales. 
Not all stages of 'multicriteria decision-making' have necessarily to be used. For 
instance, although it might be considered, the phase of 'sensitivity analysis' is not crucial 
for the approach suggested here71. Furthermore, any recourse to this technique should take 
place mutatis mutandis, in order to reflect the distinction between legal and extra-legal 
decision-making. The choice of attributes (delimitation factors), for example, is limited by 
the 'legal matrix', and is thus not a part of the discretion conferred upon the decision-maker. 
Amongst the stages whose application is being suggested are 'problem statement', 'criteria 
compilation and assessment', and 'decision-matrix design'. Even in relation to each of these 
stages, not all aspects thereof have to be considered. A decision-matrix might be designed 
(69) On the role of "mental imagery" and "visualisation" in legal reasoning, cf. Aikenhead/2001 (unpublished), pp.85-99. 
(70) Paras.7.3.b) supra, 7.4.b) infra. 
(71) 'Sensitivity analysis' is the final step in the construction of a model, whereby the variations in response of the 'decision-model' 
derived from variations at the input are analysed. Unreasonable output variations can lead to alterations in the' model'. 
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only partially, by defining the attributes, but not the decision alternatives . What the resort 
to multicriteria decision-making seeks to attain is to rationalise the delimitation problem, 
through deconstruction and diagrammatic representation, to create a framework upon which 
to predicate legal reasoning in general, and judicial argumentation in particular. 
7.4.b) Framework for Reasoning Discourse 
Having argued why 'multicriteria decision-making' may - and perhaps should - be 
used as the basis for rationalising the reasoning of courts in maritime delimitation, it is now 
necessary to explain how it might be used. The intention is not to describe and examine all 
possible applications of 'multicriteria decision-making'73. The aim is to delineate, on the 
basis of the conceptualising thoughts advanced hitherto, a proposal for reasoning the choice 
of line, by devising a framework that allows the 'gap' between the judicial reasoning and 
the choice of line to be reduced as much as possible. 
In one of his analyses, Evans argues that it would not be "unreasonable to expect 
[courts] to find some flexible rule as to the approximate weight to be attached to the general 
categories of circumstances". This "appropriate hierarchical order between factors" would 
be practicable, however, "only in a classificatory system less rigid that that traditionally 
employed in the examination of relevant circumstances"74. He suggests that there is the 
misplaced belief that "the various factors are to be 'weighed' against one another is some 
fashion". To him, "not only is this not, strictly speaking, necessary, but the inability of the 
adjudicative bodies to do so in a fashion that convincingly relates to the line of delimitation 
ultimately adopted has served to distance relevant circumstances from the delimitation 
process". As regards the delimitation process, case law has in his view failed "to provide 
adequate guidance as to its operation, or to the 'weighing' of relevant circumstances". From 
here, he concludes that there are "fundamental misconceptions concerning the delimitation 
process and the nature of the role of relevant circumstances within i t" 7 5 . 
What can be said of all of this? The question of identification of delimitation factors 
has been analysed already. It was suggested that international law provides a certain 
'typification', which identifies the 'types' of factors potentially relevant76. The impossibility 
of specifying in advance the weight of each factor in a choice of line in concreto was also 
(72) Because the objective is to create a basis for legal reasoning, and not to construct a 'decision-rule' for the delimitation, it is not 
necessary to go beyond the stage of 'decision-matrix design' - which is why 'sensitivity analysis' is not required. 
(73) It is worthwhile noting that, although this proposal is derived from on a certain conceptualisation, the recourse to multicriteria 
decision-making may take place under different conceptualisations. 
(74) Evans/1991, pp.28-29. 
(75) Ibid., pp.32-33. 
(76) Para.7.2.c) supra. This aspect is cardinal for the differentiation between legal and extra-legal decision-making. 
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accepted. No other conclusion can be reached if, as argued above, delimitation is seen as 
consisting of the optimisation of two principles (which can be achieved in concreto only). 
Evans's criticism leads us to ask subsequently two questions. Is it possible to establish a 
hierarchical order between factors in abstratol Can a 'convincing' link be found between 
the weighing-up of factors in concreto and the choice of line? 
As to the first question, let some comparisons be drawn between extra-legal and 
legal decision-making. Suppose again the example of purchase of the 'most efficient car'. 
The first step consists of identifying in abstrato the factors that might become relevant. In 
maritime delimitation, this is already made by legal 'typification'. Then, one must establish 
how much each factor is relevant for the notion of 'car efficiency'. This notion is to some 
extent variable. It depends, for example, on technical-advisory expertise, annual budgeting, 
government policy, and the specific needs of the 'car user'. Hence, only by coincidence 
would two purchases lead at different times to the same hierarchisation of factors. 
What about the hierarchisation of factors in maritime delimitation? Presumably, 
because the decision-maker is bound by normativity, it would not be unreasonable to expect 
guidance on how to hierarchise the factors upon which the decision hinges. Perhaps this is 
Evans's point. However, a hierarchisation in abstrato is hindered by conceptual difficulties. 
The aim of maritime delimitation (i.e. to achieve a non-inequitable boundary) is a variable 
notion77. Further, since delimitation is governed by two principles, normativity stems from 
their optimisation, undertaken in relation to the legal and factual possibilities in casun. No 
weight can be given in abstrato to categories of factors. The type of normativity, and the 
objective to be attained, does not allow it. The Tunisia/Libya Judgment made the point 
excellently, when stating that "no rigid rules exist as to the exact weight to be attached to 
each element in the case", because "what is reasonable and equitable in any given case must 
depend on its particular circumstances"79. Defining the factor-weights is part of the margin 
of discretion of courts. The requirement is that, through their reasoning, courts offer a sound 
justification as to why in casu factors are hierarchised in a certain fashion, and not another. 
In reasoning from principles, the scrutiny concerns the 'value-judgments' on the basis of 
which the 'case-norm' is reached. The first question is thus answered. 
The proposal concerning the recourse to 'multicriteria decision-making' is intended 
to address the second question: it seeks to create a framework for establishing a convincing 
link between the weighing-up of factors and the choice of line. As yet, this appears not to 
(77) On the notion of equity, cf. para.6.4.a)(i) supra. 
(78) Conclusions to Part II supra; cf. also para.6.2.b) supra. 
(79) ICJ/Reports/1982, p.60, paras.71-72. On the multi-factor analysis, cf. also ILA, Second Report of the Committee on Water 
Resources Law, Article 4; 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Article 6. 
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have been achieved. Alternative forms of structuring legal discourse and argumentation 
must then be sought. To begin with, it is important to emphasise that the hesitancies in the 
posture of courts towards delimitation factors have apparently disappeared. In the Jan 
Mayen case, the Court found that it had "to examine every particular factor of the case 
which might suggest an adjustment or shifting of the median line provisionally drawn"80. 
Ever since, factors have been dealt with as 'adjusters' of the provisional equidistance. 
In broad terms, the delimitation process has two goals: first, to determine whether 
the provisional equidistance is to be adjusted, and if so, how much it should be adjusted; 
secondly, to justify each of the answers. The framework for reasoning discourse proposed 
here is based on a 'decision-matrix'81, in which the attributes are delimitation factors. 
The construction of the matrix is initiated by the identification of the elements of the 
'factual matrix' that bear upon the delimitation. It is here that the question of 'typification' 
surfaces. The facts have to be sifted to arrive at the delimitation factors. It is important to 
observe that, under the conceptualisation adopted in this study, delimitation factors are not 
strictly speaking factual circumstances. They appear as a condition to fulfil, or an objective 
to attain. Although they stem from facts, they emerge in the process as 'value-judgments' 
forged by the decision-maker. Sieving the factual circumstances through the 'legal matrix' 
amounts, therefore, not only to determine whether they are relevant for the process, but also 
how they are relevant for it. 
Let the Jan Mayen case be taken as example. As to the disparity of coastal lengths, 
the factual element is: Greenland's coast is roughly 9 times longer than Jan Mayen's coast. 
A possible enunciation of the delimitation factor is: the coastal length ratio of roughly 9:1 
must be reflected in an adjustment of equidistance-line towards the Jan Mayen coast2. The 
difference is that the delimitation factor incorporates a 'value-judgment' on the legal 
consequence of the fact83. In regard to the question of the capelin resources, the delimitation 
factor could be described as follows: in the southern sector, the boundary must allow an 
equitable access to the capelin resources by both parties. Had the existence of ice been 
deemed to affect the access to the resources, it is possible that the 'value-judgment' would 
have to be redefined accordingly. A third decision-factor could be the conclusion that Jan 
Mayen should be given a prima facie full-effect, which could be enunciated as follows: Jan 
Mayen has no ''capitis diminutio' in terms of its maritime entitlement4. 
(80) ICJ/Reports/1993, p.62, para.54. 
(81) A 'decision-matrix' may be described as a table in which both attributes and alternative choices are identified. 
(82) "Coastal length ratio": the ratio between the lengths of the relevant coasts of the states involved in the delimitation. 
(83) This 'value-judgment' can be refined further, to give an idea of how much the adjustment should be; cf. para.7.4.c) infra. 
(84) Despite having held this view, the Court based its Judgment on the area of overlapping claims rather than on the area of 
overlapping entitlements; cf. para.4.3.b) supra. 
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Two other factors were examined in this Judgment: considerations of security, and 
conduct of the parties. Apparently, the Court admitted that, potentially, these factors might 
be relevant for continental shelf and fisheries zone delimitation. In casu, it concluded that in 
the light of the resulting boundary, the considerations of security were irrelevant, and that 
the conduct of the parties did not influence the course of the boundary. As a delimitation 
factor, the considerations of security could be enunciated as follows: even if adjustments to 
equidistance are necessary, the boundary shall not run so close to the coasts of either party 
as to raise questions of security. The question of conduct of the parties is a different matter. 
Unlike the Tunisia/Libya case, in which the question related to the conduct of the parties as 
between them, here, Denmark claimed that the conduct of Norway vis-a-vis a third state 
(Iceland) was indicative of the delimitation method. The fact that this conduct was deemed 
to be irrelevant means that, under the 'legal matrix', no consequence stems from it in terms 
of the determination of the boundary. Accordingly, this consideration could be left out of 
the 'decision-matrix'. However, since reasons that lead to discarding arguments advanced 
by the parties must be part of the judicial argumentation, the 'decision-matrix' should make 
reference thereto, not as a delimitation factor strictly speaking, but as an issue to be dealt 
with in the decision. A possible description would be: the conduct of Norway vis-a-vis a 
third state (Iceland) has no influence over the determination of the boundary. 
In conclusion, the 'case-norm' emerges from the concatenation of all delimitation 
factors - each of which is discovered through the optimisation of the principles of maritime 
zoning and of equity, account being taken of the 'factual matrix'. What the 'weighing-up 
process' must provide is a sound justification for the end-adjustment to be applied to the 
provisional equidistance. Efforts thus should concentrate on structuring legal discourse and 
argumentation on the basis of 'multicriteria decision-making'. At the core of these efforts 
lies a 'decision-matrix' reflecting: (I) the identification of the facts legally relevant; (II) the 
relativised assessment of each relevant factor, formulated in the light of the 'legal matrix'. 
This approach, not totally dissimilar to that adopted by courts, has the advantage of putting 
together in one view all relevant factors pertaining the 'decision-matrix' (Table 5 below). 
7.4.c) The Determination of the Boundary 
When delving into the concept of maritime delimitation, it was argued that the 
division of the area of overlapping claims is not a requirement under international law. It is 
theoretically possible that the claimed-line advanced by one of the litigants becomes the 
boundary awarded by the decision. Hence, the first step of any tribunal must be to analyse 
the parties' claim-lines, to determine whether either of them meets the requirements laid 
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down by the delimitation factors . Once more, the 'decision-matrix' of the Jan Mayen case 
may be used as illustrative example. 
TABLE 2 
'Decision-Matrix': Analysis of the Parties' Claims 
D E L I M I T A T I O N F A C T O R S 
Danish 
Claim-Line 
Norwegian 
Claim-Line 
A. The coastal length ratio of roughly 9:1 
must be reflected in an adjustment of the 
equidistance-line towards the Jan Mayen 
coast. 
YES NO 
B. In the southern sector, the boundary 
must allow an equitable access to the 
capelin resources by both parties. 
NO NO 
C. Jan Mayen has no capitis diminutio in 
terms of its maritime entitlement. NO YES 
D. Even i f adjustments to equidistance are 
necessary, the boundary shall not run so 
close to the coasts of either party as to raise 
questions of security. 
YES YES 
E . The conduct of Norway vis-a-vis a third 
state (Iceland) has no influence over the 
determination of the boundary. 
The delimitation factors that are verified and not-verified by each of the claim-lines 
are marked with "Yes" and "No", respectively86. It is noticeable that neither claim-line 
satisfied the requirement concerning the capelin resources, showing the relevance of this 
issue in concreto. Furthermore, whereas the Norwegian claim-line did not verify the need to 
adjust the equidistance-line as a result of the disparity between coastal lengths, the Danish 
claim-line did not recognise the prima facie full-entitlement of Jan Mayen (which in casu 
required some 'amputation' of the Danish entitlement). Perhaps these considerations should 
(85) Para.4.3.d)(ii) supra. It might also happen that the parties agree to 'swing arbitration', in which case the tribunal will be bound 
to choose between the parties' claim-lines; cf. para.6.1 .b)(iii) supra. 
(86) Because the question of the conduct of the parties, as advanced by Denmark, was not considered a delimitation factor propria 
sensu - meaning that it could not be translated in condition to fulfil or an objective to attain - the claim-lines do not have to be 
compared with that factor. 
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have underpinned the argumentation of the Court to discard both claim-lines, on the basis of 
their unreasonableness. Neither claim-line raised concerns as to security, meaning that, 
because the decision would have to award a line within the area of overlapping of claims 
(wow ultra petita), this factor was irrelevant. 
The approach adopted in this study does not depart dramatically from that usually 
followed by courts. Attention must nevertheless be devoted to two points. First, the 
formalisation of a 'reasoning-structure' offers a better chance to comprehensively address 
all relevant issues. Secondly, this approach emphasises the idea that, before 'discovering' a 
boundary-line, courts must first conclude that neither claim-line verifies the requirements of 
a non-inequitable solution, as expressed through the delimitation factors. 
A pause has to be made in order to clarify one point: there can be more than one 
equitable boundary. All delimitations have more than one possible solution. In reality, each 
judge is likely to have his/her own perception of which line should be chosen. Even when 
judges agree on the line, the reasons that underpin their views are not necessarily 
coincident. This is patent not only in the different lines proposed in dissenting opinions, but 
also in the separate opinions of judges who either vote with the majority because the chosen 
line is as reasonable as a boundary which they could have been inclined to draw, or agree 
with the line but justify their concurring votes on diverse reasoning. In reality, delimitation 
is usually a choice (or a compromise) between proposed lines. The recourse to 'multicriteria 
decision-making' is intended to facilitate this choice (or compromise), whilst seeking to 
substantiate it by pointing out the reasons that make a line preferable vis-a-vis another. 
The 'weighing-up process', in effect, amounts to the discovery of a non-inequitable 
boundary-line. The kernel of the proposal advanced here consists of an objectification of 
discourse that relies on the concatenation of two elements: the introduction of comparative 
appraisals with examples found in case law and state practice; the recourse to a quantitative 
element - the 'distance ratio'. The critical underlying assumption was already signalled: all 
previously delimited boundaries are deemed to be 'equitable solutions', susceptible of use 
as 'yardsticks' in other instances. Recurrent patterns in state practice, in particular, appear 
as opinio aequitatis, bearing a quasi-normative effect87. The key thought is thus to uncover 
previous cases that bear some analogy with the case to be decided. Case law and state 
practice are in essence marshalled as 'yardsticks' to analyse two aspects: the quantum of the 
adjustment (if any) to the equidistance-line, and the possible 'configuration' of the line. The 
(87) Para.7.1. supra - which refers to the use of 'yardsticks' for purposes of objectifying the choice of line. There is no question of 
appreciating negotiated agreements in the exact same terms as case law. Notwithstanding this, a high the level of recurrence of a 
solution in state practice evinces a diluted influence of extra-legal factors in the cases of boundary negotiation under appraisal. In 
any event, state practice should be resorted primarily either to complement case law, or to supplement it. 
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immediate aim of the 'weighing-up process' is two-fold: first, to determine the average 
'distance ratio' that corresponds to the line that runs at a reasonable distance from either 
coast; secondly, since there are virtually an infinite number of lines with the same average 
'distance ratio', to choose among the possible lines which 'configuration' should be adopted 
for the line in casu. Besides these two aspects, there is a third aspect that must be assessed 
by courts in their 'value-judgments': the degree of relationship between the 'yardstick' and 
the case to decide. This aspect determines the soundness of resorting to the former to reason 
and decide upon the latter88. 
From a conceptual viewpoint, this approach aims at bringing further certainty into 
delimitation without having to abdicate of justice. Insofar as to each value of 'distance ratio' 
correspond virtually an infinite number of possible boundary-lines, determining the average 
'distance ratio' does not amount to choose the course of the boundary. It simply provides 
guidance as to the 'amount of adjustment' to be applied, account taken of all delimitation 
factors - being the adjustment defined in relation to the coast. 
Before returning to the 'weighing-up process' proprio sensu, there is another point 
to be made. The delimitation factors are 'value-judgments' that express the optimisation of 
the principles of maritime zoning and of equity in concrete They form the basis on which 
hinge the adjustments to equidistance necessary to arrive at a non-inequitable line; a line 
which produces the equilibrium between the exclusive maritime rights and interests of the 
disputants. Hence, the delimitation factors constitute the core of the delimitation process. 
Subtle legal assessments must be made on the basis thereof. 
Let factors A and B of the 'decision-matrix' of the Jan Mayen case be considered as 
an example. Factor A is formulated in such a way that it inevitably leads to a displacement 
of the provisional equidistance-line. Assessed in conjunction therewith, factor B does not 
necessarily require further displacement of that line towards the Jan Mayen coast. The 
adjustment caused by factor A might entail a partial or full verification of the condition set 
in factor B. Had it been appraised on its own however, factor B would inevitably require 
some adjustment. In any event, its impact would always be greater than in the case above. 
This illustrates what is meant by attributing to each factor a weight that is determined by its 
importance in comparison with that of other relevant factors, with a view to reaching a 
conclusion on the basis of the whole. Practically speaking, factor A influences primarily the 
determination of the 'distance ratio', whilst the impact of factor B might be restricted to the 
'discovery' of the boundary 'configuration' (i.e. its course). 
(88) The relationship might be assessed in terms of similarity of coastal geography, existence of a dominating factor (e.g. disparity 
of coastal lengths, convexity/concavity of coast, natural resources, position of islands), or a similar set of delimitation factors. 
-288-
TOWARDS THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF MARITIME DELIMITATION 
TABLE 3 
'Decision-Matrix': 'Weighing-Up' of the Delimitation Factors 
D E L I M I T A T I O N F A C T O R S 
Average 
'Distance Ratio' 
(ADR) 
'Configuration' 
A. The coastal length ratio of roughly 9:1 
must be reflected in an adjustment of the 
equidistance-ltne towards the Jan Mayen 
coast. 
ADR = 0.70 
Favouring Denmark 
{Libya/Malta case) 
No impact. 
B. In the southern sector, the boundary 
must allow an equitable access to the 
capelin resources by both parties. 
Minimal impact 
(and only i f required 
for the division of 
capelin grounds). 
A line that, in the 
south, divides the 
capelin fishing 
grounds equitably. 
C. Jan Mayen has no capitis diminutio in 
terms of its maritime entitlement. 
Factor A implies 
already some 
'amputation' of the 
Danish entitlement. 
No impact. 
D. Even if adjustments to equidistance are 
necessary, the boundary shall not run so 
close to the coasts of either party as to raise 
questions of security. 
No impact. No impact. 
E. The conduct of Norway vis-a-vis a third 
state (Iceland) has no influence over the 
determination of the boundary. 
The following analysis of the Jan Mayen case, necessarily simplified, is intended to 
illustrate how the 'decision-matrix' designed above could have been utilised to structure the 
argumentation of the Court, in order to bridge the gap between the reasoning and the line 
awarded. By recourse to Table 3, it is possible to summarise the impact of each delimitation 
factor in terms of either the overall adjustment of the provisional equidistance, or the course 
of the boundary. Being a delimitation between opposite states with a coastal length ratio of 
roughly 9:1, there was good reason to argue, considering the Libya/Malta case, that an 
average 'distance ratio' of 0.68 favouring Denmark was a reasonable first step towards an 
equitable adjustment89. As regards the capelin resources, as long as the 'configuration' of 
the line would guarantee to both states an equitable access thereto, no reason would justify 
increasing the amount of average displacement of the equidistance-line. Should the average 
(89) See Figures 8, 11,71. 
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'distance ratio' derived from factor A verify factor C, the practical impact of the latter in 
adjusting the provisional line could be seen as negligible. Factor C was relevant perhaps for 
purposes of reaching the conclusion that the Danish claim-line was inequitable. When 
relativised to the other delimitation factors, however, its impact on the determination of the 
adjustment was in effect non-existent90. 
The factors appraised as regards the adjustment of the provisional equidistance, 
conclusions would have to be drawn with respect to the boundary course. Unlike in the 
Libya/Malta case, where the whole of equidistance was displaced northwards, here the need 
to ensure equitable access to the capelin resources in the southern part of the boundary had 
to be considered. A line that would divide the capelin resources equitably would thus have 
to be found. The remainder of the boundary would be 'constructed' northwards so that the 
average 'distance ratio' would remain approximately 0.68 favouring Denmark. These are 
aspects that result from the delimitation factors directly. Other relevant aspects stem from 
propositions as to what international law requires. For example, the boundary should depart 
from equidistance as little as possible, and should have no unnecessary turns91. Once these 
conditions are fulfilled, it is virtually inevitable to arrive at a boundary-line very close to 
that awarded by the Court. 
The arguments put forward by the Court in the Jan Mayen case were neither wrong, 
nor misplaced. In effect, the boundary finds clear support in international law92. What is 
suggested in this study is that this approach makes the leap from the Court's reasoning to 
the boundary-line much smaller. The improvement in discourse is based on the conjugation 
of three elements: a 'reasoning-structure' based upon 'multicriteria decision-making', the 
recourse to an objective assessment that has not been used before (the average 'distance 
ratio'), and the utilisation of 'yardsticks' found in case law and state practice (somewhat 
similar to the Anglo/French arbitration). 
Without attempting to undertake similar exercises in relation to other cases93, it 
might be interesting to provide further examples of how case law and state practice may be 
resorted to as objective 'yardsticks', with respect to either average 'distance ratio' or the 
'configuration' of the boundary. The example of delimitations between adjacent states, in 
(90) The expression "No impact" indicates the factors that played an irrelevant part in the determination of the boundary. 
(91) On this issue, cf. Conclusions to Part II supra, and para.8.4.e)(i) infra. 
(92) Fourteen judges voted favourably on the decision, and only one voted against it. This is the greatest majority in a maritime 
delimitation case decided by the ICJ, and evinces (despite the criticism directed against the reasoning, inside and outside the 
Court) a common perception of the reasonableness of the course of the boundary. In the exercise that was carried out, it was 
assumed (as the Court did without further explanation) that the continental shelf boundary and the fisheries zone boundary would 
coincide. If the question of the single maritime boundary were raised, further elaboration would be required to justify the course 
of the boundary (most probably, other delimitation factors would be introduced in the 'decision-matrix'). 
(93) The final chapter, analysing the delimitation of the continental shelf boundary between Australia and Bast Timor, is intended to 
form a "test-case", in which the propositions advanced here are applied in practice to a delimitation yet to be effected. 
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which the coastal concavity 'pushes' the equidistance-line towards one of the states (which 
has a slightly shorter coastal length), has already been mentioned above94. Although there 
are other circumstances to weigh in each case, an objective value of average 'distance ratio' 
appears to characterise this geographical setting. Taking account of the Tunisia/Libya case 
and the two agreements negotiated in the aftermath of the North Sea cases, Table 4 shows 
that an average 'distance ratio' of 0.90 favouring the state with the shorter coastline is an 
acceptable first step towards an equitable adjustment of equidistance95. 
TABLE 4 
Average 'Distance Ratio' in Certain Adjacent Boundaries 
BOUNDARY 
C O A S T A L L E N G T H 
R A T I O (Facades) 
A V E R A G E 
' D I S T A N C E R A T I O ' 
Denmark / Germany 1.3-1.4 (approx.) 0.88 (approx.) 
Netherlands / Germany 1.3-1.4 (approx.) 0.91 (approx.) 
Tunisia / Libya 1.5-2.0 (approx.) 0.90 (less than) 
Where there is no strict adjacency or oppositeness, as between France and Spain in 
the Bay of Biscay96, the situation is somewhat different. The agreement between these two 
states includes a Special Joint Zone, which contributed to the final balancing of interests. 
Notwithstanding this, because this Zone straddles the boundary, this line may still be a 
reference for other delimitations in which the coastal relationship varies from adjacency (at 
the terminus of the land boundary) into oppositeness (near the end-point of the boundary). 
With an average 'distance ratio' of roughly 0.85 favouring France, the line reflects mainly 
the length of the French coast (ratio of 1.54 in relation to the Spanish coast)97. Another case 
in which the coastal relationship cannot be clearly defined as adjacency or oppositeness is 
the USA/Canada boundary in the Gulf of Maine. Although the two settings cannot be 
equated98, it is interesting to note that the line awarded by the Chamber is based on an 
(94) Conclusions to Part II supra. 
(95) Figures 2, 5, 69, 70. The state with longer coastal length is indicated first in column one. The values of coastal length ratio are 
mere approximations, because they depend on how the measurements are carried out. In terms of average 'distance ratio', the 
figures smaller than 1.00 mean that the boundary lies closer to the state indicated first in column one. Because the end-point of the 
boundary remained undefined in the Tunisia/Libya boundary, the value of average 'distance ratio' had to be indicated in relative 
terms (i.e. "less than") and not as a concrete value. Considering the examples of Figure 64, these figures are unsurprising. 
(96) Figure 31. Appendix 2, D25. 
(97) Anderson suggests that this agreement (negotiated shortly after the North Sea cases) considered to some extent the seabed 
morphology (Anderson, IMB/Report 9-2, pp. 1722-1723). Contra, referring to proportionality only, see Jeannel/1980, pp.37-38. 
(98) The coastal relationship between France and Spain is initially adjacency, and turns towards the other extreme of the boundary 
into a situation of oppositeness. Between the USA and Canada, the coastal relationship is somewhat hybrid initially, it evolves 
into a situation of oppositeness in the middle (near the mouth of the Gulf), and it ends as a situation of almost adjacency. 
-291 -
TOWARDS THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF MARITIME DELIMITATION 
average 'distance ratio' of approximately 0.98 favouring the USA , the state with longer 
coastline (ratio of 1.38 in relation to the Canadian coastline)100. 
Typical are also the delimitations between opposite states in enclosed areas (where 
the area of overlap comprises the whole, or great part, of the sea area), in which the coastal 
length ratio is less than 2.0. The solution adopted in case law (e.g. Eritrea/Yemen and the 
Anglo/French arbitrations, the latter in the "Channel region") and state practice (e.g. the 
Italy/Yugoslavia, Italy/Tunisia and Iran/Saudi Arabia agreements) is derived from a dual 
approach101: the boundary is based on an equidistance-line (average 'distance ratio' of 1.0); 
and insular features are treated autonomously. In territorial sea delimitation, the line is in 
principle an equidistance (or runs close thereto). I f it concerns areas beyond the territorial 
sea, the boundary is based primarily on an equidistance-line from the mainland coasts. 
Islands positioned close to the mainland coast are equated thereto. I f located in the vicinity 
of, or beyond, the equidistance from mainland coasts, islands are guaranteed a 12 M 
territorial sea. The impact of islands located in an intermediate position varies with the 
distance from it to the mainland, and the distance between mainland coasts102. 
To end this brief excursion through some of the 'yardsticks' existent in case law and 
state practice, reference will be made to the situation in which the territory of a coastal state 
is 'walled', by the territory of another state. Regardless of the average 'distance ratio' 
involved, state practice seems to favour what may be named 'corridor-solutions'. Examples 
of this type of approach are the Gambia/Senegal, Monaco/France, and Dominica/France 
(Guadeloupe and Martinique) agreements103. The two lateral boundaries were reached by 
'opening' the equidistance-lines, and by 'pushing' them towards the 'surrounding state'. 
The Canada/France arbitration and the Venezuela/Netherlands (Antilles) agreement, while 
having similar sort of solution, reflect nonetheless a slightly different setting104. Since the 
islands are located in front of a continental coast (and not 'side-walled'), the coastal facade 
is not continuous; and the equidistance-lines were instead 'pushed' towards the 'surrounded 
state' (thus conveying a different equilibrium). Notwithstanding this, all cases suggest one 
type of 'yardstick'. Where two adjacent boundaries have to be delimited between the same 
two states, 'corridor-solutions' ensure reasonable area-attributions105. 
(99) In this calculation, Mount Desert Rock, a very small insular feature detached from the coast, was not considered. 
(100) When compared with the division that would be operated with recourse to equidistance (if account was taken of the same 
basepoints), the value of 0.98 suggests that the division operated by the boundary is not substantially favourable to the USA (in 
terms of area-attribution). 
(101) See Figures 3, 12, 18, 19, 25; cf. Appendix 2, B25-B26, D45. 
(102) Para.8.2.c)m/ra. 
(103) Para.5.3.d)(iii) supra; cf. Appendix 2, D27, F19, F34; Figures 23, 27, 39. Cf. Brunei/Malaysia continental shelf boundaries, 
defined by the United Kingdom in 1938, and apparently accepted subsequently by the two emerging states (Appendix 2, B15). 
(104) Figure 10; Appendix 2, D65. 
(105) It is noteworthy that the 'corridors' do not have to be formed by two parallel lines. They might have a 'funnel shape'. 
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All in all, the key issue becomes the identification of the aspects of 'typification' 
on the basis of which analogies can be elicited. Granted that this is not a novelty in legal 
theory, it nevertheless demonstrates that maritime delimitation can be seen as just another 
problem of the application of the law. What makes the difference is that the normative 
standards whose application is required are two principles of law, entailing an argument of 
principle that emerges as their optimisation relative to the legal and factual circumstances in 
concreto. The aim of this section was to explain, conceptually, how the determination of the 
boundary, consisting of such an optimisation, ought to be undertaken, account taken of one 
specific concern: bridging the gap between the reasoning and the line awarded. For practical 
reasons, no attempt has been made to offer a comprehensive assessment of all typical 
situations that can be found in case law and state practice, as to either average 'distance 
ratio', or 'configuration' of the boundary106. 
TABLE 5 
'Negotiation-Matrix': Identification of Goals of States A and B 
STATE A 
(Goals) 
STATE B 
(Goals) 
Goal 
Relationship 
Regulating navigation in strait ZZZ, 
owing to environmental concerns 
Regulating navigation in strait ZZZ, 
owing to environmental concerns Common 
Ensuring a boundary that addresses 
security concerns in area YYY Indeterminate 
Create a stable environment for 
investment in petroleum exploitation 
Create a stable environment for 
investment in petroleum exploitation Common 
Exclusive access to fishing resources 
in area XXX 
Sharing the fishing resources of the 
area XXX Opposite 
Equidistance unacceptable because it 
does not guarantee exclusive access 
to fishing resources in area XXX 
Equidistance (or equidistance-based) 
boundary, to safeguard position in a 
future delimitation with state C 
Indirectly 
Opposite 
Ensuring political approval for the 
boundary internally Indeterminate 
Finally, a brief reference must be made to the use of 'multicriteria decision-making' 
in negotiations. Just as it is applicable for structuring the reasoning in adjudication, it might 
be used in negotiation. States could indeed develop a complete 'decision-model'. However, 
this would not be viable in many instances. The time and effort needed to design a detailed 
(106) Owing to the amount of groundwork that would be required, it was not even possible to calculate the average 'distance ratios' 
involved in all examples advanced above. Without adequate computation means - capable of accessing electronic-vector charts 
-293-
TOWARDS THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF MARITIME DELIMITATION 
'decision-model' can be as much as required to negotiate the boundary on more 'traditional' 
bases. More appropriate is the recourse to 'multicriteria decision-making' in terms similar 
to those described above for legal decision-making. 
In addition, whilst helpful towards the identification and formulation of delimitation 
factors, matrices are useful for clarifying other aspects in the negotiating process. A matrix 
might be useful for taming the waters in highly complex negotiations. First, presenting 
delimitation under a more objective framework contributes to measuring the realisation of 
each party's goals. This expedites proposals and counterproposals. With it, the balance is 
more easily struck. Secondly, it is important in negotiation to pinpoint, among the various 
goals and interests of each state, those that have a conflicting nature and those that are 
reconcilable. Owing to confidence-building, the identification of common goals can create a 
momentum that may become decisive for the successful outcome of negotiations. Table 5 
shows an example of how negotiation-goals might be identified and related. 
and of executing specific computations on the basis of the information contained therein - the calculation of average 'distance 
ratios' is extremely time-consuming. For this reason, it would become incompatible with the main objective of this study. 
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Chapter 8 
THE QUEST FOR A BOUNDARY-LINE 
8.1. Elements Germane to the 'Weighing-Up Process* 
Elements germane to the 'weighing-up process' are those considerations that, being 
weighed in the delimitation process, determine the course of the boundary. This notion 
comprises primarily factual elements from which stem the delimitation factors. But there 
are also non-factual elements to be considered. They are designated here as 'complementary 
delimitation elements'. The expression 'relevant circumstances' was purposely avoided. Its 
connotation, linked with the 'equitable principles doctrine', is perhaps unhelpful for this 
analysis. Similar reservations may be raised as to the notion of 'special circumstances', 
whose arguably narrower content seems incompatible with the approach outlined below. 
Notwithstanding these remarks, it is obvious that the considerations examined hereinafter 
overlap significantly - i f not totally - with these notions. 
There is no reason for undertaking an analysis that would repeat much of what has 
already been said as to the concepts of 'relevant circumstances' and 'special circumstances'. 
What is necessary is to reassess the conclusions of case law and scholarship in light of the 
conceptualisation adopted here. It is particularly important to identify discrepancies in 
viewpoints, to evaluate recent developments, and to clarify the impact of the 'factual 
matrix' in the optimisation of the principles of maritime zoning and of equity. 
Latent in the different terminology that has been used is a different conception of 
maritime delimitation. Delimitation factors appear not as facts but as 'value-judgments', 
indispensable for the application of the normative standards laid down in international law. 
As such, they result from a sifting of the 'factual matrix' through the 'legal matrix', which 
seeks to establish which factual elements ought to be considered, and how they are to be 
considered. Delimitation factors surface thus as conditions to fulfil or objectives to attain. 
What the 'weighing-up process' considers are these factors; not the facts whose existence 
they presuppose. 
From the standpoint of optimisation of principles, which depends on the interaction 
between the factual and the legal possibilities in casu, this means that, in different contexts, 
the same fact might result in different delimitation factors. What seems reasonable in EEZ 
delimitation might be less reasonable in territorial sea delimitation. Access to certain fishing 
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grounds, for instance, should be appraised differently in EEZ delimitation, or in territorial 
sea delimitation. Although the fact is the same, the delimitation factor that it will give rise 
to will almost invariably be different, in respect of both its definition and its relative weight. 
Such an intuitive conclusion reflects the different regimes of exclusiveness, and its impact 
under the proposed conceptualisation. 
Directly tied up with this subject is the question of precedence between entitlements 
of a different type107. To use the same example of the fishing grounds, suppose that they are 
located within the territorial sea entitlement of state A; and suppose that, though outside the 
territorial sea entitlement, they are located within the EEZ entitlement of state B. Under the 
conceptualisation advanced here, in principle, these fishing grounds would not result in a 
delimitation factor when determining the EEZ boundary between states A and B. At best, i f 
positioned relatively at close distance from the coast of state B, they might become a factor 
to be 'weighed-up' in the wider balance of interests. 
Hitherto emphasis has been put primarily on the understanding of the 'legal matrix', 
and how it moulds the delimitation process. The following two sections seek to elaborate on 
the 'factual matrix'. The focus is the way in which 'typification' interweaves with the 
'weighing-up process'. Categorising facts under the bipartition "juridical circumstances 
versus geographical circumstances"108, for instance, fails to realise that all pertinent facts 
must be juridically relevant. Their pertinence in adjudication rests always on the normative 
regime of maritime zoning, by relation either to maritime entitlement, or to the regime of 
exclusive rights and interests. Practically speaking, thus, this analysis attempts to provide an 
outline of the facts that may be subsumed in the notion of considerations related to the 
basis of maritime entitlement, or to the legal rights and interests embodied in the regime of 
exclusiveness of each zone. Since there can be no closed list of relevant considerations, the 
following categorisation and fact-description should be seen as merely exemplificative. 
8.2. Facts Related with the Basis of Maritime Entitlement 
8.2.a) Coastline 
The fundamental fact in maritime delimitation is coastal geography. Entitlements 
over maritime areas are always referenced to the coast. A state projects its sovereign power 
onto the sea, and exercises control over maritime areas, i f its territory abuts on an oceanic 
space. This idea is neatly summed-up by Weil, when observing109: "In order to benefit from 
(107) Paras.4.3.d)(iii)(iv) supra. 
(108) Cf. Calatayud/1989, pp.96-132. 
(109) Weil/1989a,p.53. 
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maritime rights it is not enough to be a state. One must also be a coastal state [. . . ] . A 
coastline is an essential element in every state projection seawards." 
In principle, the coastline is referenced to the low-water line 1 1 0. All parts thereof are 
relevant for delineating the limits of states' maritime jurisdiction111. With perhaps only the 
exception of Article 121(3)112, little room is left for interpretation as to what constitutes the 
relevant coast. The main issues concern the notion of low-water line. Unrelated to the coast 
stricto sensu is, on the other hand, the entitlement to the continental shelf beyond 200 M; 
which under Article 76 is to be delineated, inter alia, in accordance with geomorphological, 
geological, and geophysical data. This aspect of entitlement will be examined later. 
Saying that equidistance is de facto and de jure the starting point for delimitation is 
tantamount to placing the coastline at the forefront of the assessments of fact to be made. In 
the Qatar/Bahrain case, the first assessment concerned the determination of "the relevant 
coasts of the Parties" - specifically the determination of the "location of the baselines and 
the pertinent basepoints which enable the equidistance-line to be measured". The Court's 
conclusion (on the basis of which it analysed the parties' views) was that "under the 
applicable rules of international law the normal baseline for measuring this breadth is the 
low-water line along the coast""3. This approach confirmed what had already been asserted 
in the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, in which the Tribunal drew the same conclusions"4. 
Especially important in the debate surrounding the determination of the relevant 
coastline is the question of low-tide elevations located in the area of overlapping territorial 
sea entitlements - an issue raised also in the Qatar/Bahrain case. The Court stated then that 
"international treaty law [was] silent on the question whether low-tide elevations can be 
considered to be territory", and that it was unaware "of a uniform and widespread state 
practice which might have given rise to a customary rule which unequivocally permits or 
excludes appropriation of low-tide elevations". The key inference of the Court was that 
"there is no ground for recognising the right [...] to use as a baseline the low-water line of 
those low-tide elevations which are situated in the zone of overlapping claims", and that 
"for the purposes of drawing the equidistance-line, such low-tide elevations must be 
disregarded""5. 
(HO)LOSC, Articles 5-7, 9-10, 13,47, 121. 
(111) LOSC, Articles 3-4, 33(2), 55, 76(1). 
(112) Para.8.2.c)w/ra. 
(113) Qatar/Bahrain-Merits, paras. 177-178, 184. 
(114) Eritrea/Ycmcn-II, paras.133-135. Building on this idea, one would argue that technical problems related to 'normal baseline 
definition' might become crucial in these assessments. In the Qatar/Bahrain case, the Court did not examine Qatar's argument 
that the provisional equidistance-line should be computed by reference to the high-water line, which was arguably defined more 
accurately (Qatar/Reply, paras.9.44-9.49.). 
(115) Qatar/Bahrain-Merits, paras.205-209. Because this is somewhat of a novel question, and because it influenced the decision of 
considering that Fasht ad Dibal belonged to Qatar, it is worthwhile stressing that this latter decision was taken unanimously; cf. 
paras.220,252(5). Low-tide elevations are thus not territory stricto sensu. 
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All that need be added to demonstrate the relevance of the coastline in maritime 
delimitation is to refer to its key role in the definition of the overlapping of entitlements116. 
Its significance is two-fold. Without defining the overlapping, it would not be possible to 
distinguish between the different types of overlapping entitlements, which would render the 
idea of precedence between different entitlements inapplicable117. The issue is all the more 
significant because, as suggested above, the Court should reason in terms of division of the 
area of overlapping entitlements, and not of the area of overlapping claims118. 
8.2.b) 'Controlling Basepoints' 
When it comes to the impact of the coastline in the delineation of the spatial limits 
of maritime jurisdiction, an idea must be borne in mind at all times: not all basepoints along 
the low-water line are relevant for this operation. The technique of 'envelope of arcs'119 
renders most points on the low-water line irrelevant. Only the basepoints whose prominence 
in relation to the other basepoints results in an impact on the calculation of the 
outer-envelope are relevant. Naturally, the number of relevant basepoints varies with the 
coastline shape: in relative terms, a flatter coast generates usually more relevant basepoints 
than an indented coast. Further, the wider the breadth of the maritime zone, the smaller is 
the number of relevant basepoints. More basepoints are utilised to delineate the territorial 
sea outer limit than to delineate the EEZ and continental shelf outer limit. For the purpose 
of delineating the limits of maritime zones, therefore, the state's coastline may be described 
by a series of discrete points along the coast. 
Inasmuch as equidistance is to be computed by reference to basepoints, this issue 
cannot be underestimated in delimitation120. Analogously to the delineation of limits, in the 
computation of equidistance the number of relevant basepoints is variable. It varies with the 
geography between the coasts involved, notably the adjacency-oppositeness aspect and the 
distance between coasts. As a rule of thumb, it may be said that the number of relevant 
basepoints is larger in a clear case of oppositeness than in a clear case of adjacency, for 
states with similar coastal lengths (although this depends critically on the shape of the 
coasts in question and on the distance between states)121. 
(116) Because maritime entitlements are based primarily on distance, the overlapping of entitlements is usually defined on the basis 
of computations that resort to the coastline. In some exceptional cases, however, there might be areas of overlapping entitlements 
that are created by reference to the natural prolongation of states (cf. para.8.4.b)(i) infra). 
(117) Paras.4.3.d)(iii)(iv) supra. 
(118) Paras.4.3.b) supra. 
(119) On the "envelope line", cf. Shalowitz/1962, pp.170-172; Boggs/1951, pp.246-250. 
(120) There are various technical question associated with this computation, notably: the geodetic datum to which the basepoints' 
coordinates are referred, the recourse to graphical or technical methods in computations, the problems raised by chart projections. 
(121) For two similar cases of oppositeness, the number of relevant basepoints varies with the distance between coasts. 
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A single basepoint (or a small number of basepoints) controlling the whole course 
of equidistance is a possibility less likely to be realised in oppositeness (except in certain 
instances involving islands), than in adjacency. In the latter, a headland near the terminus of 
the land boundary, or an insular feature either in a similar position or further away from the 
terminus but in a more salient position, are very likely to control the course of equidistance. 
Because they control the whole (or very long stretches) thereof, these basepoints might be 
named 'controlling basepoints'. Why three equidistance-based methods were initially 
devised for adjacency cases is perhaps explicable by reference to this fact. The "method 
based on equidistance from the boundary" sought to circumvent the effect of 'controlling 
basepoints' by spreading relevant basepoints along the coast122. 
Concealed in this debate is a question of 'representativeness'1 - i.e. of determining 
whether the basepoints utilised to compute equidistance faithfully characterise the coastal 
relationship between the states involved (considering the relevant coast). One would submit 
that 'controlling basepoints' are unrepresentative of the coastal relationship. They might 
produce inequitableness in area-attribution i f strict equidistance is applied (Figure 86). The 
existence oj''controlling basepoints' is an aspect that must be considered in the formulation 
of delimitation factors. Equidistance is to be adjusted in order to reach a non-inequitable 
solution - the adjustment depending on the relevant 'yardsticks'. Whatever the answer, the 
key point is that the disproportionate area-attribution yielded by 'controlling basepoints' 
breaches the requirement of equilibrium. 
8.2.c) Islands 
In maritime delimitation, probably no issue caught the attention of writers more than 
the 'effect of islands'123. One would argue, however, that most (if not all) aspects regarding 
this problem are in effect subsumable under the problem of 'controlling basepoints'. The 
key question is primarily whether basepoints on islands' are unrepresentative of the coastal 
relationship between the states concerned. That is what happens, for example, with islands 
detached notably from the 'mainland coast' in oppositeness, or with islands positioned in 
the vicinity of the terminus of the land boundary in adjacency124. 
(122) Para.5.2.a)(i) supra; Figure 56. 
(123) Cf. Kozyris/1998; Lucchini/Vcelckel/1996, pp.169-173, 255-263; Estapa/1996, pp.98-102; Bowett/1993; Jayewardene/1990, 
pp.259-529; Weil/1989a, pp.229-235; Evans/1989, pp.133-151; Briscoe/1989; Ciciriello/1988; Attard/1987, pp. 259-264; 
Dipla/1984, pp. 105-231; Bowett/1979, pp.139-247; Symmons/1979, pp.152-204; Karl/1977; Hodgson/1973a; Hodgson/1973b. 
(124) The effect of low-tide elevations is similar. The distinction is that whereas islands' basepoints are always usable, low-tide 
elevations' basepoints can only be used if they lie within the territorial sea of land territory striclo sensu. In this debate, attention 
must be drawn to the comments of judge Oda in the Qatar/Bahrain case (cf. Separate Opinion, paras.6-9, 20-21,40). Noting that 
many provisions of the LOSC concerning insular features were simply transposed from the 1958 Conventions, which had been 
devised for a narrower territorial sea belt, he expresses his "doubts as to whether Article 121 concerning the regime of islands of 
the 1982 United Nations Convention which does not refer to islets or small islands may as a whole be considered the customary 
international law in the age when the 12-mile territorial sea prevails" (para.7). 
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Bowett analyses this issue by categorising two types of setting: the first concerns 
cases in which islands appear as "the sole unit of entitlement"; the second relates to cases 
where the entitlement of islands appears "in conjunction with the entitlement of a larger 
territorial unit"1 2 5. No question is raised against putting emphasis on geography. It reflects 
the nature of the entitlement, and leads to a categorisation that finds support in case law and 
state practice. Attention has nevertheless to be paid to a conceptual point. Behind this view 
is an issue of 'representativeness' of the basepoints for the delimitation. Islands that appear 
as the "sole unit of entitlement" deserve different treatment because the 'representativeness' 
of their basepoints is beyond question. The Canada/France arbitration and the Jan Mayen 
and Qatar/Bahrain cases demonstrate that islands have no capitis diminutio as to maritime 
entitlement. The latter case illustrates equally the distinction between islands' basepoints 
which are representative of the coastal relationship, and those which are not. 
Having an objective idea of the disproportion created by 'controlling basepoints' 
entails a comparison between strict equidistance and the equidistance-line that results i f 
these basepoints are not considered. The notion of partial-effect (or no-effect) builds on this 
comparison126. Partial-effect seeks to avoid the effect of 'controlling basepoints' of islands, 
when they completely 'shadow' other basepoints on the state's coastline. Various examples 
may be given: the Scilly islands (U.K./France); the Kerkennah islands (Tunisia/Libya); Seal 
island (Canada/USA); Filfla island (Libya/Malta); the Zubayr group and Jabal al-Tayr 
(Eritrea/Yemen); Qit'at Jaradah (Qatar/Bahrain); Fanos, Samothrake and the Strofades 
group (Greece/Italy); Kharg island (Iran/Saudi Arabia). 
Another approach adopted to overcome this issue is the enclaving (semi-enclaving) 
of islands127. The underlying distinction is that the basepoints on these islands are even less 
representative of the coastal relationship, thus producing an even greater inequitableness in 
area-attribution, if strict equidistance is applied. Both in adjacency and in oppositeness, the 
examples are clear: the Channel islands (U.K./France); Abu Musa island (Dubai/Sharjah); 
Alcatraz island (Guinea/Guinea-Bissau); Pelagruza and Galijula islands (Italy/former 
Yugoslavia); Lampedusa, Lampione, Pantelleria and Linosa islands (Italy/Tunisia). Though 
simplified, the same solution was used in the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration. Preserving the 
territorial sea of Zuqar and Hanish islands, the Tribunal considered it preferable to have a 
simpler straight line as the boundary, instead of the more complex 12-mile limit. It observed 
nonetheless that the line was "also very near to the putative boundary of a Yemen territorial 
(125) Bowett/1993, p. 132. He divides the second type of setting in three sub-categories referenced to the relative position of islands: 
(a) lying proximate to a mainland coast under the same sovereignty; (b) straddling a median or equidistant line between 'mainland' 
coasts; or (c) proximate to a mainland coast under a different sovereignty. 
(126) Para.5.2.c)yi/pro. 
(127) Para.5.3.a) supra. 
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sea in this area, but [made] for a neater and more convenient international boundary" . 
Bringing simplicity to the boundary, this approach may in many instances be preferable. 
There is little doubt that islands (regardless of their size and position) are entitled to 
a full territorial sea belt, and that in principle 'amputations' of territorial sea entitlements 
occur only by effect of an overlapping territorial sea entitlement129. With respect to EEZ 
and continental shelf entitlements, account must be taken of Article 121 (3) 1 3 0 - one of the 
most debated provisions of the LOSC. Conceptually, inasmuch as delimitation refers to an 
area of overlapping entitlements, determining whether an island generates a relevant 
entitlement is an issue that precedes any delimitation involving that island. For better or for 
worse however, this has not been the approach adopted by courts in delimitation131. 
Oude Elferink argues that, in most delimitations, "the clarification of Article 121(3) 
is not a matter of great urgency". To him, "[t]his is mostly explained by the contents of the 
rules of international law applicable to the delimitation of maritime boundaries, which allow 
for sufficient flexibility to achieve an equitable result without ruling on the applicability of 
Article 121(3)"132. Judicial restraint would indeed explain the 'unwillingness' of courts to 
address an issue whose outcome would not be strictly necessary to resolve the dispute. The 
problem however, is conceptual. Insofar as delimitation law applies to an overlapping of 
entitlements, the determination of the reach of all entitlements involved ought to precede its 
application. Concerning the existence of an entitlement, Article 121(3) should be interpreted 
and applied before delimitation law. To apply delimitation law without fully detennining 
which entitlements are involved, and overlap, is somewhat odd. 
Charney identifies the root of this difficulty. He observes first that, "[i]n theory, 
Article 121(3) features may also influence the location of international maritime boundaries 
that delimit EEZs and continental shelves generated from other features"; but concludes that 
"that potential will almost never be realised"133. 
Consider the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, which involved features whose status under 
Article 121(3) could be debated. Because the distance between the mainland coasts of the 
two states is less than 200 M, the whole of the sea area between them consists of an area of 
overlapping entitlements, regardless of the islands' status. Ultimately, without analysing 
Article 121(3), the Tribunal virtually ignored the mid-sea islands in the delimitation of areas 
(128) Eritrea/Yemen-n, para.162. 
(129) Para.4.3.d)(ii) supra. 
(130) On the entitlement of islands and Article 121(3), cf. Getnes/2001; OudeElferink/1999; Charney/1999; Karagiannis/1996; 
Kolb/1994; Kwiatkowska/Soons/1990; VanDyke//Morgan/Gurish/1988; Dipla/1984, pp.38-42; Symmons/1979, pp.45-53, 
120-129; Van Dyke/Brooks/1979, pp. 351-392. 
(131) Article 121(3) raises two different issues: one concerns the delineation of the outer limits of state jurisdiction; the other 
regards the delimitation of maritime boundaries between states. Only the latter is considered in this study. 
(132) OudeElferink/l999b, p.12. 
(133) Charney/1999, p.877 (similarly, p.875). 
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beyond the territorial sea134. In the debate surrounding Article 121(3), the decision to give 
no-effect to Jabal al-Tayr and the Zubayr group deserves special attention135. The reasoning 
of the Tribunal appears to hint at the recourse to the substantive criteria of the said Article 
121(3) without ever committing itself to a clear assertion. The reference to the "barren and 
inhospitable nature" of the islands as justification for not attributing to them any effect "is 
perhaps as close as one may come to affirm that a particular island 'cannot sustain human 
habitation and economic life of their own' without really saying so"136. 
Owing to the interpretative difficulties that Article 121(3) embodies, questions have 
been hung on its operational nature137. One would argue, however, that many issues are 
insusceptible to 'black-white distinctions' - especially i f relying on open-ended concepts. I f 
the example of the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration is followed, this provision might become the 
basis for justifying a 'gradualist application'. Courts might use it as the basis to consider 
extra-geographical factors in assessing the effect of islands: less viability to sustain human 
habitation or economic life might be equated to less effect. 
By conjugating paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 121, questions must be raised as to the 
relationship between the entitlement to a contiguous zone and the delimitation of maritime 
areas beyond the territorial sea. It was suggested before that some precedence should prima 
facie be given to the entitlement up to 24 M, over entitlements beyond i t 1 3 8 . However, 
this is not tantamount to asserting that a contiguous zone entitlement can be 'amputated' 
only by effect of a similar competing entitlement. Mostly, it depends on the (geographical) 
scope to redress inequities. There is at least one example in case law that supports this 
suggestion: the Canada/France arbitration139. 
In summary, one would submit that, in maritime delimitation, islands should be 
assessed primarily in terms of the 'representativeness' of their basepoints. For those islands 
that Bowett denominates "sole units of entitlement", the 'representativeness' cannot be 
questioned. What might be relevant then is a possible existence of disparity of coastal 
lengths140. Islands are truly 'advantaged' in terms of their capacity to generate maritime 
entitlements. Their 'circular shape' - so to speak - creates a radial-effect that causes them 
(134) The boundary awarded was based on an equidistance-line between mainland coasts (which the Tribunal deemed to be "in 
accord with practice and precedent in the like situations but is also one that is already familiar to both Parties", and to be 
supported in some measure by the petroleum concessions), the effect of islands requiring careful consideration (Eritrea/Yemen-II, 
para. 132). For reasons related with the simplicity of the boundary (recourse to a straight line rather than to a 12-mile limit-line), 
the Tribunal attributed the Zuqar and Hanish islands a little more than territorial sea; but it gave no clear explanation as to why the 
impact of these islands should be so restricted (paras. 160-162). 
(135) Eritrea/Yemen-II, paras. 147-148. 
(136) Antunes/2001,p.329. 
(137) Karagiannis/1996, p.623. 
(138) Para.4.3.d)(iv) supra. 
(139) ILM/31/1992, pp.1169-1170, paras.68-69. On the scope to redress inequities, cf. para.8.4.a) infra. 
(140) While examining the situation of insular features in the context of the South China Sea, Oude Elferink has concurred with this 
view (OudeElferink/2001, pp. 180-181). 
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to generate areas greater than those generated by a straight coast with the same length. This 
does not signify that the said radial-effect prevails in delimitation. Nothing in international 
law supports such a proposition - and the bilateral nature of delimitation does not allow the 
mere extrapolation thereof. The existence of a coastal length disparity (the effect of which 
emerges clearly in the adjustments made to equidistance in the Canada/France arbitration 
and in the Jan Mayen case) might predominate in terms of area-division. 
For islands belonging to a larger territorial unit, the issue is 'representativeness' of 
their basepoints - in the light of the geographical context. Other factors (e.g. population, 
economic status) should be appraised only as to very small islands. Here, Article 121(3) 
might become the beacon for a 'gradualist approach'. Geographical 'representativeness' can 
then be assessed by reference to 'distance ratio' assessments (as either average 'distance 
ratio', or differentiated 'distance ratio'), in the context of 'yardsticks' found in case law and 
state practice. Rather than being centred on the size of islands141, the effect of islands should 
be assessed in terms of a correlation between coastal length and the distance of the relevant 
basepoints from the majority of the basepoints. What matters is that larger islands, with 
longer coasts, contribute more to the coastal relationship. To the greater 'representativeness' 
of their basepoints corresponds greater effect. Contributing less to the coastal relationship, 
basepoints on small islands (especially i f isolated) are less representative. 
Any analysis of this problem entails, almost inexorably, a reference to Isla Aves, an 
insular feature belonging to Venezuela. In terms of delimitation, this insular feature poses, 
simultaneously, problems of 'representativeness' and of legal status under Article 121(3)142. 
Three treaties entered into by Venezuela, with the USA, the Netherlands (Antilles) and 
France (Guadeloupe and Martinique), have granted it full-effect143. This was objected to by 
certain Caribbean states, resolved not to acquiesce to, or recognise, the granting of "island 
status" to Aves144. An in-depth analysis of all legal issues cannot be carried out here. Two 
points should be highlighted, however. First, it is true that the legal status of Aves under 
Article 121(3) is open to question. However, and secondly, it is also true that the relevant 
Venezuelan continental coastal facade abutting on the area is well over 300 M, much longer 
than any other facade abutting on this area of the Caribbean Sea. 
(141) This does not mean that size is not considered to determine if an island is a rock under Article 121(3), to which Hodgson's 
classification might be useful: rocks, less than 0.001 square mile (sq.M) in area; islets, between 0.001 and 1 sq.M; isles, between I 
and 1,000 sq.M; islands, larger than 1,000 sq.M (Hodgson/1973a, p. 17; Hodgson/1973b, pp.150-151). A classification attempted 
by the IHB (apparently not adopted) referred to rock as a feature 400 times larger than that of Hodgson (Kapoor/Kerr/1986, p.68). 
(142) Its coastal length of less than one mile, and its location is 270 M north of Isla Margarita (Venezuela), but much closer to other 
Caribbean islands (e.g. 125 M from Dominica, 110 M from Guadaloupe, 100 M from St Kitts and Nevis). 
(143) Appendix 2, D64, D65, D67. 
(144) The text of the letters addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by Antigua and Barbuda, St.Kitts and Nevis, 
Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, appears in LOS Bulletin, No.35, pp.97-100. Taking account of the de facto 
limitations that the agreements might impose in the Caribbean context, these objections are understandable. Legally speaking, the 
objections might add little to the position of these states, which were already protected by the pacta tertiis rule. 
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To illustrate 'representativeness', in more classical terms, reference can be made to 
the Greece/Italy agreement, which illustrates various combinations. Corfu, Kefallinia and 
Zakynthos, islands with long coastlines, positioned very close to the mainland, were given 
full-effect; Fanos and Samothrake, islands further offshore, having shorter coasts, were 
given three-quarter-effect; and the Strofades, islands with even shorter coastlines, located 
even further offshore, were given half-effect145. Decisive for this idea is the argument of the 
Court, in the Qatar/Bahrain case, in relation to the effect of Fasht al Jarim. Stressing that 
the northern coasts of the parties were ''not markedly different in character or extent" and 
that Fasht al Jarim was "a remote projection of Bahrain's coastline", the Court attributed 
no-effect thereto146. 
8.2.d) General Direction of the Coast and Facades 
From the outset, it must be clarified that the concepts of general direction of the 
coast and facade do not differ substantively. The general direction of the coast is a coastal 
facade at a certain scale147. The distinction is perhaps only practical. Typically, references to 
the general direction of the coast are correlated with the determination of boundaries by 
recourse to perpendiculars. Fagade appears as a more loose term in two contexts: to apply 
methodes de lissage (whether perpendiculars or bisectors), and to measure coastal lengths. 
This distinguishing aspect is however not a hard and fast rule. In case law, relevant coasts 
have already been measured by recourse to "segments, according to their lines of general 
direction"148. In reality, a strict conceptual distinction between these two terms does not 
appear to be possible. 
The coastal facade is not strictly speaking a fact. It is an interpretation of a fact: the 
coastline. In essence, a facade amounts simply to the greatest simplification of the coast, 
contemplating no prominent points. Consequently, the effect of 'controlling basepoints' that 
might exist along the coastline is circumvented. This is partly the rationale underlying the 
methodes de lissage. Insofar as it takes account of the whole length of what is deemed the 
relevant coast, a facade bears great 'representativeness'. Coastal relationship is indeed best 
expressed by facades than by the low-water line along the coasts. Judge Oda, who as shown 
in the Qatar/Bahrain case has long been one of the main advocates of using coastal facades, 
observes in this respect: 
(145) Appendix 2, D29. The total length of Greece's Ionian Sea facade is slightly less than 300M. The approximate facade of the 
islands' are: Corfu, 30 M; Kefallinia, 25 M; Zakynthos, 20 M; Fanos, 2 M; Samothrake, 1.5 M; Strofades islands (together), 1 M. 
From Zakynthos, the shortest distance to the mainland is some 9M; from the Strofades, it is 26 M. 
(146) Qatar/Bahrain-Merits, paras.247-248, emphasis added. 
(147) As observed by the Committee of Experts in 1953, scale is the key aspect for 'discovering' the general direction of the coast, 
the danger that it is subject to diverse interpretations (cf. ILC/Yearbopk/1953(11), p.78). See Figures 75,84. 
(148) Canada/France arbitration, 1LM/31/1992, p.l 162, para.33. On the measurement of coastal lengths, cf. para.8.2.e) infra. 
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Would it not be correct to interpret the equidistance/special circumstances rule to 
mean that the line of equidistance, from the outset, should be drawn taking into 
consideration the topography of the region, which is vast, as a whole. This is why I 
have advocated the macrogeographical approach. [...]The coastal faqade, as I 
envisage it, represents a view taken of a State's coastal front with the intent of 
placing it in the proposed perspective in relation to the coastal front of its 
neighbouring States. 
The idea of conjugating the equidistance/special circumstances rule with recourse to 
coastal facades must be justified under international law. One would argue that the soundest 
(if not the only) manner of presenting such a normative justification is by recourse to a 
'value-judgment'. As aforesaid, the existence of 'controlling basepoints' might prompt the 
need for a delimitation factor that takes account thereof. It is on this idea, and on the fact 
that methodes de lissage are substantively a variant of equidistance, that the justification to 
resort to facades should be predicated. The principle of equity provides justification for 
discounting the effect of 'controlling basepoints'; and the principle of maritime zoning, 
offers legal support to utilise methodes de lissage. This application might include, in very 
specific cases where the coast is concave or convex, the recourse to 'radial-lines' (which is 
based not on a general direction, but on a general orientation of the coast). In line with the 
argument that there should be no question of freedom of choice of method, this proposition 
exemplifies how the application of methods other than equidistance might be reasoned. 
Weil argues that since equidistance, "by its very nature, reflects the direction of the 
two coasts and their changes of direction, together with the irregularities of the shoreline as 
a whole, any adjustment of this line [would amount] to a correction of geography". He adds, 
as to the potential inequity of equidistance, that "[njature, not equidistance, should be the 
target"150. Perhaps this is not exactly true. First and foremost, since only a few basepoints 
are relevant to compute an equidistance-line151, the true direction of the coasts involved 
might not be translated in such computation. That equidistance is not inequitable is 
undoubted152. However, the crux is that, in that it might be computed from points 
unrepresentative of the coast, equidistance might not reflect the legal basis from which it 
stems: maritime zoning. Then, recourse to the facade or general direction (orientation) of 
the coast, which amounts indeed to some refashioning of geography, seems reasonable, thus 
equitable. Secondly, the fact that equidistance (as well as the breadth of maritime zones) is 
measured from the low-water line is not a natural fact. It is a legal proposition. States could 
have opted instead for other types of line (e.g. the mean-water line or the high-water line, or 
(149) Separate Opinion, paras.38-39 (partially citing his arguments in the pleadings of the North Sea cases). 
(150) Weil/1989a,p.225. 
(151) Para.5.2.a)(ii) supra. 
(152) Para.6.3.d)(iv) supra. 
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even some other form of coast-depiction)153. What happens is that nautical charts (which are 
par excellence the maps that offer worldwide information on coastal and offshore areas, and 
seabed relief, germane to the law of the sea), for reasons other than legal (i.e. safety of 
navigation), depict with reasonable accuracy the low-water line. Moreover, this is 
coincidentally the line that maximises the maritime claims of states. 
One needs scarcely point out that the recourse to facades ought to be differentiated 
from using straight baselines lato sensui5A. Insofar as it has been argued that equidistance 
must always be taken as the starting point of all delimitations, this issue must necessarily be 
addressed. In negotiations, there are three main possible ways to consider straight baselines. 
The first consists of giving full or partial weight to any straight baselines claimed by each of 
the states involved. Another possibility is to disregard any straight baselines, and to derive 
the equidistance from the normal baseline. A third option is to 'construct' straight baselines 
exclusively for purposes of the delimitation155. Notably, all options rely on a consensual 
approach: the states involved agree on the way in which to deal with straight baselines. 
The perspective is not much different in adjudication. Unless the parties agree that 
the straight baselines are to be given effect (or to be otherwise utilised), tribunals are bound 
not to consider them. In the Libya/Malta case, without expressing an opinion on the validity 
of the Maltese straight baselines drawn around Filfla island, the Court disregarded them. In 
effect, it gave no-effect to Filfla island when computing equidistance156. Further explaining 
why straight baselines are irrelevant, the Tribunal that decided the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau 
stated that the problem of the baselines is not of direct concern to courts "as these lines 
depend on the unilateral decision of the states concerned and do not form part of 
[delimitation] dispute[s]"157. This view was fully endorsed in the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration; 
while assessing the relevance of the Eritrean straight baselines, the Tribunal asserted that 
such an issue was "hardly a matter that the Tribunal [was] called upon to decide"158. 
In summary, taking into account the bilateral nature of delimitation, since straight 
baselines stem from unilateral decisions of states, their use vis-a-vis other states depends on 
(153) "Coastline" should be seen as a term distinct from "normal baseline", and not necessarily referring to the low-water line. In 
this respect, it should be noticed that the non-existence of reliable nautical charts for certain areas has sometimes led negotiators 
to resort to land maps and surveys (which utilise mostly the mean-water line) to identify the relevant coastline. Particularly where 
the incline of the shore is steep, the difference between these vertical references is negligible. 
(154) Straight baselines lato sensu include all straight lines used to measure the breadth of maritime zones, notably baselines 
defined under Article 7 of the LOSC, bay-closing and river-closing baselines, and archipelagic baselines. 
(155) On the use of straight baselines in state practice, cf. Sohn/1993, pp.155-160. 
(156) ICJ/Reports/1985, p.48, para.64. 
(157) ILM/25/1986, p.292, para.96, emphasis added. 
(158) Eritrea/Yemen-II, para. 142. It must be observed, however, that the Tribunal made some references to Article 7 of the LOSC. 
In one case, while rejecting the use of a low-tide elevation (Negileh Rock) for computing the equidistance, it noted that, even if a 
straight baseline system existed around the Dahlaks, under Article 7(4) that feature would not be usable (paras. 143-145). Another 
reference to Article 7 came to justify the recourse to Kamaran island, and its satellite islets, as being part of the Yemeni mainland, 
since their location and context was such that it would be of the kind contemplated by Article 7 (paras.150-151). Reisman has 
noted that this provides "new guidance on what constitutes reasonable implementation of Article 7" (Reisman/2000, p.732). 
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their consent. This rationale appears to have underlain the Court's reasoning as regards the 
archipelagic status of Bahrain, in the Qatar/Bahrain case, when affirming that its judgment 
"could not be put in issue by the unilateral action of either of the parties, and in particular, 
by any decision of Bahrain to declare itself an archipelagic state"159. 
8.2.e) Coastal Length (and Its Role in Proportionality) 
The idea that the apportionment of areas effected by delimitation has to reflect the 
coastal length of the states involved was first advanced by Germany, in the North Sea cases. 
In its Judgment, the Court acknowledged that "a reasonable degree of proportionality" must 
be factored in delimitation160. Ever since, to one degree or another, coastal length has been 
given relevance in jurisprudence (perse or in proportionality assessments)161 - thus leading 
scholars to devote much attention to i t 1 6 2 . Once more, it is of little relevance to reanalyse the 
issue from its inception. Building on previous analyses instead, the following excursus 
seeks to present an argument on how the fact coastal length bears on delimitation. 
Even the quickest glance over scholarship reveals that three central points must be 
analysed. First, since there is room for 'subjectivity', resultant from the non-existence of 
objective criteria on coastline measurement, it is necessary to analyse how this issue is to be 
handled legally. Secondly, it must be established whether coastal length comparison should 
be utilised for purposes of an ex post proportionality test, and/or be weighed in the 
'weighing-up process'163. Thirdly, it is crucial to ascertain whether coastal length may be 
used in all geographical settings. 
Lest it be forgotten, reference must be made to the two key ideas that emerged from 
the analysis of the technicalities related with coastal length measurement and comparison. 
First, there are different ways of measuring coastal lengths (leading to different results). 
Secondly, in assessments concerning the division of what is deemed to be the relevant area, 
the definition of such an area determines the outcome thereof. Arguments based upon 
coastal length comparison are thus characterised by a margin of subjectivity at two levels 
(159) Qatar/Bahrain-Merits, para. 183. 
(160) Para.2.3.a)(ii) supra. ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.53, 55, paras.98, 101(D)(3). Arguing that proportionality was not by then a part of 
delimitation law, Tanja concludes that recourse thereto amounted to exces cfe/wwvo/>(Tanja/1990, p.75). 
(161) Cf. e.g. Anglo/French, RIAA/18, pp.57-58, 115, paras.98-101, 246; Tunisia/Libya, ICJ/Reports/1982, pp.75-76, 91, 
paras. 103-104, 130-131; Gulf of Maine, ICJ/Reports/1984, pp.323, 336-337, paras.185, 222; Libya/Malta, ICJ/Reports/1985, 
pp.43-55, paras.55-59, 65-75; Guinea/Guinea-Bissau, ILM/25/1986, pp.292-293, 301, paras.97, 119-120; Canada/France, 
ILM/31/1992, pp.1161-1162, 1175-1176, paras.27-33, 92-93; Jan Mayen, ICJ/Reports/1993, pp.65-69, 79-81, paras.61-70, 92; 
Eritrea/Yemen-II, paras. 165-168; Qatar/Bahrain-Merits, paras.241-243,247. 
(162) Cf. e.g. Yoshifumi/2001; Kozyris/1998; Kozyris/1997; Lucchini/Voelckel/1996, pp.306-313; Estapa/1996, pp.102-106; 
Charney/1994, pp.241-243; Legault/Hankey/1993, pp.217-221; Weil/1989a, pp.75-79, 235-244; Evans/1989, pp.224-231; 
Calatayud/1989, pp.133-137, O'Connell/1989, pp.724-725; Jaenicke/1986. 
(163) There is a reason for using the term "coastal length comparison", instead of using the term "proportionality". Whereas all 
proportionality assessments entail coastal length comparison, the reverse is not true. It is possible to compare coastal lengths, and 
to weigh-up in the delimitation process any existing disparities, without ever entering into proportionality assessments. 
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that opens the door to discourse manipulation164. Hardly surprisingly, in the Eritrea/Yemen 
arbitration, the Tribunal observed that proportionality had been "argued strenuously and 
ingeniously by both parties"165. 
How is coastal length comparison to be contextualised? Coastal length is germane to 
delimitation, not because it suits some arguments of states, but because it is a requirement 
of the principle of equity. Equal situations have to be treated equally, just as a differentiated 
treatment ought to be awarded to different situations, in the exact measure of the existing 
difference. Conjugated with the principle of maritime zoning, this proposition demands that, 
other considerations being absent, "a reasonable degree of proportionality" be retained 
between the length of the relevant coasts and the area-attribution brought about by the 
boundary-line. What does this mean in more practical terms? 
Delimitation amounts to resolving a concurrence of rights, entailing an 'amputation' 
of potential areas of exclusiveness for the disputants. The requirement is that this produces 
no clear detriment to either party166. Interpreting the effect of the principle of equity in this 
respect, the Anglo/French Award clarified the statement of the Court in the North Sea cases 
by highlighting that "it is disproportion rather than any general principle of proportionality 
which is the relevant [...] factor"167. Without exception, this approach has been endorsed 
ever since. In terms of formulation of a delimitation factor, the prima facie corollaries are 
two-fold. First, in the absence of great disparity between coastal lengths, there should be no 
disproportion in area-attribution. Secondly, where disproportion exists, adjustments must be 
made to the provisional equidistance-line to avoid causing clear detriment to the party with 
the longer coastline. Notwithstanding the weighing-up of other factors, 'value-judgments' 
on coastal lengths should be formulated on these bases. 
The second point to ascertain is whether coastal length should be used as an ex post 
facto test of equitableness, and/or as a consideration to be weighed-up in the determination 
of the boundary. Evans concludes that "[proportionality is chiefly relevant at the final stage 
of the delimitation process, as a means of assessing the equitability of the result achieved", 
adding that "[i]t is to be distinguished from the relevant circumstances of a disparity of 
coastal lengths"168. From this viewpoint, coastal length appears relevant at two stages: as a 
factor, during the 'weighing-up process'; as an ex post facto test of equity, to assess the 
outcome of that process. Insofar as this conclusion is in accord with case law, and because 
Evans was analysing relevant circumstances as proposed in jurisprudence, there is little 
(164) Para.5.3.c) supra. See Figure 76. 
(165) Eritrea/Yemen-II, para.39, emphasis added. 
(166) Conclusion of Part II supra. 
(167) RIAA/18, p.58, para. 101; emphasis added. 
(168) Evans/1989, p.231. Jaenicke reaches similar conclusions (Jaenicke/1986, pp.68-69). 
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room for dissention here. Whether this is conceptually sound is a different matter. Coastal 
length measurements can be undertaken in an almost infinite variety of ways. Coastal length 
ratios are therefore mere approximations that depend on how these measurements are 
effected. Similarly, the 'relevant area' is not an objectified concept. It varies with the 
decision-maker's viewpoint. For these reasons, whilst warning against "the uncertainties 
and dangers of the proportionality test in its quantitative form", Weil has voiced a paradox 
that amounts to the most compelling argument against the recourse to proportionality as an 
ex post facto test169: 
What would happen if the proportionality test indicated an unreasonable 
disproportion between the ratios of coastline length and those of areas? Would the 
judge or arbitrator then be bound, in order to arrive at a more proportionate result, to 
adjust the line which he states he has arrived at by other methods? A negative reply 
would deprive the proportionality test of all significance. An affirmative reply would 
be tantamount to converting proportionality into the dominant principle of 
delimitation. It may perhaps be said that an unfavourable test is unlikely and has 
never occurred, but is not this precisely because the data on which the arithmetical 
test is based are in reality selected so as to confirm a predetermined result? 
One must side with Weil. Discarding the outcome of the 'weighing-up process' on 
the basis of an ex post facto proportionality test would amount to overruling the result 
arrived at through consideration of all other pertinent factors. This would amount arguably 
to unsound legal and justification discourse. By contrast, denying relevance to the said test 
in the face of a disproportion of area-attribution would deprive it of all significance. In this 
light the ex post facto proportionality test appears as an empty exercise. Furthermore, in the 
absence of objective criteria to measure coastal lengths and to define the relevant area, 
proportionality may be manipulated to justify numerous solutions170 - which explain why 
O'Connell notes that, due to its "capricious results", proportionality is of "limited value"171. 
All in all, coastal length should be considered in context of the 'weighing-up 
process'. The coastal lengths of the states should be compared and, i f and where justified, a 
'value-judgment' should be formulated on the basis of such a comparison, to reflect the 
optimisation in casu of the principles of maritime zoning and of equity. Its contribution thus 
would be gauged in relativised terms, by reference to that of the other relevant facts. 
This approach deals also with the third point that one has set out to clarify: whether 
or not proportionality is applicable to all geographical settings172. Practically speaking, the 
(169) Canada/France arbitration, Dissenting Opinion, ILM/31/1992, p.1207, para.25, emphasis added. In addition, he questions 
"whether there is any real difference between a quantified proportionality test [...] and proportionality as a direct delimitation 
criterion". Besides this, it should be noted that Weil has considered that, either as a delimitation factor, or as an ex post facto test, 
coastal length and proportionality considerations "ought not to survive the re-examination by the courts" (Weil/1989a, p.244). 
(170) Antunes/2001,p.339. 
(171) 0'Connell/1989,p.725. 
(172) Yoshifumi suggests that, in oppositeness, "the applicability of proportionality is doubtful" (Yoshifumi/2001, pp.458-459). 
Evans argues that proportionality is "for use only where the circumstances permit" (Evans/1989, p.231). Jaenicke considers that 
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problem may be posed differently. Wherever the required measurements rely heavily on the 
exercise of discretion by the decision-maker, proportionality might be meaningless. It might 
be manipulated to justify virtually any boundary. However, if coastal length is seen merely 
as one of the facts that can generate delimitation factors - as proposed here - the difficulty 
is overcome. What emerges is a relativised factor, formulated in terms of its weight in the 
decision-making process. Further, even i f in a specific case coastal length comparison is 
possible only on the basis of very 'subjective' assessments, that problem might be diluted in 
the way in which the 'value-judgment' is formulated. 
Attention must now be turned, briefly, to some practical aspects of coastal length 
comparison, the first step of which is to measure coastal lengths. It became clear since the 
North Sea cases that what is to be measured is not the length of the low-water line, with all 
its sinuosities. Coast length is to be appraised as the frontage (constituted by straight-line 
segments) projecting onto the area of overlap. Although it indubitably leaves the door open 
to some ambiguity (as to the definition of the relevant segments), this is the correct way of 
assessing the link between coasts and principle of maritime zoning. Most basepoints are 
irrelevant for defining the outer limits of maritime zones, which is why they should also be 
discounted in terms of coastal length measurement. The Canada/France arbitration and the 
Jan Mayen case are recent illustrations of this approach in jurisprudence173. 
One aspect of the Jan Mayen case is critically important. The coast of Greenland 
defined as relevant for purposes of coastal length measurement was restricted to the stretch 
between the two most extreme points that contributed to the computation of equidistance174. 
From here stems one proposition: only those coastal stretches that interrelate in the division 
of the overlapping of entitlements are to be compared. To some extent, this is no novelty. 
Correctly, in the Tunisia/Libya case, the Court asserted that not the whole of the coast could 
be taken into account, and that those parts thereof that did not contribute to the overlapping 
of entitlements were to "be excluded from further consideration"175. The problems at the 
time emerged from the fact that equidistance was deemed not to have a normative content. 
If equidistance is accepted as the starting point for delimitation, the solution adopted in the 
Jan Mayen case is not only conceptually logical, but also inevitable. 
Other questions must be addressed. How does the coastal length ratio translate into a 
delimitation factor? How is the adjustment to equidistance to be calculated? The references 
to proportionality as a factor have led to speak of "disparity of coastal lengths", meaning 
the "concept of proportionality is not applicable in all geographical situations", "irrespective of whether the relevant coasts are 
geographically adjacent or opposite to each other" (Jaenicke/1986, pp.68-69). 
(173) See Figures 10 and 11. 
(174) ICJ/Reports/1993, pp.47-48, para.20. 
(175) ICJ/Reports/1982, p.61, para.75. 
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that adjustments were required i f such a disparity existed. Qualitatively, however, there is 
another category of situation to be considered. As shown in the North Sea cases, should 
there be no disparity of coastal length, the equidistance-line must be adjusted wherever the 
area-attribution effected thereby does not reflect the similarity of coastal lengths. 
Under the notion of proportionality, coastal length ratio has been used as reference 
point to divide a relevant area, which is defined by courts. Conceptually, the way in which 
courts have approached the issue can be criticised on two grounds. First, the relevant area 
should not include areas that are not part of the overlapping of entitlements (e.g. Jan Mayen 
case - Figures 80 and 81). Delimitation should refer to the division of areas of concurrent 
potential entitlements. Secondly, the relevant area should not include areas falling under a 
different entitlement. Territorial sea areas should not be considered in EEZ and/or 
continental shelf delimitation (e.g. Canada/France arbitration). 
In summary, i f equidistance effects a disproportionate area-attribution, considering 
the coastal length ratio, a delimitation factor is to be incorporated in the 'decision-matrix'. 
The relevant area, it is suggested, should be defined so that it includes only areas belonging 
to the overlapping of entitlements of the same nature. It is conceptually odd to consider in a 
certain area-attribution, areas that under international law could not be attributed to one of 
the states involved in the delimitation. As to the quantification of the adjustment based on 
coastal length, the conceptual kernel is manifest disproportion. Not all disproportion entails 
an adjustment. The requirement of a "reasonable degree of proportionality" is tantamount 
only to the rejection of an unreasonable degree of disproportionality. 
Seeking to objectify the notion of unreasonableness, Kozyris speaks of a lgrossness 
factor', which quantifies disproportion through a ratio of ratios: the coastal length ratio and 
the ratio between areas apportioned under equidistance. In his view, a formula between 
"two-to-one and three-to-one equidistance-proportionality" emerges from case law1 7 6. This 
view appears to improve the understanding of proportionality in two ways: it demonstrates 
that previous delimitations can be utilised as 'yardsticks' for future cases; it introduces a 
concept that objectifies the notion of disproportion - the 'grossness factor'. 
This concept of 'grossness factor' deals also with another issue that has been raised: 
Can proportionality be used in all situations? It has been contended that, between opposite 
states, if a disparity of coastal lengths exists, an area-apportionment based on equidistance 
will reflect the disparity177. According to this argument, usually illustrated by recourse to a 
geometric figure of a trapezium (Figure 88), further adjustments would be unnecessary. A 
median line would arguably attribute to the state with a longer coast an area ("Zone 2") that 
(176) Kozyris/1998, pp.362-366, 388; Kozyris/1997, pp.35-46, 52-53. 
(177) For an overview of the argument, cf. Yoshifumi/2001, pp.441-443. 
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is larger than that attributed to the state with the shorter coast ("Zone 1"). However, perhaps 
caution is required. For this to be verified, the relevant area must be defined as a trapezium 
(which has not happened in the Jan Mayen case, for example). As shown in Figure 88, the 
overlapping of entitlements might extend beyond the trapezium limits, and might not 
include all areas comprised thereby. Further, geometrically, the "trapezium mid-line" is not 
a strict equidistance-line. Away from the centre, an equidistance-line shifts towards the state 
with shorter coastline178. This approach, maybe valid in the context of the Libya/Malta case, 
should thus not be extrapolated lightly. It restricts coastal length comparison to adjacency 
situations needlessly, leaving unanswered situations such as those of Figure 88. There, i f 
based on equidistance, the delimitation attributes to state A roughly 56% of the overlapping 
of entitlements, and to state B the other 44%. In terms of areas apportioned, the ratio A:B is 
some 1.27; the coastal length ratio A:B is some 15.70. The manifest disproportion revealed 
by a 'grossness factor' of 12.36 would have to be considered in the 'decision-matrix'. 
What deserves attention, therefore, is whether the coastal length ratio and the ratio 
between the 'shares' apportioned by equidistance are grossly disproportionate. Should that 
be the case, an adjustment to equidistance ought to be factored into the 'decision-matrix'. 
Once more, the notion of average 'distance ratio' is helpful in objectifying the adjustments 
required, account taken of existing 'yardsticks'. Not only is it applicable to all geographical 
situations, but it also is compatible with the notion of 'grossness factor'. Once the coastal 
lengths ratio and the 'shares' of the overlapping of entitlements apportioned to each state 
are compared, the 'grossness factor' obtained therefrom can be examined comparatively, by 
reference to solution found in analogous geographical settings179. It is possible to establish 
then whether adjustments to equidistance are indeed justified, and i f so, what could be a 
reasonable average 'distance ratio' for the adjusted line. 
By way of conclusion, one would suggest that coastal length ought to be considered 
within the 'weighing-up process', on which the determination of the boundary is predicated, 
in exact the same terms as other facts. In this conceptualisation, the ex post facto test is 
rendered unnecessary and unjustified. The non-inequitableness of the boundary is ensured 
through the structured 'weighing-up' of all legally typified facts. Coastal length comparison 
(or proportionality) amounts to an objectification of the principle of equity, account taken of 
the principle of maritime zoning. It purports exclusively to avoid gross disproportion in 
(178) The equidistance between the straight coasts that form the apex and the base of the trapezium follows closely the equidistance 
between coasts shown in Figure 88. 
(179) Perhaps it is interesting to observe that, at least in relation to the Jan Mayen case, this study confirms Kozyris' approach to 
area-attribution on the basis of a formula between "two-to-one and three-to-one equidistance-proportionality". The boundary 
awarded gave Greenland a part of the overlapping of entitlements (within the relevant area defined by the Court) that was 2.7 
times larger than the area attributed to Jan Mayen. Compared with the 9:1 coastal length ratio, this leads to a 'grossness factor' of 
roughly 3.37, which seems to confirm that "a total disproportion of a magnitude of at least three to one was tolerated" 
(Kozyris/1998, p.364; Kozyris/1997, p.38). 
-312-
TOWARDS THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF MARITIME DELIMITATION 
area-apportionment, by singling out situations of manifest inequity. Neither should it be 
decontextualised, nor should it be turned into an autonomous exercise. Mathematically 
refined attributions of maritime spaces should not be produced on the basis thereof. The 
proportionality test becomes unjustified because replacing an analysis that considers the 
whole 'factual matrix' in the light of the 'legal matrix', by an operation that would 
contemplate only one aspect of the 'factual matrix', is from a legal-conceptual perspective 
unsound. Furthermore, it would entail the risk of relying too largely on a test that might 
revolve around the discretionary powers of courts. Perhaps significantly, this test has had 
hitherto no tangible impact on delimitation. 
8.2.f) Macrogeography (and Entitlements of Third States) 
A macrogeographical view (which amounts to examining geography at a smaller 
scale) looks at the wider context in which delimitation is to be undertaken. To Evans, this 
affects the perception of the problem in two ways: "it might reduce the relative importance 
of particular factors or features"; and it "might suggest a different means of achieving the 
delimitation than that indicated by the immediate area"180. Referring to the Libya/Malta 
case to show the dangers of macrogeographical analyses, Weil notes however that by 
"extending the area concerned to the overall geographical context, the Court eventually 
recognised as a relevant circumstance coasts which were completely foreign to the two 
countries in the case". Due to the dangers that it entails, he thus argues that this 
consideration should be ejected from the list of relevant circumstances181. 
Macrogeography is a fact whose consideration bears some obvious dangers indeed, 
i f only owing to the further discretion that it introduces in the delimitation process. The 
definition of the relevant delimitation area remains largely unrestricted. Circumscribing 
spatially the facts that might be taken into account in the delimitation, such a discretionary 
decision might be decisive for the outcome. Although agreeing with Weil's view that the 
role of macrogeography in the Libya/Malta case was somewhat odd, one would argue that 
banning macrogeographical considerations altogether would be hasty. Dismissing the wider 
delimitation context altogether is analogous to interpreting a legal provision isolated from 
its systematic element. It should not happen. At the very least, there are three planes on 
which macrogeography bears. 
Macrogeography might provide pivotal guidance when, for instance, owing to the 
existence of 'controlling basepoints', the conclusion is that equidistance must be adjusted. It 
(180) Evans/1989, p.131; cf. also Lucchini/Voelckel/1996, p.239. If an illustrative example of these two ideas is required, it may 
easily be found in the determination of the general direction of the coast (Figure 84). 
(181) Weil/1989a,p.252. 
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is not a question of resorting to macrogeography to discard equidistance. The question is 
one of adjusting the provisional equidistance due to the effect of 'controlling basepoints'; 
macrogeographical aspects come into play only as guidance for determining how the line 
should be adjusted. The 'yardstick' for the adjustment should stem again from case law and 
state practice. Presupposing that (on account of the 'controlling basepoints') equidistance 
would yield an inequitable solution in the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau arbitration, the decision to 
look "at the whole of West Africa" to predicate the boundary-line is reasonable182. Should 
an analogous situation arise, nothing should hamper the recourse to this 'yardstick' to 
reason the boundary course. 
The second plane on which macrogeography might become relevant concerns the 
rights of third states183. Delimitation is undoubtedly a bilateral issue. But it is equally true 
that there are numerous instances in which third states' positions might affect the boundary 
in a specific delimitation. Since it looks always beyond the strict geographical scope of the 
bilateral boundary, the issue of third states is always a macrogeographical issue. Malta's 
attempt to intervene in the Tunisia/Libya case resulted in a boundary based on a bearing line 
whose end-point remained undefined. Italy's attempted intervention in the Malta/Libya case 
caused the Court to confine geographically the scope of its judgment. The presence of Saudi 
Arabia to the north, and of Djibouti to the south, in the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, led the 
Tribunal to define end-points well short of areas potentially disputed by third states184. In 
the Qatar/Bahrain case, the Court defined two bearings along which the boundary is to run 
beyond its northernmost and southernmost end-points, until it meets the boundary with Iran 
and Saudi Arabia respectively185. 
The presence of third states cannot be neglected, although it might have variable 
relevance. The idea that a "delimitation designed to obtain an equitable result cannot ignore 
the other delimitations already made or still to be made in the region" should be upheld186. 
In cases such as the Cameroon/Nigeria case, currently sub judice, it is unrealistic to effect 
the delimitation without considering the wider context. Like in a jigsaw-puzzle, one piece 
(the Cameroon/Nigeria boundary) makes sense only in the context created by the other 
pieces (the boundaries between other states in the Gulf of Guinea)187. The balance of 
equities is so delicate here that the Court did not "rule out the possibility that the impact of 
the judgment required by Cameroon on the rights and interests of the third states could be 
(182) ILM/25/1986, pp.297-298, paras. 108-111. 
(183) Paras.6.3.d)(iii) supra, 9.3.b) infra. 
(184) Eritrea/Yemen-II, paras.44-46, 136, 164. 
(185) Qatar/Bahrain-Merits, paras.221-222, 250 (in fine). 
(186) Guinea/Guinea-Bissau arbitration, ILM/25/1986, p.291, para.93. 
(187) As to the geographical scope to redress inequities, cf. para.8.4.a) infra. 
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such that [it] would be prevented from rendering it in the absence of these States"188. 
Equatorial Guinea eventually requested permission to intervene, which was eventually 
granted189. What is important to stress is that the problem is especially acute in adjudication, 
owing to the de facto imprimatur of courts' decisions (despite the fact that they have, 
strictly speaking, an inter partes effect). As Equatorial Guinea argued, "any judgment 
extending the boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria across the median line with 
Equatorial Guinea [would] be relied upon by concessionaires who would likely ignore 
Equatorial Guinea's protests and proceed to explore and exploit resources to [its] legal and 
economic detriment"190. 
Macrogeographical aspects are also relevant on a third level. It was argued that 
coastal length appraisals should, as far as area-attribution was concerned, bear only on the 
area of overlapping entitlements. In taking no account of the areas immediately adjacent to 
the overlapping of entitlements, an inequitable solution might be created. Compensation 
might have to be made in some cases to attain an overall balance of equities. The size of 
areas lying outside the overlapping of entitlements, and the entitlements generated by the 
remainder of the coasts (taking into account i f necessary third states), might have to be 
considered. Suppose the fictional situation of Figure 87. In the delimitation between states 
A and B, i f account were taken only of the geographical context near the boundary, this 
would be probably a straightforward case in which equidistance yielded an inequitable 
boundary. However, whereas states A and C can both extend their entitlements up to 200 M 
from certain stretches of their coasts, state B has its entitlement 'amputated' throughout. I f 
equidistance were adjusted on the ground that B l is a 'controlling basepoint', correcting it 
to be a perpendicular to the general direction of the coasts of states A and B, for instance, 
would be a perfectly reasonable solution in the absence of state C. As it is, one would argue 
that, because the fact that state B is disadvantaged in relation to the other two states must be 
considered, equidistance must either be retained as boundary, or at least be corrected less 
than in would otherwise be. 
8.2.g) Natural Prolongation: Geology and Geomorphology 
From the outset, it is necessary to clarify that the question under appraisal here is 
whether natural prolongation (and thus geomorphological and geological aspects) is a fact 
(188) Preliminary Objections, ICJ/Reports/1998, p.324, para.116. 
(189) As regards the questions of third states' rights, third-party intervention and the possible solutions to be adopted by the Court, 
in the Cameroon/Nigeria case, cf. Antunes/2000c. On intervention before the ICJ, cf. Chinkin/1993, pp.147-185. 
(190) Application for Permission to Intervene, of 30 June 1999, pp.8-9. For an overview of the ways in which the third state issue 
has been dealt with in state practice, cf. Colson/1993, pp.61-63. But it should be noticed that, in delimitations effected by 
negotiation, states are in a position that is rather different from that of courts; cf. paras.6.1 .b)(i)(ii) supra. An example of a 
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susceptible of influencing the legal determination of a maritime boundary. In other words, 
what need be enquired is whether, under the LOSC, geological and geomorphological 
elements must be taken into account injudicial decision-making on maritime delimitation. 
The reference to natural prolongation appeared for the first time in the North Sea 
Judgment191. Although recourse thereto might be criticised nowadays, it must be recognised 
that some reasons made it understandable at the time, especially i f it is considered that the 
distinction between entitlement criterion and delimitation criterion was unclear. The notion 
of continental shelf was defined as the submerged prolongation of the land territory; and its 
conventional definition referred to a geomorphological element: the 200-metre isobath. For 
this analysis, two points concerning the North Sea cases approach must be noted. First, 
'natural boundary' (i.e. a "line between areas which already appertain to one or other of the 
states affected"192) is a concept that has no existence in international law. Secondly, of all 
the propositions advanced in the North Sea Judgment, and in its aftermath, one must be 
rejected in limine. Natural prolongation can never be seen as a question of "what looks, on 
the map, like a 'natural' prolongation of the land territory"193. 
What can be said about subsequent case law? The answer is simple194. States have 
attempted to ground their claims on natural prolongation to no avail (whether by resort to 
geological or to geomorphological aspects). These attempts stopped completely after the 
Libya/Malta Judgment. Natural prolongation was then 'checkmated' as a relevant fact in 
delimitations between coasts situated less than 400 M apart - the Court's conclusion is so 
blunt that it leaves no scope for elaboration on natural prolongation195. 
[S]ince the development of the law enables a state to claim that the continental shelf 
appertaining to it extends up to as far as 200 miles from its coast, whatever the 
geological characteristics of the corresponding seabed and subsoil, there is no 
reason to ascribe any role to geological or geophysical factors within that distance 
either in verifying the legal title of the states concerned or in proceeding to a 
delimitation as between their claims. [... To rely on previous] jurisprudence would 
be to overlook the fact that where such jurisprudence appears to ascribe a role to 
geophysical or geological facts in delimitation, it finds warrant for doing so in a 
peculiar way in which the third state issue was approached is that of the practice of Colombia in relation to Jamaica, Haiti, and the 
Dominican Republic (Appendix 2, D14, D16, F9 - cf. Figure 35). 
(191) Paras.2.3.c), 2.3.d), 4.3.a), 4.3.b), 6.3.c)(ii) supra. 
(192) ICJ Reports 1969, p.23, para.20. On the notion of natural boundaries, cf. General Introduction. 
(193) Thirlway suggests that this was how the Court understood natural prolongation in the North Sea cases (Thirlway/1993, p.23). 
(194) On this matter, cf. e.g. Estapa/1996, pp. 108-110; Lucchini/Voelckel/l 996, pp.136-137, 213-218; Highet/1993, pp.166-183; 
Wallace/1992, pp.10-33; Highet/1989; Evans/1989, pp.99-118; Sharma/1989, pp.166-170; Goldie/1973. 
(195) ICJ/Reports/1985, pp.35-36, paras.39-40, emphasis added. This statement is all the more remarkable because a few months 
before, in the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau arbitration, the Tribunal accepted theoretically the relevance of natural prolongation; the 
non-relevance in concreto owed to the fact that the continental shelf was viewed as being continuous (ILM/25/1986, p.300, 
paras. 116-117). This view seems to build on the dictum of the Tunisia/Libya case, in which the Court stated that it was "only the 
legal basis of the title to continental shelf rights - the mere distance from the coast - which can be taken into account as possibly 
having consequences for the claims of the parties" (ICJ/Reports/1982, p.48, para.48). 
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regime of the title itself which used to allot those factors a place which now belongs 
to the past, insofar as seabed areas less than 200 miles from the coast are concerned. 
There can be no doubt about the 'devastating' effect of the LOSC as to recourse to 
natural prolongation as a fact relevant for maritime delimitation. The consecration of the 
EEZ1 9 6, concatenated with the fact that up to 200 M from the coast the criterion upon which 
entitlement to the seabed and subsoil is based becomes independent of any 'natural' aspect, 
brought about a dramatic change. The prevalent view is that, for delimitations concerning 
areas within 200 M from coasts, facts related to natural prolongation "have been rendered 
immaterial"197. By framing the issue as it did, the Court seems to have left the door open as 
to the weighing-up of natural prolongation in delimitations encompassing continental shelf 
areas beyond 200 M. This is a question to be analysed at a later stage198. 
Reinforcing the unwillingness of courts to dwell upon aspects concerning natural 
prolongation are also reasons of practicality, such as the fact that they are unequipped to 
make pronouncements on matters that remain unresolved scientifically. Not long before the 
Libya/Malta Judgment, Weil suggested that natural prolongation had not been awarded any 
weight because of the excessive technical nature of the arguments, which led courts to 
devalue them in favour of more classical elements. He equally contended that international 
justice has not been set up to rule, with the authority accredited to res judicata, between 
contradictory scientific theories, which are moreover submitted with the precariousness of 
novel discoveries and ever-changing fashions199. Following a similar path of reasoning, in 
the Libya/Malta case, the Court rejected the idea that to reach a decision it had 
first [to] make a determination upon a disagreement between scientists of distinction 
as to the more probably correct interpretation of apparently incomplete data; for a 
criterion that depends upon such a judgment or estimate having to be made by a 
court [...] is clearly inapt to a general legal rule of delimitation.2 0 0 
For states, whether to weigh-up arguments on natural prolongation is a question that 
falls in their contractual freedom. A survey of state practice indicates that in one case only 
is it beyond doubt that natural prolongation was paramount for the delimitation: the 1972 
Australia/Indonesia agreement201. In a decision-making process based on international law, 
however, such an approach would perhaps find no support today. The same survey suggests 
(196) Vicufla/1989, pp.188-227. 
(197) Sharma/1989, p.174. Concurring, cf. Lucchini/Vcelckel/1996, p.218; Estapa/1996, p.) 10; Lilje-Jensen/Thamsborg/1995, 
p.622; Ahnish/1993, pp.88-90; Vicuna/1990, p. 617; Evans/1989, pp.117-118; Highet/1989, pp.95, 98-99; Weil/1989a, p.281; 
Kwiatkowska/1988, pp.149-150; Bowett/1987b, pp.23-24; Willis/1986, p.54. The question of geomorphological features 
associated with the notion of thalweg should perhaps not be examined under "natural prolongation". What matters in such cases is 
the functional relevance of those features in terms of the use of the suprajacent waters for navigation purposes. 
(198) Para.8.4.b)(n/ro. 
(199) Weil/1984, pp.358-359. 
(200) ICJ/Reports/1985, p.36, para.41. 
(201) Highet/1993, pp. 186-188. Here refers also to the 1989 so-called Timor Gap Treaty, which however is not a treaty delimiting 
maritime boundaries. Cf. also Prescott, IMB, Report 6-2(2), pp. 1210-1212. 
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that other treaties gave natural prolongation a "partial recognition" . That however, might 
be questioned. Consider the France/Spain agreement. Whereas some authors have suggested 
that geomorphology was considered203, others have dismissed that idea204. Perhaps more 
significantly, in other settings involving marked geomorphological features, the absence of 
clear evidence of their use suggests that they were irrelevant. The delimitation between the 
Dominican Republic and Venezuela seems to have disregarded the 5000 metres Muertos 
Trough205. Similarly, in the India/Thailand agreement, the fact that the Andaman basin lies 
closer to the Indian coast than to the Thai coast seems to have not been considered; the 
agreed boundary was based on equidistance206. Although there has been occasional use of 
natural prolongation in state practice207, one would submit that such practice is insufficient 
to weaken the ICJ's conclusion expressed in the Libya/Malta case. 
No arguments could be found to contradict the idea that in delimitations between 
states whose coasts lie less than 400 M apart, courts will disregard natural prolongation. 
The pronouncement in the Libya/Malta case has been implicitly accepted in the Jan Mayen 
case. Neither the parties, nor the Court, entertained the possibility of a continental shelf 
entitlement beyond 200 M. Moreover, the same assumption has been made in relation to 
Iceland, a third-party. The Court stated that its possible claims appeared "to be fully covered 
by the 200-mile line"2 0 8. This appears as a strong indication that the Court accepted that, 
because all three states were less than 400 M apart, none could claim areas beyond 200 M. 
No delimitation factor was therefore to be derived from the geomorphological or geological 
evidence. 
8.3. Facts Related with the Regime of Exclusiveness 
8.3.a) Natural Resources: Petroleum and Fisheries in Particular 
The quickest of glances over the historical development of both the continental shelf 
and the EEZ shows one very simple truth: the driving force behind them was primarily the 
exclusive access to natural resources. Perfectly clear in the 1945 Truman Proclamation, this 
(202) Highet/1993, pp.188-190. 
(203) Cf. e.g. Anderson, IMB/Report 9-2, pp.1722-1723; Evans/1989, p.l 15 (fh.96). The fact that subsequent negotiations (in 1979) 
over the water column boundary have failed, because Spain argued that the acceptance of a single maritime boundary was 
conditioned by the revision of the 1974 boundary (delimited as a continental shelf boundary), appears to indicate that aspects of 
natural prolongation played some role in this delimitation. Cf. also Calatayud/1989, pp. 178-184. 
(204) Cf. Weit/1989a, p.29 (fh26); Jeannel/1980, pp.37-38. 
(205) Nweihed, IMB/Report 2-9, pp.583-584. 
(206) Prescott, IMB/Report 6-11, p. 1436. 
(207) Highet/1993, pp. 194-196. 
(208) ICJ/Reports/1993, p.68, para.67. This assumption is unquestionable as between Iceland and Norway, which have entered into 
agreement to that effect. However, vis-a-vis Denmark, Iceland could perhaps claim continental shelf areas beyond the 200-mile 
line (for that seems possible under Article 76). The 200-mile limit seems to be operative if it is assumed that the approach adopted 
in the Libya/Malta case is legally binding. 
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is no less clear in the 1952 Santiago Declaration . This development culminated in the 
LOSC, which reserves for coastal states either exclusive, or preferential, access to the 
natural resources off their coasts, within their legal area of entitlement210. 
Since delimitation concerns the division of an area of overlapping exclusiveness, it 
is odd to conceive that such an operation could be undertaken with complete disregard of 
the key aspect underlying the maritime zone in question. With this said, it must be stressed 
immediately that this does not amount to a plea for distributive justice - in the sense of 
balancing the relative economic position of states. International courts have rightly rejected 
the idea of apportioning resources on the basis of need2". What is in question is a division 
of resources that would belong to either state under international law, were it not for the 
presence of the other state. It might happen that the resources are not shared ultimately 
because that would be possible only i f an unacceptable boundary would be awarded. The 
possibility however, must be entertained. 
Most authors have acknowledged the relevance of natural resources in delimitation. 
Higgins, for example, argues that courts' task "of determining whose claim is well founded 
is only preliminary to the real task of allocating resources between claimants"212. Starting 
by affirming that, because "they have no role to play at the level of legal title, it is logical 
that considerations to do with the existence, importance, and location of natural resources 
cannot be regarded as relevant for the purposes of delimitation", Weil concludes, that they 
"cannot be ignored since it is in reality the heart of the matter"213. Similarly, Kwiatkowska 
observes that natural resources are "a leitmotif for concluding delimitation agreements", 
and that despite courts' "formal rejection of economic factors in their decisions, [they] do in 
fact take such factors into account in the delimitation process"214. 
As perceptively noted by Evans, the core point is not "whether the location of 
natural resources is a relevant circumstance but of how such a relevant circumstance can be 
given effect"215. Intertwined in this question are two distinct aspects: one concerns the 
determination of the substantive scope of the fact to be considered; the other is related to the 
practical manner in which this fact is to be reflected on the adjustment of the provisional 
equidistance. 
(209) The fact that the 1952 Declaration, as well as the doctrine of the Patrimonial Sea, went further than the Truman Proclamation, 
and presented the claim as an extension of the territorial sea sovereignty does not invalidate the idea that the key aim was to 
guarantee an exclusive access to valuable natural resources. Since claims over extended fisheries jurisdictions seemed unlikely to 
succeed, these states strengthened their claims by dressing them as claims to extended territorial sea sovereignty. 
(210) LOSC, Articles 56(1 )(a), 77(1). Somewhat paradoxically, the EEZ does not provide an exclusive access to natural resources, 
placing coastal states under the obligation of sharing its surplus resources - LOSC, Article 62(2). 
(211) Cf. France/Canada arbitration, ILM/31/1992, p.1173, para.83; Libya/Malta case, ICJ/Reports/1985, p.41, para.50; 
Tunisia/Libya case, ICJ/Reports/1982, pp.77-78, para. 107. 
(212) Higgins/1994, p.224, italic in original. 
(213) Weil/ 1989a, pp.259, 264. 
(214) Kwiatkowska/1993, pp.103, 110. 
(215) Evans/1989, p. 191, italic in original. 
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By suggesting de lege ferenda that "delimitation should not be divorced from the 
interests of the world community in promoting the economic well-being of states which 
have so far been economically underdeveloped or disadvantaged in terms of their access to 
resources"216, Bowett confirms the approach taken by international courts as to economic 
considerations. At present, delimitation is not a matter of dividing resources in an equitable, 
distributive fashion217. A key distinction must nevertheless be made. Economic factors and 
access to natural resources have a different scope. That the relative economic strength of 
states is legally irrelevant for delimitation purposes is not tantamount to saying that an 
equitable access to natural resources is not a relevant fact. Exclusiveness and inclusiveness 
can be distinguished not only ratione loci, but also ratione material. As yet, only the 
criterion of entitlement has been deemed a fountain of relevant considerations. However, 
since the principle of maritime zoning entails not just a question of division by space, but 
also a question of division by subject matter, there is good reason to argue, conceptually, 
that the substantive regime of the maritime zones must be considered. To the extent that 
delimitation is a division between areas of exclusiveness, it is logical that facts relevant 
ratione materiae be taken into account. Natural resources located in the area of overlapping 
entitlements (whether in the seabed or in the water column) are resources that would belong 
to either state were it not for the presence of the other state. More than being potentially 
inequitable, to disregard the access thereto as a relevant fact is juridically illogical. 
A more complex issue is to know how to take account of natural resources in terms 
of adjustment of the provisional equidistance. The Jan Mayen case is the only clear instance 
of case law in which natural resources influenced the boundary course219. For this reason, it 
is crucial to understand that its outcome stems from a conjugation of factors. What allowed 
the Court to choose a line that shared the capelin resources between the parties was the 
disparity of coastal lengths, which required an adjustment of the provisional equidistance 
towards the Jan Mayen coast. Had the two coasts a similar length it would have been very 
difficult to justify such a dramatic adjustment simply to provide equal access to the capelin 
resources. Thus, the access to capelin resources influenced the course of the line, but had 
little or no impact on the amount of adjustment220. Interweaving here is the key argument 
advanced by courts to reject the relevance of natural resources in area-attribution. Because 
only known and readily ascertainable resources can be considered, because some resources 
are exhaustible, and because boundaries have a prima facie ad eternum nature, a division 
(216) Bowett/1987a, p.62. Proposing also a wide consideration of economic factors, cf. Sharma/1989, pp.123-150. 
(217) One exception might perhaps be considered: that of catastrophic repercussions for the population, as pronounced in the Gulf of 
Maine case (ICJ/Reports/1984, p.342, para.237). 
(218) Para.7.2.c)*«pra. 
(219) ICJ/Reports/1993, pp.70-72, paras.73-76. 
(220) Para.7.4.c) supra, in particular Table 3. 
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that is reasonable today might turn to be unreasonable tomorrow221. New discoveries might 
be made. Natural resources unvalued today might acquire a significant value in the future, 
either due to technological advancements, or owing to scarcity of 'land resources' of the 
same type. In other cases, resources might be simply exhausted. 
Central to this debate is therefore one question. Is it possible to divide the resources 
without yielding a potentially inequitable area-attribution? One would argue that, although 
it is feasible, the resulting boundaries might be very complex, and/or depart from examples 
in case law and state practice to a great extent. Let the situation be examined by resort to 
diagrammatic examples of oppositeness and adjacency (Figures 96 and 97). Suppose that 
the resource spreads equally on both sides of equidistance, in a case in which the coasts 
'mirror' each other, and where equidistance yields an equal division of the overlapping of 
entitlements (Scenario l ) 2 2 2 . There is no reason for adjusting equidistance: both the area and 
the resources are divided equally. Consider this example with one alteration: the resource 
does not spread equally, lying slightly closer to state A (Scenario 2). Although the area is 
divided equally, the resource division favours state A. Notwithstanding this, perhaps no 
unreasonableness exists, and no adjustment is required. Equidistance operates an equal and 
proportionate area-attribution, and both states have some access to the resources. Consider 
now Scenario 3, where the whole of the resources lie within state A's area, if the boundary 
is equidistant. Geographically, it would be possible, in oppositeness, to provide state B with 
some access to the resources, whilst maintaining the equal area-attribution required by the 
coastal relationship (Figure 97, Scenario 4) 2 2 3 . That might not be possible in adjacency, 
however. To effect an equal and proportionate area-attribution, the boundary would have to 
zigzag back and forth, thus rendering the solution impracticable. I f state B would have a 
significantly longer coast, and/or i f state A would benefit from the effect of 'controlling 
basepoints' (Figure 96, Scenario 4) 2 2 4 , perhaps an adjustment towards state A could then be 
justified. This would allow granting state B some access to the resources. 
Noteworthy in respect of this problem is the Honduras/United Kingdom (Cayman 
Islands) agreement. Whilst effecting the delimitation on the basis of equidistance (adjusted 
(221) For a summary of jurisprudence, cf. Evans/1989, pp.193-194; Bowett/1987a, pp.60-61. Bowett's argument that, in terms of 
petroleum resources, the situation might be taken as unchangeable seems unconvincing, if only because what were yesterday 
unexploitable resources (e.g. lying at seafloor depths of 3000 metres) are nowadays being exploited, which suggests that similar 
developments might occur in the future. 
(222) Although en passant, it is worthwhile noting that the management of straddling resources (whatever the type) is subject to a 
principle of mutual cooperation. Due relevance has been given to unitisation of hydrocarbon resources since the North Sea cases, 
(ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.52-53, para.97; emphasised recently in the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, paras.84-86). As to fisheries, the 
LOSC incorporates an explicit obligation to cooperate in the conservation of resources (e.g. Articles 63-64). Reisman notes that, 
in the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, the approach of the Tribunal seems to entail that the body of state practice on straddling natural 
resources has already crystallised into customary law (Reisman/2000, p.735). 
(223) Although not an equidistance-line, the "tilted" boundary still retains an average 'distance ratio' of 1:1. Should state A have a 
shorter coastal length (like Jan Mayen), the resource division could be attained by simply pushing the equidistance towards it. 
(224) The Jan Mayen case is a good illustration of a similar situation, but as between opposite states. 
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to take into account the relevant geographical considerations), the two states have set-up a 
special fishing area within the Honduran EEZ, which allows for the continuation of the 
historic fishing rights of Cayman Islands' fishermen (Figure 42) 2 2 5. Aside from whether this 
fisheries regime has an historical character, the point to note is the creative solution in terms 
of the dialectics 'area-attribution versus access to resources'. Because the area-attribution 
that results from encompassing the Misteriosa and Rosario Banks within the Cayman 
Islands' EEZ would probably entail an inequitable adjustment of the equidistance-line, the 
two states opted for sidelining the issue of fishing rights by creating the special area. The 
delimitation was then effected primarily by reference to geographical considerations. 
By way of conclusion, it is suggested that the difficulties surrounding the issue of 
access to natural resources is owed principally to the practicalities of considering it while 
retaining a reasonable area-attribution. In boundary adjudication, the difficulty is that courts 
do not enjoy the freedom allowed to states in negotiation. Hence, it may not be as easy to 
reach equilibrium between the parties' rights and interests226. Insofar as it permits objective 
appraisals of area-attribution, whatever the boundary configuration, the notion of average 
'distance ratio' allows certain flexibility. Notwithstanding the difficulties, it is postulated 
that access to natural resources should be considered, particularly as to continental shelf and 
EEZ delimitation227. A different approach, besides legally illogical, would ignore reality 
inadvisably. Their significance is such that they have already been elevated to a condition 
which, if not fulfilled, may lead to review a boundary treaty228. For account to be taken of 
access to natural resources there is however one prerequisite: the boundary must not yield 
an unreasonable area-attribution. The risks that future developments turn the line into an 
inequitable division must be reduced to the absolute minimum, especially taking into 
account that resources might have a transitory existence (e.g. hydrocarbons). 
8.3.b) Defence and Security 
An analysis of the relevance of facts relating to defence and security in must take 
account of the different regimes of exclusiveness of maritime zones. Just as it is doubtless 
that the relevance of natural resources is greater in continental shelf and EEZ delimitation 
than in territorial sea delimitation, it is also clear that defence and security play a greater 
(225) Appendix 2, F61. The agreement defines spatially the area in question, and outlines a specific regime of which the following 
aspects deserve attention: (i) the fishing resources that may be captured are of a specific type, and cannot exceed a certain amount; 
(ii) only a certain number and type of vessels are allowed to fish; (ii) the catch is for local consumption only. 
(226) As regards the possibility to resort to joint zones, cf. para.8.4.e)(iii) infra. 
(227) Natural resources might be relevant in territorial sea delimitation. However, since resources are not the key concern here, the 
focus must be shifted - for the exclusiveness embodied in this zone entails a 'different reasonableness'. On the balance between 
interests concerning seabed/subsoil resources and those concerning water column resources, cf. para.8.4.c)(ii) infra. 
(228) Note the treatment given to unitisation and development of hydrocarbon resources in the Nigeria/Equatorial Guinea agreement 
- cf. Appendix 2, F22, Articles 6, 7(3). 
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role in the latter. The historical canon-shot rule is a useful literal illustration of how much 
defence and security have always been at the forefront of rights and interests of states in the 
territorial sea. One of the first instances in which defence and security emerged as relevant 
for maritime zoning was the 1917 Gulf of Fonseca case, in which the Central American 
Court of Justice stated that national defence and security were essential for the Gulfs 
condominium regime229. Another landmark in this regard is the Truman Proclamation, 
which referred to "self-protection" in offshore activities in continental shelf areas. 
Case law on continental shelf and EEZ delimitation, having accepted that defence 
and security concerns are relevant, has been somewhat unsuccessful in showing its practical 
impact. In the Anglo/French arbitration, though accepting the idea that these considerations 
are connected with the delimitation, the Tribunal said no more than that they evidenced the 
"predominant interest" of France in the southern Channel. Even this came only after 
affirming that their influence was not decisive, and could not negative conclusions drawn 
from geographical, political and legal considerations230. In this debate, one of the more 
positive contributions came from the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau arbitration. Emphasising that 
"neither the EEZ nor the continental shelf are zones of sovereignty", the Tribunal affirmed 
that it had ensured that each state would control the maritime territories situated opposite its 
coasts and in their vicinity, and that its prime objective had been to avoid that rights 
exercised opposite each party's coast, or in its immediate vicinity, would compromise its 
security231. In the Libya/Malta case, not much was added when the Court referred to 
nearness to the coast, while stating that security was "not unrelated to the concept of 
continental shelf'2 3 2. The Jan Mayen case restated this idea, although making it subject to 
the primacy of geographical considerations, whilst clarifying that the fundamental issue is 
"to avoid creating conditions of imbalance"233. By referring to security concerns in the 
ambit of the delimitation of the overlapping territorial seas, the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration 
brings further conceptual clarification to this discussion234. 
Before advancing any propositions, attention must be devoted to at least two points. 
Early references to defence and security concerns in maritime areas beyond the territorial 
sea presupposed a breadth of 3 M for the latter. Much has changed with the possibility of 
extending the territorial sea to 12 M, which is reinforced by a further 12 M of contiguous 
zone jurisdiction. What this means is that, for example, the reference made to security in the 
(229) AJIU11/1917, pp.705, 714, 716, 730. 
(230) RIAA/18, p.90, para.188 (cf. also pp.80-81, paras. 161-163). 
(231) ILM/25/1986, p.302, para. 124. 
(232) ICJ/Reports/1985, p.42, para.51. 
(233) ICJ/Reports/1993, p.74, para.81. 
(234) Eritrea/Yemen-II, paras.157-158. 
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Truman Proclamation has lost some of its relevance, owing to the different context in which 
it has to be appraised today. 
The second point concerns the substantive aims envisaged by defence and security 
jurisdiction. Analysing the Eritrea/Yemen award, Reisman has suggested that "long-range 
and over-the-horizon weapons have consigned Bynkershoek's 'canon-shot rule' to the 
museum of antiquities of international law, and have largely depreciated the erstwhile 
defensive value of the broad territorial sea"235. This approach is unquestionable if assumed 
that security considerations embrace strict military threats only. One would suggest that a 
number of security threats, with sources and means other than military, must be considered. 
Deployment of biological/chemical weapon-devices, infiltration of terrorist agents, drug 
trafficking, and even illegal immigration, are examples thereof. States with long coasts can 
only combat it through law enforcement over broader offshore areas236. Their importance 
surfaces clearly in the fact that NATO redefined its strategic concept to encompass them237. 
Indubitably, these new threats have rendered an effective control over maritime spaces in 
the vicinity of the coast at least as important today as it was before. As to their relevance for 
territorial sea delimitation, it suffices to say that states are prohibited from exercising law 
enforcement powers in another state's territorial sea (e.g. hot pursuit must cease when the 
ship pursued enters the territorial sea of another state238). 
The above thoughts are reinforced by Oxman's conclusion that, in state practice, 
though security factors "have influenced some boundary arrangements beyond the territorial 
sea", they "are most prominent in dealing with maritime boundaries close to the coast"239. 
Hardly coincidental, such a distinction stems in fact from the different nature of the powers 
with which states are endowed in each maritime zone. 
Defence and security exist at the heart not only of the concept of precedence of 
entitlements240, but also of the paramountcy of distance in maritime zoning241. No doubt, 
states exercise stronger powers closer to their coasts. The practical corollary of this fact is 
that closer proximity is elevated to a central criterion for assessing the value of sea areas for 
defence and security purposes. By circumscribing the relevance of security to the territorial 
sea delimitation, in the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, the Tribunal contributed to assert a key 
conceptual distinction. The legal effect, yet to be explicitly voiced by courts, is inescapable: 
the presumption in favour of equidistance in territorial sea delimitation is much stronger 
(235) Reisman/2000, p.735. 
(236) Their importance is such that it justifies that greater relevance be given to the contiguous zone jurisdictional powers. 
(237) The Alliance's Strategic Concept, approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council in Washington D.C., on 23rd and 24th April 1999; cf. paras.24-25. 
(238) LOSC, Articlel 11(3). 
(239) Oxman/1993, p.40. 
(240) Para.4.3.d)(iv) supra. 
(241) Para.6.3.bX«) supra. 
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than in continental shelf and EEZ delimitations . Logically, it is stronger in the division of 
areas up to 24 M from the coast than in the division of areas beyond it. Perhaps it is this that 
explains the different text of Article 15 and Articles 74 and 83 of the LOSC. 
8.3.c) Navigation 
Insofar as international law confers upon states no powers of exclusiveness, as far as 
navigation is concerned, in areas beyond the territorial sea, it is difficult to conceive that 
this might be a consideration in the delimitation of those areas. As regards the continental 
shelf, because legally it comprises only the seabed and the subsoil, the idea is indeed very 
odd. How one can navigate the seabed and subsoil is difficult to imagine. In relation to the 
EEZ, although questions related to navigation may be raised, the LOSC leaves no room for 
doubts: the freedom of navigation is preserved in the EEZ2 4 3. 
Why courts have been reticent in discarding the relevance of navigational issues in 
EEZ and continental shelf delimitation can only be speculated. As already observed, during 
the ILC debates, Francois explicitly stated that navigation would not be a consideration in 
continental shelf delimitation244. More importantly, the relevance of navigable channels had 
already been clearly conceptualised by Gidel in the 1930s, when asserting (as to adjacency 
cases) that where the waters were not navigable on both side of the equidistance-line, the 
adoption of the latter would lead to gross inequity in the partition of the waters between the 
two riparian states245. Inasmuch as courts are not unaware of these doctrinal ideas, it might 
be argued that the explanation must be found in more practical grounds. Since it soon 
became obvious that no closed list of relevant considerations could be made, it is possible 
that courts sought to avoid discarding any consideration that might later be helpful for 
resolving a dispute in an unforeseen context. Thus, the potential relevance of navigation in 
continental shelf delimitation has been accepted without ever having been utilised to justify 
departures from equidistance (or in any way shape the boundary). 
That issues concerning navigation interests are relevant to territorial sea delimitation 
is doubtless. As delimitation is bilateral, these interests are usually vested in the parties. In 
the Beagle Channel arbitration, for instance, the boundary was delimited having regard 
inter alia to "navigability, and the desirability of enabling each party to so far as possible to 
(242) Any adjustment to equidistance in territorial sea delimitation will come probably only from questions of 'representativeness' 
of basepoints. A typical example would be a situation where equidistance is pushed towards one state by effect of an isolated 
low-tide elevation, which is faced by a mainland basepoint on the other side. The 'representativeness' of the tow-tide elevation 
might be questioned, if only because its relevance for defence and security purposes is less than a point on the mainland. 
(243) LOSC, Articles 58(1), 87. The legal qualifications imposed on the freedom of navigation, which are primarily related with the 
exercise of rights of coastal states, have a minor weight when compared with the limitations existent in territorial waters. 
(244) 204th Meeting, ILC/Yearbook/1953(1), pp.126-129, paras.14, 35, 55. 
(245) Gidel/1934, p.771. He stated, in relation to cases of oppositeness, that the rule of the thalweg was valid only exceptionally 
(p.758). On the notion of thalweg, cf. para.5.3.b) supra. 
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navigate its own waters", notable by following the "habitually used navigable track" near 
Gable Island246. Navigability was prominent also in the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau arbitration, 
in which the initial stretch of the boundary follows the navigable channel, from the mouth 
of the Cajet river through Pilots'" Pass247. 
Considering that the passage through territorial waters can only be made in terms of 
the right of innocent passage, there are navigation interests of the international community 
as a whole that might also be relevant. In the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, while delimiting the 
territorial seas in the middle stretch of the boundary, the Tribunal emphasised the need for 
simplicity in the immediate vicinity of a main international shipping lane248. This reasoning 
is justified on at least two grounds. First, the parties had explicitly drawn attention to this 
issue when acknowledging "their responsibilities towards the international community as 
regards [...] the safeguard of the freedom of navigation in a particularly sensitive region of 
the world" 2 4 9. Secondly, since these interests are part of the regime of inclusiveness legally 
protected by international law, the Tribunal must consider them, even when the central issue 
is a bilateral one and concerns primarily areas of exclusiveness. Importantly, this approach 
is not unfamiliar to state practice. The Indonesia/Singapore agreement on the territorial sea 
delimitation in the Strait of Singapore (which connects with the Strait of Malacca), safety of 
international navigation was central to the outcome. The boundary follows primarily the 
deep-draught tanker route250. 
To sum-up, navigation interests, vested in either party or in the international 
community as a whole, might be in certain contexts a cardinal consideration in territorial 
sea delimitation, susceptible even of determining the course of the boundary. As to 
continental shelf or EEZ delimitation, it is difficult to conceive a situation in which they 
might become directly relevant in the choice of boundary-line251. 
8.3.d) Historical Regimes 
The inclusion of a heading "historical regimes" at this juncture requires further 
explanation. It is necessary not only to clarify what facts are encompassed thereby, but also 
to explain why this reference appears under the category of facts related with the regime of 
exclusiveness. Within this heading fall a number of facts that have a common aspect: they 
all have subsumed a degree of consolidation through time. This is the positive aspect of a 
(246) ILR/52/1979, p.185, para.110. 
(247) ILM/25/1986,pp.273,298,paras.45, 111. 
(248) Eritrea/Yemen-II, paras. 128, 155. 
(249) Arbitration Agreement of 3 October 1996, Preamble. 
(250) Park, IMB/Report 5-11, pp.1049-1053. 
(251) Recognising that there is no conceptual link between continental shelf and navigation interests, Evans concludes that there is 
little evidence that such interests had any direct impact or influence in continental shelf delimitation (Evans/1989, p. 183). 
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category of facts which is marked by its residual character. Encompassed here are facts of 
a historical nature insusceptible of giving rise to a historic title. A historic title signifies that 
there can be no overlapping of entitlements. Delimitation cannot be at issue252. The issue 
here may concern historic rights. Furthermore, these historic regimes cannot amount to 
acquiescence or estoppel as to a specific line. Should there be a tacit agreement upon the 
boundary location, or should a state be barred from claiming a different boundary-line, no 
delimitation is to be effected253. The dividing-line is already in place254. 
Historic regimes are placed under the category "facts related to the regime of 
exclusiveness" because they refer to either exclusive rights (or their enforcement) and they 
have a distinguishing historical integrant. The facts comprised here have a composite 
nature. Speaking of consolidation through time signifies that 'something' is maintained 
virtually unaltered for a period. The key element is the perpetuation of a situation through 
time. The situation that is perpetuated may be, for instance, the upkeep of a navigation 
channel, the exploitation of fishing grounds, oil concessions, or the exercise of a certain 
jurisdiction up to a line. These facts have thus an obvious fluidity, which would make them 
indistinct from other headings were it not for the aspect 'passage of time'. 
As to the relevance of these historical regimes for delimitation, it is particularly 
important to enquire whether they can justify adjustments to the provisional equidistance. 
The modus vivendi line referred to in the Tunisia/Libya case is perhaps the most known 
example of recourse to this type of fact in case law2 5 5. The line was seen as a "sort of tacit 
modus vivendi", which although resting "on the silence and lack of protest" by France, fell 
however "short of proving the existence of a recognised maritime boundary". Its relevance 
was greater, in the first sector, for it coincided with the line separating the adjoining oil 
concessions granted by both parties - a factor of crucial importance for the Court. Further, 
the line in question 'fitted' in the geographical setting to perfection: it corresponded to an 
approximate perpendicular to a general direction of the coast. 
The possible existence of a modus vivendi was equally debated in the Gulf of Maine 
case, but the Chamber rejected it eventually256. One would argue that, besides other aspects 
(e.g. provenance of the "Hoffman letter"), the fundamental reason behind this rejection was 
(252) Of crucial importance here is the distinction between historic title and historic rights. If what are in question are historic rights, 
it is possible to consider simultaneously a delimitation dispute. In contradistinction, a historic title is preclusive of the division of 
the areas to which the title is referred - for there can be no overlapping title. Cf. paras.l.3.c)(ii), 4.3.c) supra. 
(253) Practically speaking, it is clear that claims based on estoppel or acquiescence must be considered within the same judicial 
process. However, conceptually, a distinction must be made between the judicial declaration of existence of a boundary in case of 
estoppel or acquiescence, from the judicial determination of the course of the boundary through the delimitation process. On 
acquiescence, recognition and estoppel in boundary disputes, cf. Antunes/2000a. 
(254) Evans seems to include issues of estoppel and acquiescence in the delimitation process (Evans/1989, p.217). Bravender-Coyle 
also includes de facto agreements and historic title in the delimitation process (Bravender-Coyle/1988, pp. 174-179,205). 
(255) ICJ/Reports/1982, pp.70-71, 83-85,93-94, paras.93-96, 117, 120, 133.C(2). 
(256) ICJ/Reports/1984, pp.303-312, paras. 126-154. 
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the non-existence of de facto state activities (e.g. pattern in petroleum grants, effective law 
enforcement) showing the 'presence' of a line. This relationship between state activities and 
a definable line (as a prerequisite for attributing relevance thereto) emerges explicitly in the 
Guinea/Guinea-Bissau arbitration, when the Tribunal emphasised the existence of a "wide 
area of indetermination"257. The view taken in the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration confirms these 
ideas258. To strengthen its choice of a boundary-line, the Tribunal observed that the offshore 
petroleum contracts previously entered into by Yemen, and by Ethiopia and by Eritrea, lent 
"support to a median line between the opposite coasts of Eritrea and Yemen, drawn without 
regard to the islands". This approach was nevertheless tempered, inter alia, with the need to 
accord some weight to the mid-sea islands (in order to preserve their territorial sea areas). 
Food for thought is brought by the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration in relation to another 
type of historic regime: the traditional fishing rights259. Many aspects of the Tribunal's 
approach in this regard deserve a closer look. Such a task is beyond the scope of this study 
however, which will concentrate on one question. What impact, i f any, had the traditional 
fishing regime in the delimitation? The fact to be taken into account is perhaps simple to 
describe: there is a community of individuals whose livelihood has relied since immemorial 
times on the fishing resources of a certain broadly defined area. Less simple is the question 
that follows. In a delimitation of states' boundaries across that area, how are the rights of 
this community to be weighed? The reasoning of the Eritrea/Yemen award may be outlined 
in broad terms260. Stressing that the "factual situation reflected deeply rooted common legal 
traditions which prevailed during several centuries among the populations of both coasts of 
the Red Sea", the Tribunal turned its attention to Islamic law. Importantly, it concluded that 
the sovereignty of Eritrea and Yemen was "subject to the Islamic legal concepts of the 
region", and that the traditional artisanal fishing regime had to be preserved for the benefit 
of the fishermen from both states. Central for delimitation purposes was the idea that "by its 
very nature" the historic lex pescatoria was "not qualified" by the maritime zones specified 
in the LOSC. The conclusion was that neither was the existence of the lex pescatoria 
dependent on the determination of the maritime boundary, nor was the determination of the 
latter influenced by the existence of the former261. 
(257) ILM/25/1986, pp.281, 295, paras.62, 105. 
(258) Eritrea/Yemen-II, paras.75-86, 131-132. 
(259) Traditional Ashing rights were not considered under para.8.3.a) supra, because they entail an historical element that makes 
them distinct from access to fishing resources in general; so much so that, in the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, the Tribunal had little 
doubt is considering fishing and fisheries in general as separate from the traditional fishing rights (Eritrea/Yemen-II, paras.61-74). 
(260) The similarities with the situation in the Grisbadama arbitration cannot hide important distinctions between the two cases. In 
the Grisbadarna arbitration, the lobster fishing by Swedish nationals was supported by state acts performed a litre de souverain. It 
was the concatenation of these two types of activity that led the Tribunal to weigh the maxim quieta non movere. In the 
Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, the community of fishermen was looked at as individuals separate from either state. For an analysis of 
this issue, a discussion on the Tribunal's use of Islamic law, and the possible recourse by analogy to the principles underlying the 
debate on the indigenous peoples' rights, cf. Antunes/2001, p.301-316. 
(261) Eritrea/Yemen-n, para.87-112. 
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Highlighting that the parties had not suggested the resort to Islamic law, Reisman 
criticises this approach pertinently. He notes that the Tribunal's excursion into Islamic law 
appears, even to non-specialists, "superficial" and "unnecessary". Since the preservation of 
the traditional fisheries could have been founded on classical international law (through the 
notion of easement), he contends, the unasked use of Islamic law (with no disparagement of 
its richness and force) was "unwise in context". For international law seeks to mediate the 
relations between states of different cultures, legal systems, and belief systems through 
common standards262. This study shares some of these concerns, in particular with respect 
to the decontextualised assimilation of normative precepts from another system. Further, 
without questioning the suggestion that the concept of easement could provide a solution for 
the preservation of the lex pescatoria, perhaps this could be contextualised, by analogy, 
under a different umbrella: the indigenous peoples' rights263. State practice is not strange to 
this idea, having in the Australia/Papua New Guinea treaty its paradigmatic example264. 
Notably, state practice shows that it is possible, under general international law, to effect 
delimitations while making provision for the preservation of historic rights. By devising a 
special area where the Cayman Islands' fishermen were given the right to continue fishing 
as they have done historically, Honduras and the United Kingdom were able to agree on a 
boundary-line upon which such rights had apparently no direct impact265. 
In short, the impact of traditional fisheries upon maritime delimitation will always 
have to be examined in concreto (as should be expected), by reference to the patterns of 
activities involved. It might happen, as the Tribunal concluded in the Eritrea/Yemen award, 
that no adjustments to the boundary are required in order to accommodate those rights266. 
However, that should be a decision made by reference to delimitation law. 
More generally, what conclusion can be drawn as regards the relevance of historic 
regimes? Concluding that the "most significant effect occurs in the use of lines primarily 
drawn for some other purpose", Oxman recognises that on the whole "there is no consistent 
pattern"267. Although these are indeed the two key ideas, perhaps further elaboration is 
required. The first point to make is that there can be no closed listing of relevant historic 
regimes, which can only be appraised in concreto. The second point concerns the impact on 
the choice of boundary-line. It is unlikely that adjustments to equidistance are justified on 
the basis of historic regimes only. Their impact in area-attribution will usually be negligible. 
(262) Reisman/2000, pp.728-729. 
(263) The analogy is founded on the similarities between the community of Red Sea fishermen and the indigenous peoples, notably 
an immemorial way of life and livelihood to which state boundaries are irrelevant (cf. Antunes/2001, p.312-316). 
(264) Appendix 2, D7. On this treaty, cf. Schug/1996. On the issue of fisheries and indigenous peoples, cf. Bess/2001. 
(265) Para.8.3.a) supra. 
(266) Examples of state practice supporting this solution may be found in the India/Sri Lanka and Australia/Indonesia agreements; 
cf. Appendix 2, D5, D36. 
(267) Oxman/1993,p.40. 
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More likely, a pattern of activities hinting at the 'presence' of a line might suggest a certain 
configuration for the boundary-line, especially where the line 'fits in geographically' (e.g. 
Tunisia/Libya case, Eritrea/Yemen arbitration). Thirdly, as shown in respect to traditional 
fishing rights, nothing excludes the possibility that these historic regimes have in casu no 
bearing on the course of the boundary. 
8.4. Complementary Delimitation Elements 
The terms "complementary delimitation elements" is used to refer to a number of 
hybrid concepts. The adjective "complementary" does not entail a minor relevancy. These 
elements are complementary in that the wholeness of the 'delimitation picture' depends on 
them. Without them, the understanding of the choice of line might be incomplete. Notice 
that they are neither facts stricto sensu, nor strictly legal aspects. What characterises them is 
that they couple factual and juridical elements in a way that bears, often decisively, on the 
outcome of the delimitation process. Because of their hybrid nature, it becomes difficult to 
affirm with certainty whether they will have an impact on delimitation. It might simply be 
that they influence the way in which the delimitation factor is formulated, without giving 
rise to an autonomous 'value-judgment'. 
8.4.a) Delimitation Area and Geographical Scope to Redress Inequities 
In maritime delimitation, it became commonplace to refer to the delimitation area. 
Lucchini and Vcelckel, which refer to Evans' study, suggest that this area may be broadly 
defined as a zone where there is a concurrence of entitlements of states, i.e. in which their 
entitlements overlap268. They note, nevertheless, that despite being described as a "legal 
concept"269, this notion is still surrounded by great uncertainty270. This is indubitably true. 
What is deemed to be the delimitation area varies from case-to-case, not only as to the 
exactitude with which the area is identified, but also as regards its underlying basis. 
That the delimitation area must comprise an area where entitlements of (at least) 
two states overlap stems from the concept of delimitation271. Delimitation is required only 
where such an overlapping exists. In adjudication, it is crucial that the geographical limits 
of a court's jurisdiction are set down. Determined sometimes by agreement between the 
states (e.g. Anglo/French arbitration, Gulf of Maine case272), these limits might equally 
(268) Lucchini/Voelckel/1996, pp.218-219; Evans/1989, pp.64-69. 
(269) Gulf of Maine case, ICJ/Reports/1984, p.272, para.41. 
(270) Lucchini/Vffilckel/1996, pp.220. 
(271) Paras.4.3.d(i)(ii) supra. 
(272) Article 2 of the Arbitration Agreement, RIAA/18, p.5 (Figure 79); Special Agreement, Article n, ICJ/Reports/1984, p.253. 
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result from a 'value-judgment' that takes into account the presence of third states (e.g. 
Libya/Malta case273). This issue might nonetheless be circumvented by not defining the 
boundary end-point (e.g. Titnisia/Libya case274), or simply by establishing the extremities of 
the boundary-line so that they fall short of areas where the interests of third states come into 
play (e.g. Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, Qatar/Bahrain case275). 
In reality, the delimitation area and the overlapping of entitlements seldom are (if 
ever) coincident. Owing to the presence of third states, the former is often smaller than the 
latter. States might also agree to exclude from a court's jurisdiction a certain part of the area 
of overlapping. In the Anglo/French arbitration, the boundary between the southern coast of 
the Channel Islands and northern France was put outside the competence of the Tribunal276. 
Conversely, the area relevant for the dispute might include zones which are not part of the 
zone of overlap (e.g. the Jan Mayen case - Figures 80 and 812 7 7). 
Whether the delimitation area corresponds to the notion of relevant area, to which 
reference is made in the course of proportionality assessments, is unclear278. In any event, 
inasmuch as in such cases those areas are used in mathematical computations, they must 
necessarily be defined as a closed polygon. This is what happened in the Canada/France 
arbitration, when the area-attribution ratio resulting from the boundary was calculated279. In 
the Jan Mayen case, the delimitation area was also utilised for purposes of proportionality 
assessments. Although the Judgment does not reflect it openly, one need only to look into 
the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fischer to realise that similar proportionality assessments 
were carried out in the preparation of the Judgment280. 
Distinct from the notion of delimitation area (or of relevant area) is the concept of 
"geographical scope to redress inequities". Assumedly a broad notion, it is intended neither 
to define a court's spatial jurisdiction, nor to be used for proportionality assessments. The 
rationale lies elsewhere. The optimisation of legal principles, from which the 'case-norm' 
stems, ought to be made in casu. The geographical context within which that optimisation 
takes place is therefore critical. Optimal solutions require contextualised 'value-judgments'. 
As regards delimitation, this can be translated into one pivotal question: How large is the 
geographical scope to redress inequities? 
A cardinal point made by the Tribunal in the Anglo/French arbitration, to justify the 
enclaving of the Channel Islands, was that "the scope for adjusting equities" was small. To 
(273) Libya/Malta case, ICJ/Reports/1985, pp.24-28, paras.20-23. 
(274) Tunisia/Libya case, ICJ/Reports/1982, pp.42,91, paras.35, 130. 
(275) Eritrea/Yemen-II, paras.44-46, 136, 164. Qatar/Bahrain-Merits, paras.221-222,250 (infine). 
(276) RIAA/18, p.25, para.22. 
(277) ICJ/Reports/1993, pp.47-48, paras.18-21. 
(278) On the notion of relevant area and its use in proportionality assessments, cf. para.8.2.e) supra. 
(279) ILM/31/1992, p.l 176, para.93. 
(280) ICJ/Reports/1993, p.309. 
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illustrate the point, it made a contradistinction between the Channel Islands and St. Pierre 
and Miquelon, stressing that to the east of the latter (and unlike in the case of the former) 
there is nothing except "the open waters of the Atlantic Ocean"281. This means that the 
reasonableness of the equilibrium between the parties' interests essentially depends on the 
room to manoeuvre geographically, in moulding the boundary. 
As far as the scope to redress inequities is concerned, there is a world of difference 
between, for example, the geographical framework of the Jan Mayen case and that of the 
Qatar/Bahrain case. The changes caused, in relative terms, by alterations in the boundary 
course are in each case dramatically different. The fact that islands are discounted fully, or 
enclaved, in settings characterised by close proximity between the coasts involved (taking 
as reference the maximum potential entitlement) is equally no coincidence. These solutions 
are the result of the lack of geographical scope to redress inequities. 
The Cameroon/Nigeria case is also a good illustration282. The claim-line advanced 
by Cameroon encroaches clearly upon areas where the presence of third states must be 
considered283. In fairness, the predicament of Cameroon deserves close attention. Its coast is 
one of the longest in the Gulf of Guinea. However, the area attributed to Cameroon will be, 
most likely, the smallest amongst the five states abutting the Gulf. Such a situation results 
from a combination of two points: the marked concavity in the Gulfs coast; and the fact 
that the projection of Cameroon's coast is hampered by Bioko island (Equatorial Guinea)284. 
Ultimately, what should be stressed is that, however the Court approaches the delimitation, 
the scope it will have to redress any inequity is minimal. 
To sum-up, the geographical scope to redress inequities is a broad concept, whose 
relevance surfaces when appraising the 'factual matrix'. Not surprisingly, it intertwines with 
other elements. For instance, the situation of Cameroon would be rather similar to that of 
Germany in the North Sea cases were it not for the presence of Bioko and of S.Tome and 
Principe. As it happens, the presence of third states (Equatorial Guinea in particular), which 
are not parties to the case, lessens the geographical scope to find equilibrium between all 
interests involved. Practice indicates that in cases such as this, courts tend to delve strictly 
into facts related to the basis of entitlement. Questions of 'representativeness' of basepoints 
(especially of insular features) acquire particular relevance. However, from the conceptual 
viewpoint, nothing impairs attributing relevance to other facts. 
(281) RIAA/18, p.94, paras.200-201. 
(282) For an idea of the geographical framework, with indication of distances between the various coasts, see Figure 38. For an 
overview of the delimitation problem, cf. Antunes/2000c. 
(283) Line GHIJK, on Figure 14. Although the author had no access to the Memorial, the description made by Professor Crawford 
during the oral hearings allowed a rough reconstruction of the line (cf. ICJ, Verbatim Record CR/98/02, 3 March 1998, para.35). 
(284) When the case was brought before the ICJ, no boundaries had yet been delimited in the Gulf of Guinea. The situation changed 
in the meantime. Agreements were reached between Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, and S.Tom£ and Principe. Figure 37 illustrates 
the course of the boundaries, and the joint zone agreed between Nigeria and S.Tom£ and Principe. 
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What confers autonomy on this complementary aspect, distinguishing it from facts, 
is that it cuts across and intertwines with different facts. Delimitation factors formulated on 
the basis of certain facts (e.g. basepoints, islands, coastal length, macrogeography, natural 
resources) reflect necessarily the scope to redress inequities. Optimising the principles of 
maritime zoning and of equity entails taking into account the geographical room to 
manoeuvre in shaping the boundary-line. Its hybridity results from the fact that it is not the 
geographical context, but an appraisal of the geographical context in the light of normative 
standards. It is an aspect of the determination of the impact of each factual element on the 
adjustment of the provisional equidistance-line that is in question here. 
8.4.b) Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles 
8.4.b)(i) Areas Beyond 200 Nautical Miles: Entitlement and Overlap 
Underlying Libya's "rift zone" argument advanced in the Libya/Malta case was the 
existence of a fundamental discontinuity of a geophysical/geological nature. Allegedly, it 
resulted in two separate shelves. The argument was rejected on two grounds. Above all, the 
Court considered that, because up to 200 M from the coasts the basis of entitlement is no 
longer natural prolongation, but distance, geophysical/geological features lying in that area 
could not constitute a fundamental discontinuity. Secondly, the Court declared that it was 
not prepared to decide on a disagreement between scientists as regards the scientific data 
concerning the rift zone285. With respect to the geographical setting, there is another issue to 
examine: the question of continental shelf entitlements beyond 200 M. Given the approach 
of the Court in the Libya/Malta case, it would seem that in principle geomorphological and 
geological facts would have here a particular bearing. Conceptually, however, what is an 
apparently straightforward conclusion deserves further investigation. 
That delimitation is required only where there is an overlapping of entitlements is 
indisputable. As to continental shelf delimitation, it is possible to categorise the overlapping 
of entitlements in three different types (Figure 90): (1) an overlapping between entitlements 
based on the distance criterion; (2) an overlapping between entitlements based on natural 
prolongation; (3) an overlapping between one entitlement based on distance, and another 
based on natural prolongation. In Figure 90, Scenario 1 shows an overlapping of the first 
type. As to Scenario 2, assuming that state A has an entitlement beyond 200 M that overlaps 
with the 200-mile entitlement of state B, it is possible to identify overlaps of the first and 
third types. With respect to scenarios 3 and 4, it must be noted that the distance between the 
two coasts is always greater than 400 M, which means that there can be no overlaps of the 
(285) ICJ/Reports/1985, pp.34-37, paras.35-41. Cf. also para.8.2.g) supra 
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first type. Contemplating an interruption of the continental margin, Scenario 3 shows two 
areas of overlap of the third type. In Scenario 4, because the interruption does not exist, the 
whole area beyond both 200-mile limits is an overlap of the second type286. 
Should the approach of the Libya/Malta case be adopted, natural prolongation is 
immaterial for delimitations concerning overlaps of the first type. It is equally certain that 
the Court's reasoning did not refer to overlaps of the second type. What might raise doubts 
is whether natural prolongation is relevant for delimitations concerning overlaps of the third 
type. There are thus two crucial issues. For one thing, it becomes necessary to determine the 
impact of natural prolongation in delimitations whose object is an overlap of the second 
type. For another, it must be enquired whether one can speak of delimitation when referring 
to overlaps of the third type, and if so, whether natural prolongation is relevant. 
Before addressing the first issue, distinction must be made between the delimitation 
of an overlap involving areas beyond 200 M and the question of existence and extension of 
such an overlap. Coastal states' rights over the continental shelf are not dependent on any 
declaration, or on occupation, regardless of whether they are based on distance or on natural 
prolongation287. Moreover, although the unilateral delineation of the continental shelf limits 
beyond 200 M is subject to a 'technical homologation' by the CLCS288, this is without 
prejudice to delimitation issues289. Apparently, the existence and extension of an overlap 
depends primarily on the mutual recognition of the states involved. Despite the fact that 
hitherto only one claim was submitted to the CLCS290, a number of boundaries extending 
beyond 200 M have already been delimited291. Combined with the fact that the ICJ showed 
in the Libya/Malta case little propensity for resolving quarrels of a scientific character, this 
suggests that it is unlikely that two states will resort to adjudication to resolve a dispute over 
the existence of an overlap of entitlements beyond 200 M. If the occasion ever materialises, 
(286) It ought to be observed that, in scenario 4, because there is no interruption of the continental margin, those areas beyond the 
territorial sea limit and within 200 M from the coast of each state form part of an overlap of the third type. The entitlement of each 
state (based on natural prolongation) extends potentially up to the outer limit of the territorial sea of the other state. 
(287) LOSC, Article 77(3). For entitlements based on distance, this idea is somewhat hard to grasp conceptually. 
(288) LOSC, Article76(8) and Annex II. According to Article 4 of Annex II, each state shall submit the details of the outer limits of 
its continental shelf within 10 years from the date it became bound by the Convention. However, no sanction is established for the 
case of failure in complying with this prescription. Considering the ab initio and ipso facto nature of states' rights, it is difficult to 
conceive that such a failure would result in the loss of its rights. On the commencement of, and compliance with, the 10-year 
period, see the decision of the 11th Meeting of States Parties (UN Document SPL0S/72,29 May 2001). 
(289) LOSC, Article 76(10). 
(290) Russian Federation, Submission of 20 December 2001; UN Doc. CLCS.01.2001.LOS (Continental Shelf Notification). 
(291) USA/Mexico, 2000 (concerning exclusively areas beyond 200 M); Trinidad and Tobago/Venezuela, 1990; USA/USSR, 1990; 
United Kingdom/Ireland, 1988; Australia/Solomon Islands, 1988; Australia/France, 1982; Australia/Papua New Guinea, 1978 (cf. 
Appendix 2, D2, D6, F4, F39, F57, F64, F65). In some other cases, it might be argued that because the end-point of the boundary 
is not established, and because the outer edge of the continental margin is likely to lie beyond 200 M, the same line will extend up 
to it: e.g. Brazil/France, 1981; Kenya/Tanzania, 1976; Argentina/Uruguay, 1973 (Appendix 2, D l , D9, D48). On the basis of this 
practice, Oude Elferink suggests that, "in principle the same rules apply to the delimitation of continental shelf areas within and 
beyond" the 200 M (OudeElferink/1999a, p.645). There is an advantage in having already delimited adjoining jurisdictions 
beyond 200 M: since there is no dispute, the CLCS will have no reason to refuse a submission by either coastal state. The CLCS 
has made clear that it will not examine submissions in such cases unless there is consensus between all parties involved. Cf. Rules 
of Procedure of the CLCS (CLCS/RoP), Rule 45 and Annex I (UN Doc.CLCS/3/Rev.3,6 February 2001). 
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however, perhaps international law is best served i f (subject to agreement between the 
parties) the forum to which the question is asked calls upon the CLCS to provide neutral 
scientific-technical expertise292. 
Equally significant is the fact that in some cases in which states have claims beyond 
200 M, boundaries were delimited up to that limit only2 9 3. This approach is reflected in the 
Gulf of Maine case. The area within which the end-point of the boundary had to fall was 
established by Canada and the USA in a way that encompasses the intersection between 
their respective 200-mile limits. The Chamber defined the boundary terminus on a point 
that, along the final segment, was positioned at the limit of the overlapping between the 
200-mile entitlements. Notably, the reasoning is not based upon the fact that the parties had 
requested a single maritime boundary (i.e. within 200 M). Instead, the Chamber asserted 
that "the decisive criterion" was that the boundary sought to "divide the areas in which the 
maritime projections of the two neighbouring countries' coasts" overlapped19*. Apparently, 
the fact that the continental shelf entitlements of both states extend, and overlap, beyond 
200 M, was given no relevance. It ought to be asked, however, why the Chamber viewed 
the overlapping as comprising only the 200-mile entitlements. I f that was owed to the terms 
of the parties' agreement, then perhaps it should have been stated explicitly295. What is clear 
is that this approach lends support to Lilje-Jensen and Thamsborg's view that states "give 
preference to the idea of considering the outer shelf as a surplus calling for a separate legal 
treatment"296, and reinforces the conceptual proposition that entitlements up to 200 M have 
certain precedence over entitlements beyond that limit 2 9 7. 
8.4.b)(ii) Overlapping of Two Entitlements Beyond 200 M 
Let the case of an overlap of the second type be examined. I f two states refer to 
adjudication a dispute over the course of the continental shelf boundary beyond 200 M, they 
recognise mutually their entitlements. Should this occur, it prompts an immediate question. 
How are geomorphological and/or geological facts relevant? Contrary to what might be 
thought at first glance (taking into account the Libya/Malta case), it is improbable that a 
"fundamental discontinuity" would become relevant. I f this discontinuity amounts to an 
(292) Nelson recognises that the C L C S is the only body really equipped to carry out the necessary assessments of bathymetry, 
geodesy, seismic and geophysical data entailed in delimitations beyond 200 M (Nelson/1998, pp.587-588). As to recourse by 
courts to neutral technical expertise, cf. para.5.t.a) supra. As to a possible recourse to the C L C S , cf. para.9.3.a)(ii) infra. 
(293) Iceland/Norway (Jan Mayen), 1981 (Figure 29); Denmark (Faraes)/Norway, 1979; USA/Mexico, 1978; USA/Cuba, 1977; 
Cuba/Mexico, 1976; Portugal/Spain, 1976 (Figure 20) - cf. Appendix 2, D21, D30, D55, D56, D61, D62). 
(294) ICJ/Reports/1984, p.339, para.228, emphasis added; see Figure 6. 
(295) As evidenced by Article VII of the Special Agreement (ICJ/Reports/1984, p.255), the parties seem to have requested strictly a 
delimitation up to 200 M (perhaps because they sought to avoid the discussion of Article 76 before the Chamber). This provision 
designs a procedure for extension of the boundary seawards, whereby third-party settlement can be resorted to if agreement on 
this extension would not be reached subsequently. Hitherto, however, neither party seems to have considered recourse thereto. 
(296) Lilje-Jensen/Thamsborg/1995, p.643. 
(297) Paras.4.3.d)(iii)(iv) supra. 
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interruption of the continental margin (in the sense of Article 76), there is no overlapping of 
entitlements. Inasmuch as the two natural prolongations are separate, no delimitation issue 
arises. I f the discontinuity amounts to less than a continental margin interruption, one ought 
to enquire on what grounds, and by what standards, should its relevance be appraised. 
Resembling the Libya/Malta case, this situation would probably have a similar outcome: a 
non-decision as to the relevance of the discontinuity. In short, it may be argued that, should 
the situation arise, it is likely that courts approach the delimitation in terms similar to those 
regarding an overlapping of 200-mile entitlements. Geomorphology and geology are likely 
to continue to have a lesser role, i f only owing to the 'discomfort' that they cause to courts. 
Still, some analysis is required, in order to investigate how they might become relevant. 
Lilje-Jensen and Thamsborg tackle the issue perspicaciously, pointing out that the 
continental shelf areas to be divided are legally "a featureless space", and conclude that any 
lawful claim thereto would be a claim to the entire area298. An overlapping of entitlements 
based on natural prolongation exists indeed only i f the seabed is 'featureless', i.e. if there is 
no geomorphological or geological interruption of continental margin between the states 
involved. I f it exists, their entitlements do not overlap. Lilje-Jensen and Thamsborg also 
note that, as to the outer shelf, "one may find an analogy between the 200 nm opening and 
the coastal opening, the latter known as the mediate (indirect) basis of title to shelf in areas 
in general"299. This 200 M opening consists of the stretch of the 200-mile limit that overlaps 
geographically with the area of natural prolongation, i.e. the part of that limit from which 
the natural prolongation is projected seawards (Figures 91 and 92). Taking the analogy 
further, they contend that the length of the 200 M opening should be the "basic parameter" 
for area allocation beyond 200 M. Finally, they argue that equidistance, reflecting bilateral 
proximity, will have a prominent status in these delimitations300. 
Since no specific case law exists, and state practice is scarce, arriving at conclusive 
ideas as to these propositions is far from easy. Things are made no easier by the fact that 
data on continental margins is not always available. It may nevertheless be noted that the 
propositions above were verified in the 2000 USA/Mexico agreement. The agreed boundary 
is based on equidistance, and the area-attribution favouring Mexico coincides with a longer 
200 M opening (Figure 40). Support for the proposition that equidistance is central to the 
delimitation of areas beyond 200 M may equally be found in other agreements301. 
(298) Lilje-Jensen/Thamsborg/1995, p.639. 
(299) Ibid., italics in original. 
(300) Ibid., pp.643-644. 
(301) Appendix 2, D l , D2, D6, D9, F4, F39. Cf. Australia/Solomon Islands, Australia/France, and Australia/Papua New Guinea 
agreements. The UK/Ireland boundary, although a "stepped" line composed of segments of parallels and meridians, is based 
primarily on equidistance and its variants (e.g. modifications, bisectors). Boundaries that are perpendicular to the general direction 
of the coast or to bay-closing tines are also a variant of equidistance (e.g. Brazil/France; Argentina/Uruguay). 
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Consider now the four scenarios shown in Figures 91 and 92. Whereas in scenario 
91(1) both states (A and B) have a 200 M opening, in scenario 91(2) only state A has it. 
Analogously, whilst four states (A, B, C and D) have a 200 M opening in scenario 92(1), 
only two states (B and D) have such a position in scenario 92(2). Can it then be suggested 
that only those states having a 200 M opening have an entitlement to the outer continental 
shelf? Lilje-Jensen and Thamsborg give no conclusive answer302. 
To answer the question, it must be realised that i f a state with no 200 M opening 
claims an outer shelf, its outer shelf will be separated from its 200-mile limit by a portion of 
the Area, a somewhat odd situation. Without discarding this solution in limine, one would 
restrict it to cases in which it is proven that a geomorphological and/or geological continuity 
exists between the state's coast and the outer shelf. It is in this respect that geomorphologic 
and geologic facts might become decisive in delimitations beyond 200 M. In fact, this is a 
cardinal aspect in the Guidelines of the CLCS303. Geomorphology and geology are equally 
relevant for delineating the outer edge of the continental margin, on the basis of which is 
established the 200 M opening, and the areas beyond 200 M that will be divided by the 
delimitation. Once more, if such issues arise in adjudication, perhaps courts should request 
the expertise of the CLCS (again subject to agreement between the parties). 
Of course, speaking of a 200 M opening presupposes that the limits of the natural 
prolongation beyond 200 M are already established - which raises a number of complex 
questions. In adjacency, this also means that the delimitation up to 200 M must necessarily 
have been effected. I f a court is requested to delimit a boundary concerning overlaps of both 
the first and second types, perhaps a two-step approach based on a prior delimitation of the 
areas within 200 M should be followed. Although the delimitation process should continue 
to be approached as a whole, the conceptual advantages of this proposition justify recourse 
thereto as the basis for a decision. Besides, the continental shelf boundary beyond 200 M 
must start from the end-point of the continental shelf boundary within 200 M. 
With this said, it must be emphasised that the notion of 200 M opening ought not to 
be seen as an absolutely overriding fact. Its weight is to be determined in the delimitation 
process through an approach that integrates all relevant facts. Most importantly, insofar as 
Article 83(1) - which was deemed to reflect customary law - makes no distinction between 
the continental shelf within 200 M, and the continental beyond that limit, it appears that its 
normative content is applicable to both cases. The delimitation must achieve an equitable 
solution. And such a solution is to be attained by application of the principles of maritime 
(302) Lilje-Jensen/Thamsborg/1995, pp.635-639. 
(303) CLCS/Guidelines, paras.8.2.21, 8.S.. These paragraphs deal with scientific data concerning sediments. 
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zoning (which in this case focus primarily on geomorphology and geology304) and of equity. 
For example, Figure 93 illustrates a case in which conferring decisive effect on the 200 M 
opening would lead to a manifestly inequitable result. Island B has a 200 M opening longer 
than state A's. But a non-inequitable solution must weigh other significant facts: coastal 
length disparity, 'geological linkage' between both territories and the continental margin, 
and the existence of areas westwards of island B that cannot be attributed to state A. 
Finally, a closer look ought to be had into the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau arbitration, 
which appears to be somewhat open to criticism. Since the parties requested a delimitation 
of their "maritime territories"305 (i.e. all areas under national jurisdiction), the delimitation 
beyond 200 M should have deserved further investigation. The Tribunal accepted that, in 
casu, the outer edge of the continental margin lay beyond 200 M. How could it then go on 
to conclude that this had no effect on the reasoning (because contradictory information is 
received from the parties), and to delimit the boundary through an open-ended line?306 This 
is to say the least very odd. Neither the notion of 200 M opening, nor the approximate areas 
beyond 200 M to be divided, appeared as factors for the decision. Whether the Tribunal 
actually undertook the delimitation beyond 200 M without considering the area-attribution 
effected by the boundary-line it awarded is unclear. Should it be the case, one would argue 
that it would have been preferable to make no pronouncement on the delimitation beyond 
200 M, and to delimit only the 200-mile overlapping of entitlements. 
8.4.b)(iii) 200 M Entitlement versus Entitlement Beyond 200 M 
It is now necessary to turn to delimitations concerning overlaps of the third type, i.e. 
where a 200 M entitlement overlaps with an entitlement beyond 200 M. In this instance, 
should we speak of delimitation? To address this question, recourse might be had to the 
Canada/France arbitration. Whereas France claimed that it had an entitlement that extended 
beyond 200 M, asking the Tribunal to prolong the boundary up to the 200-mile limit from 
the Canadian coast, Canada opposed this view on the grounds that the French claim-line 
might lie beyond the outer edge of the continental margin. Holding the view that a decision 
on areas beyond 200 M would bear on the rights of a third-party (the International Seabed 
Authority - ISA), the Tribunal did not pronounce on the issue, whilst stressing that this was 
without prejudice to the rights of both states307. 
A closer look must be had into this approach. The Area (the maritime zone to which 
the competences of the ISA are directed) is defined, residually, as "the seabed and ocean 
(304) Para.6.3.b)(ii) supra. 
(305) Arbitration Agreement, Article 2, ILM/25/I986, p.256. 
(306) ILM/25/1986, pp.264,292,299, paras.19, 96, 113. Note the bathymetry development off the coast in Figure 7. 
(307) ILM/31 /1992, pp. 1171 -1173, paras.75-82. For an illustration, see Figure 10. 
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floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction" . It consists of the 
maritime spaces unclaimed by states, which will indirectly set its limits. Most importantly, 
the regime of the Area shall not affect either the delineation of the limits of the continental 
shelf or the delimitation of maritime boundaries between states309. In short, there can be no 
question of delimitation (or of delineation of outer limits for that matter) involving the ISA. 
Furthermore, as Boyle observes, "where the deep seabed begins is not an abstract notion". 
Noting that the deep seabed limits depend on various aspects, which include distance from 
the coastal state, he asks a key question: "which coastal state?" Arguing that, "where two 
states are potentially in contention", only delimitation provides an answer, he suggests that 
"where the deep seabed begins may depend first on how the shelf is delimited". Because 
neither the ISA nor the CLCS "has any competence to delimit the boundary between the 
shelf and the [deep] seabed", he concludes that "it may well be erroneous" to say that there 
are three parties to this sort of dispute310. In this respect, one would contend that the key 
difficulty for the Tribunal was that it was not in a position to determine the existence, and 
extension, of an overlapping of entitlements based on natural prolongation. With Canada 
disagreeing with the French argument, and without the possibility of resorting to the CLCS 
(for the LOSC was not yet in force, which meant that the CLCS had not yet been set up), 
little (maybe nothing) could have been done to resolve the problem of entitlement beyond 
200 M. Perhaps this would have been a sounder basis for reasoning the non-pronouncement 
on the boundary beyond 200 M. 
With respect to the issue of the broad shelf, the Canada/France Award leads to a 
second question, raised by Judge Gottlieb in his Dissenting Opinion. He suggests that the 
Tribunal "should have dismissed outright all French claims to a continental shelf beyond the 
Canadian 200-mile limit". The fact that the French area is "zone-locked" inside the 200 M 
Canadian entitlement, was in his view tantamount to saying that no French rights can exist 
either within 200 M from Canada or beyond that distance. By referring to the "miraculous 
travelling" of the French claim for a 100 M or so, in a "dormant state", through the 200 M 
Canadian jurisdiction, to "somehow revive" beyond the Canadian 200-mile limit, he gives a 
bright image of the difficulties that the argument raises conceptually311. 
Commenting on Judge Gottlieb's views, Oude Elferink rejects, on two grounds, that 
the LOSC supports his proposition312. First, he argues that Article 76 makes no exception to 
the rule that the continental shelf extends to the outer edge of the continental margin 
(308) LOSC, Article 1(1)(1), emphasis added. 
(309) LOSC, Articles 84(2), 134(3)(4). Concurring with this view, cf. Nelson/1998, pp.575-576; DeLacharriere/1983, pp.15-16. 
(310) Boyle/1997, p.46. 
(311) ILM/31/1992, pp.1195-1196. 
(312) OudeElferink/1999a, pp.462-463. 
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wherever the margin extends beyond 200 M. Secondly, he affirms that it is possible for an 
entitlement beyond 200 M of one state to overlap with a 200-mile entitlement of another 
state. Both statements being indubitably true, neither is sufficient to reach the conclusion 
that France has maritime rights outside its 'locked area', whether within or beyond the 
200 M Canadian entitlement. 
Conceptually, the French proposition faces great difficulties. As argued above, an 
argument can be made to support the notion of a hierarchy between entitlements of different 
types313. Thus, even if the sovereign right and the jurisdiction over the seabed and subsoil 
within 200 M are considered separately from the water column jurisdiction, there is a 
precedence to be considered. Attributing to one state continental shelf areas beyond 200 M, 
whose resource exploitation would be conditioned to payments to be made to the ISA, while 
removing it from the 200-mile area of another state, which could exploit those resources 
unconditionally, appears to be juridically illogical and untenable. Furthermore, after such an 
attribution, would the state whose entitlement beyond 200 M was in question still have to 
obtain a technical homologation of its jurisdiction-limits from the CLCS? This would not be 
an issue i f the precedence between entitlements were considered. In negotiation, states can 
decide to proceed however they see it fit. In adjudication, where an overlap of the third type 
exists, the presumption should be that the 200 M entitlement takes full precedence. 
Hence, in the Canada/France arbitration, perhaps the Tribunal should have asserted 
clearly the non-existence of any French rights to an outer shelf within the 200 M entitlement 
of Canada. Whether France can claim an outer shelf beyond the 200 M limit from Canada is 
a question that must be viewed on the same grounds as that of claims to outer shelf areas 
without having a 200 M opening (the problem is then one of overlap of the second type, and 
not of the third type). Unless it is proven that geomorphological/geological continuity exists 
between the French islands and the outer shelf areas (and even then subject to other factors), 
such a possibility should be rejected314. This typically scientific issue could be referred to 
the CLCS for advice (should the parties agree thereto). 
8.4.c) The Single Maritime Boundary Issue 
8.4.c)(i) Towards the Territorialisation, of Maritime Boundaries 
The single maritime boundary (SMB) issue is a consequence of the reformation that 
the definition of maritime zones underwent in the Third Conference. It stems from the 
(313) Paras.4.3.d)(iv), 8.4.b)(i) supra. 
(314) As Evans observes, the theory of a 'southern push' of the French entitlement may be objected on the grounds that the further 
seawards the French zone would project, "the less tenable this theory becomes". The further southwards the areas lie, the more the 
issue turns from one of natural prolongation of Newfoundland, into one of prolongation of Nova Scotia's coast (Evans/1994, 
pp.688-689). 
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solution reached on the spatial definition of the EEZ and the continental shelf. Despite their 
distinct historical development and different scope ratione materiae, and the fact that they 
retained in the LOSC certain systematic autonomy315, these resource-related zones were 
somewhat integrated and linked as to the basis of entitlement and 'horizontal extension'316. 
Up to 200 M from the baselines, the two became coincident. However, it might be asked 
whether the conceptual difficulties involved in this integration were fully anticipated. As the 
SMB issue has been already examined extensively317, the present section does not centre on 
discussing all questions involved, but on highlighting cardinal points, and contextualising 
the issue within the conceptual approach that has been proposed in this study. 
At a prefatory level, it must be emphasised that the classical understanding is that 
the SMB refers solely to areas within 200 M from the baselines, and beyond the territorial 
sea. Speaking of SMB as including the territorial sea, or continental shelf beyond 200 M, is 
conceptually imprecise. Owing to the way in which some issues were dealt with in recent 
case law, perhaps some reconsideration is required. 
In the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, the Tribunal has simply asserted that "after careful 
consideration of all the cogent and skilful arguments put before [it] by both parties, that the 
international boundary [would] be a single all-purpose boundary". It added later that, as to 
the middle stretch, there was "added to the boundary problem of delimiting continental 
shelves and EEZ the question of delimiting an area of overlapping territorial seas"318. Why 
a single all-purpose boundary was awarded when the parties asked for an award "delimiting 
maritime boundaries" remained unclear319. The fact is that the single all-purpose boundary 
divided also territorial sea areas. In the Qatar/Bahrain case, the parties requested "a single 
maritime boundary between their respective maritime areas of seabed, subsoil and 
superjacent waters". The Court noted that the SMB would result from "the delimitation of 
various jurisdictions": territorial sea in the south, and continental shelf and EEZ in the 
northern sector. Later, it referred to "the course of that part of the single maritime boundary 
(315) Whereas the E E Z regime appears in Part V of the LOSC, the continental shelf regime is set down in Part VI. Notwithstanding 
this, it must be noted that Article 56(1 )(a) establishes that the E E Z jurisdiction encompasses also the seabed and subsoil, blurring 
somewhat their autonomy. Apparently, a claim to an E E Z that does not make clear that it refers to the water column jurisdiction 
only must be seen as encompassing also the continental shelf jurisdiction. 
(316) Referring to the link between these two institutions, cf. Libya/Malta case, ICJ/Reports/1985, p.33, para.33. The reference to 
'horizontal extension' seeks to stress that there is a spatial distinction between these jurisdictions along the vertical axis: the EEZ 
comprises the water column, while the continental shelf comprises the seabed and subsoil. 
(317) Cf. Sharma/1989, pp.151-187; Weil/1989a, pp.117-135; Vicuna/1989, pp.195-211; Attard/1987, pp.212-229; McRae/1987, 
pp. 225-234; Oda/1987; Legault/Hankey/1985, pp.973-986; Reuter/1984; Peters/Tanja/1984. Qatar/Bahrain case, Merits - Judge 
Oda, Separate Opinion, paras. 10-12; Judges Bedjaoui, Ranjeva, Koroma, Joint Dissenting Opinion, paras. 163-168. Jan Mayen 
case, ICJ/Reports/1993: Judge Oda, Separate Opinion, pp. 102-117; Judge Shahabuddeen, Separate Opinion, pp.197-202. 
Guinea/Guinea-Bissau arbitration, ILM/25/1986, pp.298-300, paras. 112-117. Gulf of Maine case, ICJ/Reports/1984: Judgment, 
pp.292-295, 325-328, paras.90-96, 190-196; Judge Gros, Dissenting Opinion, pp.362-377; Canadian Counter-Memorial, 
paras.457-554. Tunisia/Libya case, ICJ/Reports/1982: Judge DeArechaga, Separate Opinion, pp.115-116; Judge Oda, Dissenting 
Opinion, pp.231-249; Judge Evensen, Dissenting Opinion, pp.282-298. 
(318) Eritrea/Yemen-II, paras. 132,154. 
(319) Arbitration Agreement, Article 2(3). Cf. also Antunes/2001, pp.330-333. 
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which will delimit the territorial seas' . In both instances, the division of the territorial sea 
was included in the SMB, an 'incorporation' that departs from the traditional understanding 
of the concept321. 
What may be deemed a trend towards the 'unification' of all maritime boundaries 
appears to extend also to areas beyond 200 M (although this is an idea still to be approached 
cautiously). State practice dealing with such boundaries shows little distinction in relation to 
delimitations within 200 M, reinforcing the suggestion that the same normativity applies in 
both cases322. What differ are the facts the appraisal of which becomes relevant. Other signs 
can be identified in the Canada/France arbitration. The Tribunal was asked to effect "a 
single delimitation" to "govern all rights and jurisdiction" exercisable under international 
law3 2 3. But i f "single delimitation" equates to a SMB (i.e. within 200 M), there is a certain 
paradox in the parties' phraseology. The rights exercisable under international law include 
areas beyond 200 M. That the intention might have been to ask for a single all-purpose 
boundary (similar to that of the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau arbitration) is suggested by France's 
claims beyond 200 M, and by Canada's reply in substantiam. In this regard, Nelson argues 
that, for the Tribunal to reject any pronouncement on the delimitation beyond 200 M, it 
would have sufficed to observe that, because these areas comprise the seabed and subsoil 
only, there was no question of SMB. He adds that the Tribunal should have affirmed that 
the issue fell outside its mandate, and that further pronouncements were unnecessary324. 
Eventually, the Tribunal concluded that the delimitation should reach only "as far as the 200 
nautical miles outer limit", which was "the single delimitation applicable simultaneously to 
the EEZ and the normal continental shelf'3 2 5. But its previous comments indicate that it 
considered to some extent the areas beyond 200 M; perhaps because the parties, having 
requested a line dividing "all rights and jurisdiction", raised the issue. 
One would venture to suggest that there appears to be an inexorable trend towards 
the 'unification' of all maritime boundaries, which will eventually crystallise, and which is 
explicable in the light of the 'politicisation' of maritime boundaries and of the progressive 
'territorialisation' of the areas beyond the territorial sea326. From here stems the concept of 
the single all-purpose maritime boundary. This boundary divides the maritime zones under 
the jurisdiction of adjoining states regardless of the precise scope of the jurisdiction that 
international law entitles each state to exercise over such zones, on either side of the line. In 
(320) Qatar/Bahrain-Merits, paras. 168-170, 221. 
(321) Judge Oda makes this point in his Separate Opinion in the Qatar/Bahrain case (para. 12). 
(322) OudeElferink/1999, p.465. 
(323) Arbitration Agreement, Article 2(1), ILM/31/1992, p.l 152. 
(324) Nelson/1998, pp.574-575. 
(325) ILM/31/1992, pp.1172-1173, para.82. 
(326) Cf. Bardonnet/1989, pp.39-54; Weil/1989b, pp.1024-1026. 
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the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau arbitration, the Tribunal was asked to decide upon "the course of 
the boundary between the maritime territories appertaining" to the two states327. For most 
of its course, the boundary runs along a loxodrome of azimuth 236°, which prolongs to the 
"outer limit of the maritime territories of each state"328. The continental shelf areas beyond 
200 M that apparently exist off the coast of these states were also delimited thereby. 
As shown in the 1996 Estonia/Latvia agreement, this trend appears also in state 
practice. Reference is made therein to a maritime boundary concerning "the territorial seas, 
the EEZs, the continental shelf, and any other maritime zones which might me established 
by the contracting Parties in accordance with the provisions of the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea and principles of international law"3 2 9. 
8.4.c)(ii) AU-Purpose Line: Single Boundary and Dual-Coincident Boundaries 
When in 1979 Canada and the USA requested the Chamber to delimit a SMB in the 
Gulf of Maine there were no judicial precedents in this respect. What existed was a fairly 
significant number (18 out of 47) of post-1969 agreements that resorted to a single line to 
divide the maritime areas beyond the territorial sea330. As noted by McRae, who was a legal 
advisor for Canada in the Gulf of Maine case, the USA and Canada adopted this approach 
due to "practical considerations"331 - just as other states had done in negotiation, it might be 
added. Dual maritime boundaries are susceptible of creating great difficulties at the level of 
administration of maritime spaces, as the scarcity of state practice shows. It is difficult to 
conceive how hydrocarbon exploitation, fisheries, environmental protection, and marine 
scientific research - to mention only the more visible issues - can be dealt with on the basis 
of a strict seabed/subsoil and water column separation. Law enforcement, in particular, 
might require rather complex arrangements (not to mention political trust). Not surprisingly, 
Herriman and Tsamenyi conclude, in relation to the 1997 Australia/Indonesia agreement332, 
which devises separate boundaries, that it "fails to address important issues" relating to the 
matters above. For the agreement to become workable, they add, further instruments of 
clarification might be needed333. 
Practical considerations and administrative convenience however, might not always 
match well with legal conceptualisation. The SMB issue is an example of this reality. As 
(327) Arbitration Agreement, Article 2, ILM/25/1986, p.256, emphasis added. 
(328) Ibid., p.304, para. 130.3)c), emphasis added. 
(329) Appendix 2, F23, Article I , emphasis added. 
(330) Appendix 2, D l , D10, D13-DI7, D20-D21, D27, D34, D36, D48, D61-D62, D64-D66. It is noteworthy that these states were 
ready to delimit their maritime spaces without having full knowledge of what would be the outcome of the Third Conference, as 
to the substantive scope of their jurisdiction. 
(331) McRae/1987,p.225. 
(332) As to the impact of the independence of East Timor (in 20 May 2002) on this treaty, cf. paras.9.2.c), 9.3.b) infra. 
(333) Herriman/Tsamenyi/1998), pp.378-379. 
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McRae recognises, when Canada and the USA requested a SMB, "probably neither side 
realised the full implications" of their approach, "nor did they realise that this aspect [...] 
would so preoccupy the Chamber". Whereas "Canada assimilated the [SMB] to an EEZ 
boundary", the USA (although arguing that the continental shelf and the 200-mile resource 
zone were distinct) treated the SMB "as approximating an EEZ boundary". But "neither 
party devoted much attention [...] to whether such a thing as a [SMB] existed in law"3 3 4. 
From the legal standpoint, the answers to some questions that might be asked appear 
to have been given already, and to raise little controversy. First, it is undisputed that there is 
no strict normative prescription requiring the continental shelf and EEZ boundaries to 
coincide. Secondly, the idea that a continental shelf boundary that is already in place can be 
altered only by express consent of the parties is equally unchallenged. An EEZ delimitation 
does not ipso facto revoke a previous continental shelf boundary. However, i f an EEZ 
delimitation is effected in a situation where no continental shelf boundary exists yet, due to 
Article 56(l)(a) of the LOSC, unless the continental shelf is explicitly excluded from the 
delimitation, the boundary will also divide it. Thirdly, there appears to be no requirement 
establishing that the water column boundary is conditioned by a previously delimited 
continental shelf boundary - although the alignment between the two might become in casu 
a relevant consideration. 
Perhaps the most important legal question, subject of an ongoing debate, has to do 
with the equilibrium that must be reached between the parties' interests in the area of 
overlapping exclusiveness. The problem is outlined in the question posed by the President 
of the Chamber to the parties in the Gulf of Maine case (which appears below, somewhat 
rephrased, with a view to adapt it to the conceptualisation adopted in this study). 
In the event that one particular [adjustment of the provisional equidistance-line] 
should appear appropriate for the delimitation of the continental shelf, and another 
for that of the [water column jurisdiction], what [are] the legal grounds that might be 
invoked for preferring one or the other in seeking to determine a single line? 3 3 5 
The need to arrive at an equilibrium founded on an all-inclusive appraisal of facts 
was endorsed by both parties. The USA answered that "the matter should be considered as 
an integrated whole" including a "balancing" of relevant facts. Canada "recognised 
implicitly that there was a balancing process involved" when stating that the boundary 
course "should be dictated by the circumstances relating to each particular sector"336. The 
Chamber opted for resorting "to criteria that, because of their more neutral character, [were] 
(334) McRae/1987, p.225. 
(335) Sitting of 19 April 1984, cited by Judge Gros, Dissenting Opinion, ICJ/Reports/1984, p.362. The question referred to methods 
instead of adjustment of the provisional equidistance-line, and to fisheries zones instead of water column jurisdiction. 
(336) For the replies of the parties, cf. McRae/1987, p.226. Judge Oda considers that both Canada and the USA "appear to have had 
difficulties in formulating their respective answers to this somewhat embarrassing question" (Oda/1987, p.3S0). 
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best suited for use in a multi-purpose delimitation". Turning to those 'criteria' "derived 
from geography", it refused to appraise facts exclusively related to either seabed/subsoil or 
water column337. What the Chamber did was, fundamentally, to appraise only the facts 
related to the basis of maritime entitlement, leaving aside those facts related with the regime 
of exclusiveness. The delimitation concerned solely areas within 200 M, and the Judgment 
anticipated the pronouncement made in the Libya/Malta case as to the irrelevance of natural 
prolongation in these delimitations. 
In the Jan Mayen case, Denmark requested a single boundary for the fishery zone 
and continental shelf; Norway contended that, although the two boundaries could coincide, 
they remained distinct. The Court recognised that there was a difference between this case 
and the Gulf of Maine case, in that it had not been asked for a single boundary. As to the 
applicable delimitation law, it accepted the Norwegian argument that whereas for the 
continental shelf the boundary should stem from the Article 6 of the CS Convention, the 
fishery zone boundary should be based on customary law3 3 8. The Court concluded that both 
regimes required the adoption of equidistance provisionally, to be adjusted in conformity 
with the relevant facts. Ultimately, the boundaries awarded were deemed to be coincident, 
despite the fact that capelin resources, relevant exclusively for water column jurisdiction, 
were weighed-up as a relevant consideration. 
A different concept now seems to have emerged. One appears to be faced here with 
dual-coincident maritime boundaries, instead of a single maritime boundary. Were it not 
for the relevance attributed in casu to the capelin resources, perhaps the concept would have 
raised little difficulty. The point was made by Judge Shahabuddeen who, while stating that 
"two lines drawn independently for each area would coincide along their entire lengths only 
exceptionally", considered that the location of fish stocks is not relevant to continental shelf 
delimitation339. From a similar perspective, Judge Oda noted that, although the possibility of 
an eventual coincidence of the two lines may not be excluded, i f a single boundary was 
sought by the parties, then they should have agreed upon it as in the Gulf of Maine case. In 
this regard, he added: 
If the marine resources constitute a factor to be taken into account, it is unthinkable 
to draw a single maritime boundary without having a clear idea as to which 
particular circumstances ought to predominate (i.e. those relating either to the EEZ 
or to the continental shelf). The Court does not give any good reason why equitable 
access to the "fishing resources" should have also been taken into account when it 
drew the line constituting the boundary not only of the EEZ but also of the 
(337) ICJ/Reports/1984, p.326-328, paras. 192-196. 
(338) ICJ/Reports/1993, pp.56-58, paras.41-44. 
(339) Separate Opinion, ICJ/Reports/1993, p.201. 
-345-
TOWARDS THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF MARITIME DELIMITATION 
continental shelf. The Court erred in this respect after taking it for granted that there 
ought to be such a single boundary.340 
One would argue that perhaps there is a reconciling approach. Let it be assumed that 
a large disparity of coastal lengths must be reflected as an adjustment of the provisional 
equidistance341. I f objectified in terms of average 'distance ratio', the adjustments in the 
Libya/Malta and Jan Mayen cases appear similar. The difference is that, in the former, the 
displacement was applied equally to the whole line, whereas in the latter, equidistance was 
adjusted keeping one of its extremities (point A) unmoved. For area-attribution purposes, 
the amount of displacement remained similar; what differed was the way in which the line 
was displaced. The coastal length disparity being also similar in both cases, perhaps it is fair 
to presume that the quantum of adjustment was determined primarily by the coastal length 
disparity. I f this is accepted, then it might be argued that although the 'access to capelin 
resources' was relevant in the Jan Mayen case to determine the shape of boundary, it was 
virtually immaterial as far as area-attribution was concerned. 
Suppose now that the area-attribution was indeed determined primarily by coastal 
length disparity (which is relevant also in continental shelf delimitation). In the absence of 
other facts relevant for the continental shelf regime (e.g. known hydrocarbon resources), no 
impediment existed to an apportionment of areas in accordance with the requirements of the 
water column jurisdiction. Rather than adjusting equidistance throughout its extension, the 
Court displaced it unevenly, but without altering the area-attribution resultant from the 
coastal length disparity. As shown in Figure 83, other lines with similar average 'distance 
ratio' would have operated similar area-attributions. The significant advantage was that, in 
that way, the boundaries coincided. An example of discretionary powers, the Court's view 
is justified, particularly because it reflects practice overwhelmingly followed by states. 
This preference for solutions based on coincident boundaries is equally reflected in 
the way in which the equilibrium between the interests of Iceland and Norway was devised 
in the Jan Mayen conciliation. Faced with an existing water column boundary running 
along the 200-mile limit from Iceland, the Conciliation Commission, which had been asked 
to pronounce unanimously on the continental shelf boundary, recommended that it should 
coincide with the water column boundary. By way of counterpoise, it proposed the 
consecration of joint access to, and exploitation of, hydrocarbon resources in an area of 
significant prospect. Although the Commission referred to proportionality en passant only, 
the large disparity of relevant coastal lengths was almost certainly decisive for retaining the 
Icelandic 200-mile limit as the 'dual-coincident' boundary342. As it subsequently happened 
(340) Separate Opinion, ICJ/Reports/1993, pp.109-110, 114-117. 
(341) Judge Oda questioned this idea in his Separate Opinion (ICJ/Reports/1993, p. 115). 
(342) ILR/62/1982, pp.124-136. 
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in the Jan Mayen case, equitable access to natural resources was a key element in balancing 
exclusive interests, whilst opting for a solution based on coincident boundaries. 
In summary, it is important to realise that the question of the single maritime 
boundary, in adjudication, depends much on how the request is phrased by the parties343. A 
SMB can be awarded only i f the parties require it. No obligation stems from the LOSC, or 
from general international law, in this respect. This conceptual point made, one is prompted 
to observe immediately that, even if EEZ and continental shelf boundaries are delimited 
separately, they will tend to coincide (emerging as dual-coincident maritime boundaries). 
This idea is supported on legal and factual grounds. With respect to the 'legal matrix', it 
suffices to note that, in the LOSC, the normativity applicable to both types of delimitations 
is the same. First, the textual element of Articles 74(1) and 83(1) is identical. Secondly, this 
is reinforced by the statement made in 1978 by the chairman of NG7, who emphasised that 
"in essence, [the Negotiating Group had] been considering the same set of criteria to be 
applied both to the EEZ and the continental shelf'3 4 4. As regards the 'factual matrix', 
insofar as the basis of maritime entitlement within 200 M is the same for the water column 
and the seabed/subsoil jurisdictions, all factual elements related to maritime entitlement 
become relevant in both cases. Perhaps Sharma is right when suggesting that there is juris 
tantum "presumption in favour of a single, general purpose maritime boundary to divide 
jurisdictions within the 200-mile zone, which can be rebutted if the states advance reasons 
for having divergent boundaries for the seabed and superjacent waters"345. Unless the facts 
impose a different solution (e.g. i f sharing seabed resources is incompatible with sharing 
water column resources), the two lines will tend to coincide. As the facts related to maritime 
entitlement are in a majority, and are arguably more significant346, the spatial coincidence of 
boundaries (even i f delimited separately) emerges 'naturally'. One would suggest that only 
where it is impossible to reconcile the interests of the disputants inherent in different types 
of exclusiveness (primarily different types of resources), with coincident boundaries, should 
distinct boundaries be adopted. Evidenced in state practice, all-purpose boundaries (either 
single or dual-coincident) became a reality in maritime delimitation. This reality, linked to 
the 'territorialisation' of maritime boundaries, appears to stem from the all-purpose 
dividing-character of the line that is similar to that of land boundaries. 
(343) In situations of adjacency, states should exclude explicitly areas beyond 200 M if they do not want these areas to fall within 
the court's mandate. A general expression such as "areas under the jurisdiction of the two states" is likely to lead courts to delimit 
also, through a solution of the type 'open-ended line of bearing', the areas beyond 200 M (even without having the outer limit of 
the continental margin defined). 
(344) Doc.NG7/22, 8 September 1978, Platzoder/Documents(IX), p.427. Judge Oda recently referred to this idea (Qatar/Bahrain 
case, Separate Opinion, para.35). 
(345) Sharma/1989, pp.173-174. 
(346) In the Libya/Malta case, the Court asserted that "greater importance must be attributed to elements, such as distance from the 
coast, which are common to both concepts (ICJ/Reports/1985, p.33, para.33). 
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8.4.d) The Emergence of 'Grey Areas' 
In the Gulf of Maine case, Canada sought to demonstrate that the consecration of the 
distance principle as criterion of entitlement had a further impact upon delimitation, which 
gave "particular weight" to the recourse to equidistance. The departure from equidistance 
(at the terminus of the boundary) would result in the emergence of a 'grey area'347. 
A 'grey area' may be defined as an area lying beyond the maximum jurisdiction of 
state A, and which apparently also is excluded from state B's jurisdiction - although lying 
within its potential jurisdiction - by effect of a delimitation. This concept is illustrated in 
Figure 94(a). Discussed by Boggs in the 1930s, this area was characterised by him as an 
area that "needlessly constitutes a zone of waters of controvertible jurisdiction". He argued 
then (referring to a 3 M territorial sea) that the simplest boundary should run as a straight 
line from the land boundary terminus to the point on the 3-mile limit equidistant from the 
two land territories (which he named the "normal terminus")348. 
Although acceptable in the context of 3 M territorial waters, this solution faces 
insurmountable legal difficulties in the context of 200 M jurisdictions. The problem should 
perhaps be posed in different terms today. The key idea is simple. I f a boundary between 
two adjacent states does not end at the point on the 200-mile envelope equidistant from the 
two baselines349, it creates an area of'non-enjoyed' national jurisdiction. Notably, this is not 
a question of the course of the boundary, but of its end-point. Adjustments to equidistance 
will not create a 'grey area' if the boundary ends eventually at the equidistant point on the 
350 
outer envelope . 
Let the fictitious case of Figure 94(a) above (which depicts a situation similar to that 
of the Gulf of Maine area) be considered. Is state B entitled to exercise jurisdiction over the 
'blue-shaded area' (since the boundary stops at the perimeter of the area of overlapping 
entitlements)? Supposing that the outer edge of the continental margin lies beyond 200 M, 
entailing the prolongation of the boundary (presumably in a similar direction), may state B 
exercise jurisdiction over the water column jurisdiction, while state A does the same over 
the seabed/subsoil? These questions exemplify some difficulties posed by the emergence of 
'grey areas'. Intertwined here is also the issue of precedence between different entitlements. 
The practical effect might be the exclusion of an area from the jurisdiction of one state to 
place it under a less intense jurisdiction of another state, or to take altogether from state 
(347) Canadian Counter-Memorial, paras.569-576. 
(348) Boggs/1937, pp.453^»56. 
(349) This is valid mutatis mutandis for the territorial sea and contiguous zone 12-mile and 24-mile envelopes. 
(350) Naturally, the boundary-line would be somewhat more complex, which is necessarily a consideration to be weighed against 
this suggestion. 
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jurisdiction. May an area that would in principle be under the (territorial sea) sovereignty of 
a state be put under the EEZ and contiguous zone jurisdiction of an adjoining state? May an 
area that would in principle allow the exercise of jurisdiction over the seabed/subsoil and 
superjacent waters become part of the high seas and the Area (or of the high seas and of the 
continental shelf beyond 200 M of an adjoining state)? 
Answers to these questions are far from easy, as demonstrated by Oude Elferink's 
analysis. Quite perceptively, he poses the problem in terms of "[wjhether it is permissible to 
create a grey area in the legal determination of an EEZ or territorial sea boundary"351. The 
crucial point is not whether 'grey areas' may be created by treaties, but whether they may 
result from courts' decisions. His conclusion that courts have adopted hitherto a "somewhat 
cautious approach" reflects the uncertain legal contours in this matter, which is entangled 
with "the fundamental principles applicable to the relationship of the regimes of the 
continental shelf and EEZ". Referring to the Gulf of Maine case and the Canada/France 
arbitration, he argues that the boundary was delimited only up to the 200-mile limit because 
the parties asked for a single maritime boundary. No doubt true as to the former, it is less 
clear in the latter. This is suggested by the fact that the Tribunal's non-pronouncement on 
the boundary beyond 200 M appears justified also on the basis of the need to consider a 
third-party's interests. Observing that the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau arbitration created a 'grey 
area', Oude Elferink draws attention to the "remarkable" fact that this was done "without 
any rationalisation", i.e. "no legal justification was given for this decision"352. 
In the aftermath of the Gulf of Maine case, Canada delineated the outer limit of its 
200-mile zone in compliance with the Chamber's decision. Because the boundary ends at 
the perimeter of the overlap of 200-mile entitlements, it included the 'grey area' within its 
200-mile zone. The USA was apparently unhappy with this, arguing that Canada had gone 
beyond the awarded line. McRae, who describes these facts, considers that this amounts to 
prejudging the prolongation of the boundary353. He then asks two questions, which can be 
generalised as follows. Can a 'grey area' become subject to a state's jurisdiction when lying 
beyond its 200-mile limit (but on the 'right' side of the boundary)? In delimitation, do EEZ 
rights of one state take priority over the continental shelf claims of another state? 
In relation to the first question, the answer depends on its scope. In negotiation, no 
reason prevents a state from 'transferring' the exercise of jurisdiction over areas within its 
200-mile limit to another state. This does not infringe upon the rights of the international 
(351) OudeElferink/1998, p.146, emphasis added. On the 'grey area' issue, cf. also Colson/1993, pp.67-69. Both authors give 
examples of negotiated agreements that created 'grey areas'. 
(352) OudeElferink/1998, pp. 161 -163, 176-177. 
(353) McRae/1993, pp. 168-169. 
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community354. This is the case of the 'transfer' of "special areas" in the 1990 USA/USSR 
agreement355. In adjudication, the answer is however less obvious. I f the court's task is 
delimitation - the division of an overlapping of entitlements, it might be difficult to justify 
such a 'transfer'. Either the overlap is non-existent (if the continental shelf does not extend 
beyond 200 M), or the overlap does not comprise the same rights for the two states. This 
type of 'transfer' seems possible only i f states explicitly empower courts to effect it. 
Since this was not the case in the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau arbitration, the legal status 
of the 'grey area' created thereby might be questioned. In the 'blue-shaded area' shown in 
Figure 95 (estimated as being more than 2,500 sq.km), Guinea cannot exercise jurisdiction 
over the water column (assuming that it is entitled to a continental shelf beyond 200 M). 
Whether Guinea-Bissau is entitled thereto remains doubtful (for the area lies on the 'wrong' 
side of the boundary). If the boundary is seen as 'territorialised', then Guinea-Bissau can 
make no claims beyond it. I f the line is viewed as merely effecting the division between an 
overlapping of entitlements, as there is no overlap of the water column jurisdiction in that 
area, theoretically, it may be suggested that Guinea-Bissau is entitled thereto. However, no 
court has yet addressed this issue. 
The second question mentioned above concerns the possible existence of priority of 
EEZ rights over opposing continental shelf claims beyond 200 M. It was suggested above 
that, in principle, the exclusiveness concerning the 200-mile zone takes precedence over the 
exclusiveness beyond i t 3 5 6 . Notwithstanding this, it seems doubtless that such a presumption 
must be contextualised within maritime delimitation law. The precedence between different 
entitlements relies upon the principle of maritime zoning. Practically speaking, it is rebutted 
when it becomes irreconcilable with the demands of the principle of equity. 
Bearing in mind what was said above, the following conclusions are possible. The 
emergence of 'grey areas' is another element to weigh-up in the delimitation process (in 
particular if sizeable areas are at issue). As a rule of thumb, it may be said that the more the 
line departs from equidistance, the larger are the areas in question. The existence of a 'grey 
area' entails necessarily prejudice to one of the states involved in the delimitation; and this 
should be a consideration in the determination of the boundary. It is also noteworthy that 
the emergence of 'grey areas' is avoidable, even where departures from equidistance are 
required. I f the end-point of the boundary is placed on the equidistant point of the outer 
limit, no 'grey areas' will emerge (although the line might become more complex). 
(354) Cf. OudeElferink/1998, p. 176; Verville, IMB/Report 1-6, p.450. 
(355) Appendix 2, F65, Article 3. Figure 94(b) depicts a situation that is similar to that of the 1990 US/USSR agreement. 
(356) Paras.4.3.d)(iii)(iv) supra. 
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Whether a state can exercise jurisdiction over areas located on the 'wrong' side of 
the boundary (in cases similar to the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau arbitration357) is an unresolved 
and controversial question. One would argue that perhaps the exercise of jurisdiction should 
not be permitted. The reasons are two-fold. First, the trend towards the 'territorialisation' of 
maritime boundaries signifies that they are likely to become 'watertight lines', separating 
adjoining spheres of jurisdiction. Secondly, inasmuch as that would lead to superimposed 
jurisdictions, the advantages sought with single boundaries - administrative convenience 
and practicality - would be offset. Indubitably, this does not happen where no rights beyond 
200 M exist. In such instances, one state has an unopposed EEZ jurisdiction, and there is no 
obvious reason for impeding its exercise. With a view to avoiding 'non-enjoyed' areas of 
jurisdiction, states may opt for 'transfer solutions' similar to the USA/USSR agreement. 
Whether such 'transfers' might be considered and legally valid, in the balancing of interests 
in boundary adjudication depends perhaps much on how special or arbitral agreements are 
phrased. Another point deserves attention. The strength of the presumption that territorial 
sea entitlements take precedence over 200-mile jurisdictions is translatable in the restraint 
felt in the creation of territorial sea 'grey areas'. Weight is lent to this proposition by the 
rare character of the departures from equidistance in territorial sea delimitation. But even in 
relation to 200-mile jurisdiction, one would subscribe to the proposition that "the creation 
of a substantial grey area should be avoided to the greatest extent possible"358. 
8.4.e) Other Issues 
8.4.e)(i) Simplicity of the Boundary-Line 
Behind many solutions devised in state practice is an element of convenience that 
concerns the exercise of jurisdiction. The simplicity of boundary-lines has always been an 
issue for states. Even today, when satellite systems allow the determination of positions at 
sea with an accuracy of some ±10 metres, a simple line facilitates greatly the exercise of 
jurisdiction, especially law enforcement. The most obvious expressions of this search for 
simplicity are treaties that resort to simplified equidistance-lines, lines of bearing, parallels 
and meridians. Even what seem at first glance complex lines often contain an element of 
administrative convenience. For instance, the 'stepped boundary-lines' of the UK/Ireland 
agreement (constituted by segments of meridians and parallels, which are loxodromes), 
appears to be orientated towards the concession blocks of both parties359. 
(357) Notice that the boundary has no defined end-point, which presumably means that it extends beyond 200 M. This distinguishes 
this case from Gulf of Maine case, where the boundary was terminated at the perimeter of the overlapping of entitlements. 
(358) Legault/Hankey/1985, p.988. 
(359) Appendix 2, F39; Anderson, IMB, Report 9-5, p. 1770. Notice that the location of fishery resources was irrelevant, because 
both states are members of the European Union. 
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Significantly, the idea that "a degree of simplification is an elementary requisite to 
the drawing of any delimitation line" was sanctioned in the Gulf of Maine case. There, the 
Chamber affirmed equally its belief that the method employed observed "the advantages of 
simplicity and clarity"360. In the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, the simplicity of the line was 
again a consideration that influenced the Tribunal. References thereto were related to the 
need to preserve the 12-mile territorial sea of all islands. The Tribunal asserted that having 
"a neater and more convenient international boundary", and the desirability for simplicity in 
the "neighbourhood of a main shipping lane", were considerations to be weighed-up361. An 
identical approach was taken in the Qatar/Bahrain case. In the delimitation of the territorial 
sea boundary, the Court decided, "in accordance with common practice, to simplify what 
would otherwise be a very complex delimitation line in the region of the Hawar Islands"362. 
Amidst other factors, the simplicity of boundary-lines might appear less relevant. 
There is some truth is this idea. Line simplicity cannot become an argument for effecting 
either significant changes of area-attribution, or different resource-sharing. Its immediate 
objective should be the 'smoothing' of the boundary-line, aiming ultimately at facilitating 
the exercise of jurisdictions in the fringe, adjoining areas. Again, the distinction must be 
made between the shape of the line, and the area-attribution operated thereby. 
With this said, a further point must be made. I f simplicity is a consideration, why 
are geodesic lines being systematically utilised by courts, without considering the benefits 
of resorting to loxodromes? Owing to the practical nature of loxodromes (a line of bearing), 
and the widespread use of Mercator charts amongst mariners (on which a loxodrome is a 
straight line), perhaps courts should review their approach to this matter. Mathematically 
and graphically, a geodesic is a much more complex line. The reservations in relation to 
loxodromes are understandable in the light of the events of the Anglo/French arbitration. 
But it is important to realise that their simplicity, and wide resort, is an asset that cannot be 
underestimated. Recourse thereto when very short segments of equidistance are in question 
is justified. Its use in longer stretches might also be acceptable, if the area-attribution that 
they operate is correctly comprehended. The fact that loxodromes remain widely resorted to 
in state practice is a token of their usefulness, and advantages, in many instances. 
8.4.e)(ii) Agreement on Aspects of the Boundary-Line 
The existence of delimitation disputes does not impair partial agreements between 
the disputants. In fact, because negotiations are likely to have been held previously, states 
(360) ICJ/Reports/1984, pp.330, 333, paras.203, 213. 
(361) Eritrea/Yemen-II, paras.128, 155, 160-162. 
(362) Qatar/Bahrain-Merits, para.221. 
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referring a dispute to a third-party, for resolution, might have already agreed upon specific 
aspects related to the boundary-line. In the Grisbadarna arbitration, the parties were in 
agreement in relation to various aspects: (a) on the course of the boundary between points 
XVIII and XIX; (b) between points XIX and XX, on making the division along the median 
line drawn between islands, islets and reefs (disagreeing as to whether Heiefleur or the 
Heieknub should be the basepoint on the Norwegian side); (c) on "the great unsuitability of 
tracing the boundary line across important bars" (which basically meant that they wanted 
the Grisbadarna bank not to be divided)363. Quite rightly, the Tribunal accepted these partial 
agreements, deciding strictly on the unresolved issues. A similar approach was followed in 
the Anglo/French arbitration. Throughout the Award, the Tribunal stressed the fact that, in 
the Channel area, the parties had agreed that the boundary should be a median line, whilst 
referring to the disputed aspects for which they had sought resolution354. Recently, in the 
Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, one argument that the Tribunal used to justify the recourse to an 
equidistance-line between mainland coasts was that both parties had "claimed a boundary 
constructed on the equidistance method, although based on different points of departure", 
and that this solution was one "familiar to both parties". Equally, the relevance given to the 
shipping lane near the delimitation area is fully supported by the Arbitration Agreement365. 
Insofar as the resolution of the dispute is the primary goal of recourse to third-party 
settlement, the acceptance of this type of agreement between the parties appears logical. 
There is no reason to widen the unresolved issues. Hence, regardless of whether they were 
reached beforehand, or during the course of the hearings, courts should consider these 
agreements in their entirety i f possible. The decision ought to seek only to 'fill-in the gaps'. 
Naturally, i f the parties may agree to an ex aequo et bono decision, a fortiori, they may also 
direct courts to consider specific extra-legal elements. Besides strictly legal considerations, 
courts become then empowered to resort to specific non-legal considerations. 
Whether the parties can agree to exclude a certain aspect from consideration during 
the dispute resolution appears to be a similar question. In the Tunisia/Libya case, the Court 
observed that neither party had relied on equidistance in their claims, and that it had to take 
account of this fact. At first glance, the Court interpreted the non-reference to equidistance 
as an agreement not to attribute relevance thereto. This is perhaps why it has been argued 
that " i f both parties deny the applicability of a certain method, or the relevance of a certain 
factor, it is likely to be ignored"366. But the fact is that the Court's assertion was qualified 
by the idea that i f it "were to arrive at the conclusion [...] that an equidistance-line would 
(363) AJIL/4/1910, pp.230, 233. 
(364) RIAA/18, pp.22, 24-25, 52-53, 58-59, 75, paras.15, 22, 87, 103, 146. 
(365) Eritrea/Yemen-II, paras. 128,131-132,155; Preamble of the Arbitration Agreement 
(366) Evans/1989, pp.218-219. 
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bring about an equitable solution of the dispute, there would be nothing to prevent it from 
so finding even though the parties have discarded the equidistance method"367. No doubt, 
omitting reference to certain methods (or other elements for that matter) does not preclude 
courts from legally considering them during the delimitation process. 
A word of caution is indeed necessary. Courts are bound to decide according to law. 
If the principle of maritime zoning demands that equidistance be provisionally applied in all 
delimitations, directing courts to disregard it is tantamount to an authorisation not to apply a 
legal standard. What is then the impact of requesting a court not to apply a legal standard? It 
is crucial to realise is that, when resorting to adjudication, the parties relinquish the juridical 
freedom that they enjoy in negotiation. An agreement of this type appears to have thus one 
of two effects. Either it amounts to endowing courts with what are virtually ex aequo et 
bono powers, or courts will still have to apply the law - in which case they will consider the 
parties' agreement only to the extent that it coincides with the legal solution (i.e. the law 
might require the agreement to be disregarded, wholly or partially). 
8.4.e)(iii) Joint Zones 
A final brief note concerns the impact of joint zones in the determination of 
maritime boundaries. There is no question of addressing such a complex subject here in its 
entirety. The intention is to highlight the fact that, in the balancing-up of exclusive interests 
inherent in delimitation, joint zones might become a relevant consideration. 
That the establishment of zones of joint jurisdiction might be a solution to overcome 
issues raised by maritime delimitation became unquestionable after the North Sea cases368. 
Strictly speaking, however, the delimitation process is unconcerned with the creation of 
such zones; for it seeks to determine the course of a line. Importantly, joint zones are a 
second-best option in ocean management. With their creation must be associated a specific 
jurisdictional regime for the area in question, whose preparation might itself be a source of 
present and unforeseeable future difficulties369. Recourse to joint zones thus should occur 
only where states are unable to agree on a strict area-division - that underlies the notion of 
boundary). An agreement on a joint zone might become easier to reach, because in most 
circumstances joint zones entail a 'lesser' spatial 'amputation' of entitlements. 
(367) ICJ/Reports/1982, p.79, para.l 10 
(368) ICJ/Reports/1969, p.54, para. 101.(C)(2). 
(369) Joint development entails the resolution of two key issues. The first issue, intertwined with the basis of maritime entitlement, 
concerns the 'area' and the 'sharing-percentages' involved. Since the balance of interests must be related to the spatial extension 
of the entitlements, the location and extension of the joint area influences decisively the percentages in which the benefits are to 
be shared; and vice-versa. There is an interlocked relationship between these aspects. The second issue concerns the regime to 
implement in the joint area, as to management and administrative structure, the exploration, exploitation and management of 
resources, and associated peripheral issues. To a great extent, these issues can be dealt with separately. It is important to note that 
there is no such thing as 'genuine jointness'. Sharing of jurisdiction must be decided on a case-to-case basis. Jointness is whatever 
states agree to share, and can never constitute an obligation. The only obligation for states is to resolve disputes peacefully. 
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The brief account given here seeks to look into the question of setting-up joint zones 
concurrently with boundary-lines, that is, with the division of areas of exclusiveness. One 
typical example is the UK/Denmark (Faree Islands) agreement370. Attempts to negotiate the 
delimitation for the fisheries zone and the continental shelf failed partially, due to questions 
related to the fisheries resources. The two states eventually agreed upon a continental shelf 
boundary, a partial fisheries zone boundary and a joint zone orientated to the water column 
jurisdiction. Estimated to be approximately 8,000 sq.km, this joint zone corresponds to the 
area of overlap of the parties' claims (which apparently were both based upon equidistance, 
but computed from different basepoints). 
Joint zones are primarily concerned with the exploitation of natural resources. Their 
creation might have a specific effect in the delimitation process: to attain a balance as to the 
access to certain natural resources, thereby contributing to a spatial division of maritime 
areas in a reasonable manner. Legally, however, this is an instrument whose utilisation 
depends on consent. No court was hitherto empowered to decide a question of delimitation 
by recourse to a balance of interests on the basis of a joint zone. There is nevertheless an 
example of third-party settlement in which this approach was followed: the Jan Mayen 
conciliation371. Whilst adopting the Icelandic 200-mile limit (which was already the water 
column boundary) for the continental shelf boundary, the Commission recommended the 
creation of a joint area for exploitation of hydrocarbon resources. 
Since maritime delimitation consists of achieving a reasonable balance of interests 
in an area of overlapping exclusiveness, it is necessary to bear in mind that such a balance 
may be easier with joint zones. Still, one would argue that such an approach should only be 
resorted to when the advantages of 'reconciling' exclusive rights significantly outweigh the 
advantages in terms of convenience and clarity of having separate areas of exclusive rights 
for each state. This matter has to be pondered on a case-by-case basis, taking account of the 
'factual matrix' in concreto. The decision to endow a court with such powers also depends 
on it. Doubtlessly, the binding character of the decisions of courts, and the fact that the 
creation of such zones entails some discretion on the delineation of their regime, leads us to 
suggest that it is unlikely that states will ever refer this issue to a court. Theoretically, 
however, it is a possibility that cannot be ruled out. It may also happen that a court is 
requested to draw a boundary in an area where a joint zone is already in place, in which 
case the question of balancing interests would be posed in converse, but similar, terms. 
(370) Appendix 2, F60; Figure 36. 
(371) ILR/62/1982, pp.111-136; Figure 29. For illustrations of other joint zones set up by states, see Figures 30-35. 
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Chapter 9 
TEST STUDY: MARITIME DELIMITATION BETWEEN 
AUSTRALIA AND EAST TIMOR 
9.1. Introductory Notes 
When attempting the conceptualisation of a subject that has been deemed to be best 
approached from a practical perspective, as in the present case, difficulties are likely to arise 
on various levels. A test-case may thus facilitate bridging the gap between the theoretical 
nature of the conceptualisation and the practicalities of the task to be undertaken. Seeking to 
test how the conceptualisation proposed in previous chapters 'performs' when applied to an 
actual situation, this chapter attempts to overcome the gap between theory and practice, 
whilst clarifying conceptual aspects that may have been left somewhat obscure. 
The question arose as to which case study to select. After considering a number of 
possibilities, the choice fell on the maritime delimitation between Australia and East Timor. 
First, this is a case in which nature, history and politics 'conspired' to create a 'test' that 
involves a significant number of aspects. Secondly, the delimitation between Australia and 
East Timor has one of the most challenging factual contexts worldwide, providing thus a 
stern test. Thirdly, this delimitation problem is of particular interest to the author. 
The objective is to examine how the maritime boundary between Australia and East 
Timor would be legally determined, should the conceptualisation proposed be adopted. It is 
thus necessary to assume that a dispute would emerge between the two states, and that such 
a dispute would be referred to a judicial or an arbitral forum. However, the jurisdictional 
questions relating thereto (which also involve the issue of the decision to litigate), will not 
be analysed; for they are not at the heart of the subject matter. The analysis below describes 
first the geographical setting between Australia and East Timor. Secondly, to establish the 
background of the delimitation, it provides an account of the political-legal developments 
concerning the continental shelf and the water column jurisdiction. The analysis will then 
be centred on the elements relevant for the legal determination of the maritime boundary (or 
boundaries) between Australia and East Timor, using the conceptualisation advanced here 
as the basis thereof. More than pointing to a specific line (or lines), the aim is to provide an 
actual illustration of how the decision-making process is envisaged in terms of the legal 
justification for the choice of line. Should the delimitation be effected by negotiation, such a 
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justification is not required. Nevertheless, in perhaps the vast majority of cases, it is clear 
that the negotiating strategy of states takes due account of such analyses, and of possible 
outcomes of judicial or arbitral proceedings. 
9.2. Background Aspects 
9.2.a) The Geographical Setting of the Timor Sea 
The geographical framework for the delimitation between Australia and East Timor 
must take into account two distinct aspects: coastal geography and seabed geomorphology 
and geology. Both are important to understand the opposing arguments. Because coastal 
geography is the key factual element in maritime delimitation, it is natural that particular 
attention be drawn thereto. As to the seabed aspects, it is through them that the concept of 
natural prolongation is materialised, which might become relevant in continental shelf 
delimitation. The following sub-sections thus refer very briefly to these issues. 
9.2.a)(i) Coastal Geography 
The northern Australian coast and the island of Timor are separated by the Timor 
Sea372, which is confined eastwards by the Arafura Sea and westwards by the Indian Ocean 
(Figure 98). I f the macrogeography of the coasts of Timor and Australia are looked at in 
terms of straight coastal facades defined at small scales, the two coasts run in similar 
directions (approximately 065°-245°). The two coasts lie thus in an almost perfect relation 
of oppositeness, roughly 250 M apart. The Australian coast abutting on the Timor Sea, 
which extends from Melville Island to Cape Bougainville, is a coastal stretch that includes a 
deep and wide indentation, where the Joseph Bonaparte Gulf is located373. The perception 
of the Australian coastal direction at large scales thus might be somewhat different. 
The territory of East Timor is that of the former Portuguese colony374. It includes the 
'eastern-half of the Timor island, the enclave of Oecusse in West Timor, the isle of Atauro 
- off the northern coast of East Timor, and the isle of Jaco - off the easternmost tip of 
Timor island375. For purposes of the delimitation vis-a-vis Australia, only the eastern-part of 
the southern coast of the island of Timor and Jaco isle have to be considered. The coast has 
no marked indentations, which means that even at large scale the perception of its general 
direction does not change much. What is noticeable geographically is that the territory of 
(372) IHO/S-23, para.5.14.. The IHO S-23 publication defines the limits of oceans and seas (which should nevertheless not be taken 
in very strict terms, if only because of the disclaimer that it contains as to its legal and political value). 
(373) IHO/S-23, para.5.14.1.. The Joseph Bonaparte Gulf is circumscribed by a line joining Cape Rulhieres and Cape Hay. 
(374) For an analysis of East Timor's land boundaries, cf. Deeley/2000. 
(375) Cf. East Timor's Constitution (approved by the Parliament on 22 March 2002), Section 4(1). 
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East Timor is 'walled' by Indonesia. Particular relevance must be given, in the east, to the 
isles of Leti, Moa and Lakor, and in the west, to cape Tanjong We Toh. These geographical 
features control the course of the 'lateral-equidistances' between East Timor and Indonesia: 
an 'eastern-line' starting at a midpoint between Jaco and Leti, and a 'western-line' starting 
at the mouth of river Masin (Figure 99, lines AC and BD). 
A final point concerns the 'frontal-equidistance' between Australia and East Timor. 
For purposes of its computation, the Australian coast within the indentation that comprises 
the Joseph Bonaparte Gulf is irrelevant. Thus, the equidistance-line has a V-shape, with its 
vertex pointing towards the midpoint between Cape Fourcroy and Cape Londonderry. 
Prescott has suggested that this line is about 120 M long - assuming that it stops at the two 
equidistant trijunction points with Indonesia376. Geometrically, however, it is possible to 
compute an equidistance-line extending beyond these two points. Trijunction points are, no 
doubt, an important reference for delimitation; they reveal the existence of third parties' 
interests. But as will be noted below377, in this context, there is a particular issue concerning 
the maritime areas relevant for a delimitation between Australia and East Timor to which 
attention must be drawn. Not only has Indonesia relinquished seabed/subsoil rights vis-a-vis 
Australia, but Australia also has relinquished water column rights vis-a-vis Indonesia. 
Because Indonesia and Australia thus are precluded from claiming certain rights vis-a-vis 
each other, as a reference, the equidistant trijunction points have to be dealt with differently. 
Perhaps the 'frontal-equidistance' between Australia and East Timor should not be a priori 
restricted to the line between those equidistant trijunction points. 
9.2.a)(ii) Seabed Aspects 
A geomorphological and geological description of the seabed in the Timor Sea area 
is a highly difficult undertaking that, owing to the complexity of the geodynamics of the 
area, would require an extensive analysis. This section falls short of it, as it has merely a 
functional objective. It seeks to provide a brief introductory account of aspects relevant for 
understanding some arguments that have been made in the context of the delimitation 
between Australia and East Timor3 7 8. 
In terms of seabed relief, the Timor Sea comprises two outstanding features. On its 
southern side, there is a broad shelf (Sahul Shelf), and in the north, the Timor Trough. Off 
the northern coast of Australia, the geological continental shelf extends to distances of over 
150 M from the coast. The seabed descends then to the bottom of the Timor Trough, the 
(376) Prescott/1999, p.74; see Figure 99, points C and D. 
(377) Paras.9.2.c), 9.3.c) supra. 
(378) For further elaboration, cf. para.9.4.b)(i) infra. 
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marked gee-morphological feature that stands out in the seabed relief of the northern Timor 
Sea. From the bottom of the Timor Trough, the seabed rises steeply, with the northern slope 
somewhat mirroring the southern. The three seabed profiles shown in Figure 105 illustrate 
the geomorphological complexity of the Timor Trough area, both in terms of contour and of 
depth. It appears to be indisputable that this seabed depression results from a geological 
process of subduction of the Australian plate under the Eurasian plate. What is discussed at 
present is whether, geologically speaking, Timor is separated from the Australian margin by 
the Timor Trough; or whether instead, Timor has accreted to the Australian margin. 
9.2.b) Political-Legal Developments Concerning the Continental Shelf 
The political-legal background against which the delimitation between Australia and 
East Timor would take place is complex, and stretches back to the 1960s. The objective of 
this section, and the one that follows, is not to describe the context in detail, but simply to 
focus briefly on those to aspects that have a specific impact upon the delimitation issue. The 
following description, regarding aspects related to continental shelf delimitation, is divided 
into five sub-sections that sequentially deal with: the Australian theory of the 'two shelves'; 
the 1972 Australia/Indonesia seabed boundary agreement; the Portuguese perspective; the 
1989 'Timor Gap' treaty; and the 2001 Timor Sea Arrangement. 
9.2.b)(i) Emergence of the Australian Theory of the 'Two Shelves' 
As will become clear in due time, should the delimitation between Australia and 
East Timor be effected through adjudication, the outstanding issue would most probably be 
the continental shelf boundary. Hence, it is important to start by delving into the question of 
continental shelf entitlement, and its development in international law. 
The 1958 CS Convention states that the legal term 'continental shelf is used to 
encompass "the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside 
the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the 
superjacent waters admits the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas", both in 
relation to continental and insular territories (Article 1). It then adds that the "rights of the 
coastal state over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, 
or on any express proclamation" (Article 2). With respect to delimitation between states, the 
CS Convention utilised a formula that resorted to the notion of equidistance (Article 6). In 
the 1969 North Sea cases, whereas Articles 1 and 2 were deemed to reflect customary law, 
Article 6 was deemed not to have such status379. 
(379) ICJ/Reports/1969, pp.40-46, para.63-81. On this issue, cf. para.2.3.b) supra. 
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The Australian interpretation of the conventional regime led to the enactment of 
legislation (1967) establishing an 'adjacent zone' extending roughly up to the 500-metre 
isobath on the southern side of the Timor Trough. On the basis of this legislation, Australia 
granted exploration permits in those areas. At the time, many questions relating to the 
extension of the legal continental shelf remained unanswered. Juristic reflection was scarce, 
and the ambiguity of the notion of exploitability left plenty of room for elaboration. Above 
all, the legal understanding on the location of the outer limit of the continental shelf was 
still being shaped by the practice of states. It is in this light that the Australian claim to the 
existence of two shelves should perhaps be interpreted. In October 1970, responding to 
doubts raised in regard to the international lawfulness of the 1967 Act, and making explicit 
reference to the dicta of the ICJ in the North Sea cases, the Australian Foreign Minister 
formulated what became known as the Australian theory of the 'two shelves'. 
The rights claimed by Australia in the Timor Sea area are based unmistakably on the 
morphological structure of the sea-bed. The essential feature of the sea-bed beneath 
the Timor Sea is a huge steep cleft or declivity called the Timor Trough, extending 
in an east-western direction, considerably nearer to the coast of Timor than to the 
northern coast of Australia. It is more than 550 nautical miles long and on the 
average 40 miles wide, and the sea-bed slopes down on opposite sides to a depth of 
over 10.000 feet. The Timor Trough thus breaks the continental shelf between 
Australia and Timor, so that there are two distinct shelves, and not one and the same 
shelf, separating the two opposite coasts. The fall-back median line between the two 
coasts, provided for in the Convention in the absence of agreement, would not apply 
for there is no common area to delimit. 3 8 0 
9.2.b)(ii) The 1972 Australia/Indonesia Seabed Boundary Agreement 
In the negotiations with Indonesia that led to the 1972 seabed boundary agreement, 
Australia based its position on the aforesaid theory, in particular on the idea that the Timor 
Trough represented a separation between continental shelves. The treaty does not reflect the 
strict separation along the Timor Trough advocated by the 'two-shelves theory'. What this 
theory did was to give Australia room to negotiate. The agreed boundary appeared thus as a 
'fall back position' in relation to the 'two-shelves theory' claim, while departing minimally 
from the limit used by Australia in its 1967 legislation. 
The 1972 boundary, which is illustrated in Figure 101, runs slightly southwards of 
the Timor Trough axis, and extends to areas where the rights and interests of East Timor (at 
the time a Portuguese possession) required consideration. Owing to this fact, the line was 
interrupted between points A16 and A17, leaving a gap that would become known as the 
(380) AYIL/1970-73, pp. 145-146. As a party to the CS Convention, Australia was bound by the contents of Article 6. 
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'Timor Gap'381. Insofar as it was positioned much closer to the Indonesian coast than to the 
Australian coast, the boundary amounted to the acceptance by Indonesia of the relevance of 
the Australian theory of the 'two shelves'. The North Sea Judgment, to which reference had 
been made in 1970 by Australia, seems to have encouraged this outcome382. 
The nomenclature 'Timor Gap', whose use became common amongst writers, will 
be used here. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that the gap defined by the 1972 treaty is 
unopposable to East Timor. Juridically, it is res inter alios acta (as between Australia and 
Indonesia). The rights and interests of East Timor are therefore protected by the pacta tertiis 
rule3 8 3. Nothing prevents East Timor from advancing claims extending beyond points A16 
and A17. In fact, the possibility that another state (at the time Portugal) would claim areas 
beyond these points was explicitly recognised in the 1972 treaty384: 
The lines between Points A15 and A16 and between Points A17 and A18 [...] 
indicate the direction of those portions of the boundary. In the event of any further 
delimitation agreement or agreements being concluded between governments 
exercising sovereign rights with respect to the exploration of the seabed and the 
exploitation of its natural resources in the area of the Timor Sea, [Australia and 
Indonesia] shall consult each other with a view to agreeing on such adjustment or 
adjustments, if any, as may be necessary in those portions of the boundary lines 
between Points A15 andA16 and between Points A17 and A18. 
9.2.b)(iii) The Portuguese Approach 
East Timor was in the early 1970s a Portuguese territory. Thus, it is important to 
have a brief outline of the approach adopted by Portugal in relation to the Australian theory 
of the 'two shelves'. I f accepted, this theory would basically mean that East Timor would 
have no entitlement to continental shelf beyond the Timor Trough. As the following notes 
show, however, such a possibility was strongly rejected by Portugal. 
In the late 1960s, the Oceanic Exploration Company had approached the Portuguese 
Government to request the granting of an oil and gas concession in the continental shelf off 
the East Timorese coast385. Since the requested concession would overlap with areas over 
which Australia had granted permits, Portugal proposed to Australia, in November 1970, 
the opening of formal negotiations to delimit the continental shelf. Without rejecting it 
openly, Australia replied that it would prefer to wait for the result of the Third Conference, 
(381) Articles 1 and 2 of the 1972 boundary treaty; IMB, pp. 1215-1216. 
(382) Concurring with this view, cf. Prescott, IMB/Report 6-2(2), p.1211. 
(383) VCLT, Articles 34-35. 
(384) Article 3, emphasis added. Insofar as injunction points were in question, the reference to an agreement between Australia and 
Indonesia as to the position of those points is absolutely natural. For trijunction points to be legally valid, they require in practical 
terms that three bilateral agreements be reached. 
(385) For the geographical limits of the requested concessions, cf. Boletim Oficial de Timor No.44, 1970, pp. 1018-1021. 
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and for the conclusion of its negotiations with Indonesia. Disagreeing with the request of 
Oceanic, Australia reasserted its 'two shelves' theory in a 1971 note to Portugal386. 
It was only in 1973, after the conclusion of the negotiations with Indonesia, whose 
result clearly benefited it, that Australia proposed to Portugal the opening of negotiations on 
the delimitation of the continental shelf. Apparently due to successful negotiations with 
Indonesia, Australia affirmed in July 1973 that it would not accept a boundary lying more 
than 50 M off the East Timorese coast. Faced with this position, Portugal granted in January 
1974 a concession off the coast of East Timor to Petrotimor, a company that was to be 
incorporated by Oceanic™. This concession overlapped with areas over which Australia 
had granted permits388, which led to its protest. A dispute arose then as to how delimitation 
was to be effected. Whereas Australia argued that the principle of natural prolongation 
entitled it to the areas south of the Timor Trough, Portugal contended that the two states 
being parties to the CS Convention, Article 6 (thus equidistance) would apply. Portugal 
declined to enter into negotiations on the delimitation of the continental shelf, stating that it 
would be preferable to wait for the results of the Third Conference. 
The major question here is whether, at the time, Portugal held a valid continental 
shelf entitlement beyond the Timor Trough. Under the CS Convention, such an entitlement 
would have to be based on one of two criteria: the 200-metre isobath, and the exploitability 
criterion. Because the 200-metre isobath off East Timor runs on average at a distance of 
some 2.5 M from the coast, and because at the time no exploitation could be carried out at 
depths of over 2,000 metres, the Portuguese entitlement beyond the Timor Trough was at 
first glance legally non-existent. Such an approach however, is too simplistic. 
In 1967, ambassador Pardo's speech in the United Nations had demonstrated that 
the exploitability criterion would sooner or later render the whole of the oceans susceptible 
to appropriation by coastal states. Under the CS Convention, this meant that the oceans 
would eventually be divided on the basis of equidistance. The map used by Germany in the 
1969 North Sea cases (Figure 44) - depicting such a division of the North Atlantic Ocean -
is the paradigmatic illustration of the awareness of states in this respect. By the late 1960s, 
no doubt subsisted as to the future capacity of states to exploit all oceanic areas, regardless 
of depth. The driving force behind the process that led to the LOSC was in fact to somehow 
limit the maritime claims of states. The emergence of an entitlement based on distance was 
(386) The following description is based partially on the Portuguese Memorial in the East Timor case, in particular para.7.04. 
(387) Oceanic and Petrotimor filed a suit on the 21 August 2001, in the Federal Court of Australia, seeking compensation for the 
loss of petroleum rights in the Timor Sea. These companies contend that they were forced to flee East Timor before they could 
start exploration, and that they have since tried to convince Indonesian and Australian authorities of the validity of their claim. 
The figure of some US$ lbn was already advanced as the amount of compensation requested. Cf. The Sydney Morning Herald, 23 
August 2001, «Damages bid hits Timor Gap talks»; Reuters, 22 August 2001, «Oceanic launches Timor Sea legal claim». 
(388) East Timor case, Portuguese Memorial, sketch-map between pp. 198-199. 
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inevitable. It also seemed clear that such an entitlement would always extend much further 
than the territorial sea. The existence of Portuguese entitlement beyond the Timor Trough 
was thus not a question of i f , but when. Faced with this scenario, Australia sought to push 
forward with the boundary negotiations. It negotiated with Indonesia first because its 
chances of success were greater. Since the timing for entering into negotiations is a 
prerogative inherent in the jus tractuum, it is however unsurprising that Portugal declined to 
negotiate in the aftermath of the agreement with Indonesia. Whilst anticipating the changes 
in international law, Portugal showed clear unwillingness to accept a boundary flowing 
from rapidly evanescent entitlement criteria389. 
The concession-area granted by Portugal, and that requested by Oceanic, are shown 
in Figure 103. The concession-area does not extend beyond equidistance (with exception of 
two extremely small areas). Its limits were legally defined as comprising only a part of East 
Timor's continental shelf, and as being subject to adjustments resulting from international 
accords390. The limits of the concession-area granted by Portugal are particularly significant 
because Oceanic's request extended to areas clearly beyond equidistance. Laterally, this 
request was confined by what seemed two perpendiculars to the general direction of East 
Timor's coast. Frontally, three zones have to be considered, extending approximately up to 
the 200-metre isobath off Australia, the equidistance-line, and a line running on average at a 
distance of 180-odd M off East Timor's coast. This discrepancy between request and grant 
leaves no doubt as to Portugal's willingness to abide by Article 6 of the CS Convention. 
The limits of the concession-area purposely avoid connecting with points A16 and A17 
defined in the 1972 treaty, in order to deny relevance to the 'Timor Gap' limits. 
What the Portuguese conduct reveals beyond doubt is a refusal of Australia's claim 
to the whole of the continental shelf south of the Timor Trough391. Such a claim was, in the 
light of the coeval changes in international affairs concerning the law of the sea, an attempt 
to acquire maritime areas which would not belong to it in the future. In the East Timor case, 
Australia contended that the negotiations with Portugal on continental shelf delimitation did 
not take place for "it proved difficult to interest the then Portuguese Administration in the 
(389) Lowe, Carleton and Ward argue that "Australia's position in the 1970s was not necessarily consistent with the jurisprudence of 
the [ICJ] in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases" - for "the ICJ determined that although the concept of natural prolongation of 
the physical continental shelf was fundamental, the result of any delimitation must take into account considerations of equity and 
fairness". They note that "[t]he manifest inequity and unfairness of Australia, with its entitlement to vast maritime zones around 
its coasts, forcing the continental shelf entitlement of Portugal / East Timor into a narrow strip north of the Timor Trough, 
explains the failure of Portugal to agree to the position upon which Australia insisted at that time". Cf. Lowe/Carleton/Ward/2002, 
para. 12.. This view implicitly assumes the existence of an overlapping of entitlements at that time - i.e. "a single physical shelf to 
be divided between Portugal and Australia" (ibid. para. 10). 
(390) For the concession limits, cf. Decree No.25/74, of 31 January 1974, Article 2(1 )(2)(3), published in Didrio da Republica, 
I Serie, No.26, pp. 142-164. The concession contract, and a map (p. 158), are included in this instrument. 
(391) Lowe, Carleton and Ward observe that "Portugal appears to have taken the position that the Timor Trough was not such a 
geologically significant feature in this context as to divide the seabed in the Timor Sea into two separate continental shelves, north 
and south". Cf. Lowe/CarletonAVard/2002, para.10.. 
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issue" (arguably due to its general indifference to East Timor) . This contention is clearly 
contradicted by the events above. More importantly, the 2000 Australian Senate Report on 
East Timor ^Senate Report") recognises that negotiations failed "because Portugal argued 
for a boundary along the mid-line"393. Portugal did not act indifferently. Its clear intention 
was to deny the Australian 'two shelves' theory any recognition (thereby preserving East 
Timor's future rights to larger continental shelf areas). Portugal was unwilling to negotiate 
with Australia at the time because it was not prepared to do so in a position that had been 
clearly weakened by the Indonesian acceptance of the said theory. This suggestion is plainly 
supported by other facts, to which attention will now be drawn. 
9.2.b)(iv) The 1989 'Timor Gap' Treaty 
As a consequence of the Revolution of April 25, 1974, Portugal acknowledged the 
right to self-determination of the peoples of all colonial territories, which included East 
Timor. During the attempted decolonisation, in 1975, an internal armed conflict broke out 
in East Timor between opposing political factions. Portugal, the state in which sovereignty 
was vested, struggled with acute problems in its European territory, and was thus unable to 
control the situation in East Timor394. On 7 December 1975, Indonesian forces occupied 
East Timor. Subsequently, the Oceanic Company addressed the Portuguese Government in 
1976, stating that it was unable to continue its activities, and requesting a suspension of its 
obligations by force majeure. This suspension was granted a few months later. 
In 1979, Australia and Indonesia initiated negotiations to ' f i l l the gap' left by the 
1972 agreement, which corresponded to the entitlement of East Timor395. The purpose was 
initially to complete the seabed boundary. The two states were nevertheless unable to agree 
on a delimitation line. At that time, Indonesia had already realised how damaging the 
previous agreement (negotiated in the aftermath of the North Sea cases) had been to its 
interests. This idea emerges clearly in the words of the Indonesian Foreign Minister, who 
had been the principal member of the Indonesian negotiating team. In December 1978, he 
stated that Australia had in 1972 "taken Indonesia to the cleaners"396. The question is 
certainly not one of wrongdoing, but the raw realisation that the timing of the 1971-1972 
negotiations decisively favoured the Australian views. 
(392) East Timor case, Australian Counter-Memorial, para.384. 
(393) Committee Hansard, Report to the Senate, 7 December 2000, Chapter 4, para.4.15.. 
(394) For a short summary of this process, cf. Teles/2001, pp.588-599. 
(395) The Australian argument - advanced in the East Timor case - as to why it had to deal with Indonesia was three-fold: there 
was no obligation of non-recognition of the Indonesian invasion; the Indonesian effective control of East Timor entailed that 
Australia had no other state to negotiate with; and that these negotiations amounted to the exercise on the part of Australia of its 
rights under international law (East Timor case, Australian Counter-Memorial, paras.318-412). 
(396) Cf. The Sydney Morning Herald, 21 December 1978, «Boundary threat to seabed leases». 
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During the negotiations that led to the 'Timor Gap' treaty397, Australia continued to 
assert its entitlement to a continental shelf up to the Timor Trough, whereas Indonesia 
claimed a 200-mile entitlement (which reflected the developments in the Third Conference). 
The unsuccessful negotiations on delimitation evolved then to the establishment of a Zone 
of Cooperation, founded on the concept of joint development, which broadly encompassed 
the overlapping of entitlements (Figure 101). From north to south, the 'frontal-lines' which 
define the Areas (A, B and C) that constitute this zone are as follows: (I) a straight-line 
representing approximately the Timor Trough axis, i.e. the Australian claimed-entitlement; 
(II) a straight-line simplifying the 1500-metre isobath, which is perhaps predicated on the 
Australian delimitation claim (not far from the line that would join points A16 and A17); 
(III) an equidistance-line, which corresponds to the Indonesian delimitation claim; (IV) the 
200-mile limit from East Timor, i.e. the Indonesian claimed-entitlement. Southwards of the 
1972 boundary, the eastern and western lateral limits are equidistance-lines. To the north 
thereof, they appear to be lines agreed on pragmatic grounds. 
With this agreement, Indonesia accepted an area of 50/50 revenue-split lying fully 
northwards of the equidistance-line. This is difficult to explain in strict legal terms. By 1985 
the ICJ had already asserted the irrelevance of geological and geomorphological factors 
(central to the Australian theory of the 'two-shelves') in delimitations between states whose 
coasts lie less than 400 M apart398. This assertion had decisively weakened the Australian 
position. There is good reason to contend, therefore, that the 'Timor Gap' treaty represents a 
solution based on political premises, rather than legal ones. It seems indeed the result of a 
quid pro quo whereby Indonesia obtained the de jure recognition of its sovereignty over 
East Timor from its most influential neighbour. 
Subsequent to the 'Timor Gap' treaty, Portugal (which under the UN resolutions 
was still East Timor's de jure administering power) seized the ICJ, in 1991, of a dispute 
against Australia. The Portuguese Application argued that, by entering into the 1989 treaty, 
Australia had infringed on the right of the East Timorese people to self-determination, and 
the related rights. This view reflected the principle nemo plus juris transferre potest quam 
ipse habet: one does not have the right to transfer what one does not possess. The 
Portuguese argument was that Australia could not deal with Indonesia, i f only because 
Indonesia (whose occupation of East Timor was unlawful) could not dispose of rights 
belonging to East Timor. The Court considered that it lacked jurisdiction (for Indonesia was 
not a party to the case and its conduct was in question), and consequently that it could not 
rule upon the merits of the case. Notwithstanding this, it is politically noteworthy that the 
(397) For the text of the treaty, cf. IMB, pp. 1256-1328. 
(398) Para.8.2.g) supra. 
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Court reaffirmed that East Timor remained legally a non-self-governing territory, and that 
its people had the right to free self-determination - an erga omnes right3 9 9. 
Of significance in this case, taking into account subsequent developments to which 
reference is made below, are some of the statements regarding what would potentially occur 
should East Timor become an independent state. To Portugal, the result of negotiations over 
the 'Timor Gap' between Australia and an independent East Timor would certainly not be 
as favourable to Australia, as had been in the negotiations with Indonesia400. Contradicting 
this perspective, Australia contended that there was "no basis for Portugal's assertion that 
negotiations with the people of East Timor would not have led to a result as favourable to 
Australia"401. Recent developments in this respect, which culminated with the 2001 'Timor 
Sea Arrangement', appear to have fully vindicated the Portuguese proposition. 
9.2.b)(v) The 2001 Timor Sea Arrangement 
Diplomatic negotiations held between Indonesia and Portugal under the auspices of 
the UN Secretary-General since 1983 sought to reach an agreement on the situation in East 
Timor. A treaty was eventually signed on 5 May 1999. This accord paved the way for the 
popular consultation of 30 August 1999, concerning the political future of East Timor, and 
its status vis-a-vis Indonesia. Voting massively (roughly 80%) in favour of becoming an 
independent state, the East Timorese people freely exercised its right to self-determination. 
After dramatic events that followed the referendum, the United Nations eventually 
set up a transitional administration: the United Nations Transitional Administration in East 
Timor (UNTAET). Its functions were established by the UN Security Council Resolution 
1272 (1999), of October 25. Considering the ongoing activities in the Timor Sea, and its 
powers under the said resolution, UNTAET (acting on behalf of East Timor) concluded an 
agreement with Australia providing for the continuity of the terms of the 'Timor Gap' 
treaty402. Three points need to be stressed in relation to this instrument. First, the United 
Nations explicitly asserted that it did not recognise the validity of the 'integration' of East 
Timor into Indonesia. Secondly, the agreement did not amount to the continuation of the 
'Timor Gap' treaty, which was deemed to be null and void. Only the terms of the treaty 
were continued. Thirdly, the agreement was valid for the transitional period only. Its effects 
were to cease, as they did, as of the day of independence of East Timor. 
A problem remained unresolved. What would happen after independence to the 
petroleum developments in the Timor Sea area, in areas where the rights and interests of 
(399) ICJ/Reports/1995, pp. 100-106, paras.23-37. 
(400) Portuguese Memorial, para.2.03. 
(401) Australian Counter-Memorial, para.388. 
(402) Exchange of Notes of 10 February 2000, constituting an agreement between Australian and UNTAET (DOALOS website). 
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East Timor come into play? This was the subject of further negotiations, which took place 
mainly in 2000 and 2001 - but which in some respect are still in progress. 
The Australian position remained largely unchanged. Australia continued to assert 
its entitlement up to the Timor Trough, on the basis of the 'two shelves' theory. However, 
today, Australia's approach to this issue is primarily driven by a political rationale. Its 
central problem lies in the reaction that Indonesia might have should Australia accept a 
boundary with East Timor differing greatly from the 1972 line. In the words of Gillian 
Triggs (Law Faculty, University of Melbourne), cited in the Senate Report, "[fjhere is no 
doubt Indonesia will feel quite aggrieved if we have unequal boundaries in certain areas 
with Indonesia and we suddenly blow the boundary out and make a more equidistant one in 
relation to East Timor"403. This is why Australia approached the issue in terms of 
renegotiation of the 1989 treaty, referring to a new treaty only at a later stage404. 
With respect to East Timor, the position publicly expressed by the two members of 
the transitional cabinet who co-headed the East Timorese delegation was that the 1989 
treaty was null and void. In short, unless an agreement would be reached, to enter into force 
after independence, a legal vacuum would exist thereinafter. Practically speaking, as far as 
East Timor was concerned, there would be a 'blank sheet'. All lines that had previously 
been agreed between Australia and Indonesia were unopposable thereto. For East Timor, 
the key points in the negotiations were: (a) the 1989 treaty was null and void, and there was 
no question of renegotiating such a treaty; (b) the 1972 boundary was not binding on East 
Timor. Two issues had therefore to be resolved. In respect of the 'frontal limit', East Timor 
claimed rights up to the equidistance-line; and in regard to the 'lateral limits', it did not 
recognise any effect to the 1972 boundary405. 
On 5 July 2001, Australia and UNTAET (East Timor) initialled a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU), to which is attached the 'Timor Sea Arrangement', initially devised 
to enter into force on East Timor's independence406. This instrument establishes a regime 
for joint development of petroleum resources and activities between Australia and East 
Timor, and seeks primarily to replace the 1989 treaty. A detailed discussion of its contents 
(403) Cf. Reuters, 6 October 2000, "Australia seeks to avoid East Timor border dispute". Cf. Senate Report, para.4.15.. 
(404) Cf. Reuters, 31 May 1999, «Timor Gap fiscal, tax uncertainty may affect gas production projects)); Reuters, 15 June 1999, 
«Oil Companies Reassured on Timor Gap Treaty Talks»; Australian Financial Review, 17 January 2001, «AUSTRALIA: News -
Millions at stake in Timor oil talks»; Dow Jones, 17 January 2001, «East Timor Ups Stakes In Oil Treaty Talks With Australian; 
Financial Times, 26 January 2001, «E.Timor Demands Oil Money»; Reuters, 6 April 2001, «Second Round Timor Gap Talks End 
Without Deal»; Herald Sun, 25 May 2002, «Downer Rules Border Changes Out of Bounds)). 
(405) Galbraith/2001. Cf. The Sydney Morning Herald, 21 June 2000, «Timor deal set to deliver windfall for Dili»; Reuters, 26 June 
2000, «E.Timor seeks mid-way boundary with Australian; New York Times, 19 October 2000, «A tonic for East Timor's 
poverty»; The Sydney Morning Herald, 10 April 2001, «UN Talks Tough Line on Timor Gap Negotiations)); The Sydney Morning 
Herald, 28 April 2001, «East Timor Eyes Off Oil's Billions*; The Sydney Morning Herald, 3 May 2001, «Pressure Mounts for 
New Accord on Seabed Carve-up». By a declaration read on the day of independence, East Timor restated its right to negotiate its 
boundaries ex novo; cf. Herald Sun, 21 May 2002, «Oil Row Spoils Timor's Party». 
(406) Due primarily to disagreements on the unitisation of the Greater Sunrise field, Australia and East Timor decided to maintain in 
force until further notice the arrangements in place before East Timor's independence; cf. Exchange of Notes of 20 May 2002. 
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is beyond the scope of this study. It is nevertheless necessary to briefly outline some aspects 
that are relevant for contextualising an analysis on continental shelf delimitation. 
The area to which the Arrangement applies - the Joint Development Petroleum Area 
(JPDA) - corresponds to Area A of the 'Timor Gap' treaty407. Owing to Australia's 
concerns as to a possible Indonesian reaction, the acceptance of the spatial limits of the said 
Area A became, in effect, a conditio sine qua non to reach agreement. A dramatic change 
occurred, however, as to the revenue-split of the petroleum production in this area. Under 
the 2001 Arrangement the revenue-split will be 90/10, favouring East Timor408. This 
appears as a first sign of the recognition of a 'better title' over the area in question; an idea 
furthered by other changes on the level of management structure in relation to the 1989 
treaty (in which the parties appeared on an equal footing). The Arrangement attributes East 
Timor a prominent role in the three-tiered management structure409. After a transitional 
period, the Designated Authority will be East Timor's ministry responsible for petroleum 
activities (or a statutory authority assigned by i t ) 4 1 0 . Within the Joint Commission, 
moreover, East Timor will have one more appointee than Australia411. Finally, it ought to be 
emphasised that this instrument, considered as falling within the category of practical 
arrangements to which Article 83(3) of the LOSC makes reference, is without prejudice of 
the parties' position as regards seabed delimitation412. Apparently, therefore, both parties 
appear to be entitled to continue claiming seabed areas outside the JPDA. 
One ought to ask, however, whether this 'formal' safeguard is sufficient to fully 
prevent the practical impact of the establishment of a zone of petroleum exploitation. Since 
Area A of the 1989 Treaty is the JPDA of the 2001 Arrangement, and since patterns of 
petroleum exploitation in this area might consolidate further through the 2001 Arrangement, 
courts may in the future be reluctant to disturb what may become crystallised patterns of 
petroleum exploitation. Quieta non movere. The Tunisia/Libya case, and the Eritrea/Yemen 
arbitration are clear examples of adjudications in which such patterns influenced the choice 
of boundary-line413. The 'without prejudice clause' thus may be weakened by the fact that 
delimitation law places weight on de facto patterns of petroleum exploitation. It all depends 
(407) Article 3(a), and Annex A. 
(408) Article 4(a). The Exchange of Notes of 20 May 2002 has provided for the maintenance of this revenue-split. 
(409) Under Article 6, the Regulatory Bodies are: the Designated Authority, the Joint Commission, and the Ministerial Council. 
(410) Article 6(b)(ii). The Designated Authority will control the day-to-day activities in the JPDA. 
(411) Article 6(c)(i). The Joint Commission is the organ competent for establishing the policies and regulations relating to 
petroleum activities in the JPDA, which is empowered also to oversee the work of the Designated Authority. It must be noted, 
nevertheless, that the Commissioners have an individual competence to refer directly issues to the Ministerial Council 
(subparagraph iii). With this, Australian Commissioners may refer to the Council majority decisions taken by the three East 
Timorese commissioners. 
(412) Article 2. 
(413) Para.8.3.d).vu/>ra. 
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on how this is balanced with the fact that, ex vi pactum , the 2001 Arrangement ceases to 
exist should a delimitation between Australia and East Timor be effected. 
What this brief outline also shows is that the position of East Timor under the 2001 
Arrangement is manifestly better than that of Indonesia under the 1989 treaty415. This fact 
evidences the advisability of the Portuguese conduct in this respect. For one thing, it is now 
clear that Portugal was right in not accepting to negotiate with Australia in the aftermath of 
the 1972 Australia/Indonesia treaty, and in continuing to claim a seabed boundary beyond 
the Timor Trough. For another, it confirms that Portugal was correct when suggesting, as it 
did in the East Timor case, that Australia would not obtain in a negotiation with East Timor 
a result as favourable as that that it had obtained in the negotiations with Indonesia. 
9.2.c) Jurisdiction over the Water Column: Brief Notes 
In respect of the jurisdiction over the water column, it must first be observed that the 
exclusiveness of fishing resources in areas further offshore crystallised in the late 1970s 
only, through the concept of EEZ. When the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases were decided (July 
1974), the right of states to claim exclusive fishing zones beyond 12 M remained doubtful. 
The acceptance of the 200-mile limit cemented in 1976 only, during the Third 
Conference416. This inspired many states to subsequently claim jurisdiction up to this limit 
in domestic legislation. Australia established a 200-mile fisheries zone in 1979; Indonesia 
proclaimed a 200-mile EEZ in 1980417. What this demonstrates is that some of the relevant 
developments took place after the Indonesian occupation of East Timor. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, the contextual aspects to consider here are much more recent than those of the 
continental shelf. Thus, the Portuguese conduct is less relevant. 
A second point is helpful for explaining why the question of the jurisdiction over the 
water column was less controversial than that of the continental shelf: the resources in 
question are significantly less relevant for the states involved. Furthermore, what could 
have been the contentious issue between Australia and Indonesia in this respect - the access 
of traditional Indonesian fishermen to those Australian waters to which they had had access 
over decades of time - had already been resolved in 1974, before the 200-mile limit had 
acquired widespread support418. 
(414) Article 22. 
(415) It was reported recently that, following the agreement of December 2001 between East Timor and Phillips (as regards the field 
Bayu-Undan), East Timor and Australia were on the verge of negotiating a new treaty, to be signed on East Timor's independence 
day; cf. Business Wire, 21 December 2001, ((Phillips Announces Agreement with East Timor On Bayu-Undan Gas Development)) 
The Sunday Times - Australia, 22 December 2001, «Darwin gas pipeline back on»; Upstream, IS February 2002, «Aussics to sign 
new Timor Gap treaty». The agreement signed however, does not seem to have substantively altered the 2001 Arrangement. 
(416) Cf. Nordquist/1993, pp.550-551; Churcill/Lowe/1999, pp.284-289. 
(417) In 1994, Australia has proclaimed an EEZ. The Indonesian E E Z legislation in force today was enacted in 1983. 
(418) Prescott, IMB/Report 6-2(4), p.1233. 
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When examining the delimitation of the water column boundary between Australia 
and East Timor, account must be taken of two agreements entered into by Australia and 
Indonesia: the 1981 MOU on the Implementation of a Provisional Fisheries Surveillance 
Enforcement Arrangement; and the 1997 Treaty establishing an EEZ Boundary and Certain 
Seabed Boundaries^9. The former established a 'jurisdictional-limit' concerning fisheries, 
which was used as a de facto provisional fisheries boundary. This line coincides with that 
adopted as EEZ boundary in 1997. According to a government source, Australia seems to 
have accepted the idea that the 1981-line had become in the meantime "a de facto water 
column/EEZ boundary"420. 
This strict equidistance-line became under the 1997 treaty the boundary dividing the 
water column jurisdiction between Australia and Indonesia in areas in which the interests of 
East Timor were involved (Figure 101). As shown, the line is also partially coincident with 
the southern limit of the JPDA. Mention must be made here of two issues. First, despite the 
fact that the 1997 treaty concerns also areas belonging to East Timor, as far as this state is 
concerned, the boundary is res inter alios acta. For East Timor because rejects the status of 
successor to Indonesia421. Otherwise, because boundaries are excluded from the tabula rasa 
rule, East Timor would be bound thereby422. Noteworthy is the fact that Portugal protested 
the signature of this treaty to the extent that it related to East Timor423. Pointing out that it 
purported to delimit also the EEZ boundary between Australia and the non-self-governing 
territory of East Timor, and contending that Indonesia's entry and continued presence in 
East Timor was unlawful, Portugal informed Australia that it did not recognise the intended 
delimitation. Secondly, it must be noted that this boundary has an effect over the water 
column jurisdiction that somewhat mirrors the effect of the 1972 line as to seabed/subsoil. 
Just as Indonesia has relinquished its seabed/subsoil rights vis-a-vis Australia to the south of 
the 1972 boundary, Australia has relinquished its water column rights vis-a-vis Indonesia to 
(419) Appendix 2, D5, F3. The 1997 treaty is yet to be ratified. It is unlikely that the ratification takes place without the treaty being 
altered first to take account of East Timor's independence. 
(420) Statement cited in Herriman/Tsamenyi/1998, p.365. 
(421) The Preamble and Section 1(2) of East Timor's Constitution states that 28 November 1975 is the day of proclamation of 
independence. This suggests that East Timor seeks to be recognised formally as an independent state since 1975, which appears to 
entail a succession to Portugal - or at the very least that East Timor is not a successor to Indonesia. Several arguments (which due 
to this study's scope must be outlined in brief terms) support this standpoint. To assume that East Timor succeeds to Indonesia 
amounts to sanction legally the Indonesian occupation; this would have complex implications on the consecration of the rule of 
law in international affairs - in particular the non-use of force. Moreover, it would be inconsistent with a number of resolutions of 
the UN General Assembly. In addition, if the other option - succession to Portugal - is not accepted, the political status of East 
Timor between 1975 and 1999 will not be easy to conceive on juridical grounds. In effect, the stance taken by UNTAET during 
the negotiations that preceded the 2001 Arrangement is indicative of refusal of the idea of succession to Indonesia. By affirming 
that it did not recognise the validity of the integration of East Timor into Indonesia, that the 'Timor Gap Treaty' was null and 
void, and that there was no question of renegotiation of the 1989 treaty, the United Nations asserted the unlawfulness of the 
Indonesian occupation (para.9.2.b)(v) infra). 
(422) VCSSRT, Article I I . 
(423) Note verbale from the Portuguese Embassy in Canberra, dated 28 August 1997, addressed to the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade of the Government of Australia (LOS Bulletin No.35, pp.97-98). 
-370-
TOWARDS THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF MARITIME DELIMITATION 
the north of the 1997 boundary. How then are the spatial limits of the water column rights 
claimed by East Timor in this area to be established?424 
In terms of delimitation, the situation that has been created for East Timor with the 
1972 and the 1997 boundaries is rather singular. Although the area in question was initially 
a tripartite overlapping of entitlements, in-between those boundary-lines (i.e. with respect to 
'lateral-lines'), East Timor has to deal with one state only. Whereas its counterpart for the 
seabed/subsoil delimitation is Australia, its counterpart for the water column delimitation is 
Indonesia. As between Australia and East Timor, the impact on the delimitation is two-fold. 
First, the seabed/subsoil boundary and the water column boundary can never fully coincide 
(because the delimitation of the water column has to consider no 'lateral-lines'). Secondly, 
there are no grounds to suggest that the 'lateral-lines' applicable to seabed/subsoil boundary 
between Australia and East Timor ought to coincide with the water column boundary 
between Indonesia and East Timor425. 
Another problem that would emerge should the delimitation between Australia and 
East Timor be referred to adjudication is the 'third-state issue' - which brings about further 
difficulties to the water column delimitation. Unlike the 1972 treaty, the 1997 treaty has 
neither left a 'gap' to accommodate East Timor's rights, nor included a provision similar to 
Article 3 of the 1972 treaty. For practical purposes, a water-column delimitation between 
Australia and East Timor thus entails a 'cut' on the 1997 boundary, involving a third state. 
Such an issue is one with which a tribunal would perhaps deal very cautiously. 
9.3. Starting Point for the Delimitation 
9.3.a) The Overlapping of Entitlements 
9.3.a)(i) Entitlements Based on Distance 
That the existence of an overlapping of entitlements is a conditio sine qua non for 
delimitation, and that delimitation is to be effected by reference thereto, was asserted in 
recent case law 4 2 6. Owing to the consecration of the distance criterion as the primary basis 
of entitlement, the overlapping of entitlements is typically defined through envelopes of 
arcs measured from the coasts of the states involved. As between Australia and East Timor, 
the overlapping of 200-mile entitlements extends beyond a 90-degree frontal projection of 
East Timor's facade (Figure 101). This image helps focusing on the idea that the potential 
(424) When proclaiming - Constitution, Section 4(2) - that the "extent and limits of [•••] the EEZ [...] shall be laid down in the 
law", East Timor is implicitly advancing a claim over the water column. 
(425) Para.9.5.b)(iii) infra. 
(426) Para.4.3.b) supra. 
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entitlement of East Timor extends well beyond the so-called 'Timor Gap', the relevance of 
which as limit of East Timorese claims is virtually negligible. 
None of this would justify the suggestion that the whole of the said overlapping of 
entitlements is to be divided between Australia and East Timor exclusively. No doubt, parts 
thereof belong to Indonesia. Its entitlement overlaps to great extent therewith, and many 
parts thereof lie much closer to Indonesia's coast than to either Australia's or East Timor's 
coasts. Or put differently, the determination of the maritime boundaries between Australia 
and East Timor cannot be effected without duly considering Indonesia's entitlement427. An 
important distinction has nevertheless to be made. Whilst between Australia and Indonesia 
the division of areas of exclusiveness is comprehensively made through bilateral treaties, 
between Indonesia and East Timor such a division is yet to be undertaken. 
9.3.a)(ii) The Australian Theory of the 'Two Shelves': What Relevance? 
In respect of the overlapping of entitlements, another question must be asked. What 
relevance, i f any, should be given to the Australian theory of the 'two shelves'? To properly 
answer the question, its scope must be refined. The original argument founded on the notion 
of natural prolongation meant that East Timor's continental shelf entitlement stopped at the 
Timor Trough428. Owing to the developments that took place in international law since the 
theory was first formulated, today this proposition finds no support. East Timor's 200-mile 
entitlement (including the seabed and subsoil) is beyond question. What Australia might 
claim is that its natural prolongation extends up to the Timor Trough. If accepted, this idea 
would become relevant on two specific levels. On the one hand, insofar as it concerns a 
continental shelf entitlement beyond 200 M, it might have an impact on the definition of the 
overlapping of continental shelf entitlements. On the other hand, as an element of the 
'factual-matrix', the Timor Trough might lead to the formulation of a delimitation factor, to 
be weighed-up in the delimitation process. At this juncture, only the first issue has to be 
addressed. The question is whether or not Australia's argument entails a redefinition of the 
overlapping of continental shelf entitlements (which would then differ from the overlapping 
of water column entitlements). 
On account of a number of reasons, which are articulated below, one would submit 
that, in casu, the answer ought to be given in the negative: this entitlement beyond 200 M 
should not be considered to redefine the relevant overlapping. The first argument resides in 
the presumption of precedence between different entitlements. In principle, East Timor's 
(427) Para.9.3.b) infra. 
(428) Para.9.2.b)(i) supra. 
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200-mile entitlement should have precedence over Australia's entitlement beyond 200 M . 
This presumption is rebuttable only if, objectively, it would hamper achieving an equitable 
solution. As can be easily demonstrated, that is not the case. Suppose ad absurdum that the 
whole of the said area is awarded to Australia. This would be patently inequitable whatever 
the view taken as to Australia's entitlement. Hence, the boundary must a fortiori fall within 
the overlapping of 200-mile entitlements, an area which provides enough scope to avoid 
inequitableness. The presumption mentioned above should thus be upheld. 
The second reason pertains to the bilateral relationship between Australia and East 
Timor. Whether geomorphological features are relevant for continental shelf entitlement has 
depended much on agreement between the states involved. For instance, whilst Indonesia 
accepted (by the 1972 treaty) that the Timor Trough was critical for its continental shelf 
delimitation vis-a-vis Australia, the UK and Norway agreed that the Norwegian Trough was 
irrelevant for continental shelf delimitation. Since Portugal has never acquiesced to the 
relevancy of the Timor Trough vis-a-vis East Timor, and claimed that the boundary should 
be based on equidistance, no claim predicated on historical consolidation can be opposed to 
East Timor. Therefore, unless Australia provides scientific evidence showing beyond doubt 
that the Timor Trough represents today a cut-off of the continental margin, its relevancy for 
defining the overlapping of continental shelf entitlements cannot be legally entertained. 
A final argument for denying relevance to Australia's entitlement beyond 200 M is 
related to the fact that, scientifically, it is far from clear that the Timor Trough represents a 
cut-off of East Timor's natural prolongation. In fact, the Timor Trough might not represent 
a geological separation between Timor and the Australian margin430. The idea that Timor 
has become, and is at present, an accreted part of the Australian margin finds support 
amongst geologists. I f so, the continental margin is not interrupted at the Timor Trough. 
Should this be true, the whole of the seabed/subsoil of the Timor Sea forms a continuous 
continental margin. The argument that only Australia has an entitlement based on natural 
prolongation thus would be flawed. For the possibility that Australia and East Timor have 
between them a continuous continental shelf, i.e. they both would have a continental shelf 
entitlement up to each other's outer limit of the territorial sea, must be legally contemplated. 
As shown, the question of overlapping of entitlements becomes more complex when 
entitlements predicated on natural prolongation are claimed. Without expert advice, courts 
might find it altogether impossible to determine whether there is an overlap of entitlements, 
and/or the extension thereof. Even i f that would happen, it is not certain that a decision 
would be made (as demonstrated in the Libya/Malta case). It is equally noteworthy that the 
(429) Paras.4.3.d(iii)(iv) supra. 
(430) Para.9.4.b) infra. 
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scientific-technical issues involved here are virtually the same as those raised as to the 
extension of the continental shelf beyond 200 M. The possibility that courts call upon the 
CLCS for technical expertise is however not contemplated in the Commission's Rules of 
Procedure^. Since courts' decisions would ultimately contribute to the discharge of the 
Commission's duties432, one would suggest that, subject to an agreement between the 
parties, the request should be accepted. Although such an agreement might be difficult to 
reach in most cases433, there will be instances in which the states involved might conclude 
that it is in their best interests that the issue be resolved definitively. 
9.3.b) The 'Third-State Issue': Aspects Relating to Indonesia 
As aforesaid, Indonesia's maritime entitlement is an issue that would surface in the 
delimitation between Australia and East Timor. Case law and state practice indicate that the 
presence of third states, prima facie, is not impeditive of maritime delimitation434. A 
number of decisions concerning maritime delimitation have been rendered in cases 
involving third states. Of these decisions, particular attention must be directed to the 
Tunisia/Libya and Libya/Malta cases, and in regard to some specific aspects to the 
Qatar/Bahrain case and the Dubai/Sharjah and Eritrea/Yemen arbitrations. In state practice, 
the presence of third states has equally not been an impediment to effecting bilateral 
delimitations435 - so much so that agreements on trijunction points usually are subsequent to 
agreements on the bilateral boundaries that converge thereto. 
Noteworthy here is also the fact that the Judgment on the preliminary objections in 
the Cameroon/Nigeria case confirmed the suggestion made above. Citing the East Timor 
case, the ICJ restated that, notwithstanding the principle of consent as basis for conferring 
jurisdiction, "it is not necessarily prevented from adjudicating when the judgment it is asked 
to give might affect the legal interests of a state which is not party to the case". Meanwhile, 
it acknowledged that, in the circumstances of the Cameroon/Nigeria case, the impact of the 
judgment required by Cameroon on third states' rights "could be such that the Court would 
be prevented from rendering it in the absence of these states". Whether such states would 
choose to intervene, it observed, remained to be seen436. Subsequently, Equatorial Guinea 
(431) During the Open Meeting held in New York on 1 May 2000, the author asked members of the CLCS what would be the reply 
should the question be posed. The answer was that this possibility would be assessed only if and when it arises. 
(432) LOSC, Annex n, Article 3; CLCS/RoP, Rule 55. 
(433) First, unless the scientific data would have already been collected, the costs involved would be rather significant. Secondly, 
states are always reluctant to release scientific data (sometimes classified) regarding their continental shelf areas (which would 
have to occur at least in relation to the other party and to the court). Finally, the possibility that the CLCS would give a scientific 
answer that would not have the certainty required for courts to make a binding decision on this matter cannot be ruled out. 
(434) As to the question of the presence of third states as an element of the 'factual matrix', cf. para.8.2.f) supra. 
(435) Colson presents an overview of state practice (Colson/1993, pp.61-63). 
(436) ICJ/Reports/1998, p.324, para. 116, emphasis added. 
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requested permission to intervene in the proceedings as non-party, which was granted by 
the Court. 
Therefore, the question to ask is whether Indonesia's position is such that a court 
asked to delimit the boundaries between Australia and East Timor would find it impossible 
to undertake its task, fully or partially, without affecting Indonesia's rights and interests. 
We think not, regardless of whether or not Indonesia would intervene in the proceedings437, 
or would otherwise address the court to raise issues relating to its position as a third state. 
And this answer is without prejudice to the proposition that Article 59 of the Statute of the 
ICJ is insufficient to effectively protect third parties' rights and interests, owing to the 
imprimatur that the decision of an international court (especially the ICJ) would de facto 
confer upon the boundary adjudged438. 
Suppose that Indonesia decided to request permission to intervene. If, as suggested 
elsewhere, future cases on third-party intervention are decided by reference to the approach 
adopted in the Cameroon/Nigeria case, which concerned Equatorial Guinea's request for 
permission to intervene439, then Indonesia's request should be granted. First, in the area 
between the 1972 and 1997 boundaries, Indonesia's water column rights are superimposed 
to Australia's and East Timor's seabed/subsoil rights440. Secondly, the understanding of 
Article 3 of the 1972 Australia/Indonesia treaty, which concerns points Al5 to A18, might 
be under discussion. Thirdly, in casu, to view the Indonesian boundaries with Australia, and 
East Timor, as unrelated to the Australia/East Timor boundaries would be an abstraction 
that would serve no purpose in international law. 
Assuming that Indonesia would somehow inform the court of its concerns about the 
outcome of the case, and would refer to a claim over a specific area441, the most restrictive 
view would lead to effect the delimitation only in relation to areas over which Indonesia 
advanced no claims - as occurred in Libya/Malta case in relation to Italy's claims442. But 
perhaps this approach ought not to be repeated, for as Judge Schwebel observed "it is an 
unhappy precedent"443. The decision to cut-off the boundary at the limits of Italy's claims 
placed undue weight on third parties' claims. The approach adopted in the Tunisia/Libya 
case, which resorted to a boundary with an undefined end-point (thus not conditioned by 
(437) As to intervention before the ICJ and ITLOS, cf. ICJ/Statute, Articles 62-63; ITLOS/Rules, Articles 99-104. 
(438) Cf. Antunes/2000c, pp.178-179; also para.8.2.f) supra. 
(439) Cf. Antunes/2000c, pp. 175-187. 
(440) The distinction between some water column rights and seabed/subsoil rights is in practical terms not always easy to draw. Cf. 
the rights concerning artificial islands (LOSC, Articles 60 and 80), and the rights concerning living resources, notably sedentary 
species (LOSC, Articles 68 and 77(4)). 
(441) These claims would be vis-a-vis East Timor; between Australia and Indonesia, the 1972 and 1997 treaties govern the issue. 
(442) ICJ/Reports/1985, pp.24-28, paras.20-23. As Judges Mosler and Schwebel show in their Dissenting Opinions, although Italy's 
request for permission to intervene was denied, for all practical purposes the Court has acted upon Italy's views as if such request 
had been granted (ICJ/Reports/1985, pp.116-117,172-177). See Figure 8. 
(443) Dissenting Opinion, ICJ/Reports/1985, p. 177. 
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Malta's claim), appears to be preferable . Notably, the position of Iran as a non-party to 
the 1981 Dubai/Sharjah arbitration was protected by recourse to a similar type of solution: 
a 12-mile arc with an undefined end-point445. 
Two recent decisions offer indications that case law is unlikely to follow along the 
lines of the Libya/Malta case. During the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, Saudi Arabia suggested 
to the Tribunal that its decision should "not extend north of the latitude of the most northern 
point on Jabal al-Tayr island". The Tribunal decided to extend the boundary further north, 
while affirming that it believed that the terminal point thereof stopped nonetheless "well 
short of where the boundary line might be disputed by any third state"446. Undoubtedly 
noteworthy here is the fact that it was the Tribunal's perspective that fixed the limits beyond 
which the boundary did not extend. Furthermore, in the Qatar/Bahrain case, although only 
for short segments, the Court confirmed the reversion to open-ended-lines when dealing 
with the presence of third states (in casu, Iran and Saudi Arabia)447. 
Recourse to open-ended lines finds clear support in state practice, being perhaps the 
most commonly used approach amongst states448. Thus, the protection of Indonesia's rights 
(to which any court would have to attend) is not tantamount either to saying that 
delimitation should not be effected, or to restricting the boundary by reference to claims 
made by Indonesia (should any claims be advanced). Technically feasible in various ways, 
the recourse to open-ended-lines allows the delimitation of the whole disputed area to be 
effected without interfering with third states' positions. 
A second point relating to Indonesia's legal position is more complex. It concerns 
the effect of the 1997 treaty, and the issue of state succession that might be intertwined 
here. If it were considered that East Timor succeeds to Indonesia, the 1997 boundary would 
be binding on East Timor. Boundary treaties are unaffected by state succession449, even in 
relation to newly independent states. By taking the view that East Timor does not succeed 
to Indonesia, the answer acquires a different complexion. How then should a court tackle 
the problem of an agreement entered into by a third party (Indonesia), which nonetheless 
purported to delimit also the water column boundary between the two parties before it 
(Australia and East Timor)? 
The question might appear similar to that in the East Timor case, in which the Court 
declined to exercise jurisdiction, on the basis of the Monetary Gold principle. There is a key 
difference, however. The dispute would involve an independent East Timor (claiming not to 
(444) ICJ/Reports/1982, p.94, para.l33.C.(3); see Figure 5. 
(445) ILR/9I/I993, p.680; see Figure 4. 
(446) Eritrea/Yemen-II, paras.44-46, 136, 164; see Figure 12. 
(447) Qatar/Bahrain-Merits, para.250, in fine. Cf. para.6.3.d)(iii) supra. 
(448) Colson/1993, p.61. This author has identified five different techniques used by states to address the 'third-state issue'. 
(449) VCSSRT, Article 11. On the question of East Timor as a successor state, cf. para.9.2.c) supra, fn.421. 
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be a successor to Indonesia), and would cover issues of state succession as regards the 1997 
boundary treaty. Upholding the East Timorese viewpoint indirectly asserts the unlawfulness 
of the Indonesian occupation (the investigation of which seems to depend, according to the 
East Timor case, on the presence of Indonesia450). By contrast, considering that East Timor 
is a successor to Indonesia would be tantamount to underwrite the view that the Indonesian 
occupation was lawful, an even more questionable assertion. A 'non-decision' would loom 
once more. Whether jurisdiction would be exercised, and should it not be exercised, where a 
non-pronouncement would leave international law, can only be conjectured. What seems 
inadvisable is not to ponder the possibility that the Monetary Gold principle would lead to 
the dismissal of the proceedings again. 
The notions of 'indispensable party', and of 'very subject-matter of the case', offer 
nevertheless room for discretion. It may be argued that Indonesia should not be seen as an 
'indispensable party' because its conduct would not be the very subject-matter of the case: 
its rights would not be essentially affected should it be concluded that, as between Australia 
and East Timor, the 1997 agreement has no relevance. Weight is perhaps lent to this view 
by the Phosphate Lands case. Apparently, to the Court, even i f the findings of a case "have 
implications for the legal situation" of states other than the parties, as long as "no finding in 
respect of that legal situation" is required as a basis for the decision, courts cannot decline 
to exercise jurisdiction451. Insofar as the decision could incorporate caveats that would be 
sufficient to protect Indonesia's rights (e.g. by restating the strict inter partes effect of the 
decision), the only requirement would be that the boundary-line would not extend to areas 
over which Indonesia could currently have a reasonable claim. 
9.3.c) The Provisional Equidistance-Line 
Since it was argued that equidistance is the starting point for all delimitations, it 
becomes necessary to determine which equidistance-line is to be utilised as the provisional 
line between Australia and East Timor452. Even at this early stage, the complexity of this 
delimitation will become apparent. 
The first task consists of identifying the basepoints from which the provisional 
equidistance-line is to be computed. If account is taken only of the basepoints located on the 
Australian and the East Timorese coastlines, the resulting 'frontal-equidistance' runs as 
illustrated in Figure 99. Any doubts still subsisting as to the need to consider Indonesia's 
(450) ICJ/Reports/1995, p.105, para.35. 
(451) ICJ/Reports/1992, pp.261-262, para.55. 
(452) On the proposition that equidistance is mandatory, cf. paras.6.3.c), 6.3.d), and Conclusions to Part II supra. It must be restated 
that the course of an equidistance-line depends on the basepoints from which it is computed (para.5.2.a)(ii) supra). 
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maritime entitlement in this delimitation disappear once this equidistance-line is computed. 
The further eastwards and westwards it is prolonged, the deeper the equidistance-line runs 
into areas where the rights and interests of Indonesia become a relevant consideration. 
For the delimitation between Australia and East Timor to be possible, in the absence 
of Indonesia, it is necessary to safeguard Indonesia's rights and interests from its effect. 
Such a 'protective approach' must be weighed-up at various levels throughout this process. 
How it bears upon the definition of the provisional equidistance-line is the question that 
must be addressed at this point. To put it differently, the provisional equidistance-line for 
the delimitation between Australia and East Timor must be defined so that Indonesia's 
rights and interests are protected from the outset. As argued, equidistance and equidistant 
trijunction points are the reference-notions for dealing with third state issues453. In this case, 
however, account must be taken also of East Timor's singular position, resultant from the 
effect of the 1972 and 1997 Australia/Indonesia agreements. 
The first point to make is concerned with the delimitation of the water column 
boundary, and the effect of the 1997 Australia/Indonesia treaty, which was entered into on 
the assumption that East Timor was part of the Indonesian territory. Although the boundary 
established thereby includes the delimitation between Australia and an 'Indonesian East 
Timor', inasmuch as it has been suggested that East Timor does not succeed to Indonesia, 
that boundary is viewed as not being binding on East Timor. 
The second point concerns the concessions made by Australia and Indonesia to each 
other in areas where East Timor's position is compellingly strong (i.e. south-southeastwards 
of its coast). The fact that through the said agreements, vis-a-vis East Timor, neither has 
Indonesia waived seabed/subsoil rights, nor has Australia waived water column rights, must 
be dealt with cautiously. For all practical purposes, perhaps the reality should be seen as 
follows. South of the 1972 line, Australia may claim any seabed/subsoil rights that would 
otherwise appertain to Indonesia. Inasmuch as there is no doubt whatever that the 'gap' left 
therein was meant to accommodate the rights belonging to East Timor, this line effects a 
comprehensive seabed/subsoil delimitation between Australia and Indonesia. North of the 
1997 boundary, in contradistinction, Indonesia may claim any water column rights that 
would otherwise appertain to Australia. 
The third point, a corollary of the previous point, is that any delimitation involving 
East Timor must de undertaken in the light of the interwoven picture of 'exclusiveness' 
created by these agreements454. For the division of all Timor Sea areas that do not appertain 
(453) Para.6.3.d)(iii) supra. 
(454) It has been recently reported that Indonesia would join Australia and East Timor to negotiate their common boundaries. 
Upstream, 15 February 2002, «Aussies to sign new Timor Gap treaty)). Apparently, however, Indonesia will advance no claims 
over what became know as the 'Timor Gap', which the Indonesian foreign affairs minister reportedly considered to be a question 
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to East Timor has already been effected. What is still to be effected (in terms of attribution 
of areas of 'exclusiveness') is the determination of which areas belong to East Timor. From 
a practical perspective, it may be argued that Indonesia's claims to seabed/subsoil rights 
south of the 1972 boundary are now vested in Australia, and that Australia's claims to water 
column rights north of the 1997 boundary are now vested in Indonesia. In other words, just 
as Australia is invested with Indonesia's potential seabed/subsoil rights south of the 1972 
boundary, Indonesia is invested with Australia's potential water column rights north of the 
1997 boundary. By conceiving the issue in this fashion, it becomes clear that East Timor's 
position in the delimitation can only be assessed, practically speaking, by reference to both 
Australia and Indonesia. As it turns out, therefore, the provisional equidistance-line should 
consider all relevant basepoints along the coasts of the three states. The line to be adjusted 
consists of three segments: a 'frontal-equidistance' between Australia and East Timor, and 
two 'lateral-equidistances' between Indonesia and East Timor (Figure 99)4 5 5. Notably, to 
the extent that these lines converge to the equidistant trijunction points involving the three 
states, the 'third-state issue' is considered from the beginning. 
It can scarcely be overstressed that this has a crucial impact on the determination of 
the boundary between Australia and East Timor, i f it is concluded that the boundary will not 
be an extension of the lines adopted by Australia and Indonesia (whether as to the water 
column, or as to the seabed/subsoil, or both). Should this occur (which is almost inexorable 
at least in relation to the seabed/subsoil boundary, one might add), despite the fact that the 
Australia and East Timor coasts are geographically in oppositeness, their common boundary 
will consist of three different segments: one 'frontal-segment', and two 'lateral-segments' 
(which join the Australia/East Timor and the Australia/Indonesia boundaries in question). 
9.4. Relevant Facts 
With the provisional equidistance-line determined, it is then necessary to enquire 
whether this line yields a reasonable solution, and if not, which adjustments are required. 
These questions, it is submitted, are best answered by reference to an itemised appraisal of 
all those facts germane in concreto to the delimitation process. In essence, what must be 
undertaken is an elaboration on which aspects are to be considered, and how they are to be 
considered, in the optimisation of the principles of maritime zoning and of equity. This 
entails delving into the 'factual matrix' in casu. The delimitation factors that will emerge 
that regards Australia and East Timor exclusively; cf. The Jakarta Post, 16 February 2002, «Indonesia to discuss Timor Gap with 
Australia and East Timor». 
(455) Para.9.2.a)(i) supra. 
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from this analysis will ultimately consist of conditions to fulfil, or objectives to attain, with 
a view to ensure the reasonableness of the boundary-line. 
There is good reason to believe that, as happened in previous cases, the arguments 
advanced by the parties to justify their claim-lines would constitute an important reference 
for the court's reasoning. A brief summary of what could be the Australian approach may 
be found in Australia's Counter-Memorial in the East Timor case. Whilst referring to the 
question of competing rights in the Timor Sea area, in the light of the 1989 treaty, Australia 
stressed that its coastline "in the relevant area is considerably longer than that appurtenant 
to East Timor and that for reasons of history, geomorphology and geography, Australia 
regards the area covered by the Zone of Cooperation as being an area over which it has 
sovereign rights"456. In relation to East Timor, official statements providing evidence of this 
type are harder to find. The Prime Minister's statement made on the day of independence 
makes only a general reference to international law. Some indication is nonetheless found in 
the arguments advanced by UNTAET during the negotiation of the 2001 Arrangement. 
Reference was made to various points, namely: (i) the overtaking of the notion of natural 
prolongation by the concept of200-mile continental shelf, as far as maritime entitlement is 
concerned; (ii) the Portuguese rejection of any delimitation based on natural prolongation; 
(iii) the recourse to equidistance in the 'frontal delimitation'; and (iv) the irrelevance of the 
1972 boundary for delimiting 'laterally' the areas attributed to East Timor457. The following 
analysis, without venturing into specifying possible claim-lines, attempts to discuss the 
relevance of these elements, and whether other elements might be weighed-up, for purposes 
of adjusting the provisional equidistance-line. 
9.4.a) Coastal Length and Proportionality 
Coastal length and proportionality are considerations that inescapably would have to 
be dealt with. Australia would be likely to refer thereto, to advance a claim-line probably 
positioned north of the 'frontal equidistance-line'. To expound on this issue, a step-by-step 
approach is necessary. Answers ought to be given successively to a number of questions. 
Stemming from the analysis made above458, they seek to provide a coherent and organised 
framework for evaluating the relevance in concreto of this type of argument: (1) Which 
coasts are relevant? (2) What coastal lengths are in question? (3) Which area is relevant for 
(436) East Timor case, Australian Counter-Memorial, para.385, emphasis added. These arguments have been, and seem to remain 
the basis of Australia's argument on delimitation (cf. para.9.2.b) supra). 
(457) Cf. Galbraith/2001; para.9.2.b)(v) supra. 
(458) For an elaboration on the conceptual foundations of coastal length and proportionality, including coastal length measurement, 
area-computations and 'grossness factors', cf. para.8.2.e) supra. 
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proportionality assessments (if deemed necessary)? (4) What area-apportionment is effected 
by equidistance? (5) What 'grossness factor' is at issue? 
9.4.a)(i) Coastal Lengths 
Overall, the Australian coast is probably one of the longest in the world. To answer 
the first question, it is necessary to determine which part of the Australian coast is relevant 
for purposes of the delimitation vis-a-vis East Timor - for it is indisputable that not all parts 
thereof are relevant for the present delimitation. In the Jan Mayen case, when establishing 
which part of Greenland's coast was relevant, the Court took account only of the coastal 
stretch between the two most extreme basepoints that contributed to the computation of the 
equidistance-line459. There is good reason to argue that, by analogy, this 'precedent' should 
be used here. The relevant Australian coast would then extend from Cape van Diemen to 
Holothuria reefs460. By the same token, the relevant East Timorese coast consists of the 
whole of the southern facade, from the mouth of the river Masin to Jaco isle. 
The second step consists of determining the length of the coastal stretches involved, 
which as said before should be calculated along straight-line segments. Bearing in mind that 
no major indentations exist along East Timor's coast, its facade may be assimilated to one 
straight line, running from Jaco isle to the mouth of the river Masin. It is estimated that the 
length of this facade is approximately 148 M (Figure 102)461. 
The measurement of the relevant Australian coast is more complex. In principle, 
there are three possibilities. The first option consists of following the contour of the wide 
gulf between Cape Fourcroy and Cape Londonderry. The second possibility is to measure 
the coastal length along a closing-line cutting across the entrance of the said gulf. The third 
alternative is to consider only two coastal stretches: one from Cape van Diemen to Cape 
Fourcroy; and another from Cape Londonderry to Holothuria reefs. Perhaps odd at first 
glance, this option is justified because the coast from Cape Fourcroy to Cape Londonderry 
is totally irrelevant for purposes of the computation of the 'frontal-equidistance'. I f the two 
coastal stretches mentioned were isolated islands, it would make no difference whatsoever 
as far as the equidistance-line is concerned. Hence, it is fair to argue that the entitlements 
generated by the coastal areas inside the gulf are irrelevant for delimitation purposes462. The 
coastal lengths in question for each of the three options above are roughly 462 M, 327 M, 
and 119 M, respectively. Choosing between them is crucial. The first interpretation cannot 
(459) ICJ/Reports/1993, pp.47^8, para.20. 
(460) As regards the location of these reefs, and their relevance for delimitation purposes, cf. para.9.4.c)(ii) infra. 
(461) All calculations were made on the basis of small-scale cartographic information. The figures presented here for coastal lengths 
and areas should be nonetheless viewed as perfectly acceptable for purposes of legal assessment and reasoning. 
(462) The coastline inside the gulf is also irrelevant for delineating the Australian 200-mile entitlement. 
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be upheld because it considers Australian basepoints that are irrelevant in the light of the 
geographical context, and because it clearly departs from the approaches endorsed in case 
law. As to the third interpretation, although it reflects one particular aspect of the impact of 
the Australian coast, it overlooks its essential continuous nature from Cape van Diemen to 
Holothuria reefs. The second alternative is the one that should be utilised to measure the 
relevant Australian coast, which is then estimated to be some 327 M long (Figure 102). 
9.4.a)(ii) Proportionality 
Proportionality assessments can only be conducted after defining the relevant area. 
Such a definition, it is argued, should take into account the relevant coasts of the two states, 
and its relative geographical position. As a first approximation, therefore, it may be said that 
the relevant area falls within the polygon limited to the north by the East Timorese facade 
(up to the midpoint between Jaco and Leti), to the south by the Australian facade, and to the 
east and west by loxodromes joining the extremities of these facades (Figure 102). But a 
cautious approach is required here. Owing to Indonesia's presence, the precise limits of the 
relevant area cannot be established. Proportionality assessments thus cannot be undertaken. 
Such a conclusion is unsurprising, i f one ponders upon the Libya/Malta case. The ICJ noted 
then that "future delimitations with third states [could] overthrow not only the figures for 
[...] areas used as basis for calculations but also the ratios arrived at"463. And in reality, the 
relational-geographical analogies Libya-Australia, Malta-East Timor, and Italy-Indonesia, 
seem mutatis mutandis easy to ascertain. To make things more difficult, in this instance, the 
1972 and 1997 treaties must be considered ab initio. 
Notwithstanding this, perhaps it is useful to calculate some of the areas involved, to 
provide at least rough guidance in this respect. To this effect, it is necessary to bear in mind 
that the relevant area should consist only of the overlapping of entitlements comprised by 
the said polygon. Considering the 200-mile limits from both Australia and East Timor, such 
an area is approximately 113,440 sq.km (or 33,074 sq.M). If it is assumed (for purposes of 
continental shelf delimitation) that Australia's entitlement extends up to the Timor Trough, 
this area at issue is some 127,907 sq.km (or 37,292 sq.M)464. For demonstration purposes, 
let it now be assumed that, after delimitating its maritime boundaries vis-a-vis both 
Australia and Indonesia, East Timor is attributed all maritime areas lying to its side of the 
three equidistance-lines. This would amount to some 32,455 sq.km (or 9,462 sq.M) out of 
the overlapping of 200-mile entitlements, and of roughly 46,740 sq.km (or 13,627 sq.M) out 
(463) ICJ/Reports/1985, p.53, para.74. 
(464) Even if, for the sake of argument, it is assumed that the Timor Trough forms an interruption of natural prolongation - meaning 
that Australia has an entitlement up to the Timor Trough based on natural prolongation that overlaps only with the East Timorese 
entitlement based on distance, the outcome of the delimitation is not altered in a great measure - as shown by these calculations. 
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of the overlapping of continental shelf entitlements mentioned in the second case above. By 
comparison, as a result of the Australia/Indonesia 1972 and 1997 treaties, Australia would 
be attributed roughly 56,793 sq.km (or 16,558 sq.M) of water column area, and roughly 
75,292 sq.km (or 21,951 sq.M) of seabed/subsoil area. 
That mathematical proportionality assessments bear no dispositive effect is a given. 
Notwithstanding this, as far as the 'grossness factor' is concerned, the figures above suggest 
some conclusions. The coastal length ratio is some 2.21:1 (Australia:East Timor). The ratio 
between the areas apportioned is, in regard to the water column, approximately 1.75:1 
(Australia:East Timor), and as to seabed/subsoil areas, some 1.61:1 (Australia:East Timor). 
The corresponding 'grossness factors' are 1.26 and 1.37 respectively. This signifies that, i f 
East Timor would be able to secure all areas on its side of the equidistance-lines with 
Australia and Indonesia, there would be some disproportion in area-attribution vis-a-vis 
Australia. What matters, however, is whether this disproportion is manifestly unreasonable. 
Inequity has been deemed to exist where 'grossness factors' are at least 2:1 (often 3:1 and 
more). In the Jan Mayen case, computations based upon the overlapping of entitlements (in 
the relevant area defined by the Court) lead to a 'grossness factor' of 3.37. The (maximum) 
'grossness factor' between Australia and East Timor is 1.37. Such a figure suggests that 
attributing to East Timor all areas lying inside the equidistance-lines results in no 'manifest 
disproportion'465. Figures of coastal length disparity found in previous cases, for instance, 
8:1 (Libya/Malta) and 9:1 (Denmark/Norway), much larger than that of the present case, 
2.21:1 (Australia/East Timor), help in explaining this conclusion. 
9.4.b) Natural Prolongation: the Timor Trough 
Another important argument that, most likely, would be put forward by Australia in 
support of its position is natural prolongation. More specifically, this argument involves the 
significance of the Timor Trough for the continental shelf delimitation. There are two ways 
in which such pleading might emerge. It might be presented as a question of relevance of 
geomorphological and geological aspects for continental shelf delimitation. Or it might also 
be advanced on the basis of a contention of historical consolidation. 
9.4.b)(i) Timor Trough: Brief Geomorphological and Geological Account 
The Timor Trough is a seabed depression running somewhat parallel to the southern 
coast of Timor island (and extending to the east thereof), at an average distance of roughly 
(465) Importantly, this figure considers Australia's continental shelf entitlement up to the Timor Trough as relevant for defining the 
overlapping of entitlements (which as argued in para.9.3.a)(ii) supra should not be the case). What it demonstrates however, is 
that even in the most extreme possibility there is no manifest disproportion in an area-attribution based on equidistance. 
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30 M from it. Resulting from the geological process of subduction of the Australian plate 
under the Eurasian plate, the Timor Trough has a geomorphological complexion (in terms 
of contour and depth) that is best illustrated through the three seabed profiles shown in 
Figure 105. Although the seabed rises steeply on both sides of its bathymetrical axis (i.e. the 
line joining the deepest depths), as a seabed depression the Timor Trough is shallower and 
wider than oceanic trenches, with which it must not be confused. Its maximum depth varies, 
averaging roughly 2,500 metres. A maximum depth of some 3,300 metres appears at its 
eastern extremity. Equally notable geomorphologically is that, despite the existence of a 
geological shelf prolonging off the northern Australian coast, there is no similarity between 
the situation in the Timor Sea and the classical type of continental shelf seabed-profile, with 
shelf, slope, rise and deep ocean floor. 
The collision process associated with the northwards subduction of the Australian 
plate under the Eurasian plate, from which the Timor Trough resulted, lies also at the centre 
of the creation of the island of Timor. This island appears to have emerged some 3 million 
years ago, in the eastern end of the Java trench. However, its geological uniqueness (as well 
as the geological uniqueness of the Timor Trough) defies categorisations. In typical cases, 
oceanic trenches run upon the convex side of islands arcs, forming areas where the greatest 
oceanic depths can be found (commonly 5,000 metres, and often exceeding 10,000 metres). 
The island of Timor, located off the Indonesian island arc, is one of the rare exceptions 
worldwide (the other being Barbados, off the Caribbean island arc). The island sits where 
the trench should be, having "weird displays of recently [in geological terms] deformed and 
uplifted deep-sea sediments"466. The orogenic nature of Timor is based on "an anomalously 
thick accretionary prism" which has associated "upthrusted fragments of the Australian 
continental margin"467. 
When analysing the Timor Trough for delimitation purposes, not much emphasis is 
to be put on the geological history of the area, the scale of which is commonly millions of 
years. Delimitation has a 'snapshot' nature. It entails the examination of facts as existent at 
the time at which the delimitation is to be effected. 
With this said, it must be asked whether, at present, the Timor Trough amounts to a 
geological separation between Timor island and the Australian plate. In reality, the process 
of subduction has virtually ceased today south of Timor - with the Timor Trough evolving 
into a foreland basin. The absence of seismic activity at the Timor Trough is evidence of 
this situation. The zone of convergence moved northwards, to the back arc thrust. Indeed, 
"most of the current convergence between Australia and SE Asia occurs north of the 
(466) Judson/Deffeyes/Hargraves/1976, pp.211-212. 
(467) Symonds/2000, p.54. 
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volcanic Inner Banda Arc . The Flores-Wetar backthrust fault, in the Banda Sea, appears 
thus from the need to accommodate the northward motion of the Australian plate, no longer 
happening at the Timor Trough. As could be expected, the Flores-Wetar backthrust is today 
a region of significant seismic activity. 
The geological complexity of the Timor region is patently illustrated in the different 
structural models that have been proposed (Figure 106). Noteworthy in these five models is 
the fact that all establish some relationship between the Australian continental margin and 
Timor. One represents Timor as an uplifted part of the Australian margin; another portrays 
it as a detached edge of the Australian margin. Significantly, no model represents Timor as 
'sitting' separately on an area of oceanic crust. Recent studies on plate motion argue that the 
island and the continental plate are moving northwards with equal relative velocity vectors. 
Today, it seems that "the southeastern Indonesian island arc shows a transition from normal 
subduction of oceanic lithosphere south of Java to a completed accretion of an island arc 
terrain to a continental margin at Timor'"469. 
In conclusion, there are strong indications of a close affinity of Timor island with 
the Australian margin. It is therefore very difficult to affirm straightforwardly that there is a 
geological detachment between Timor island and the Australian margin. 
9.4.b)(ii) Timor Trough: Relevance for Continental Shelf Delimitation 
That, in the Libya/Malta case, the Court 'checkmated' natural prolongation as a fact 
relevant for delimitations between states with coasts situated less than 400 M apart, and that 
in doing so it left no scope for elaboration on this issue, is indubitable. Further grounds for 
the refusal to confer weight upon geomorphological and geological elements in such cases 
have also been expounded470. Insofar as Australia and East Timor have coasts that lie some 
250 M apart, therefore, the answer as to whether the Timor Trough is a relevant fact for a 
continental shelf delimitation between them is rather straightforward: it is not. 
To reinforce this viewpoint, it ought to be observed that a decision in regard to the 
relevance of the Timor Trough would entail a type of decision that the Court declined to 
make in the Libya/Malta case. A determination on a disagreement between scientists as to 
the correct interpretation of geological data would have to be made4 7 1. 
One would further argue that, since the continental shelf can extend to the outer 
edge of the continental margin (as defined in Article 76), a fundamental discontinuity must 
(468) Snyder et all 1996, p.51. 
(469) Gcnrich el a/./1996, p.293, emphasis added. Evidence of geological relationship between the Australian continental margin 
and Timor equally appears often in sketch-maps of various types. Cf. Longley/1997 p.316 (Fig.4); Wilson/Moss/1996, p.304 
(Fig.l); Nishimura/1992, p.162 (Fig.3). 
(470) Para.8.2.g) supra. 
(47!) ICJ/Reports/1985, p.36, para.41. 
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equate to a scientifically proven limit of the continental margin. Whatever the claims based 
on natural prolongation, therefore, the regime of Article 76 is necessarily to be considered. 
Arguments concerning a 'fundamental discontinuity' of the natural prolongation of a state's 
land territory cannot succeed unless founded thereon. Either there is an interruption of the 
state's legal natural prolongation, or no weight should be placed on such arguments. In this 
respect, the emphasis is to be put on marking the limits of the continental margin. 
As observed above, Timor is partially constituted of upthrusted fragments of the 
Australian continental margin. Further, it seems to have accreted to the Australian margin. 
Apparently, today, the geological break of the Australian margin exists north of Flores and 
Wetar islands. Scientifically speaking, therefore, the existence of a geological separation 
between the natural prolongation of Australia and that of East Timor would be far from easy 
to ascertain. Bearing this in mind, expecting that a court would accredit to a scientifically 
challengeable assertion the weight of res judicata is perhaps to expect too much (especially 
when its legal relevance is weakened by other elements). The Libya/Malta case could be 
particularly significant in respect of the decision regarding the Timor Trough because the 
Court was then "confronted with one of the most pronounced geophysical features (breaks) 
imaginable, namely a zone where originally separate crustal plates have collided'412 -
which seems to be also the case of the Timor Trough. 
From a conceptual standpoint, the argument that the Timor Trough is relevant faces 
other difficulties. To the extent that the practical impact would be to effect an area-division 
on the basis of various comparisons between an entitlement beyond 200 M and a 200-mile 
entitlement, this would seem to place on an equal footing the two types of entitlement. This 
is an idea that was in principle rejected in this study4 7 3. It may be suggested, therefore, that 
the concatenation of what is prescribed in the LOSC in terms of entitlement, with the 
developments that took place in case law (especially the Libya/Malta case), renders the 
Australian continental shelf entitlement beyond 200 M irrelevant for purposes of the 
delimitation vis-a-vis East Timor. 
One final question must be asked. Can it be affirmed that the Australian continental 
shelf claim up to the Timor Trough has consolidated historically? The quickest of glances is 
enough to conclude that what is at issue here is not a historic title414. Despite the fact that 
there are no fixed limits in terms of years necessary to give rise to such a title, since the 
Australian continental shelf claim dates back to 1970, there appears to be no question of 
possessio longi temporis. But may we speak of historic rights'? One would argue that, as far 
(472) Lilje-Jensen/Thamsborg/1995, p.622, emphasis added. 
(473) Paras.4.3.d)(iii)(iv), 8.4.b)(i) supra. 
(474) Para. 1.3.c)(ii) supra. 
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as East Timor is concerned, the argument would be unsuccessful. The foregoing account of 
Portuguese conduct as to the Australian claim is manifest evidence that such a standpoint 
was ab initio vigorously rejected. The Portuguese concession to Oceanic, extending well 
beyond the Timor Trough, is a clear rejection of Australia's claim 4 7 5 . Adding to this, there is 
the Portuguese conduct between 1975 and 1999. Attention must be drawn to the assertions 
made by Portugal in the East Timor case, which leave no doubt as to such a rejection 4 7 6. 
Serious misgivings exist, thus, as regards the historical consolidation of the Australian 
claim based on natural prolongation vis-a-vis East Timor 4 7 7 . 
9.4.c) Basepoints Unrepresentative of Coastal Relationships 
9.4.c)(i) The Lateral Equidistance-Lines 
The fact that the lateral equidistance-lines between East Timor and Indonesia are 
relevant for the delimitation between Australia and East Timor is owed to the interwoven 
picture of 'exclusiveness' existent nowadays in the Timor Sea. It may be said that Indonesia 
has 'transferred' to Australia its seabed/subsoil rights southwards of the 1972 boundary. 
Hence, for purposes of ascertaining which areas belong to Australia, southwards of the 1972 
boundary, it is fair to suggest that, as a result of the said 'transfer' of rights, the lateral 
equidistance-lines between East Timor and Indonesia should be utilised as starting points. 
However, this is in no way tantamount to saying that the area-attribution effected thereby is 
reasonable. Such an issue should be subject of further investigation. 
One of the cases of controlling basepoints unrepresentative of coastal relationships 
that emerges in the present case concerns the said lateral equidistance-lines. The Indonesian 
coastline, both eastwards and westwards of East Timor, is salient in relation to the general 
direction of East Timor's facade (065°-245°). To the east, the islands of Leti, Moa and 
Lakor, and Meatij Miarang islet, form a facade running along the bearing 099°. To the west, 
Tanjong We Toh is located on the azimuth 210° from the terminus of the land boundary 
between East Timor and Indonesia. These are features whose basepoints control the course 
of the 'lateral-equidistances' up to the 'frontal-equidistance'. Geographically, East Timor's 
facade is flanked by 'frontage-jaws' that form 'concave-angles' of 34° and 35°, eastwards 
and westwards respectively, with the general direction of East Timor's coast. Accordingly, 
the 'lateral-equidistances' are converging lines. The distance between them at midway 
(475) Para.9.2.b)(iii) supra. 
(476) Para.9.2.b)(iv) supra. 
(477) The suggestion that the Australian argument based on natural prolongation is irrelevant today (finding no support either on the 
law of maritime delimitation law, or on historic grounds) is endorsed by Lowe, Carleton and Ward - who assert that "Australia's 
historical arguments in relation to the natural prolongation of its continental shelf, whether or not those arguments were valid in 
the early 1970s, are now quite clearly irrelevant to the delimitation with East Timor" (cf. Lowe/Carleton/Ward/2002, para.31.). 
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towards Australia (i.e. at the 'frontal-equidistance') is some 110M. This is 48-odd M (or 
30%) less than the distance between their initial points (Figure 100). 
The combined effect of these two lateral lines is a cut-off effect whereby East Timor 
is denied access to areas that lie directly off its southern coast. More importantly, the impact 
at the level of area-attribution is massive. Let it be supposed that this situation would be one 
in which an equidistance-line effects an equal division of the overlapping of entitlements, 
i.e. where the coasts of adjacent states are defined by means of straight-lines (Figure 53). 
This is, in other words, the same as computing perpendiculars to the general direction of the 
coast. I f such perpendiculars to the facade would be utilised up to the ' frontal-equidistance' 
with Australia, out of the relevant overlapping of 200-mile entitlements East Timor would 
be attributed approximately 40,556 sq.km (or 11,824 sq.M). When compared with the area 
that results from the recourse to strict equidistance-lines - 32,455 sq.km (or 9,462 sq.M), 
this would represent a 25% increase. Such an effect in area-attribution, it is argued, consists 
of an unreasonable cut-off effect 4 7 8. 
Of significance also is the fact that, on the eastern side, this cut-off effect is even 
more inequitable. The course of the 'lateral-equidistance', south of the 1972 boundary and 
up to the 'frontal-equidistance' (the area to be divided between Australia and East Timor), 
is controlled by basepoints located on Lakor and Meatij Miarang, whose coastal facades are 
respectively 10 M and 1.5 M long. Compared with the eastern-half of East Timor's fapade, 
their coastal length stands in a ratio of 6.43:1 (East Timonlndonesia)4 7 9. Even i f the coastal 
length of Leti and Moa is added up, the ratio is approximately 2:1 (East Timonlndonesia). 
The inequitableness is noticeable in the light of the fact that the greatest part (43 M out of 
63.5 M , or 68%) of the equidistance-line south of the 1972 boundary is controlled by 
basepoints on Meatij Miarang - a very minor feature. In addition, the remoteness and size 
of these four insular features, lying significantly far away from any sizeable Indonesian 
islands, must be duly weighed-up. Taking into account case law and state practice480, one 
would submit that these islands are in some degree unrepresentative of the geographical 
relationship between East Timor and Indonesia. Besides the cut-off that results from the 
relative position of the facades, it is thus necessary to weigh-up the 'unrepresentativeness' 
of these insular features. Their effect upon the equidistance-line is clearly unreasonable. 
None of these considerations are overruled by Indonesia's archipelagic state. These features 
stand on the archipelago's outer perimeter - no archipelagic waters are at issue. 
(478) On the impact of the lateral equidistance-lines on the access to natural resources, cf. para.9.4.e) infra. 
(479) Since between Lakor and Meatil Miarang there is a gap of 15 M, which is longer than their coasts, and there is no significant 
insular features behind that gap, it would be unreasonable to consider that they form a continuous facade. The same approach does 
not apply to Jaco island; its proximity (0.3 M) to East Timor's mainland makes it virtually a part thereof. 
(480) Para.8.2.c) supra. 
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9.4.c)(ii) Australian Basepoints to the East of Cape Londonderry 
A second situation of controlling basepoints that might be relevant in terms of this 
delimitation concerns the Australian coast to the east of Cape Londonderry. The first point 
to make is that, as concluded above, the system of straight baselines adopted by Australia 
(which covers this area) should have no bearing on the delimitation 4 8 1. The second point to 
address is whether Holothuria reefs should be used to compute the equidistance-line and the 
outer 200-mile limit of Australia (which consequently defines the area of overlapping of 
200-mile entitlements). 
Eastern Holothuria reef lies within 12 M from Troughton island. This means that it 
may be used as a basepoint for measuring the outer limits of the Australian territorial sea 
and contiguous zone. Whether it is usable to delineate the Australian 200-mile limit 
depends on whether Troughton island can generate its own 200-mile entitlement. The island 
lies less than 12 M from the mainland coast (which means that its basepoints may be used 
for computing the 200-mile limit). However, a 'leap-frogging' effect from the mainland 
coast cannot found Holothuria reefs entitlement. With an area of roughly 0.87 sq.km (or 
0.24 sq.M), this feature is small enough to raise questions as to its status under Article 121 
of the LOSC. One would argue that Troughton island is not entitled to continental shelf and 
EEZ per se. But truly, the answer to this issue is not necessary for delimitation purposes. 
Regardless of the view adopted, what may be questioned, clearly, is whether Holothuria 
reef is relevant for delimitation. Its detachment from Australia's mainland coast makes it 
unrepresentative thereof, and since no similar case exists on East Timor's coast, it is equally 
unrepresentative of the essential geographical relationship between the two coasts482. 
The impact of Holothuria reef on the computation of equidistance is somewhat 
negligible, especially within the two lateral equidistance-lines. The area in question, up to 
the perpendiculars to the general direction of the coast, is some 500 sq.km (or 146 sq.M). 
Less negligible is the difference that it makes in terms of proportionality assessments, due 
to the impact on the location of the 200-mile limit from Australia. I f Holothuria reef is fully 
discounted, the overlapping of 200-mile entitlements lying to the East Timorese side of the 
'frontal-equidistance' is reduced by approximately 3,227 sq.km (or 941 sq.M). I f the 'new' 
overlapping of 200-mile entitlements is adopted for 'grossness factor' computations, it leads 
to a decrease thereof from 1.26 to 1.14. To that extent, the attribution to East Timor of all 
areas within the equidistance-lines appears even more reasonable483. 
(481) Para.8.2.d) supra. 
(482) Paras.8.2.b), 8.2.c) supra. 
(483) Para.9.4.a)(ii) supra. 
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9.4.d) Macrogeographical Considerations 
The discussion above as to the impact of macrogeographical considerations upon 
maritime delimitation has led to the conclusion that the question is essentially one of 
contextualisation. The weight to be given to certain facts, the search for an overall balance 
of equities, or the 'discovery' of a reasonable boundary-line, are issues the answer to which 
might in a certain measure depend upon the context within which the delimitation is framed. 
Achieving a non-inequitable solution is a task that cannot "ignore the other delimitations 
already made or still to be made in the region" 4 8 4. For the delimitation between Australia 
and East Timor, macrogeographical considerations appear to be relevant - apart from the 
'third-state issue' - in two further different ways 4 8 5. 
The first issue concerns the balancing-up of exclusive maritime rights and interests, 
which must take account of one key macrogeographical fact. Of the three states involved in 
the Timor Sea, there is one which is clearly disadvantaged in terms of maritime entitlement 
generated by its coasts: East Timor. Owing to the regional geography, its entitlement must 
be 'amputated' from all directions. Whatever the direction, East Timor's entitlement can 
never reach 200 M from the coast. This predicament does not occur with either Australia or 
Indonesia. Crucially, off the northern coast, the areas of 'exclusiveness' that wi l l belong to 
East Timor are primarily territorial sea areas. Only partially, and even then marginally, does 
East Timor enjoy maritime areas beyond 12 M (if equidistance is utilised in the delimitation 
vis-a-vis Indonesia - Figure 104) 4 8 6. Such a marked macrogeographical disadvantage, one 
would argue, ought to be weighed-up in the overall balancing-up of equities. 
The second macrogeographical aspect that might be relevant is the general direction 
of the Indonesian archipelago at Timor. From Rote island (Pamana), passing through Meatij 
Miarang, up to Sermata island, the archipelago has a facade of roughly 400 M running in 
the direction 065°-245°. Should it be concluded that using equidistance-lines as the basis for 
the 'lateral delimitation' would effect an inequitable area-attribution in relation to East 
Timor, one of the ways in which the adjustment might be determined is by reference to this 
macrogeographical aspect. This is to be considered, however, only at the stage of choice of 
boundary-line, when account is taken of the 'decision-matrix'4 8 7. 
(484) Guinea/Guinea-Bissau arbitration, ILM/25/1986, p.291, para.93. 
(485) Cf. para.8.2.f) supra. Because of the way in which the 'third-state issue' was dealt with above, its macrogeographical aspect 
has already been contemplated; cf. para.9.3.b). 
(486) It is off the coast of the Oecusse enclave that East Timor can claim a wider breadth of maritime areas. But even then, the area 
in question does not reach the 24-mile limit. 
(487) Para.9.5.b)(ii) infra. 
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9.4.e) Natural Resources: Petroleum 
Turning now to the issue of natural resources as a fact relevant for the delimitation 
process, and drawing from the idea that natural resources are at the heart of the concept of 
maritime 'exclusiveness', it is important to restate that the whole issue appears to revolve 
around the dialectics 'area-attribution versus access to resources'. Natural resources can be 
factored into a delimitation equation only i f it is possible to retain a non-inequitable 
area-attribution. This type of fact is usually insufficient for justifying significant alterations 
of the area-attribution resulting from other facts. The paradox between, first, the exhaustible 
nature of natural resources and the impossibility of foreseeing future developments and, 
secondly, the prima facie ad eternum nature of boundaries, entails that preference be given 
to ensuring that the boundary wi l l not become inequitable in the future. Natural resources 
should be assessed, therefore, primarily in terms of 'configuration' of the line, and not of 
amount of adjustment applicable to the provisional equidistance-line. Importantly, taking 
them into account can never become an exercise of distributive justice 4 8 8. 
With this said, attention must be drawn to the petroleum resources of the Timor Sea, 
to whether they should have any impact upon the delimitation, and i f so, how they are to be 
weighed-up. Of the known resource-areas, three deserve particular attention - bearing in 
mind their importance in respect of size and location (Figure 108). Greater Sunrise (which 
includes Sunrise, Sunset and Troubadour) is a massive gas reserve that straddles the eastern 
'lateral-equidistance'. Its reserves are estimated at 9.5 tcf 4 8 9 . Bayu-Undan is a gas field the 
reserves of which are estimated at 3.4 tcf. It is located some 9 M west of the western 
'lateral-equidistance', and some 12 M northwards of the 'frontal-equidistance'. Laminaria 
is an oil field located 2 M east of the western 'lateral-equidistance'. It has been exploited by 
Australia for some years, on the basis of the agreements entered into with Indonesia, and its 
average production has been about 140,000 bpd. The nearby Corallina and Buffalo fields 
are in similar situations, although their production is less significant. 
As to Greater Sunrise, because it straddles the provisional equidistance-line, the 
division thereof is inevitably a central issue. Regardless of whether there is an adjustment to 
be made, and i f so, of whether such an adjustment favours Australia or East Timor, the 
boundary-line inevitably results in 'resource-sharing'. The slightest of adjustments to the 
'lateral-equidistance' leads to a different apportionment. The question is posed differently 
as to Bayu-Undan and Laminaria-Corallina-Buffalo. For 'resource-sharing' to be possible, 
significant adjustments must be made to the provisional equidistance-line. The difficulty is 
(488) Cf. para.8.3.a) supra. 
(489) Its reserves were deemed to lie 80%/20% to east/west of the equidistance-line; cf. 2001 Arrangement, Annex E, para.(a). 
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that, i f 'awkward' lines are to be avoided, as they should be , this should be considered 
only i f there is no significant alteration of the area-attribution determined by all other facts. 
Two final points deserve consideration: one is concerned with the relationship that 
might be established between the basis of maritime entitlement and the access to natural 
resources; another is related with the exhaustible character of petroleum resources491. 
With respect to the first of these issues, it is noteworthy that the prevailing view in 
jurisprudence and in scholarship is that the LOSC conferred upon distance from the coast a 
pivotal role in maritime zoning - thus indirectly also upon the determination of access to 
natural resources. I f access to natural resources is to be weighed-up as a juridically relevant 
consideration, therefore, some relevance must be given to the position of the resources in 
terms of distance from the coasts involved. Other considerations absent, closer proximity 
may in broad terms be translated into stronger entitlement to benefit from natural resources. 
Furthermore, i f resources are much closer to one of the coasts, sharing them between two 
states is likely to require an 'awkward' boundary-line, and/or a significant change in 
area-attribution. It is notable in this case that all resource-areas mentioned above lie closer 
to East Timor's coast, than to Australia's coast - in two cases substantially closer to East 
Timor's coast. Greater Sunrise field lies, on average, at a distance of 80 M from East 
Timor's coast; a half of the distance from the closest point on Australia's coast (160 M). 
Laminaria-Corallina-Buffalo fields are positioned in a similar relative position. On average, 
the distance from East Timor is 86 M , whereas from Australia it is 185 M (or 174 M i f 
Eastern Holothuria reef is used). Although Bayu-Undan field is closer to East Timor, the 
discrepancy in terms of distance to Australia is not as marked as in the previous cases -
122 M and 161 M(or l52 M). 
The exhaustible character of petroleum resources becomes an issue because of the 
fact that Laminaria-Corallina-Buffalo fields have already been exploited by Australia. The 
resources have thus been exhausted to some degree. Since access to natural resources is a 
consideration relevant for maritime delimitation, it would be disconcerting that no account 
would be taken of the fact that resources located in the relevant overlapping of entitlements 
had been exhausted unilaterally4 9 2. The ineluctable corollary of the concurrence of rights in 
the area of overlap is that states are bound by an "obligation of mutual restraint". Unilateral 
action ought to be refrained "when it risks depriving other states of the gains they might 
realise by exercising their sovereign right of exploitation^91'. 
(490) Para.8.4.e)(i) supra. 
(491) Insofar as the 2001 Arrangement lays down (in Article 22) that it will cease to be in force if continental shelf delimitation is 
effected, its contents in terms of access to petroleum resources are not relevant for purposes of the delimitation. 
(492) Para.4.3.d)(i) supra. 
(493) Ong/1999, p. 198, emphasis added. 
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In relation to the Laminaria-Corallina-Buffalo fields, the argument that Australia 
has not been acting unilaterally, but under agreements entered into with Indonesia, cannot 
be upheld. That Indonesia's right to dispose of the maritime rights in question was disputed 
was a widely known fact. The fact that the Indonesian occupation of East Timor had not 
been recognised, not only by the United Nations, but also by the vast majority of states, 
provided further evidence in that respect. As a sovereign state, Australia chose to recognise 
Indonesia, and to negotiate the said agreements. That approach is, however, insufficient to 
legitimise Australia's exploitation of the said resources. Hence, it is fair to argue that the 
exploitation of the Laminaria-Corallina-Buffalo fields by Australia was questionable even 
before the 1999 referendum. No doubts remained thereafter as to the need to contemplate 
East Timor's legal rights in the Timor Sea. Even then, Australia chose to continue the 
unilateral exploitation of Laminaria-Corallina-Buffalo fields without taking reasonable 
measures to safeguard East Timor's potential rights - although it became clear that East 
Timor sought to assert its potential rights in the Timor Sea. Since such a conduct risked 
(and still risks) aggravating the dispute over the maritime boundaries with East Timor, the 
lawfulness of Australia's conduct - i.e. the unilateral exploitation of natural resources in an 
area of overlapping entitlements - might indeed be questioned. Furthermore, in the light of 
the Portuguese conduct, no argument of historic rights can be advanced by Australia. 
With this said, it nevertheless must be conceded that the problem is far from easy to 
address in a delimitation process. Practically speaking, how can such a fact be weighed-up 
in the determination of the boundary? Can, and should, a court make a decision that entails 
the transference of areas currently unilaterally exploited by state A to the jurisdiction of 
state B? Should these areas be kept under the jurisdiction of state A, the balance of equities 
being attained by attributing to state B other areas? One would argue that, for purposes of 
delimitation strictly speaking, it is irrelevant whether the area has already been exploited 
unilaterally. The delimitation ought to be effected by reference to the applicable normative 
tenets. Although the existence of resources might be relevant, their exhaustion has perhaps 
no bearing on the determination of the boundary. Should the delimitation attribute to state B 
an area that had already been exploited by state A, what might be raised is a question of 
compensation. Nicaragua's approach in the Nicaragua/Honduras and Nicaragua/Colombia 
cases illustrates the point. In its Application instituting proceedings against Honduras, 
Nicaragua asserted that it reserved "the right to claim compensation for interference with 
fishing vessels of Nicaraguan nationality or vessels licensed by Nicaragua", and "for any 
natural resources that may have been extracted or may be extracted in the future to the south 
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of the line of delimitation that wi l l be fixed by the Judgment" . A similar point is made in 
the Application instituting proceedings against Colombia 4 9 5. The problem however, is that 
in maritime delimitation no court has yet addressed this problem explicitly. 
9.5. The Choice of Boundary-Line 
Attention must finally be devoted to the choice of boundary-line496. As noted, the 
tangible outcome of the operation of delimitation is a line, which ought to be chosen in the 
light of all relevant facts. To overcome some difficulties that surround what is perhaps the 
most controversial step in maritime delimitation, and because the process has consolidated 
as a multiple-factor analysis, this study has proposed that a 'decision-matrix' be utilised. Its 
goals are essentially three-fold. First, it seeks to deconstruct the problem into smaller parts, 
and to provide a diagrammatic representation thereof. Secondly, it intends to allow the 
simultaneous visualisation of all relevant factors, facilitating their relativisation. Thirdly, by 
structuring the basis of reasoning, it aims at attaining better judgment and objectification of 
justification discourse. The recourse to a 'decision-matrix' presupposes that subsumptive 
logic is impossible in legal decision-making, which conversely means that 'subjectivity' (in 
the form of 'value-judgments') is inescapable. And because 'subjectivity' is inherent in 
legal decision-making, and even more so in maritime delimitation, an attempt was made to 
shorten the gap between legal discourse and choice of line. The said 'decision-matrix' seeks 
to predicate the determination of both the adjustment to be applied to the provisional 
equidistance-line, and the configuration of the boundary. 
9.5.a) Delimitation Factors 
At this stage, it is necessary to formulate the delimitation factors that stem from the 
foregoing appraisal of the 'factual matrix'. Each delimitation factor wi l l be incorporated as 
an attribute of the 'decision-matrix' - a condition to fu l f i l , or an objective to attain, in order 
to ensure the reasonableness of the boundary-line. These factors wi l l form the reference for 
determining whether the provisional equidistance-line yields a non-inequitable solution, and 
i f not, how much and in which way it ought to be adjusted. Their formulation comprises, 
thus, a short assessment as to the equitableness of the provisional equidistance-line, and as 
to the 'amount' and 'direction' of the adjustment necessary, i f any. 
(494) Application, para.7. 
(495) Application, para.9. 
(496) For an analysis of the various aspects of the process of choice of line, cf. paras.7.1., 7.4. supra. 
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9.5.a)(i) Factor A - Coastal Length and Proportionality 
The 'grossness factors' of 1.37 and 1.26, respectively for seabed/subsoil and water 
column delimitation, evince a slight disproportion to the prejudice of Australia. Case law 
suggests that this level of disproportion is not unreasonable. Nevertheless, it indicates that a 
slight adjustment to the benefit of Australia would contribute to a finer balance between the 
two states - although it is, on its own, insufficient to determine an adjustment of the 
provisional equidistance-line. Conversely, adjustments to the benefit of East Timor must be 
weighed-up with greater caution. Otherwise, the slight disproportion in question might as a 
result become unreasonable. 
9.5.a)(ii) Factor B - Natural Prolongation (the Timor Trough) 
Whether the Timor Trough represents a geological separation between Timor island 
and the Australian continental margin - thus interrupting the natural prolongation of the two 
territories - is a question the answer to which is inconclusive. Recent studies have in fact 
suggested that Timor island has accreted to the Australian margin. Conferring on natural 
prolongation any weight in these circumstances would be at least unwise. This suggestion is 
further upheld by the proposition - sanctioned in jurisprudence and in scholarship - that 
geomorphological and geological facts have no bearing on delimitations between states the 
coasts of which lie less than 400 M apart. State practice points in similar a direction. By 
giving weight primarily to solutions based on equidistance, even where natural prolongation 
could become an issue, it reinforces the said proposition. No delimitation factor should thus 
be derived in casu from this type of consideration. Nevertheless, because reasons that lead 
to discarding arguments raised by the parties should form part of the decision, reference 
should be made in the 'decision-matrix' to this type of consideration. 
9.5.a)(iii) Factor C - Cut-Off Effect of the 'Lateral-Equidistances' 
The Indonesian coast forms two 'frontage-jaws', on either side of East Timor, near 
the starting point for the 'lateral-equidistances', which as a result become converging lines. 
Should the said lines be adopted as boundaries, East Timor would be denied access to areas 
that lie directly of f its coast. The impact in terms of area-attribution is of such a magnitude 
that it may be considered as an unreasonable cut-off effect. Both 'lateral-equidistances' 
must therefore be adjusted, to some degree, to compensate for this fact. 
9.5.a)(iv) Factor D- Effect of the Islands East of Timor 
South of the 1972 boundary-line, and up to the 'frontal-equidistance', the eastern 
'lateral-equidistance' is controlled by basepoints on Lakor and Meatij Miarang. The coastal 
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length ratio between these two insular features with the eastern-half of East Timor's facade 
is some 1:6.4 (Indonesia:East Timor). This ratio is still 2:1 i f the islands of Leti and Moa are 
considered. However the issue is addressed, therefore, there is a disparity of coastal lengths 
to be weighed-up; which is all the more significant since the relative size and remoteness of 
these insular features makes them unrepresentative of the Indonesian territory. I f account is 
taken of the treatment given in case law and state practice to the question of islands, it is 
reasonable to reduce their effect on the determination of the boundary. 
Conceptually, it is important to distinguish between Factors C and D. The former 
concerns the fact that the eastern 'lateral-equidistance' is 'pushed' westwards as a result of 
the direction of the facade of the Indonesian islands. The latter has to do with the fact that 
the insular features in question have short coastal lengths, and their size and remoteness 
from the 'main islands' of the archipelago makes them unrepresentative thereof. Even i f the 
eastern 'lateral-equidistance' were not 'pushed' westwards by the direction of the coast, the 
effect of the basepoints in question would still have to be discounted. 
9.5.a)(v) Factor E - Holothuria Reefs 
Because Holothuria reefs are detached from the mainland coast of Australia, and 
because no similar situation exists as regards East Timor's basepoints, the effect of the said 
reefs on the course of the 'frontal-equidistance', and importantly on the computation of the 
overlapping of 200-mile entitlements, should be weighed-up. Their location is, however, 
insufficient to justify any adjustment whatsoever of the provisional equidistance-line. But it 
must be taken into account that recourse thereto creates a slight benefit to Australia. The 
impact of discounting it emerges as a reduction of the disproportionality concerning the 
water column delimitation (based on the 200 M entitlements), which appears reflected in a 
smaller 'grossness factor'. 
9.5.a)(vi) Factor F- Macrogeographv 
Interpretations of the 'factual matrix' which withstand the idea of warranting value 
to certain macrogeographical settings faces risks of incompleteness, or worse, incorrectness. 
The reasonableness or unreasonableness of boundary-lines is an issue that might become in 
specific cases indelibly intertwined with the macrogeographical context. To overlook totally 
the fact that East Timor's entitlement is 'amputated' from all directions, and the fact that for 
one half of its facade the entitlement generated is little more than the territorial sea, cannot 
lead to an optimisation of the principles of maritime zoning and of equity. It is particularly 
so because this is a predicament to which neither Australia, nor Indonesia, are subject. This 
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delimitation, within the available scope to redress inequities, ought to award to East Timor 
an area of exclusiveness in the Timor Sea that reflects such a geographical predicament. 
9.5.a)(vii) Factor G - Natural Resources 
Issues of natural resources require great caution as regards their impact on boundary 
delimitation. In the present instance, it is necessary to distinguish between the situations of 
Bayu-Undan and Laminaria-Corallina-Buffalo, on the one hand, and of Greater Sunrise, on 
the other hand. Insofar as the latter straddles the provisional equidistance-line, the question 
of an equitable access thereto is more easily dealt with. Finer balances may be attained by 
minor adjustments of the provisional equidistance-line. On the contrary, the alterations in 
area-attribution that would be required to warrant an equitable access to Bayu-Undan and 
Laminaria-Corallina-Buffalo would be significant. The conclusion is thus two-fold. First, 
by attributing East Timor approximately only 20% of the Greater Sunrise, the provisional 
equidistance-line yields an inequitable division of resources. It is especially so because the 
fields in question lie much closer to East Timor than to Australia, and because it is possible 
to alter such a division by minor adjustments of the provisional equidistance-line. Secondly, 
the division of Laminaria-Corallina-Buffalo and Bayu-Undan should be considered only i f 
that is achievable without significant alteration of the area-attribution that results from other 
factors. As argued before, in principle, access to resources ought not to be weighed-up for 
purposes of adjusting the provisional equidistance-line497. 
9.5.b) 'Discovery' of an Equitable Solution 
9.5.b)(i) The 'Decision-Matrix' 
Whilst the weight to attribute to each fact varies with the circumstances in concreto, 
the process whereby the boundary-line is to be 'discovered' may be approached in general 
terms4 9 8. The first step consists of analysing each of the claim-lines advanced by the parties, 
on the basis of the 'decision-matrix'. Only i f neither claim-line is accepted as reasonable 
should an intermediate boundary-line be sought. Insofar as no actual dispute underlies this 
study, which is undertaken from an academic standpoint only, there are no claim-lines to be 
considered here. However, since the following analysis exemplifies how a non-inequitable 
boundary-line should be 'discovered', it must be stressed that such an exercise would be 
carried out only i f it were concluded that international law excluded the adoption of either 
party's claim-line as boundary. 
(497) Para.8.3.a) supra. 
(498) Cf., in particular, para.7.4.c) supra. 
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TABLE 6 
'Decision-Matrix': Delimitation between Australia and East Timor 
DELIMITATION FACTORS Provisional-Line: 
Adjustment 
'Configuration' 
of the Line 
A. 'Grossness factors' of 1.37 and 1.26 
evince a slight disproportion prejudicing 
Australia; not unreasonable i f compared 
with examples in case law, however. 
Not sufficient to 
justify on its own any 
adjustment 
B. The existence and location of the 
Timor Trough should have no influence 
over the determination of the boundary. 
No impact. 
C. The cut-off effect generated by the 
'lateral-equidistances', as a result of the 
'frontage-jaws' of the Indonesian facade, 
is unreasonable, and should be 
alleviated. 
Some adjustment 
favouring East Timor 
is required 
' Lateral-equidistances' 
should be 'opened' to 
avoid cut-off 
D. The effect of the islands east of 
Timor, on the course of the provisional 
line, should be reduced, for they are 
unrepresentative of the Indonesian 
territory. 
Effect of the islands 
Lakor and Meatij 
Miarang should be 
reduced somewhat 
E . The use of Holothuria Reefs as 
relevant basepoints, though insufficient 
to justify an adjustment of the 
provisional line, benefits Australia to a 
slight degree. 
Not sufficient to 
justify on its own any 
adjustment 
F . The fact that East Timor's entitlement 
is amputated from all directions reveals a 
macrogeographical disadvantage that, to 
the extent possible, should be alleviated. 
East Timor's areas 
o f f its southern coast 
should be maximised 
G. To the extent allowed by other 
factors, petroleum resources ought to be 
equitably divided, without effecting 
major changes in area-attribution. 
Adjustments to the 
provisional line must 
be minor 
Shape of line that 
divides resources as 
equitably as possible 
Before proceeding further, it is useful to recall that all delimitations have more than 
one possible solution, and that practically speaking delimitation often amounts to a choice 
between different lines. The recourse to a 'decision-matrix' seeks to illuminate the factors 
upon which the choice is to be predicated. It aims at facilitating and substantiating such a 
choice, by pointing out what makes a line preferable vis-a-vis another. As between Australia 
and East Timor, the delimitation could be undertaken on the basis of a 'decision-matrix' 
similar to that shown in Table 6 above. 
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A major source of problems in delimitation lies in the 'weighing-up' of the factors 
identified as relevant, and the determination of their impact on the course of the boundary. 
It is perhaps at this stage that Benjamin Franklin's 'prudential algebra' might be helpful 4 9 9 . 
With all factors displayed together in one view (Table 6), it becomes necessary to estimate 
how their weights relate to each other. One key point is immediately noticeable. Whereas 
Factor A favours Australia, Factors C to F favour East Timor. The first, almost instinctive 
impression, although this is not a simple question of arithmetic, is that the overall balance of 
'exclusiveness' requires that the provisional equidistance-lines be somewhat adjusted to the 
benefit of East Timor. 
The perennial problem lies, no doubt, in the determination of a precise course for 
the boundary-line. How the factors identified ought to be translated geographically, in terms 
of adjustments to the provisional equidistance-lines, is the ultimate quandary. Conceptually, 
it is submitted, the difficulties can only be overcome i f it is recognised that there is more 
than one possible solution for each maritime delimitation problem. How to reconcile the 
principles of maritime zoning and of equity (and indirectly certainty and justice), what is 
'legally equitable' (or 'legally inequitable'), how to promote stability and finality through a 
manageable boundary-line, are merely some of the questions with which judges are faced. 
The answers inevitably entail 'subjective' appraisals. Just as courts are endowed discretion 
in other fields of law (domestic or international), in maritime delimitation they have also at 
their disposal certain discretion in the choice of line. It is also noteworthy that, in judicial 
decision-making, many 'value-judgments' stem from comparative analyses with previous 
cases. Solutions are then found by recourse to legal 'yardsticks', as it were. Bearing this in 
mind, one would contend that, besides case law, attention must be drawn to state practice, 
where recurring patterns arguably have a quasi-normative effect. Whilst expressing what 
states deem to be reasonable solutions, they amount to opinio aequitatis500. 
9.5.b)(ii) Recourse to 'Yardsticks' 
To set forth the effect of the factors formulated in the 'decision-matrix, therefore, it 
is necessary to delve into case law and state practice. What Factor A shows is that, despite 
the slight disproportion, no adjustment of the 'frontal-equidistance' favouring Australia is 
required. Only with much greater disproportions than that evidenced here have adjustments 
been made in case law. This view is reinforced by the fact that Factor E entails a reduction 
of the disproportionality expressed by Factor A (owing to its impact on the computations 
(499) Cf. para.7.3.b) supra. 
(500) Paras.7.1., 7.3.C) supra. 
- 3 9 9 -
TOWARDS THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF MARITIME DELIMITATION 
related to the 200-mile entitlements), and because the only other factor that could determine 
an adjustment of the 'frontal-equidistance' {Factor F) favours East Timor. One conclusion 
is then possible. The 'frontal-equidistance' is prima facie not to be adjusted. 
The practical impact of arguing that no adjustment of the ' frontal-equidistance' is 
required should not be underestimated. Account must be taken of the delimitations between 
Australia and Indonesia. First, inasmuch as the 1997 Australia/Indonesia boundary is an 
equidistance-line, it signifies that the water column delimitation between Australia and East 
Timor involves no determination of 'lateral-lines'. Secondly, as a result, the seabed/subsoil 
delimitation between Australia and East Timor requires the determination of 'lateral-lines' -
whereby the 1972 Australia/Indonesia boundary and the 'frontal-equidistance' are to be 
joined. Subsequent analysis as to the equitableness of the provisional 'lateral-equidistances' 
(in other words the impact of Factors C, D, F and G) refers therefore exclusively to the 
seabed/subsoil delimitation. 
Since the effect of islands has been addressed in a significant number of occurrences 
of case law and state practice, it would seem that the adjustment resultant from Factor C 
would be easily established. That is however not the case. Let the islands east of Timor be 
considered by reference to case law concerning situations in which the coastal relationship 
was fundamentally one of adjacency. In the Anglo/French arbitration, the Tribunal decided 
to attribute to the Scilly Islands half-effect. These islands are located some 22 M of f the 
United Kingdom mainland, and have a coastal facade of roughly 4 M . Half-effect was also 
attributed to the Kerkennah Islands, in the Tunisia/Libya case, although through a different 
approach. These islands lie roughly 15 M off the mainland, and have a facade of 18 M . In 
the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau arbitration, Alcatraz island - a small feature located some 24 M 
off the mainland - was awarded little more than a semi-enclave. In the Canada/France 
arbitration, St. Pierre and Miquelon were attributed much less than what would have been 
attributed had equidistance been applied. What weight should then be attributed to Leti, 
Moa, Lakor and Meatij Miarang, especially the last two, which are the features that control 
the equidistance south of the 1972 boundary? 
Extrapolations are not easy. Australia and East Timor are opposite states. The need 
to analyse the effect of Indonesian islands results from agreements entered into by Australia 
and Indonesia. That those islands ought not to be given full-effect seems indubitable; for the 
Indonesian islands have rather shorter coastal lengths, and their relative remoteness makes 
them unrepresentative for delimitation purposes. Establishing objectively what partial-effect 
should be given to these islands, and how exactly is that partial-effect to be computed, 
amounts however to an exercise of discretion. Suppose that a solution based on a half-effect 
is adopted. How is the half-effect to be computed? Since these islands are not located of f a 
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mainland coast, the traditional approach to half-effect cannot be applied . One possible 
interpretation is to view the half-effect as a 'halfway-line' between (A) the Indonesian 
basepoints and (B) the strict equidistance between East Timor and Indonesia (Figure 107a). 
Should it be considered equitable to use a %-effect, a possible interpretation of the %-effect 
line is a 'halfway-line' between and the above half-effect line and the equidistance-line502. 
Another interpretation of the half-effect resorts to the notion of facades and bisectors 
between them (Figure 107b). As done in the Gulf of Maine case, it is possible to compute a 
bisector between two facades, starting at a given point - which here would be the mid-point 
between the closest basepoints on Jaco and Leti. A 'half-effect bisector' could then be 
computed between the equidistant-bisector and the facade of the Indonesian islands503. 
These two possible solutions lead to numerous questions. In negotiation, the idea of 
attempting various solutions until an agreement is reached is a perfectly valid approach to 
the delimitation process. But it is less so in adjudication. How would a court justify using 
half-effect, and not %-effect, or any other partial-effect? What would be objectively the 
standard for gauging the partial-effect? And after determining it, what interpretation thereof 
would be adopted? Arguing simply that that would depend on what appears equitable to the 
court is less than satisfactory i f another, sounder reasoning is possible. 
Whilst it is assumed as purpose of this chapter to analyse the delimitation between 
Australia and East Timor, it must be emphasised that one should not expect an answer that 
refers to the boundary-line, but to a boundary-line. This is an inescapable corollary of the 
existence of a sphere of discretion. What one seeks to 'discover' is one solution amongst 
several possible solutions. But in doing so, it is important to attempt to find a solution that 
appears to be objective from the legal standpoint. Building on the idea that discretionary 
power ought to be orientated by recourse to 'yardsticks' found in case law, preferentially, or 
state practice, as opinio aequitatis, i f necessary, the following views seek to justify one 
solution, which resorts to the delimitation factors previously formulated. 
To begin with, the impact of the islands must be integrated with the equitable access 
to resources. It should be noticed that giving half-effect Leti to Meatij Miarang would deny 
Australia any access to the Greater Sunrise field. That is hardly a non-inequitable boundary 
to Australia (which is invested in Indonesia's potential position). Factor G requires that a 
reasonable division of resources be attained; and reasonableness ought to be assessed in 
relation to not only East Timor, but also Australia. On another level, saying that East Timor 
(501) On the technical aspects of partial-effect adjustments, cf. para.5.2.c) supra. See Figures 72 to 74. 
(502) Technically, the partial-effect lines will depend on which points are taken into consideration in their computation. 
(503) A third solution for '/5-effect and %-effect lines is advanced by Lowe, Carleton and Ward (cf. Lowe/Carleton/Ward/2002, 
para.40). Apparently, these partial-effect lines are based on an "opposite coasts median line" (which seems to be referred to Leti 
and Jaco), and a no-effect line running in the direction of the facade of the Indonesian islands. 
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is in a macrogeographical disadvantage (Factor F) is somewhat unhelpful for quantifying 
objectively these adjustments to the equidistance-line. 
Of all examples found in case law, none seems to incorporate sufficient elements of 
geographical analogy with this setting to justify straightforward extrapolations. Hence, it is 
necessary to turn to state practice subsidiarily. The best 'yardstick' found therein is the 
Dominica/France (Martinique and Guadeloupe) agreement (Figure 23) 5 0 4. First, it illustrates 
the solution achieved in a delimitation setting involving islands belonging to the same 
island arc (the Caribbean island arc). Secondly, it concerns the delimitation between an 
island (Dominica) 'walled' by islands belonging to the same state (France). Thirdly, it 
addresses questions regarding cut-off effects caused by smaller islands (Marie-Galante and 
La Desirade) and by prominent geographical features (Peninsula of the Caravel). 
The analogies between this 'yardstick' and the present case study are however not 
comprehensive. Here, the Indonesian islands are relevant only indirectly - in a delimitation 
between two opposite states, Australia and East Timor. Notwithstanding this, the rationale 
of this 'yardstick' is enough to substantiate a solution solidly. Geographically, the analogies 
'Dominica-East Timor' and 'France-Indonesia' are straightforward. Equally, the problem 
posed by Marie-Galante and La Desirade is similar to that of Lakor and Meatij Miarang; 
and the same may be said about the Peninsula of the Caravel and Tanjong We Toh. In the 
case between Dominica and France, the boundary-lines may be 'read' as follows. The two 
states concluded that i f Dominica would be attributed a 'corridor-area' extending westwards 
86 M (on average), and eastwards 200 M, a reasonable balance would be achieved in 
area-attribution. Dominica's coastal projection seawards would be reasonably secured. To 
the east, the equidistance-lines were 'opened' to create a 'funnelling-corridor', with a width 
varying from 27 M to 17 M. Taking into account the overall balance, the two states deemed 
the area-attribution yielded by equidistance to the west of the islands as reasonable. 
To what extent, then, may this 'yardstick' be utilised in the delimitation between 
Australia and East Timor? One immediate point emanates from it. Unlike what occurs with 
Dominica, East Timor does not enjoy sizeable maritime areas in two opposite directions. 
The Indonesian islands off its northern coast hamper its maritime projection, narrowing its 
jurisdictional areas significantly. The inclusion in the 'decision-matrix' of a factor reflecting 
the macrogeographical context was by comparison perfectly justified. A balance similar to 
that of the Dominica/France agreement is unattainable, due to the fact that East Timor can 
acquire virtually no areas beyond the territorial sea off its north coast, and to the truncation 
of its entitlement off its south coast505. Bearing this and the absence of countervailing 
(504) Appendix 2,F19. 
(505) The 'frontal-equidistance' lies, on average, some 140 M off East Timor's coast, far away from the potential 200 M. 
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arguments in mind, it may cogently be argued that the maritime areas to be attributed to 
East Timor off its south coast ought to be maximised. There is no other way of optimising 
the principles of maritime zoning and of equity. In this light, it cannot be argued that the 
two provisional 'lateral-equidistances' form a 'corridor' that allows a reasonable projection 
of East Timor's coast. Such a 'corridor' thus is insufficient to verify Factors C, D, F and G 
formulated in the 'decision-matrix'. 
State practice provides other 'yardsticks' to cases where one state is 'walled' by 
another, and its coasts can project seawards in one direction only. Reference can be made to 
the Gambia/Senegal and the Monaco/France agreements506. Illustrated in Figures 27 and 39, 
the solutions resort to a 'corridor' based on parallel lines, thereby avoiding cut-off effects 
resultant from coastal features. Where coastal geography favours the 'surrounded' state, as 
occurred in the Canada/France arbitration, a similar balance was reached, the 'surrounded' 
state being awarded a 'corridor' whose width equalled its coastal facade507. 
Thus let the 'lateral-equidistances' between Indonesia and East Timor be adjusted 
enough to become two parallel loxodromes. What direction should these lines have? Case 
law and state practice have resorted often to perpendiculars to the direction of the coast, 
when the objective is to determine reasonable boundaries that reflect the wider geographical 
relationship. The Grisbadarna arbitration, the Tunisia/Libya (first sector) case, and Gulf of 
Maine case (outer sector) are examples that may be cited. In state practice, the cases of the 
Brazil/Uruguay, Brazil/France (Guiana), and Portugal/Spain (Iberian peninsula) boundaries 
may be noticed508. Should East Timor be attributed a 'corridor' formed by two loxodromes 
perpendicular to the archipelago's facade, extending south of the 1972 boundary up to the 
'frontal-equidistance', the lines run as shown in Figure 108. 
Besides these examples, the reasonableness of perpendiculars is avowed in concreto 
by two other points. First, it is surely no coincidence that they run close to points A15 and 
A18, set down in Article 3 of the 1972 Australia/Indonesia treaty as the limits for the 
adjustments to accommodate possible future claims by East Timor509. Secondly, in August 
1999, when the United Nations entered East Timor, "Australia defined the south-western 
maritime boundary for the Interfet operational area in East Timor by drawing a line 
perpendicular to the general direction of the coastline starting from the mouth of the Masin 
River, which separates West and East Timor"510. 
(506) Appendix 2, D27, F34. Cf. also the Brunei/Malaysia continental shelf boundary (Appendix 2, B15). 
(507) As to 'yardsticks' on 'corridor-solutions', cf. para.7.4.c) supra. 
(508) Cf. Appendix 2, D9-10, D56. 
(509) Para.9.2.b)(ii) supra, in fine. 
(510) Senate Report, para.4.17.. 
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Whilst attempting to contribute to the objectification of the notion of equitable 
solution in maritime delimitation, this study has had recourse to the concept of average 
'distance ratio', and to its use for purposes of drawing comparisons with 'yardsticks' found 
in case law and state practice. Consider then the average 'distance ratios' of the solutions 
reached in some of the examples above. As to the Dominica/France agreement, the figures 
are approximately 0.85 and 0.94, favouring Dominica, for the northern and southern 
'corridor-lines' respectively511. The two lines considered, the average figure, rounded up, is 
0.90. In relation to the Gambia/Senegal agreement, Figure 39 shows that the adjustment was 
applied primarily to the northern equidistance-line. The average 'distance ratio' is roughly 
0.91, favouring Gambia. By contrast, the southern parallel represents apparently a slight 
benefit for Senegal512. The two lines together have an average 'distance ratio' of some 0.97, 
favouring Gambia. These values seem to be in line with those mentioned in Table 4, which 
refers to values of 0.88, 0.91, and (less than) 0.90, for boundaries between adjacent states 
(respectively, Denmark/Germany, Netherlands/Germany and Tunisia/Libya). On account of 
these figures, one would argue that figures between 0.85 and 0.95 (i.e. values around 0.90) 
are typical in cases where boundaries were noticeably adjusted. 
What are then the values of average 'distance ratio' for the perpendiculars that form 
the proposed 'corridor', which adjusts the iateral-equidistances' between Indonesia and 
East Timor, south of the 1972 boundary? The western perpendicular reveals an average 
'distance ratio' of some 0.92, favouring East Timor. For the eastern perpendicular, that 
value is approximately 0.94. The average between the two is then 0.93. What these values 
seem to demonstrate is that the resort to two perpendiculars to the general direction of the 
coast falls within the span of solutions that have been used in case law and state practice. 
Such a solution is reasonable both in terms of 'configuration' of the boundary, and of the 
quantum of adjustment. Taking into account that the solution was derived from existing 
'yardsticks', this is truly unsurprising. 
That these lines meet the requirements of Factors C and D is clear. Doubtless, they 
also fulfil (at least to some extent) Factor F. What needs to be investigated is how they 
relate to the requirement imposed by Factor G. These lateral-lines would result in a rough 
50/50 division of Greater Sunrise5n, which entails an equitable access to resources. By 
contrast, Laminaria-Corallina-Buffalo and Bayu-Undart would be attributed both to East 
Timor. Owing to the location of both resource-areas, any attempt to grant a shared access to 
(511) Segments 7-8 and 9-10 of the boundary. 
(512) The map shown in IMB, p.853, depicts the southern equidistance-line as starting slightly south of the parallel, and running 
across it to the north thereof. The cartographic information available to the author led to a somewhat different line. 
(313) Because petroleum deposits have to be assessed in three-dimensional terms, it is rather difficult to advance a precise figure. 
This would require a survey directed to establish how the volume of the deposits is distributed. 
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these resources would entail an alteration of area-attribution which is unjustified in the light 
of all other delimitation factors. Accordingly, no such access should be considered. With 
this solution, the exploitation of resources carried out by Australia to the west of the 
western 'lateral-equidistance' would almost certainly give rise to the issue of compensation 
for unjustified resource exploitation514. 
9.5.b)(iii) The Boundary-Lines 
For purposes of description of the boundary-lines that stem from the reasoning 
above, it is useful to distinguish between the water column and the seabed/subsoil. As stated 
from the outset, no attempt will be made however to define the lines technically. What is 
aimed at is a description of the boundary-lines in broad strokes. 
Let the water column boundary between Australia and East Timor be considered 
first. One would argue that the boundary ought to follow the line of equidistance between 
Australian and East Timorese basepoints. For purposes of computation of the line, recourse 
to basepoints on Holothuria reefs is justified, especially because their effect compensates to 
some extent the slight disproportion between coastal lengths (Factors A and E). To avoid 
interference with Indonesia's rights and interests, those of a third party, the line ought not to 
be defined beyond the two equidistant trijunction points515. Insofar as the 1997 boundary 
follows also the equidistance-line, the two boundaries would ' f i t ' properly, thus creating no 
subsequent jurisdictional problems (regardless of the 'lateral-boundaries' that Indonesia and 
East Timor would later adopt between themselves). In any event, the final determination of 
the location of the trijunction points must necessarily be effected in tripartite terms. As a 
final note, it must be observed that there are no indications whatsoever that this boundary 
could result in inequitable area-attribution. 
Devoting now attention to the seabed/subsoil boundary, it is perhaps easier to start 
by the 'frontal-line'. Even if it is conceded, for the sake of argument, that the Australian 
continental shelf entitlement extends up to the Timor Trough, and that such an entitlement 
is to be weighed-up, that would not lead to adjustments of the ' frontal-equidistance'. Not 
only the 'grossness factor' of 1.37 evinces no unreasonable disproportion (Factor A), but 
adjustments are also opposed by the need to maximise East Timor's jurisdictional areas 
(Factor F). Further weight is lent to this solution by another point. By keeping a boundary 
based on equidistance, the seabed/subsoil boundary will coincide with the water column 
(514) This issue is not a matter for the delimitation process. As observed above, it appears be an issue subsequent thereto, to be 
addressed as states see fit, through negotiation, adjudication, or conciliation; cf. para.9.5.a)(vii) supra. 
(515) The boundary should be described by recourse to geographical coordinates of points, to be joined by straight lines. Whether to 
use geodesies or loxodromes is perhaps negligible, but that depends on the spacing between the points utilised. The shorter the 
distance between them, the less relevant becomes this issue. 
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boundary partially, allowing partial dual-coincident boundaries. International law seems to 
uphold the presumption that coincident boundaries (although conceptually distinct) should 
be preferred wherever the delimitation regards areas within 200 M from the coasts516. 
Turning to the 'lateral-boundaries', it ought to be observed that the adopted solution 
is predicated upon the idea that Australia appears invested in Indonesia's potential legal 
position north of the 'frontal-equidistance'. For this reason, 'lateral-equidistances' based on 
basepoints on Indonesian territory were taken as the starting point for the delimitation. A 
number of factors formulated by reference to the legal and factual 'matrices' - objectified 
by recourse to relevant 'yardsticks' found in case law and in state practice - justify the 
adjustments that were made to those lines. Opting for a 'corridor-solution' stems thus from 
the fact that it is the type of solution that reasonably balances the delimitation factors of this 
case. The 'lateral-boundaries' are based on perpendiculars to the wider regional facade. 
They were devised to pass in the east by the midpoint point between Leti and Jaco, and in 
the west by the terminus of the land boundary between Indonesia (West Timor) and East 
Timor. From south to north, the two lines should start from the intersection of the 
perpendiculars above with the 'frontal-equidistance' between Australia and East Timor, and 
stop just short of the 1972 boundary, in the close vicinity of points A15 and A18. 
The question of Indonesia's rights and interests is adequately addressed with such 
boundaries. To reinforce the legal protection of this third state, explicit reference might 
nevertheless be made to the fact that these boundaries apply exclusively between Australia 
and East Timor, and that their delimitation is effected without prejudice of Indonesia's 
rights vis-a-vis East Timor, as regards both the seabed/subsoil (north of the 1972 boundary) 
and the water column. In fact, nothing precludes Indonesia and East Timor from opting for 
different 'lateral-boundaries' in either case. However, recourse to perpendiculars in such 
delimitations should not be dismissed in limine. 
While not rejecting out of hand that other lines may be chosen, one would argue that 
predicating the 'lateral-boundaries' (south of the 1972 boundary) upon perpendiculars to the 
general direction of the coast amounts an equitable solution. The area-attribution entailed by 
this solution favours East Timor in a way that is different from that assumed before in the 
computation of the 'grossness factor'. One would submit that its reasonableness is ensured 
by, and stems from, the 'weighing-up process' devised on the basis of the conceptualisation 
adopted in this study. Significantly, it is argued that no ex post facto proportionality test is 
required to check the reasonableness of the outcome517. However, to provide evidence that 
this is true, reference is made next to some figures of 'grossness factor'. This should not be 
(516) Para.8.4.c)(ii) supra. 
(517) Para.8.2.e) supra. 
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interpreted as an acknowledgement of validity of the said test. The objective is in effect to 
show that this test is dispensable, if the 'factual matrix' is assessed as suggested here. 
Taking into account the 'new' area-attribution, the 'grossness factor' is 1.28 (with 
computations based upon the overlapping of 200-mile entitlements). When the Australian 
entitlement up to the Timor Trough is considered, this figure becomes 1.74, which is still 
short of what was deemed unreasonable in other instances. Furthermore, this conclusion is 
reinforced by the fact that, when the basepoints on Holothuria reefs are discounted in the 
former computation, the figure falls to 1.17. Revealing a certain imbalance, these figures are 
however acceptable in the light of East Timor's macrogeographical predicament. Australia 
(as well as Indonesia for that matter) does not have its potential maritime entitlements 
curtailed from every direction. 
The argument that the 'lateral' seabed/subsoil boundaries between Australia and 
East Timor may not be delimited without delimiting Indonesia's water column boundaries 
in this area is flawed. International law has endorsed separate regimes for the seabed/subsoil 
and the water column, spatially and ratione materiae. Further, the existence of third states 
per se has never been an impediment to maritime delimitation. Water column rights and 
seabed/subsoil rights, if belonging to different states, are to be exercised within the limits 
imposed reciprocally. All that need be noted is that, whatever the solution found for the 
delimitation between Australia and East Timor, there will always be a situation in which the 
seabed/subsoil rights are vested in one state (Australia or East Timor) which is not that in 
which the water column rights are vested (Indonesia). In casu, it is never possible to benefit 
from the 'practical advantages' of having completely coincident boundaries. The question is 
whether the seabed/subsoil rights belong to Australia, or to East Timor. This inescapable 
reality results from the way in which the 1972 boundary was delimited and the subsequent 
developments on the basis of continental shelf entitlement518. 
One final brief note concerns the 'grey area' issue. The use of perpendiculars to the 
general direction of the coast would not create 'grey areas' in terms of continental shelf, due 
to the effect of the 1972 boundary (which precludes Indonesia from claiming rights to the 
south thereof). Nevertheless, should Indonesia and East Timor adopt boundaries coinciding 
with the perpendiculars proposed, 'grey areas' concerning water column jurisdiction would 
emerge east and west of the trijunction points. The frontal-equidistance' between Australia 
and East Timor (based exclusively on basepoints on their coasts) and the 1997 boundary are 
not coincident beyond the trijunction points519. 
(518) Cf. paras.9.2.b), 9.2.c) supra. 
(519) These 'grey areas' - illustrated in Figure 108 - would be roughly 136 and 193 sq.km, respectively off the eastern and western 
perpendiculars (assuming that Holothuria reefs were relevant basepoints). 
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CONCLUSIONS TO PART III 
To the extent that it examines how, in a process of legal determination of maritime 
boundaries (i.e. in adjudication), a boundary-line is to be 'discovered', this part constitutes a 
denouement of the conceptualisation of maritime delimitation attempted in this study. 
Maritime delimitation law has been seen as a legal field in which flexibility appears 
paramount, i f necessary at the expense of certainty, allegedly because this is inescapable in 
the light of the need to achieve an equitable solution. However, flexibility primacy is not 
unchallengeable. Building on the argument that, in maritime delimitation, normativity stems 
from the principles of maritime zoning and of equity, this part suggests that the delimitation 
process may be conceived in a way as to allow the necessary flexibility, whilst guaranteeing 
an acceptable degree of certainty. One cornerstone of this approach is the proposition that 
boundaries ought to be determined through adjustments of a provisional equidistance-line, 
that such adjustments result from the optimisation in casu of the two legal principles 
involved, and that the reasonableness of such adjustments can be analogised and objectified 
through the notion of average 'distance ratio'5 2 0. As noted, the main difficulty surrounds the 
concretisation of the 'case-norm' that flows from the optimisation of the two principles521. 
It is argued that the finding of the 'case-norm' emerges from a 'weighing-up process' in 
which the legal determination, and justification, of the amount of adjustment stems from a 
'decision-matrix' composed of the relevant delimitation factors. 
The conclusions reached here may be summarised into five key issues, all of which 
refer either to aspects of, or questions related to, the understanding of the 'weighing-up 
process' adopted here. The first point concerns the notion of unicum. The second question 
deals with the sphere of discretion with which courts are endowed. The rationalisation of 
the delimitation problem as a multiple-factor analysis is the third issue. The fourth question 
is related to the elements of the 'factual matrix', and related assessments. Finally, the fifth 
question concerns the case study through which the proposed conceptualisation was tested. 
Let us turn to the notion of unicum. That each maritime delimitation case is in some 
measure unique is irrefutable. That such uniqueness entails the introduction of a degree of 
particularisation in the delimitation process is equally uncontroversial. From here, however, 
(520) Chapter 6, Conclusions to Part II supra. 
(521) Cf. Alexy/1989, pp.243-244; also para.7.4.a) supra. 
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one should not conclude that maritime delimitation is synonymous with 'no generalisation'. 
Should that be the case, there would be no room for normative standards, for normativity is 
necessarily synonymous with some measure of generalisation. 
Bearing this in mind, the notion of unicum should not be overemphasised. No doubt, 
on account of the necessary flexibility, there can be no closed categorisation or definitive 
list of factual considerations that might be weighed-up. However, there is a basis for 
objectifying the choice of relevant considerations. These considerations have been 
denominated by case law as "pertinent", their pertinence being assessed through the 'legal 
matrix'. Maritime zoning balances up exclusiveness and inclusiveness in the public order of 
the oceans, by defining spatially the areas of exclusiveness, and those aspects of 'ocean 
utilisation' that differentiate each zone. Accordingly, only those elements of the 'factual 
matrix' that are subsumable in the zonal regime are 'weighable considerations', which thus 
relate either to the basis of entitlement, or to the regime of exclusiveness522. 
Besides the decision as to which considerations are relevant, it is crucial to decide 
how they are to be considered. Whilst it is true that maritime delimitation appears to rely on 
a multiple-factor analysis, it is also true that the process in question must be subject to the 
canons of juridical reasoning and argumentation. This proposition is another cornerstone of 
the argument advanced here. Bridging the gap between appraisals of the relevant facts and 
the choice of boundary-line has sometimes been seen as the Achilles heel of the legal 
determination of maritime boundaries. This study suggests that the contribution of each 
consideration to the equitable solution ought to be laid down with as much detail as 
possible. How that should be undertaken is the question that the present part has attempted 
to illuminate, while seeking to justify the proposal put forward. 
There is one crucial point to make with respect to the notion of unicum. The realm 
in which maritime delimitation law evolves does not appear to be in any essential way 
different from that in which other fields of law evolve523. It is true that equity is central 
thereto. But it is also central for other fields of law. It is also true that in order to reach an 
equitable solution, flexibility is required. Again, however, this is a consideration with other 
legal fields. Hence, there seems to be no reason for delving into the challenges posed by 
maritime delimitation in unique terms. The obligation to achieve an equitable solution ought 
to be interpreted by reference to the applicable normative framework. While justifiably 
leaving room for discretion such a framework does not, however, open the door to 
arbitrariness. Whether relating to the facts to weigh-up, or to the technical methods whereby 
(522) Para.7.2.c) supra. 
(523) As observed above, strictly speaking, delimitation law applies only when maritime delimitation is effected by adjudication (cf. 
para.6.1 .b)(i) supra). The delimitation process mentioned here is thus an adjudicative process. 
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boundary-lines are defined, choices made by courts ought to be justified and reasoned 
legally. Speaking of 'freedom of choice' is an overstatement - for that would contradict the 
very nature of judicial decision-making. 
The real question is the degree of discretion conferred upon court - the second key 
issue around which these conclusions revolve. Far from challenging the prevailing view that 
'subjectivity' is part of maritime delimitation, this study argues that 'subjectivity' is in fact 
inevitable524. Inasmuch as Law cannot close the door completely to 'subjective' ingredients, 
courts will always have some measure of discretion at their disposal. Subsumptive models 
of legal decision-making are long obsolete. Judges often rely, perhaps always, upon legally 
reasoned 'value-judgments', which Alexy defined as "either the actual giving of preference, 
or the judgment that a particular alternative is a better one, or the rule of preference 
underlying this judgment"525. They are indubitably central to judicial decision-making, both 
for finding the decision, and for reasoning it. A shift of emphasis is thus crucial. The 
subject of discussion ought to be judicial discretion, particularly how it is to be exercised. 
Difficulties surrounding the exercise of judicial discretion are especially acute, and 
acquire great relevance, in maritime delimitation law. International law is, i f compared to 
domestic law, a corpus juris with relatively low normative density. Further, the normativity 
in maritime delimitation flows from general principles. These normative standards have a 
normative density lower than rules stricto sensu. This means that the sphere of discretion is 
increased. Finally, there is the question of 'filling' the notion of equity, which is cardinal to 
maritime delimitation. In judicial decision-making, the possibility to reason by reference to 
equity necessarily entails that a court's discretionary stronghold is wider526. 
The tangible outcome of maritime delimitation is a line. Since the process under 
appraisal is an adjudicative process, and since predictability is a requirement (and indeed an 
aspect) of Law, it would seem at first glance that its outcome - the boundary-line - ought to 
be predictable. But in reality, what must be predictable are the procedural steps and choices 
on which the 'discovery' of the line is predicated. To steer discretion away from 
arbitrariness, the process must therefore be rationalised as to both the range and scope of the 
pertinent considerations, and the procedures whereby such considerations are weighed-up. 
From this standpoint, the rationalisation of the delimitation problem in respect of 
juridical reasoning and argumentation becomes a focal point. On the range of pertinent 
factual elements, it was already concluded that the delimitation process must weigh-up only 
the elements upon which the 'legal matrix' (i.e. the zonal regime) confers relevance. The 
(524) Para.7.3.c) supra. 
(525) Alexy/1989, p.6, fh.20. 
(526) Para.6.4.a)(iii) supra. 
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question of the scope of these elements pertains to the fourth of the key issues mentioned 
above. At this juncture, these conclusions will focus on the proposal advanced in this study 
as regards the procedures whereby the weighing-up of considerations is to be undertaken. 
Amongst the questions that have to be answered, one deserves particular attention. Since the 
discussion relates primarily to the exercise of judicial discretion, how are the delimitation 
factors translated into a specific adjustment? Or put differently, how is the reasonableness 
of the distance of the boundary from the coastline of each state to be gauged? Quite clearly, 
it is in relation to this stage of the process that case law has been openly criticised - for its 
failure to clarify the link between the pertinent circumstances and the course of the line. 
This study subscribes to a fundamental point made in the Tunisia/Libya case: "no 
rigid rules exist as to the exact weight to be attached to each element in [each] case"; "what 
is reasonable and equitable in any given case must depend on its particular 
circumstances"527. Having said this, one would argue that what matters is not so much the 
specific impact of a factual element, as the way in which such an impact is gauged and 
justified. For that is the central cornerstone of reasoning discourse. 
Courts' decisions ought to be predicated not only on assessments of the contribution 
of each factor, but also on the intertwined and relativised relationship between all factors, as 
far as their impact is concerned. Bearing this in mind, this study has attempted to draw a 
parallel between the multiple-factor approach that characterises maritime delimitation, and 
multicriteria decision-making. The aim was to implement a process tailored to objectify and 
structure decision-making through methodical relational information-processing, whilst 
furthering problem-perception in its entirety. Founded on theories of decision-making, this 
approach seeks to rationalise the questions faced by judges. Conceptually, the validity of 
this usage of decision-making theory is based upon four arguments. First, it deals with 
multi-factor decision-making. Secondly, by deconstructing the problem into smaller parts, it 
provides clearer problem-definition, and it facilitates the resolution of the issues raised by 
each specific delimitation factor. Thirdly, it improves problem-perception and reasoning 
discourse, and thus, better judgment. Fourthly, it enables criteria selection and evaluation by 
reference to the circumstances in concrete52*. 
The 'weighing-up process' designed here endeavours to support reasoned choices -
by formulating criteria relevant for choosing a line by recourse to assessments which regard 
the legal and factual 'matrices', and which are judged relevant in a given instance by the 
(527) ICJ/Reports/1982, p.60, paras.71-72. 
(528) Paras.7.3.b), 7.4.8) supra. 
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decision-maker. Ultimately, this 'decision-model' appears to allow better, more structured 
justification discourse, which strengthens the 'case-norm' derived therefrom. 
Under this approach, delimitation factors were redefined as a condition to fulfil, or 
an objective to attain. Their contents stem from assessments undertaken, in the light of the 
normative framework, as to relevant factual elements. These factors are thus at the heart of 
the choice of line, which is to be effected by recourse to a 'decision-matrix' constructed on 
the basis thereof. The formulation of conditions or objectives, as delimitation factors, stems 
from the normative framework, that is, from the optimisation of the principles of maritime 
zoning and of equity, which entails their realisation to the highest degree possible, account 
taken of the factual and the legal possibilities in concreto. The finding of the 'case-norm' is 
therefore predicated on the said 'decision-matrix'. Thus, there can be no question of 
freedom of choice as to either the pertinent facts, or the line to adopt as boundary. 
A final, and significant, point on the conceptual nature of delimitation factors must 
be made. Insofar as they result from the exercise of a judicial discretion which assesses the 
pertinent elements of the 'factual matrix' with a view to concretising the optimisation in 
casu of the principles of maritime zoning and of equity, they amount to legally reasoned 
'value-judgments'. To forge these 'value-judgments', courts ought to look into the body of 
case law and state practice. This means that adjustments to the equidistance-line are to be 
derived from comparative legal analysis with the relevant 'yardsticks' found in case law 
and state practice. The so-called 'freedom of choice' as regards the relevant circumstances 
and the delimitation methods is, from this standpoint, no more than the discretion inherent 
in the derivation of juridically relevant analogies. The average 'distance ratio' of a line 
previously used as boundary may provide guidance as to the amount of adjustment required 
to reach a non-inequitable line. And at the level of objectification, it must equally be noted 
that the 'value-judgments' that lead to the 'case-norm', i.e. the delimitation factors used as 
'adjusters' of the provisional line, become susceptible to detailed scrutiny. Discussion as to 
their validity in concreto will therefore contribute to refinements in the law. The debate is 
thus transferred to the identification of the aspects of 'typification' on the basis of which to 
elicit relevant analogies, as well as their scope. 
It is important to comprehend that there is no fundamental departure from legal 
theory here. Legal thought has a 'dual-flow': downwards from normative standards to the 
facts of each case; upwards from the individualisation of cases back to normativity. The 
measure of discretion allowed to courts depends thus on the density of the 'yardsticks'. The 
larger the body of practice, the less scope there will be for discretion. The slow accretion of 
a collection of a series of individual applications of these principles is essential to furthering 
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certainty, without abdicating of justice. A word of caution is nevertheless required. When 
resorting to 'yardsticks' found in state practice, the distinct nature of the 'negotiation 
process' and of the 'adjudication process' must be duly taken into account. 
A fourth, not inconsiderable issue concerns the significance of the 'factual matrix' 
for this process, and the need to discuss the more relevant of the factual elements germane 
for the 'weighing-up process'. It should be emphasised that the facts enumerated, which 
appear divided in two main groups - those relating to the basis of entitlement and those 
related to the regime of exclusiveness, do not form an exhaustive list 5 2 9. No such list can be 
produced. As long as a specific fact interweaves with the basis of entitlement or with a 
regime of exclusiveness in such a way as to bear upon the maritime rights and interests of 
states, or upon the exercise or enjoyment thereof, it is susceptible to becoming relevant for 
the delimitation process. 
When examining these factual elements, this work has endeavoured to place them in 
a perspective compatible with the conceptualisation adopted. How the relevance of each 
fact is appraised cannot be isolated from how the fact is perceived. Further, inasmuch as the 
approach proposed relies heavily upon case law and state practice, and inasmuch as the 
formulation of delimitation factors resorts to them as 'yardsticks', this appears to be a 
conceptual prerequisite. 
The notion of representativeness of the coastal relationship is intimately related to 
the argument that the equidistance-line is to be utilised as the obligatory starting point for 
maritime delimitation. Its relevance to assessments of the effect of prominent coastal 
features and of islands, as well as on the derivation and use of coastal facades is crucial. 
Another central idea is related to proportionality. The ex post facto test seems unjustified. 
Overriding the outcome of the multiple-factor appraisal on the basis thereof would confer 
on proportionality an absolute primacy, whilst dispossessing the former of its significance 
in the delimitation process. I f conversely, the assumption is that no adjustments should be 
made a posteriori to the multi-factor appraisal that would render the test meaningless. This 
remains the paradox to which no proper answer has yet been given. One would submit that 
coastal length disparity, or its non-existence, ought to be factored into the 'decision-matrix' 
on the same terms as other facts, and side-by-side therewith530. Proportionality thus should 
be regarded as one factor in the multi-factor analysis. Proportionality is to be intrinsic, 
(529) Paras.8.2., 8.3. supra. 
(530) Notwithstanding this, should ex post facto proportionality assessments be undertaken, one would endorse the recourse to the 
concept of 'grossness factor' as a means for objectifying the identification of manifestly unreasonable situations. Further, 
emphasis should be put on the overlapping of entitlements (rather than on the overlapping of claims), and the notion of relevant 
area should be cautiously used. 
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not extrinsic, thereto. One final point deserves attention. Reasonableness of the boundary, 
whilst bearing in mind the circumstances in casu, also depends upon its relevance for the 
regime of exclusiveness to which the boundary applies. The relevance of a fact must be 
assessed in view of the zone-delimitation at issue. Whereas reasonableness in territorial sea 
delimitation cannot overlook state security and defence, thus elevating proximity to a key 
concern, in EEZ and continental shelf delimitation reasonableness revolves mainly around 
natural resources, thus focusing on access thereto. That surfaces from the exclusiveness 
regimes, and is also clear in the historical development of each of these zones. 
Apart from these factual elements, attention should be drawn to what were named 
here "complementary delimitation elements". Comprised in this notion are various issues, 
of a hybrid nature, that result from an intertwining of factual and juridical elements, and 
without which the 'delimitation picture' could be incomplete. For example, the delimitation 
area is neither legally defined, nor a strict factual element. It amounts to a legal decision on 
the geographical context of the delimitation problem, which thus is paramount for assessing 
the scope to redress inequities, and for determining the 'factual possibilities' in relation to 
which the principle of equity should be applied. Another example relates to the single 
maritime boundary issue. What are the legal requirements in this regard? What is at issue is 
not a fact. Nor is it strictly a legal problem. But it suffices to say that not having coincident 
boundaries might result from the impact of a specific factual element. The question of 
continental shelf entitlements beyond 200 M is another element included here. Whatever the 
assessments made as to natural prolongation, they should not to be set apart from the 
legal-conceptual understanding of maritime delimitation. 
As it was recognised that delimitation is primarily a practical exercise, which the 
theoretical aspects enshrined in a conceptualisation might risk obfuscating, a test study was 
undertaken with a view to validate the proposed conceptualisation. This is the fifth point of 
analysis in these conclusions. 
The investigation of the maritime delimitation between Australia and East Timor is 
to be viewed in a functional perspective. It cannot be overemphasised that it entails no 
attempt to argue either that this delimitation case should be resolved by recourse to 
adjudication or that the boundary-lines arrived at are the only equitable solution. This case 
study was carried out with the sole purpose of illustrating the practical application of the 
conceptualisation offered for consideration. One of the reasons behind the choice of this 
case was the challenging complexity of its 'factual matrix', and the variety of problems 
posed thereby, which cover a wide range of issues that might arise in maritime delimitation. 
In carrying out such an investigation, it became possible to exemplify how the analysis of 
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multifarious factual elements in maritime delimitation could be undertaken. On another 
level, its idiosyncratic 'factual matrix' was decisive in corroborating the proposition that 
notwithstanding the uniqueness of each setting, maritime delimitation can be approached in 
general terms. It is also significant that this test study confirms the argument that the 'gap' 
between the identification of relevant considerations and the choice of a boundary-line may 
be bridged to a greater extent than is currently typical. By the same token, it lends weight to 
the proposition that state practice may provide valid 'yardsticks' in the quest for an 
equitable line, as long as it is resorted to with the required caution. With respect specifically 
to the decision-making process, this test case suggests other conclusions. The resort to a 
'decision-matrix' (which does not necessarily have to be formalised in the decision) as a 
means to structure the information-analysis appears to provide a better basis for reasoning 
discourse, thus allowing better justification of the choices that are made in the delimitation 
process. In particular, the formulation of delimitation factors - emerging as conditions to 
fulfil or objectives to attain - through legally reasoned 'value-judgments' covering partial 
aspects of the delimitation problem, offers a sounder basis for justifying the choice of one 
line, as opposed to any other line, within the range of possible equitable solutions. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
Sitting at a crossroads between politics, law and technical knowledge, maritime 
delimitation is a multi-faceted subject. Having discussed and problematised a number of its 
aspects, this work has advanced propositions which contribute to further conceptualisation. 
The focus of attention was the legal determination and technical definition of boundaries. 
Broadly speaking, whilst attempting to conceptualise the concept of maritime delimitation, 
this study argued that debate about normative standards cannot be isolated from associated 
technical issues. Insofar as the practical implementation of maritime boundary delimitations 
depends thereon, from an epistemological standpoint that is an inevitable consequence. 
As an academic endeavour, by nature analytical and investigative, this study has 
inter alia attempted to answer questions posed at the very outset. The thoughts now offered 
for consideration result from what ultimately turned into a quest for a conceptualisation 
capable of reconciling conventional and customary law, case law and state practice. At the 
end thereof, these influences have converged on two planes. First, maritime delimitation 
revolves around an obligation of result: achieving a non-inequitable solution. Secondly, the 
equidistance-special circumstances formula appears to be central to the 'finding' of that 
solution, and to be applicable mutatis mutandis to the delimitation of all maritime zones. 
How these propositions are to be understood legally and conceptually is the cynosure of 
these conclusions. 
In the realm of maritime delimitation law, there seems to be an uncontested acquis, 
endorsed explicitly in recent case law: maritime delimitation is required where the maritime 
entitlements of two or more states overlap. Put differently, the overlapping of entitlements 
is the object matter with which maritime delimitation is concerned. A more difficult point is 
the understanding of the overlapping of entitlements, in particular its significance for the 
delimitation problem. This study has argued that maritime entitlements are sub conditione 
entitlements. Their enjoyment is subject to the non-existence of competing entitlements 
over the same area or part thereof. Should an overlapping of entitlements exist, what is at 
issue is a situation of concurrence of rights. Maritime delimitation is intended to address 
cases in which (at least) two states simultaneously hold equally valid, competing rights over 
a certain maritime area. Inexorably, this entails the 'amputation' of (at least) one of the 
concurrent entitlements, regardless of how that 'amputation' is weighed-up. 
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This implication emerges as a crucial political problem, to which a certain level of 
dispute seems inescapably bound. In seeking solutions, states are bound by a paramount 
legal obligation: that of Article 33(1) of the UN Charter, the resort to peaceful means of 
dispute settlement. And it must be noted that all means are equally valid. The proposition 
that, in maritime delimitation, negotiation has precedence over the other dispute settlement 
mechanisms should be quashed. It is not required under general international law, nor is it 
prescribed in Articles 15, 74(1) and 83(1) of the LOSC. It has been strongly argued that the 
reference to agreement in conventional law and case law amounts to no more than the 
rejection of the possibility to effect 'unilateral delimitations'. However, this tenet falls well 
short of prejudicing the prerogative of states to opt for whatever peaceful means best suit 
their interests. Furthermore, as the timing of negotiation might bear decisively on the 
outcome thereof, the decision as to when to negotiate should remain within the sphere of 
freedom of states. It is especially so as regards boundaries, for prima facie they have an ad 
eternum nature, and relate to a key aspect of states: territory. 
The fact that negotiation is by far the most used means in maritime delimitation is 
revealing on a different level. States are averse to renouncing control over the outcome of 
delimitation. It is this very renunciation which is the hallmark of adjudication. 
Whether a boundary is delimited by negotiation, or by adjudication, is significant in 
other respects. Negotiated boundaries result from a process characterised by trade-off, in 
which elements completely unrelated to the boundary might be weighed-up, and in fact be 
decisive. Within this process, states are endowed with a freedom that is restricted, i f not 
exclusively, essentially by jus cogens (which encompasses no rules specific to maritime 
delimitation). It must be reiterated at this juncture that, as stated at the outset, delimitation 
proprio sensu is a problem posed only where no boundary has yet been established, either 
formally or tacitly. The fact that states are endowed with such a wide freedom explains the 
difficulty in asserting, on the basis of bilateral state practice, the existence of an opinio 
juris. Indeed, insofar as an opinio juris is supposed to reveal a rule stricto sensu - i.e. a 
'definitive ought' as regards how the course of the boundary is determined, no such opinio 
juris has emerged hitherto. In contradistinction with negotiation, adjudication is a process 
whereby a solution must be reached, and more importantly justified, by reference to 
normative parameters. Judicial decision-makers have no freedom of choice in relation to 
either the boundary-line, or the considerations to be weighed-up. The sphere of discretion 
conferred on courts must be understood differently. 
To elaborate upon this problem, one must first pause to answer a key question. 
What are the normative standards by which judicial decisions must abide? Here, one must 
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return to the point from which the ILC started. As Chapter 3 shows, the work of the ILC 
amounted to the progressive development of normative standards. By 1949, no such 
standards existed; or at least they were quite incipient or embryonic. At the juridical level, 
the difficulties were such that the ILC felt compelled to seek advice from geographers, 
those who had until then most closely examined maritime delimitation issues. In fact, the 
consultation with the Committee of Experts, while justified by the need for advice on 
technical issues, is also evidence of the incipient or embryonic stage of the law. The 
thorough study then conducted, in which political, legal and technical issues were duly 
taken into account, resulted in the equidistance-special circumstances formula, devised to 
apply to both territorial sea and continental shelf delimitations. Significantly, owing to the 
equity-related concerns raised during the ILC's debates, which were also explicitly 
mentioned by the Committee of Experts, it was noted in the comments to the draft articles 
that this formula was to partake of flexibility. No substantive changes to this understanding 
were instituted by the 1958 Conference. 
The revival in the North Sea cases of the notion of equitable principles used in the 
Truman Proclamation is striking. First, this notion was mentioned during the ILC work, and 
it was concluded that neither was it part of customary law, nor was it suitable as a 
normative standard. Secondly, taking into consideration post-1958 state practice, it is 
difficult to understand how equitable principles could have become customary law in the 
1958-1969 period. This study has argued that the Court used a double standard threshold in 
relation to the appraisal of state practice supporting the equidistance-special circumstances 
formula, and that supporting equitable principles. In no part does the Judgment show the 
existence of a settled, extensive and uniform state practice applying equitable principles. 
Thirdly, it is important not to overlook the fact that the concept of equitable principles was 
viewed, by those who first resorted thereto, as a concept broadly based on equidistance. 
This is shown in the work of Boggs, who was a member of the Committee of Experts. 
Finally, from the standpoint of the development of international law, it is well recognised 
that the work of courts is irreplaceable - this should have been a cardinal consideration. 
Having posited that equity was at the heart of maritime delimitation, the Court could easily 
have justified the use of the equidistance-special circumstances rule. And by interpreting it 
in a way that would allow the departure from equidistance to favour Germany, it would 
have furthered the development of international law. The teleological substratum of the 
notion of special circumstances (ensuring that the boundary would not be manifestly 
inequitable) offered enough room for discretion. As it stands, the reasoning discourse seems 
flawed at two key points: the idea that recourse to 'equitable principles' (whose contents 
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remained unexplained) was part of customary law; and the assertion that natural 
prolongation (a crudely defined concept) was a normative standard in continental shelf 
delimitation (when it was in effect an entitlement criterion). 
That an equity-oriented interpretation of the equidistance-special circumstances rule 
would satisfy the demands for reasonableness, particularly as to avoiding inequitable effects 
of geographical features, became clear with the 1977 Anglo/French arbitration. This award 
would be elevated, more than 15 years later (with the Jan Mayen case), to a cornerstone of 
the contemporary interpretation of maritime delimitation law. Its contribution extends well 
beyond the demonstration that the equidistance-special circumstances formula was a legally 
sound basis for 'finding' reasonable boundary-lines (to delimit those areas not covered by 
the parties' agreement, which the Tribunal homologated). Whilst asserting that it did not 
have carte blanche in the search for the boundary-lines, the Tribunal justified its decision 
within its sphere of discretion by reference to state practice. As it emphasised, rather than 
having recourse to a totally different approach, state practice showed a preference for 
variants of equidistance. The enclaving solution in the Channel Islands, and the half-effect 
solution in the Scilly Isles, stem from this approach. Regretfully, this award came too late to 
override the effect of the North Sea Judgment. 
The debates in the Third Conference, which were already taking place by the time 
this arbitration was decided, were dominated by a 'radicalisation' of viewpoints as regards 
the normative standards of delimitation. Besides often being tainted by concerns related to 
specific maritime boundary disputes, they were clearly buttressed by the misperception that 
two opposing and irreconcilable interpretations of normative standards were at issue. This 
explains the creation of the two negotiating groups - one supporting equitable principles, 
another supporting equidistance - and should be taken as a significant contextual point that 
shapes the interpretation of the delimitation provisions of the LOSC. 
What conclusions can then be reached in relation to these provisions? As regards 
Article 15 (territorial sea), two points may explain why the use of the equidistance-special 
circumstances rule was not strongly opposed. Near the coast, the potential inequitable effect 
of equidistance is in practical terms negligible. Because this was explicitly asserted in the 
North Sea cases, and because this Judgment seemed to be a vade mecum for the members of 
the Equitable Principles Group, the 'discrediting' of the combined rule seems not to have 
extended to territorial sea delimitation. With respect to Articles 74(1) and 83(1), which deal 
with EEZ and continental shelf delimitation, the agreement was reached virtually at the end 
of the Third Conference. Chapter 5 leaves no doubt as to the outcome of the doctrinal 
quarrel. Neither negotiating group prevailed. Those provisions incorporated what the two 
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groups had in common. Substantively, they lay down an obligation of result: to achieve an 
equitable solution. No specific normative standard was adopted to govern how that solution 
is to be attained. Put differently, no obligation of means was consecrated. Indeed, the renvoi 
to international law provides no practical guidance. 
One must thus adhere to the view that the normative content of Articles 74(1) and 
83(1), with respect to the course of the boundary-line, is confined to an obligation of result. 
And this obligation of result reflects, as observed in the Jan Mayen case, the requirements 
of customary law as to the delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZs. Suffice it to say 
that the views of both negotiating groups converged on this matter. The outstanding issue 
concerned the means whereby the course of the boundary was to be 'found'. Subject of 
lengthy debates in the Third Conference, this issue remained unresolved in the LOSC. 
Despite the different phraseology used in Article 15 and in Articles 74(1) and 83(1), 
therefore, it must not be unquestioningly assumed that they consecrate opposing, or even 
different, substantive normative standards. 
Through a comparative analysis another proposition may be advanced. The mention 
of decisions "on the basis of equity and in the light of all relevant circumstances" made in 
Article 59 - and similarly in Articles 69(1) and 70(1) - does not appear in Articles 74(1) 
and 83(1). Because legis quo volet dixit, quod non volet tacet, one conclusion is possible. 
Maritime delimitation is to be effected by means (on a basis) other than equity alone; which 
signifies that reaching an equitable solution is not tantamount simply to applying equity. 
Otherwise the LOSC would have utilised the phraseology of the former articles. 
What the renvoi to international law means is to clarify that the 'discovery' of the 
boundary-line is governed by a normativity laid down outside the LOSC. This normativity 
is to be identified in other sources of international law, in particular treaties, custom, and 
general principles of law. Various questions thereby arise. One concerns the application of 
successive treaties. How do the LOSC and the Geneva Conventions relate in this respect? 
Because the LOSC incorporates no general clause of supersession, and because resort to the 
equidistance-special circumstances formula is not contradictory with achieving an equitable 
solution, it is suggested that Article 83(1) of the LOSC and Article 6 of the CS Convention 
may be applied conjointly. Weight is lent to this proposition by recent case law, which has 
delimited 'equitable maritime boundaries' by applying the combined equidistance-special 
circumstances rule. 
Another point concerns those cases in which either one of the disputants is not party 
to the CS Convention, or the issue refers to an EEZ, a fisheries zone, or a single maritime 
boundary. Insofar as there is no applicable treaty law, one would have to turn to customary 
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law. The mainstream view affirms that customary law requires that delimitation be effected 
in accordance with equitable principles, taking account of all relevant circumstances. With 
all due respect, one ought to disagree. This research has verified that there is no settled, 
extensive and virtually uniform practice of application of 'equitable principles' - either 
before or after the North Sea cases. There can be therefore no question of existence of an 
opinio juris. Having said this, it must be emphasised that this does not amount to an 
argument that reaching an equitable solution is not part of customary law. Two different 
issues ought to be distinguished. 
No argument can be raised against the idea that achieving an equitable solution is 
part of customary law on EEZ and continental shelf delimitation. This view encounters no 
reservations amongst states, as was shown during the Third Conference, and is patent in 
bilateral state practice. However, this concerns the result of the delimitation. The argument 
advanced here is that no opinio juris has emerged in relation to the means applicable to 
attain equitable solutions. The cleavage that arose in the Third Conference is irrefutable 
evidence in that respect. I f further evidence were required, one only needs look to state 
practice, which overwhelmingly resorts to equidistance, or variants thereof. This hampers 
the emergence of a settled, extensive and uniform practice on the basis of which to found 
the argument that equitable principles are part of customary law. 
Should it then be concluded that there are no applicable normative standards? To 
answer this question, several points must be considered. First, the vast majority of maritime 
boundaries are to some extent equidistance-related; equidistance appears the starting point 
for delimitation. This has been noticeable in state practice, and it has been an increasing 
trend in case law. Secondly, it is undoubted that inequitable boundaries are to be avoided. 
The logical corollary is that a certain measure of flexibility - designed to avoid manifest 
hardship - is inherent in the determination of maritime boundaries. Thirdly, it must be 
emphasised that certainty is a vital constituent of normativity. Flexibility can never result in 
the obliteration of certainty. Otherwise one could not properly speak of Law. 
The question for review - which led to this consideration of the normative standards 
of delimitation - it should be recalled, was concerned with the proper understanding of the 
sphere of discretion conferred on courts. From a theoretical standpoint, this issue is 
intertwined with the three vectors enumerated above: the recourse to equidistance, and its 
debated normativity; the role of equity, and the requirement of flexibility; and the fact that a 
certain level of certainty is inherent in normativity. The route taken in this study revolves 
around the concept of principle of law (an 'ideal ought'), which is to be distinguished from 
that of rule stricto sensu (a 'definite ought'). 
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The proposition submitted may be summarised as follows. The normative standards 
with which the 'discovery' of equitable boundaries is to be underpinned are two principles 
of law: the principle of maritime zoning, of which 'closer proximity' is a corollary; and the 
principle of equity. In a concrete case, the boundary is to be determined on the basis of a 
'case-norm' that stems from the optimisation of these standards in concreto. The discretion 
of courts as to the choice of line does not amount to freedom of choice because, ultimately, 
that choice is to be made through an argument of principle whereby the factual 
circumstances in casu are weighed-up in the optimisation of the said two principles. 
The principle of maritime zoning refers to the spatial allocation of jurisdiction in the 
public order of the oceans, and reflects the conduct of coastal states towards maritime areas 
off their coasts and adjacent thereto. Proximity, which has always been linked to this 
'allocation' of maritime jurisdiction, is today the primary basis for maritime entitlements. 
Exclusiveness areas (to which correspond a prevalence of the rights and interests of coastal 
states) are distinguished from inclusiveness areas (where the rights and interests of all other 
states are prevalent) primarily by means of geographical proximity. Maritime delimitation is 
a derivative of maritime zoning. It appears as a question of competing rights and interests of 
two (or more) states over the same area. Analogically, it is only logical that 'closer 
proximity' (a corollary of the primacy of proximity in maritime zoning), becomes a key 
reference point for resolving the issue. The legal notion of equidistance (as distinct from the 
technical method) thus appears a normative standard, which prescribes that all points at sea 
positioned in the area of overlapping entitlements which are closer to state A than to state B 
ought prima facie to be subject to the sovereignty or jurisdiction of state A. 
With respect to the principle of equity, it is important to realise that it stems from a 
concept - equity - that is by nature 'indefinable'. Especially in international law, its precise 
definition remains elusive. Equity, one would argue, is the alter ego of justice, its workable 
expression. Often described as 'a sense of justice' that can only be materialised in concrete 
cases, equity may nevertheless appear as a normative veil, i f a distinction is made between 
individual equity and normative equity. Authority for this view may be detected in case law, 
in conventional instruments, and in academic writings. Indeed, the normative refinement of 
equity in maritime delimitation is irrefutable. Its 'ideal ought' is the rejection of manifest 
inequity. It prescribes that, considering those factors which, in casu and according to the 
substantive legal regime of the maritime zones to be delimited, might bear on the rights and 
interests of states with overlapping entitlements, the boundary delimited between two states 
must not be unreasonable (i.e. manifest hardship is to be avoided). More than ensuring 
'positive equity' (as an expression of distributive justice), the focal point is avoiding gross 
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unreasonableness. Besides the obligation of result consecrated in both conventional law and 
customary law, in terms of means this principle entails a certain discretionary power as to 
the choice of boundary-line, and the corresponding assessment of pertinent facts. 
Principles are however unsuitable for providing concrete answers to concrete cases. 
As 'ideal oughts', they offer broad normative guidance. It is only when the 'factual matrix' 
in casu is considered that their contents are moulded. When two principles are applicable, 
none being superior, this signifies that they have to be optimised. The impact of each of 
them is to be maximised by reference to their relative relevance in the light of the factual 
circumstances. Such an optimisation is to be prosecuted via the three vectors of the maxim 
of proportionality: appropriateness, adequacy, and proportionality stricto sensu. It is 
through this process that the 'case-norm' is 'found'. In maritime delimitation, the 
optimisation of the two principles is tantamount to a quest for a non-inequitable boundary -
the obligation of result - on a sliding scale orientated along two axes representing the two 
principles. Where equidistance yields a reasonable boundary, little or no adjustment is 
required. The principle of maritime zoning is dominant. Where the reasonableness of 
equidistance decreases the adjustment required to reach a non-inequitable boundary 
increases. The emphasis then shifts to the principle of equity. 
From a conceptual standpoint, this proposition seems to explain better than any 
other the normative aspects of maritime delimitation. To begin with, it offers a conceptual 
framework that explains why the equidistance-special circumstances formula was adopted 
by ILC, why it reflects state practice, and why it is consonant with the recent reasoning 
utilised by courts to adjudicate boundaries. Building on the Anglo/French arbitration, the 
Jan Mayen Judgment affirmed that, in the equidistance-special circumstances formula, the 
use of equidistance is subject to the absence of special circumstances (which might justify a 
different line). And it noted that, where these circumstances existed, state practice has opted 
for solutions based on modifications or variants of equidistance. Further, the Court 
emphasised the inevitable tendency towards the assimilation of the concepts of 'special 
circumstances' and of 'relevant circumstances', in the sense that they both envisage the 
achievement of an equitable result. The sliding scale mentioned above reflects the three 
points made by the Court: (1) equidistance is the starting point; (2) departure therefrom is to 
take place only in the presence of special circumstances (i.e. where the line is manifestly 
inequitable in the light of relevant facts); (3) the equitable boundary is to be achieved 
primarily by modifying or varying equidistance. Significantly, this is the understanding of 
the combined formula that the ILC had. Geography (maritime zoning) is to be balanced-up 
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with justice (equity) on the basis of a rule whereby equidistance is tempered by an 'escape 
clause' inspired in considerations of reasonableness. 
This proposition also explains the converse problem. I f in the light of pertinent facts 
equidistance yields an extremely unreasonable boundary, the principle of equity becomes so 
dominant that the boundary adopted is only remotely related to equidistance. 
The distinction between, on the one hand, EEZ and continental shelf delimitations 
and, on the other hand, territorial sea delimitations is another point that deserves attention. 
One would argue that there is no difference as regards the applicable normative standards. 
What changes is the zonal regime to be considered. Whereas the EEZ and the continental 
shelf zonal regimes emphasise primarily natural resources, in respect of the territorial sea 
the relevance of security lato sensu is crucial. As the references differ, 'reasonableness of 
the boundary' appears under a distinct light. The applicable normativity however, remains 
unchanged. Apparently subscribing to this approach, the Qatar/Bahrain Judgment describes 
the operation of the equidistance-special circumstances rule in territorial sea delimitation by 
resorting to the reasoning of the Jan Mayen Judgment, which refers to continental shelf and 
fisheries zone delimitation. 
Discretion (thus flexibility) is an unavoidable ingredient of maritime delimitation. 
How is that to be understood in judicial decision-making? Or from another viewpoint, how 
is the 'gap' between legal reasoning and choice of line better bridged? Out of this work 
emerges a conceptually coherent answer to this problem, one that steers the flexibility 
required to achieve a reasonable solution away from the perspective of 'freedom of choice 
of line'. By postulating that the crux is 'optimisation of principles', the 'case-norm' on the 
basis of which the line is 'found' appears as the result of legally relevant 'value-judgments' 
whereby pertinent facts are weighed-up in the light of two integrated normative standards. 
On the legal-philosophical level, it might be argued that judges have in fact an interstitial 
law-making power designed to f i l l gaps in the legal system, and that discretion often relates 
to such gaps. However, it might also be contended that legal systems as such have no gaps, 
that judges have no law-making power, and that case-rulings must be arrived at through the 
'wider' normative framework - which encompasses broad principles enshrined (though not 
explicitly stated) in positive law. It is the latter view that this study endorses. Although this 
might have no practical relevance on the outcome of cases, it is doubtless that it wil l shape 
the way in which reasoning discourse is structured. 
The 'weighing-up process', the process whereby the 'factual matrix' in concreto 
is appraised by reference to the principles of maritime zoning and of equity, is a realm 
in which normativity intertwines with the discretion conferred upon courts - to such an 
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extent that the two become virtually indistinguishable. One line must however not be 
crossed. In maritime boundary adjudication, there is no such thing as a freedom of choice 
of relevant circumstances, and applicable methods. No doubt, courts are endowed with a 
sphere of discretion in both the assessment of the factual circumstances, and the choice of 
boundary-line. However, as the Anglo/French award notes, they do not have carte blanche. 
Each and every decision-making step ought to be legally reasoned and justified. Hence, 
equity should be objectified by reference to previous case law, and to state practice (as 
opinio aequitatis of a quasi-normative nature). Prior delimitations should be central to the 
legally relevant 'value-judgments' from which the 'discovery' of a line is to stem. 
Premised on the idea that delimitation is a multi-factor analysis, and examining the 
theory of decision-making, it was argued that multicriteria decision-making be utilised as a 
tool to implement a process tailored to objectify and structure decision-making through 
methodical relational information-processing. With it, delimitation factors appear as 
conditions to fu l f i l , or objectives to attain. Each factor consists of an assessment of an 
element of the 'factual matrix', construed in terms of optimisation of the governing legal 
principles. Once all factors are formulated, they are included in the 'decision-matrix' of the 
case. By rationalising the problem, this decision-model supports reasoned choices through 
the formulation of factors which are deemed to be relevant by the judicial decision-maker in 
a given instance - account taken of the normative framework. 
The adjustments to apply to the provisional equidistance-line are to be 'discovered' 
through the 'decision-matrix'. The delimitation factors determine the specific adjustments, 
and thus concretise the notion of reasonableness of the boundary. Since the 'factual matrix' 
varies in each case, what is reasonable in a given instance also varies, meaning that the 
weight of each fact cannot be extrapolated easily. This could signify that courts are entitled 
to formulate and weigh-up each fact as they see fit. More likely, international law requires 
that the sphere of discretion of courts be interpreted restrictively. Bearing this in mind, the 
weight of each fact ought to be estimated through 'value-judgments' predicated on 
analogies between 'factual matrices', which are to use the solutions adopted in case law 
(preferentially) and in state practice (as opinio aequitatis) as 'yardsticks'. 
A further point concerns equitable principles, and their normativity. Case law and 
those who endorse the 'equitable principles doctrine' argue that these are the substantive 
normative standards applicable to maritime delimitation. The Gulf of Maine and the 
Libya/Malta cases enumerated some of these so-called principles: (i) the land dominates the 
sea; (ii) the equal division, in the absence of special circumstances, of the overlapping of 
entitlements; (iii) prevention of any cut-off of projections of the coast; (iv) drawing due 
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consequences from any inequalities in the extent of coasts into the delimitation area; 
(v) non-encroachment upon the maritime areas of another state; (vi) non-refashioning of 
geography; (vii) due respect to all relevant circumstances; (viii) equity does not necessarily 
imply equality; (ix) rejection of distributive justice. 
It is argued that these are not true normative standards. They are simply expressions 
of normativity reflecting specific points along the sliding scale mentioned. For instance, 
whereas 'the land dominates the sea' reflects a point to the left of the sliding scale, in which 
maritime zoning predominates, 'due respect to all relevant circumstances' appears more to 
the right, where equity prevails. Speaking of 'cut-off of projections', or of 'inequalities in 
the extension of the coast into the delimitation area', also entails an intrinsic reference-line: 
the equidistance-line - which is to be tempered with equity. Reasoning discourse and 
argumentation ought therefore not to rely on the notion of equitable principles. For one 
thing, they add nothing to the true 'normative portmanteau' constituted by the principles of 
maritime zoning and of equity. For another, to the extent that they entail the argument that 
equidistance is not the obligatory starting point for delimitation, they not only introduce 
uncertainty in the discourse, but also lack a conceptual and comprehensive explanation of 
recent jurisprudence and state practice. 
Finally, we turn, however briefly, to the issue of the technical aspects. To guarantee 
that the boundary-line is defined with technical accuracy, proficient expert advice must be 
obtained. Serious errors might occur should that not be the case, and lead to further dispute, 
as happened in the Anglo/French arbitration. Amongst all issues, one deserves particular 
attention. For conceptualisation purposes, it is essential to understand that the 
overwhelming majority of solutions adopted in case law and state practice are technically 
modifications or variants of equidistance. Even ad hoc solutions are in some measure often 
equidistance-related. And because whilst resorting to 'yardsticks' the technical 'foundation' 
of lines might need to be clarified, the work of technical experts can be crucial. Its role in 
the delimitation process should be viewed from two different angles: (a) while the 
decision-making process is underway; (b) after the course of the boundary is determined. 
During the decision-making process, the expert should provide technical information on a 
wide range of issues: possible solutions for the boundary-line; alternative choices as to, for 
example, the general direction of the coasts, coastal lengths, area divisions, partial-effects; 
technical difficulties that might surface; questions concerning the practical implementation 
of decisions. Once the decision is made, the technical expert is expected to 'implement' it, 
by translating the boundary determined into a technically accurate line, drawing attention i f 
necessary to possible misunderstandings (notably those related to 'technically polysemic 
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terminology', e.g. straight-line, parallel, half-effect). The key tenet is that the technical 
definition of the line defers to its political-legal determination, which can never be 
overstepped. 
The significance of technical information in maritime delimitation, and ultimately of 
technical experts, is illustrated in this study. Because it was argued that the discretion of 
courts was to be exercised by reference to relevant 'yardsticks' we were left with one 
problem. How to compare boundaries in terms of adjustment to equidistance? The route 
round this difficulty was premised on the equiratio method, from which the notion of 
average 'distance ratio' was derived. 
In short, since every point of a boundary is located at a certain distance from the 
nearest basepoints on the two coasts involved, one can refer to 'distance ratio' as the ratio 
between these two distances. Taking into account a number of points along the line (i.e. the 
line is to be 'sampled') it is possible to compute an average of the 'distance ratio' values on 
each of these points. For examples, because on an equidistance-line the distance to the 
nearest basepoints on each side is always the same, the 'distance ratio' on each point is 1.0, 
as is its average 'distance ratio'. Being equiratio-lines defined as a line where the 'distance 
ratio' is constant throughout, equidistance-lines are in effect a particular case thereof. What 
is significant is that the notion of average 'distance ratio' allows comparative assessments 
of the weight given to the nearest basepoints on each coast. To the figure 1.0 corresponds to 
an equal weight. I f a point on a boundary is at 100 M from state A, and 90 M from state B, 
the 'distance ratio' B/A is 0.9, which means that the weight given to the basepoint of state B 
is 90% of that given to state A's basepoint. A non-inequitable boundary may thus be 
objectified by analogies drawn with previous solutions on the basis of the notion of average 
'distance ratio'. The 'discovery' of the boundary is further reasoned by recourse to previous 
'validated precedents'. 
There is no such thing as a complete study. However comprehensive and thorough, 
it will always leave something unanswered, and it wi l l always leave scope for further and 
deeper investigation. This study is no exception. Further research is required, for example, 
to obtain a more comprehensive dataset on the use of the notion of average 'distance ratio' 
as means for objectifying equitableness. Were we to choose one ultimate thought, we would 
argue for the existence of one 'maritime delimitation rule'. Heretical as it may sound, one 
would submit that the normative framework of maritime delimitation is encapsulated in the 
equidistance-special circumstances rule. No sounder basis for balancing-up certainty and 
justice, and for achieving equilibrium between the rights and interests of those states whose 
maritime entitlements overlap, has yet been developed. 
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